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AFTER PRETORIA: THE GUERRILLA WAR.



• SUPPLEMENT • TO •
• WITH THE FLAG TO PRETORIA •



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AFTER PRETORIA : THE GUERILLA WAR



HIS MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY

EDWARD VII.

By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, KING;
Defender of the Faith; Emperor of India.

AFTER PRETORIA: THE GUERILLA WAR.

THE SUPPLEMENT TO

“With the Flag to Pretoria.”

BY H. W. WILSON.

WITH MANY ILLUSTRATIONS, MAINLY FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN AT
THE SEAT OF WAR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

(FORMING VOL. III. OF THE COMPLETE WORK.)

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ON TREK.

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AFTER PRETORIA: THE GUERILLA WAR.

BEING THE THIRD VOLUME OF

"WITH THE FLAG TO PRETORIA."



TASMANIAN BUSHMAN: J. H. BISDEE, V.C.



[After the large print published by the Autotype Company.]

LORD KITCHENER.

From the painting by A. S. Cope, A.R.A., for the Institute of Royal Engineers, Chatham.



CHRISTIAN DE WET AND SOME OF HIS STAFF.

From left to right: Commandant Nell's son; Jones, a scout who got into Potchefstroom three times while Lord Methuen occupied the town; Field-Cornet Colson; Field-Cornet Francis; De Wet's secretary; De Wet; Commandant Nell; Commandant Von Grahn.

AFTER PRETORIA: The Guerilla War.

CHAPTER I.

THE BETHLEHEM CAMPAIGN

War on humanitarian principles—Boers posing as peaceful citizens—De Wet at Bethlehem—British attacking columns—Boers attempt to capture a convoy—Cruel treatment of loyal Colonials—British enveloping movements—Grenfell's night march—Clements leaves Senekal for Lindley—Long-range work with the C.I.V. guns—The Bushmen rescue a gun—Paget's troops on short rations—Position of Bethlehem—Hill north of the town captured—Bethlehem taken—Sufferings of released prisoners—Boers repelled at Ficksburg—British cordon complete.



WHEN a whole people is fighting in deadly earnest for its independence, its resistance will always be difficult to overcome. For twenty years or more the Boers had regarded themselves as the ruling people in South Africa; they had learnt to despise the British for their supposed want of military capacity and for the pusillanimity of the British Government; nor can the events of the war be said to have changed their attitude of hatred and contempt. The population of the Boer republics had not been made to feel that the continuance of the struggle must bring upon it the most terrible hardships. "Hitherto," writes a correspondent in June 1900, "our enemy's idea of war has been that when he leaves his farm to fight against us, he can leave it to be protected and managed by his womenkind, who find with us a ready market at war or famine prices for all their farm produce, and when from inclination or circumstances the owner thinks it desirable to return, on taking the oath and giving up one of his rifles, he has been treated in practically all respects as a loyal subject of Her Majesty until such time as he thinks fit to rejoin his commando. This is a sort of game of 'heads they win, tails we lose,' which, so far as any chance of ending the war goes, may be continued indefinitely, and it is high time that it should be put an end to once for all." A few farms, no doubt, had been burnt here and there, where the inhabitants or owners had been guilty of acts of gross treachery. But generally the struggle had been carried on, upon the side of the British, with an excessive and mistaken humanity. Our tenderness to the enemy simply encouraged them to protract

War on humanitarian principles.



COMMANDANT OLIVIER.

Commandant Olivier is one of a large family of Orange Free State farmers, but he is the only one who has shown markedly anti-British proclivities, and who took any prominent part in the war. In conjunction with General De la Rey he controlled the railways in the Free State, and was thence promoted to the command of the Boer forces south of the Orange River. His capture was a very distinct blow to the enemy.

attacks upon trains and detachments. In these attacks the enemy derived a great advantage from the fact that the burghers wore no uniform. In civilised war emphasis is laid, and rightly laid, upon the adoption of a distinctive uniform by all combatants, because where there is no uniform the civilian and non-combatant population is bound ultimately to suffer. Without a uniform, the Boer had only to bury or throw aside his rifle and bandolier,

and he became at a moment's notice an inoffensive civilian. When closely pursued the small Boer commandos could always disperse, bury their rifles, return to their farms and pose as peaceful agricul-

their resistance, while it inflicted cruel hardships and unnecessary losses upon our own troops. Greater strictness at the outset, and the fixing of reasonable prices for all produce, would have contributed to shorten the war and would have proved to the Boers that we were in earnest. "War," General Sherman has said, "is cruelty, and you cannot refine it. . . . The terrible hardships of war are inevitable, and the only way the people . . . can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride." And another brilliant American general, Sheridan, has pointed out the importance of bringing home "deprivation and suffering" to the door of the non-combatant. War is not a kind of sport or pastime, but a life and death struggle, in which blows must be rained upon the enemy until his fighting spirit is quelled and till even his womankind feel the hopelessness and danger of continuing the conflict.

Foreign generals in our commanders' place would have sternly punished such offences as the concealment of arms, the breaches of parole, the abuses of the white flag, and the guerilla



A. C. Ball.]

[After a sketch by R. B. M. Paxton. By permission of "The Sphere."

A BOER SWEARING NEUTRALITY IN THE COURT-HOUSE AT VENTERSDORP, AFTER DELIVERING UP HIS RIFLE.

turists, till fresh opportunities arose. A uniform cannot be rapidly and easily discarded, and serves to make plain to all eyes the fighting man. Thus the British troops were seriously handicapped, and it is little wonder that their morale suffered when they learned by painful experience the great advantage which the Boers possessed.

In the earlier volumes of "With the Flag to Pretoria" we have dealt with the war up to the capture of Pretoria; we have now to

return to the
De Wet at Bethlehem. operations in the field after that event. The campaign against De Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier in the north-east of the Orange River Colony will first be taken in detail, after which the operations in the western and eastern Transvaal will be treated in succession. De Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier in the middle of June had a force of some 8,000 or 9,000 men in arms, infesting the broken and mountainous country around Bethlehem. To crush them, a large British army had to be employed, as the distances were great, the roads difficult, and the mobility of the enemy such that every mile of the gradually contracting circle about them had to be closely watched by adequate forces. Nor was the campaign that was about to open one in which no risks were run by the British. Had the enemy's generals been equal to strategy on a grand scale they would have struck with superior forces at the various isolated British columns which were in every case inferior to the united strength of the Boers. But De Wet, great as a raider, was no Napoleon, nor had he the daring for such a bold offensive. For him to swoop down upon small detachments without the aid of artillery, outnumbering them four or five to one and compelling their submission by shell-fire, was a less serious affair than attacking British brigades, well equipped and commanded, which would certainly not have given way without the hardest of fighting.

The troops put in motion against

De Wet and his fellow-generals were these: at Lindley was General Paget with the 20th Brigade, composed of the 3rd East Kent, 4th Scottish Rifles, 1st Munsters, and 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry—the last two, regular battalions, the first two, Militia. Of artillery, Paget had only the 38th Field



(Photo by Lafayette.)

MAJOR-GENERAL ARTHUR HENRY PAGET.

Born in 1851, son of the late General Lord A. H. Paget, C.B. Joined the Scots Guards in 1869. Captain, 1872; Lieut.-Colonel, 1882; Regimental Major, 1891; Colonel, 1895; Lieut.-Colonel Scots Guards, 1899; Major-General commanding the 20th Brigade, South Africa, April, 1900. Served in the Ashanti Expedition, 1873-4, during the second phase of the war, attached to Captain Butler's command; in the Sudan expedition in 1885; with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in Burma, 1887-8; in the Sudan, 1888-9; in the Boer War, 1899-1900, in command of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, and was present at Belmont, Enslin, Modder River, and during the march on Bloemfontein. His later achievements will be told in these pages.



NEW SOUTH WALES BUSHMEN ENCAMPED AT SYDNEY PREPARATORY TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

Battery. This brigade may have numbered 2,000 combatants. It had followed Lord Methuen in his march to the relief of the 13th Yeomanry, had occupied Lindley about June 5, and had been holding the place in the face of repeated attacks by De Wet, the most serious of which took place on June 16, 20, and 26. On the 26th a picket of Yorkshire Light Infantry was surrounded and heavily punished, losing 26 men killed and wounded; only six men, indeed, remained untouched, but they, with the less severely injured, managed to keep the Boers at bay. It was on this occasion that Private Ward, of the Yorkshires, won the Victoria Cross by carrying an appeal for reinforcements to the rear, and returning to his post under a terrible fire. He was severely wounded, yet his action saved the detachment.*

The Brigade was wretchedly clothed, many of the men being literally in rags; others had no trousers, but had to wear pants instead. The Militia battalions, which had been sent to the front very indifferently equipped, were worst off in this respect. Before Paget could move, it was necessary to give him supplies, mounted men, and more artillery. Accordingly on June 23 a convoy started from Kroonstad for Lindley, accompanied by the four-gun battery of the City Imperial Volunteers, two companies of Australian Bushmen, and as many of Middlesex Yeomanry, with a detachment of infantry from Paget's force, and the Colonial troopers of Prince Alfred's Guard. The total strength of the reinforcements was about 500 men. They did not get through without fighting. Early on June 26 the enemy were found in some force in a line of kopjes just beyond Liebenberg's Spruit. The City Imperial Volunteer battery at once pushed forward, shelled the kopjes, and dislodged the Boers. The East Kents and Bushmen then secured the ridge, when the convoy was able to pass. The British casualties were about half-a-dozen men wounded. On the 27th skirmishing began early and continued all day. The Boers brought up a 15-pounder, and with it engaged the City Imperial Volunteer battery, but as the battery gave them a hotter reply than they had anticipated, they moved their gun and turned their attention to the convoy, especially directing their fire at the traction engines, which were hauling heavy loads in the rear. Their riflemen closed in, but the City Imperial Volunteer battery succeeded in checkmating their efforts.

British attacking columns.

Boers attempt to capture a convoy.

* See p. 698 of "With the Flag to Pretoria."

"Here," says a member of the battery, "was the hottest time we had yet had, for their riflemen kept getting close up, and we had to wait to cover our splendid Australians, who are such good shots and riders. When we came to limber up, the bullets were whistling round our heads like fun. . . . Their shell fire was very wild . . . but their skirmishers were very daring, evidently trying to disable one of our guns." In the darkness the guns and the rear of the convoy reached Lindley, though three mule waggons had to be abandoned at one of the worst drifts. The City Imperial Volunteers were warmly congratulated by General Paget upon the excellence of their work.

Behind Paget, holding Heilbron, was General Macdonald with the Highland Brigade, 76th Battery, 12th Yeomanry, and Lovat's Scouts. His orders were to leave the Argyll and Sutherlands in garrison at Heilbron, march east to Frankfort, convoying a thousand remounts, and there add the other three battalions of his force to General Hunter's column. This now consisted of Bruce-Hamilton's 21st Brigade, including the City Imperial Volunteer Infantry, Ridley's 2nd Mounted Infantry Brigade, Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade, the 81st and 82nd Field Batteries, P Horse Artillery Battery, and two 5-in. guns, with two squadrons of Scottish Yeomanry. The total combatant strength was about 6,000 men: an immense convoy, with a fortnight's supplies, accompanied the column. Frankfort was reached on July 1, with nothing more than skirmishing, and in the town, as a sample of the way in

**Cruel treatment of
loyal Colonials.**

which the Boers treated the Colonials whom they captured, were found three of Rimington's Guides, confined in the gaol, with heavy fetters riveted on their legs.

Any other army but the British would have promptly retaliated by destroying the town, for it is only by the sternest retaliation that a stop can be put to such outrages in war. Macdonald did not reach Frankfort till the 2nd; on the 3rd the City Imperial Volunteer Infantry were detached and sent with a convoy of sick to Heilbron, covering the distance of 40 miles in two forced marches, at the price of a great waste of trek-oxen and mules.

The third column put in motion against De Wet was General Clements' 12th Brigade. Though the composition of no force can be stated with absolute accuracy at this period of the war, owing to



OFFICERS AT THE INSPECTION OF THE CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEER ARTILLERY (HON. ARTILLERY COMPANY'S CONTINGENT).
Left to right: 1. Colonel Boxall, secretary C.I.V.; 2. Captain White, Grenadier Guards; 3. Major McMicking, H.A.C., C.I.V.; 4. Lieutenant Duncan, H.A.C., C.I.V.; 5. Major-General Trotter, commanding the Home District; 6. Surgeon-Captain Thorne, H.A.C., C.I.V.; 7. Earl of Denbigh, Lieutenant-Colonel commanding H.A.C.; 8. Captain Budworth, H.A.C., C.I.V.



BETHLEHEM.

the imperfection of the records available and the withholding of the generals' despatches,

British enveloping movements.

the brigade seems to have been made up of the 1st Royal Irish, 2nd Bedfordshire, 2nd Worcestershire, and 2nd Wiltshire, with the 2nd Brabant's Horse, 6th, 62nd, 63rd, and 66th Yeomanry Companies, the 8th Field Battery, and a section of 5-in. garrison guns—a total of 3,000 men. The brigade had previously occupied Senekal, but from want of supplies the bulk of it had been compelled to fall back to Winburg, where it picked up a large convoy. Clements' orders were to advance to Lindley through Senekal, join Paget, and with him push forward upon Bethlehem. Last, but not least, Rundle, with the whole Eighth Division and Brabant's Colonial Division, had his men strung out along the line from Ficksburg to Senekal, preventing the Boers from breaking out to the south. He had in all about 8,000 men, but these were much scattered, as they had to watch a vast extent of country. The distance in all is 40 miles, and the most careful arrangements were necessary to facilitate the rapid concentration of an adequate force at any point which might be threatened. Brabant held the left of the long line, Campbell's 16th Brigade the centre, and Boyes' 17th Brigade the right. Numerous attempts



MILITARY STEAM TRACTION ENGINE DRAWING A 5-INCH GUN.

were made by the enemy to get through. On June 13 a party of 2,000 picked Boers, with nine guns, appeared near Ficksburg. Their object probably was only to ascertain the strength of the British cordon, as they did not deliver any serious attack. The Ficksburg garrison, which was strongly entrenched, was at once reinforced, and on the 18th was shelled by the Boers, but

with no result. On the 20th Rundle rode to the threatened town and personally reconnoitred the enemy's positions, actually penetrating within their picket line. The same day he received news that Colonel Dalgety had encountered a force of 250 Boers near Doornkop, and that he was sharply engaged.

A message was at once sent to him, directing him at all costs to keep in touch with the enemy, and in the middle of the night Rundle started to his assistance with the 2nd Scots Guards, the 79th Battery, and three companies of the 4th Yeomanry. "It was," says the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, "a pitch-black night, bitterly cold, and the road was the usual clay track of the Orange River Colony. There were no bridges to carry the road over sluits and watercourses, and no fences to mark the route. In the darkness the troops stumbled along, down the steep sides of spruits, the heavily-loaded infantrymen tripping and falling ;



DE WET'S DYNAMITE GUN.

while the artillery drivers, with their numbed hands, could scarce guide their teams across the dangerous crossings. Anyone who has ever seen one of these South African so-called roads will understand what a night march across them means. How General Rundle's was made in safety I do not profess to know. The same road in broad daylight has often given me nervous moments while I watched my own waggon plunging down one side of a spruit and climbing out at the other. But General Rundle's force, despite difficulties and darkness, made the march in record time, and about four in the morning reached the neighbourhood of Doornkop."

Unhappily, this great effort was made in vain. Dalgety had found himself confronted by a force well supplied with artillery, whereas his only weapon had become unserviceable, compelling him to retire. In spite of this, the Boers did not break through the cordon in any force. Only about 50 made their way to the south; the others retired to the Tafelberg, near Senekal. On the 23rd the same body of Boers, led by Steyn, made a fresh attempt on the cordon, which was foiled mainly because the enemy would not risk themselves in the open within range of the British entrenchments. Reinforcements were, however, hurried to the threatened point, which was six miles to the south of Senekal. The Boers attacked the transport of the British column while on the march, but were repulsed by the steadiness of the Scots Guards and the Hampshire Yeomanry—the latter under the command of Captain Seely. Great annoyance was caused during these operations by small parties of Boers, who must have worked round through the big gap to the north of the cordon, and who collected in the British rear, where they cut the telegraphs, fired at scouts, and harassed all convoys. In the closing days of June Rundle succeeded in edging his enemy to the north-east, gaining a belt of land some miles wide. Before a further advance was possible it was necessary to



[Photo by Gregory.]

GENERAL SIR LESLIE RUNDLE.
From a photo taken on board the SS. Moor.

clear the Boers in flank and rear from the Doornberg, a mountain mass to the north of the Winburg-Senekal road.

On June 25 Clements was ready to begin operations against De Wet. On that day he marched out of Winburg with a large convoy; the same night the Yeomanry, 2nd Brabant's Horse, and two guns of the 8th Battery, under Colonel Grenfell, were detached to make a night march, and with daylight capture the camp of a force of Boers near Rietspruit, who were known to be meditating attack upon the convoy. They were to fall upon the rear of the enemy, while the infantry met the Boers in front. The guides must have played the British mounted troops false, or the Boers have learnt of the design and changed their plans and dispositions, as at daylight Colonel Grenfell and his men were surprised to find themselves the targets of two Boer guns and two "Pom-Poms," which, in the grey light, pitched shells among them,

**Grenfell's night
march.**



Drawn by J. Charlton.

AN IRRESISTIBLE TEMPTATION: SPRINGBOK APPEAR WHERE BOERS WERE EXPECTED.

stampeding the horses and causing great confusion. At the same time the Boer riflemen began to press the British flanks and rear. The situation was a dangerous one, but the men rallied finely, the splendid conduct of Lieutenant Lowther and the gunners of the 8th Battery greatly contributing to that result. Lowther was struck by a shell-splinter almost the first shot, but set a superb example, continuing to direct his guns till he fainted from pain and loss of blood. The men at the guns were rapidly shot down by the Boers, and volunteers to work the weapons had to be called for. At this juncture a Boer heavy gun suddenly opened an enfilading fire from the left flank. Many of its projectiles fell among the horses, blowing them to pieces and injuring them in the most cruel manner. "So hot was the fire," writes Captain Mildmay, who was with the Yeomanry, "that according to Brabant's Horse, who had fought at Wepener, even the bombardment of Wepener would not compare with it in intensity." But about 11.30 a.m., after many hours of fighting, the British artillery began to make an impression on the Boer attack, and actually drove back their heavy gun. At the same time the

dust of a British relief column on the march showed over the veldt. A few minutes later the attack ceased as suddenly as it had begun, and the Boers precipitately retired. The British losses were three killed and twenty wounded. General Brabant, who had marched from near Senekal to Grenfell's aid with every available man, had three wounded in an attempt to cut off the Boers. It was afterwards suspected that the guide employed by Grenfell had acted in collusion with the enemy.

After this affair, Clements marched to Senekal, which place he left on June 28, with Lindley as his destination, greatly embarrassed by the seven-mile-long train of waggons and transport which the

**Clements leaves
Senekal for Lindley.**

poverty of the country rendered necessary. On leaving Senekal, the enemy showed in every direction, opening with two guns and two "Pom-Poms" on the left-flank guards. The right flank was also warmly engaged, so that progress was slow during the day; at night the Boer guns had not been silenced, in spite of a prolonged artillery duel, and they even dared to shell the British camp. Next day the enemy had fallen back to the banks of one of the innumerable Zand Spruits which water this region. There they offered a more stubborn resistance, and after they had been heavily shelled by the artillery the 2nd Worcesters had to be put in to carry the position. A turning movement on the right, by threatening the Boer retreat, eventually compelled the retirement of the enemy. A curious incident of the day was the mistaking of a herd of springbok for Boers. Cannon and machine guns played on these innocent victims of war, but the mistake, perhaps, was not unpleasant to the hungry soldier whose cooking-pots were thereby filled with daintier provender than trek-ox. In this connection a correspondent tells a good story of General Rundle and the "Brabanditti," as Brabant's troopers were nicknamed by their comrades. "On the march near Mequatling's Nek he entered a farmhouse kept by a loyal German, and was drinking a cup of tea, when several terrific volleys caused him and his staff to rush forth in expectation of a Boer attack. But there was no cause for alarm. It was only the 'Brabanditti' firing company volleys at a herd of springbok so as to make sure of bagging some of the unhappy animals." On June 30 the column reached Kruisfontein, only fourteen miles from Lindley, but not without further continual skirmishing. On July 1 a reconnoitring patrol of regular mounted infantry and Yeomanry, pushing forward close to Lindley, was cut up by the Boers and several of its men taken prisoners. Paget and Clements both were prompt in sending support, and between them drove back the enemy, but they could not recover the prisoners. However, the two brigades had now joined hands, and the 5,000 or so men of the division, whom their junction had concentrated, were ready for an advance against Bethlehem.



EX-PRESIDENT STEYN.

This advance began on July 2, Paget moving on the left by a road ten miles from the track which Clements was following on the right. Yet further to the left General Hunter's column was to sweep the country and prolong the cordon hemming in the Boer forces. The enemy showed in considerable force, and finally took up a position on a long ridge intersecting the roads along which Paget and

Clements were advancing. Here they were attacked on July 3 by both generals. Paget's force on the left made little progress, but the City Imperial Volunteer Battery did some good shooting, silencing a Boer gun in three shots at 4,200 yards. Indeed, the City Imperial Volunteer guns throughout these operations proved invaluable, as their longer range and superior rapidity of fire gave them a distinct advantage over the British regular artillery; there was, however, some trouble about their ammunition supply, since they fired a pattern of shell differing from every other gun in the service. Eventually by the close of the day the Boers were forced back some miles, but only to a second and yet stronger position. On the British right Clements' artillery was hotly engaged with several Boer guns. The Yorkshire Yeomanry, riding along the front of the enemy's position, received an unexpectedly heavy fire, by which several men were wounded. While Dr. Reynolds, the surgeon attached to the company, under cover of the Red-Cross flag, was attending to the wounded, he was deliberately stalked and fired upon by a Boer, who crept up close to him, but who, fortunately, only killed his horse. This was a particularly outrageous infraction of the laws of humanity, as the Boer could not but have known that Dr. Reynolds was not a combatant.

Next day the fighting was resumed. On the left Paget was again heavily engaged. His guns—the 38th Field Battery and the City Imperial Volunteer Battery—came into action on the left and right. Two of the City Imperial

Long-range work with the C.I.V. guns.

Volunteer guns were speedily at work trying to reach a Boer Krupp, which from a distance of 7,000 yards placed its




TOMMY IN RAGS.

Campaigning played havoc with the soldiers' clothing, and during the operations in the Orange River Colony in July, many men went in rags and tatters such as are here depicted.

projectiles all

round the City Imperial Volunteer Battery. Though the guns of that battery were only sighted up to 5,000 yards, by dint of digging holes for the trails they were made to reach the enemy, and the Krupp presently ceased fire. Next they shelled the Boer centre, and finally, towards the close of the afternoon, marched down a valley under the escort of the Munsters and Yeomanry. The heights on either side were supposed to have been examined by the scouts, and had been reported clear of Boers, wherefore the column proceeded in close order. What followed may be told by Driver Erskine Childers of the City Imperial Volunteer Battery. "Suddenly," he says, "a storm of rifle-fire broke out from a ridge on our right front and showed us we were ambushed. The Munsters were nearest to the ridge—about 600 yards [off], I should say. We were a bit further off. I heard a sort of hoarse murmur go up from the close mass of infantry, and saw it boil,



MAP OF THE BETHLEHEM CAMPAIGN.



From the painting by J. Charlton.]

"HALT!"

The picture represents a gun of the Royal Field Artillery at the moment of taking up its appointed position.

so to speak, and spread out. One section checked for a moment, in a sort of bewilderment . . . but the next, and almost without orders, guns were unlimbered and whisked round, a waggon unhooked, teams trotting away, and shrapnel bursting over the top of the ridge in quick succession. All this time the air was full of a sound like the moaning of wind, from the bullets . . . but strange to say, not a man of us was hit. . . The whole thing was soon over."

Less fortunate were the other two guns and the 38th Battery at Pleisirfontein, on Paget's left. Two of the 38th's guns unlimbered and were in action against six Boer weapons; the escort of the guns, composed of Yeomanry and Prince Alfred's Guards, had reported the ground clear for a mile, and in obedience to orders had taken up a position to the flank and rear of the guns, where there was good cover. Two more of the 38th Battery guns were in position a hundred yards to the left of the first section. After firing for an hour and a half, orders were issued that the gunners were to lie down and cease fire, with the object of economising ammunition. Between the guns and the enemy was a field planted with mealies. In the lull of the firing a strong party of Boers wearing blue cavalry cloaks crept up through a donga in this field, and thus was able to approach unobserved within 400 yards of the second section. They directed a terrible fire upon the two guns and the gunners,



ONE OF THE CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEER GUNS.

[Photo by Lieut. Bayley.]

and though directions were given to the gunners to open on them with care, these could not be carried out. Major Oldfield, who had displayed an absolute disdain for death, was mortally wounded; Lieutenant Belcher was killed. The limbers were brought up and one gun was successfully withdrawn; as the second team, however, came up, the leading driver was shot and five horses and another driver fell. The men continued their brave attempts to remove the gun though the enemy were now not fifty yards away, and not till every driver and horse was down, and Captain Fitzgerald had been twice wounded, was the weapon abandoned. The Boers surrounded it, and were starting to push it downhill

**The Bushmen rescue
a gun.**

into the mealie field, when it was dramatically recovered by a sudden charge of Australian Bushmen, led by Captain Budworth. The teams of the City Imperial Volunteer Battery removed the weapon, while two of the City Imperial Volunteer guns were brought into action to hold the Boers in check. These guns for some minutes were in a very hot corner, firing trail to trail, in opposite directions, till the enemy at last fell back. In all, the 38th Battery lost sixteen men killed or wounded; the Yeomanry and Bushmen near the gun had thirty-six casualties.

The hardships suffered by Paget's troops on this march were very great. Many of the men, as we have seen, were wretchedly clad; all were on short rations. "We are on half rations of biscuit,

which means three," writes Driver Childers, under date of July 4, "and a tin of Maconochie [emergency ration] each, a supply almost enough to whet your appetite for one meal in a life like this, but it has to last the day of about seventeen hours. The ration is issued the night before, to eat as we please, and of course there is coffee soon after *reveillé*, and tea in the evening. There is a cupful of porridge also with the coffee, paid for by


Paget's troops on
short rations.

deduction from our pay. . . . I don't know why the whole column should not get fresh meat every day, for the country is teeming with cattle, which are collected and driven along with the column in huge herds."

On July 4 Paget was able to make considerable progress without further incident than a shot or two from a heavy Boer gun at the mid-day watering place. Meantime, Clements on the right had had a good deal of fighting during the 3rd. Five Boer guns were located in position before him; they were evidently covering the retreat of a large Boer force, as some hundreds of waggons could be made out, proceeding along the roads to Bethlehem. Two squadrons of Brabant's Horse and a squadron of Middlesex Yeomanry, however, under cover of the fire of the British heavy guns, carried, with an insignificant casualty list, a hill on the right which was strongly occupied. Next day the Worcestershires and Wiltshires cleared the enemy away from the British right, encountering only slight

resistance. The troops were fired upon from a farm, which was spared with remarkable leniency, though the act had been clearly witnessed and though two rifles were found within. On the 5th Clements moved in towards Bethlehem and camped close by Paget's column, which had arrived within four miles of the town, and which had already been engaged with the Boer artillery defending the place.

The village of Bethlehem lies in a deep valley surrounded by mountains. To the north is a high conical hill which drops very steeply—almost precipitously—towards the town, but on its other face slopes more gently. To the south is a yet higher hill, known as Wolhuter's Kop, which is prolonged



A. J. Gough.]

THE AUSTRALIAN BUSHMEN RESCUING A GUN.

by broken and serrated ridges running east and west. On either flank of these ridges are others running out perpendicularly to the north, the general aspect of the ridges suggesting a letter **E**

Position of Bethlehem. laid on its back, the centre upright formed by the high conical hill or "Spitzkop"; the horizontal line by Wolhuter's Kop and its subordinate ridges. Thus, troops advancing on Bethlehem would come under fire from front and flank. On the high conical hill the Boers had two guns; on the other ridges they had nine or ten weapons, at least one of which was of large calibre. The front of the Boer position was about fifteen miles in length, so that a turning movement would be a matter of great difficulty. The total of the enemy's forces was probably about 4,000, while the combined British forces, of which Clements, by virtue of seniority, had now assumed command, must have mustered about 6,000 men, with sixteen guns—since four of the 38th Battery's weapons were *hors de combat* from want of officers and gunners. This battery, indeed,



F. Dadd, R.I.]

[After a photograph.

TOMMY'S DINNER: HOW THE REGIMENTAL COOKING-POTS ARE SOMETIMES SUPPLIED.

Our soldiers' tactics, on an occasion like this, are decidedly faulty, but for that very reason the scene is all the more amusing. The catching of ducks is not an easy matter when the only foothold is soft mud.

had now not one single officer fit for duty, and had been temporarily combined with the City Imperial Volunteer Battery and placed under its officers.

At dawn of the 6th the Boers started shelling Paget's camp with their heavy Creusot. Paget's mounted men were sent forward on the right in an attempt to get round the enemy's flank; Clements' mounted men on the left simultaneously advanced. Neither attack succeeded. Boer guns

Hill north of the town captured.

and strong Boer forces were detected on either flank, and the mounted men found it impossible to gain ground. Meantime, the two 5-in. "cow-guns," with an escort of Wiltshires, had come into action on the lower slopes of the conical hill to the north of Bethlehem, and were occupied in directing their lyddite shells upon every point where the Boer artillery showed itself, repeatedly silencing the enemy's guns. One particularly fine shot was lodged at a range of

7,000 yards upon Wolhuter's Kop, where the Boer staff could be made out watching the battle. The 8th Battery was placed to the west of the "cow-guns"; the 38th and City Imperial Volunteers to the east. All the 6th the artillery duel continued, and in the afternoon on the British right the Yorkshire Light Infantry and Munsters were able to gain a good deal of ground. The Munsters, indeed, as darkness came down, charged with the bayonet and, though their ammunition was exhausted, succeeded in carrying a ridge which ran up under the Spitzkop. A quaint incident occurred during the charge. Suddenly a goose wandered into the advancing line of British soldiers, whereupon one of the Irishmen lowered his bayonet and secured it for supper. In the evening orders were issued for a general infantry attack next day. The Royal Irish were to storm the high hill which was the key to the position; on their left the Worcestershires and Wiltshires were to advance upon the town of Bethlehem itself, while on their right the Yorkshire Light Infantry and Munsters were to push forward.

At dawn, under cover of a heavy fire from the British artillery, the infantry went forward. The Royal Irish attacked the hill which dominated the whole position, receiving a terrible fire, yet losing much fewer men than might have been expected.

Without flinching they reached the precipitous southern edge of the hill before the Boers could remove both the guns upon it. One was lowered with ropes and got away; the second on its descent overturned, broke a wheel, and was abandoned. The Royal Irish succeeded in pouring several volleys into the flying enemy and secured the gun as a trophy. It was found to be one of the 15-pounders captured from the British 77th Battery at Stormberg and supplied with ammunition made in Johannesburg. With the loss of the gun and the capture of the hill the enemy seemed to lose heart. Their waggons

could be seen in great numbers streaming away to the south, but, unfortunately, for some reason or other were not shelled by the artillery. British guns were brought up to the commanding position that had been secured and opened a fire at comparatively close range on Wolhuter's Kop; the Yorkshire Light Infantry swept forward round the base of the hill and skirmished with the enemy in the outskirts of Bethlehem itself. In the afternoon the town was occupied; a large quantity of ammunition and some stores were captured there. Thus an important success was secured at small cost. The British casualties numbered about 100, the heaviest losses



DENTISTRY ON THE VELDT.



TOMMY'S TOILET.

One soldier is here seen shaving with the aid of a heliograph mirror, while another is having his hair cut with horse-clippers.

falling upon the Royal Irish, who lost 50 killed and wounded, and the Munsters, who lost 36. The British residents reported that De Wet and Steyn had boasted that Bethlehem could never be taken; they complained bitterly of wholesale plundering by the Boers. A short halt was made by Paget and Clements, and the damaged 15-pounder was repaired and added to the artillery of their column.

The day after the capture of the town the cavalry of Hunter's division entered it. It had moved in three columns, Broadwood on the right, Macdonald and Ridley in the centre, and Bruce-Hamilton on the left, from Frankfort through Reitz. The sound of heavy firing in the direction of Bethlehem was heard on the 7th, and information was obtained from natives that on the previous day this same noise had been observed. Hunter therefore consulted his brigade commanders and decided to leave Bruce Hamilton to hold Reitz and guard the baggage, while pushing on with his other troops to Bethlehem. But in the afternoon a heliograph gave the news that Bethlehem had been taken and that there was no need for any desperate haste. Before this, efforts to get into telegraphic communication with Bethlehem had failed, though the wire was still standing, each terminal operator distrusting the other. In fact, their colloquy ended with the emphatic monosyllable "Rats!" The rest of Hunter's division followed Broadwood into Bethlehem a day or two later.

The Boers were now in grave difficulties. Rundle had swung his line forward, after a series of small skirmishes, which will be narrated shortly, and, shut in between his force on the south and west and Clements and Hunter on the north and north-east, the enemy had already been compelled to release their prisoners.

These prisoners, numbering 700, for the most part of the 4th Derbyshire Militia, captured at Roode-

val, with a few Yeomanry and Regulars, were conducted on the 5th to Olivier's Hoek Pass, given a small quantity of flour and meat, and ordered to return to Natal. They were told that if they

Sufferings of released prisoners.

were found in the mountains, they would be put to death. Attempts had already been made to induce them to give their parole not to take any further part in the war, but with the most commendable determination they refused to yield to this pressure. Their sufferings were extreme. They were one and all poorly clothed and the weather was bitterly cold; indeed the summits of the mountains were covered with snow and the frost at night was severe. The Boers stole their money and in some cases deprived them of boots. The most active among them reached the British outposts on the 6th, when steps were at once taken to help the foot-sore and broken down. The Natal Police, with waggons of supplies, received them and collected the stragglers. Thus a battalion was added to the British Army, though, as the enemy had taken care to detain all the officers, there was some delay before the Militia could again be placed in the field.



GENERAL BOYES, WITH CAPTAIN FITZ HENRY AND CAPTAIN FOSTER, HIS AIDES-DE-CAMP.

Major-General John Edward Boyes was born in 1843; joined the 75th Foot in 1861; Captain, 1863; Brigade-Major, Straits Settlements, 1869-70; Major in the Gordon Highlanders, 1880; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 1882; Colonel (Army), 1886; commanded a Regimental District, 1892; Major-General, 1898; in command of the 17th Brigade, Eighth Division, South Africa, 1900. Served with the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, through the Egyptian War of 1882; in the Sudan Expedition of 1884; in the Nile Expedition of 1884-5; and with the River Column under Major-General Earle.

General Rundle, after an interchange of letters with the Boer commandant Crowther—who complained of the conduct of the British in shelling farms from which his men had coolly fired upon our troops, and who seemed to imagine that under such circumstances farm-houses were sacred—had no more serious fighting until July 3rd. To stop the innumerable cases of treachery and the tactics followed by the Boer women who remained on the farms, professing to have made their submission, but at night harbouring armed burghers, he gave notice to the residents on farms that such conduct would render them liable to the confiscation of their property or to heavy fine.

On July 3 General Boyes, who was garrisoning Ficksburg, was attacked at midnight by the enemy in considerable force, but

Boers repelled at Ficksburg.

owing to the strength of his entrenchments and the excellent dispositions adopted was able to beat off the Boer assault without a single casualty. In the next few days the men of Brabant's division were employed in ejecting small parties of Boers from the Doornberg, whence the enemy had caused great annoyance to convoys moving along the road from Winburg to Senekal. This was effected without much trouble, probably because the enemy were afraid of being cut off from Bethlehem through Paget's and Clements' movements in their rear. The next Boer positions to be tackled were the Tafelberg, close to Senekal, and the Biddulphberg, where Rundle had fought an unsuccessful action in May. No assault, however, was necessary; as the strategic result of the capture of Bethlehem, the Boers were unable longer

British cordon complete.

to hold their ground and retired to the south-east. On July 9 Driscoll's Scouts occupied the Biddulphberg without firing a shot; on the 11th Rundle and Clements met at Zuring Krantz, and the British cordon from Bethlehem to Ficksburg was complete, shutting in the Boer forces on the west as they were already shut in by Basutoland on the east. In this mountainous and, in parts, almost inaccessible district, however, the enemy had the immense advantage of a complete knowledge of its intricacies, while the difficulty of carrying supplies into so remote a region must necessarily operate to the disadvantage of the British.



Wal Paget.

A BOER WOMAN SURRENDERING HER HUSBAND'S RIFLES.

[After a photograph.]



Meyer. Botha. Erasmus. De Wet. Grobler. Ben Viljoen.

[From the "Melbourne Leader."

A BOER COUNCIL OF WAR ON THE VELDT.

CHAPTER II.

THE CAPTURE OF PRINSLOO.

The Brandwater Basin—Hunter's operations—Closing the passes—Escape of De Wet and Steyn—Concerted attack—Paget and Clements assault Slabbert's Nek—Entering a new land of promise—Hunter attacks Retief's Nek—Moral effect of unaimed fire—Boers driven from the ridge—British camp in the Brandwater Basin—Strange re-union of Bruce Hamilton and Macdonald—Seizure of kopjes at Naauwpoort Nek—Escape of Boer guns—Flight of Olivier—Naauwpoort Nek secured—Rundle's dash for Fouriesburg—Slaapkrantz, a natural fortress—The height carried—Boers hemmed in—Emissaries negotiate—Hunter's diplomatic concession—Prinsloo surrenders—Condition of the prisoners—Other commandos yield—Pursuit of Olivier—Capture of Harrismith.



THE country in which the Boers were now confined was mountainous in the extreme. Between Ficksburg and Bethlehem rises a tangled mass of ridges, snow-covered at this time of year, exceptionally difficult of access, shutting in the wild and remote valleys of the Brandwater and Little Caledon. The Brandwater Valley is particularly fertile, and

The Brandwater Basin.

capable of supporting oxen and cattle, which had been driven thither in thousands from the surrounding districts as these were overrun by the British troops. On the south the Boers had behind them Basutoland, into which they dared not venture. The only town of any size in the Brandwater Basin was Fouriesburg, which in England would be styled only a small village. Here was the last capital of the fugitive Free State Government. The exits from the basin were the awkward passes of Commando Nek on the south, close to the Basuto frontier, Wit Nek to the north-west, Slabbert's Nek and Retief's Nek to the north, and Slaapkrantz, giving access to the valley of the Little Caledon, a region yet wilder and more mountainous than the Brandwater Valley. From the further end of the Little Caledon valley there were two exits, Naauwpoort Nek and Golden Gate, facing north and east. No trustworthy maps existed of this region, a fact which rendered campaigning in it a matter of enormous difficulty to the British. The Boers, of course, knew the country well, and were aware of many paths and mountain tracks which were shown in no map. The general opinion in the British army was that, once in their mountain fastnesses, the Boers



HOW SOME OF OUR PHOTOGRAPHS WERE OBTAINED.

This picture shows a photographer at work in a gun emplacement manned by a Boer commando. It was taken in the Biggarsberg.

could not be further pressed. But Hunter, who was in supreme charge of the operations, was determined to make a thorough clearance, and this though for supplies he had to depend upon ox-waggons

Hunter's operations. travelling along infamous roads, through a country which even then was not safe, seventy or eighty miles from Kroonstad and Winburg. He plunged boldly into the mountains, splendidly seconded by his brigadiers and by his fellow general, Rundle, marching his men through these unmapped deserts, on tracks which now clung to the edges of precipices, and now penetrated through almost impassable gorges. The troops faced the most terrible hardships in the worst of weather, and no praise can be too great for their courage, energy, and endurance. This campaign, indeed, was one of the most honourable of the war to all concerned, and it is much to be hoped that a special clasp will be granted to the men engaged in it.

The closing of the passes by which the Boers might escape was at once taken in hand. Commando Nek was watched by the troops at Ficksburg, while Rundle held other posts facing the mountains at the Willows, Hammonia, Welgevonden, near Roode Krantz, and at Witkop, which latter height,



RETIEF'S NEK AND THE ADJACENT PASSES, FROM BETHLEHEM.

[From a sketch by Mr. W. Blundell.]

commanding Wit Nek, was seized by Colonel Maxwell with two guns and a mounted column on July 13. Wit Nek itself might have been occupied, but the badness of the road up to it, and the

Closing the passes. difficulty of keeping troops on it supplied, led General Rundle to decide against such an advance for the time being. At Roode Krantz, on July 15, an attempt to carry a ridge held by the enemy and secure a good position was foiled after a sharp skirmish, in which a squadron of the 2nd Brabant's Horse suffered considerably, losing eleven horses and several men wounded. One of the recruits with the squadron displayed fine courage. While holding horses in the rear he was shot through the hand, but he continued to hold the mounts for his comrades till a second bullet struck him in the same place and inflicted disabling injuries upon him. The Boers were found to be in considerable force, and their position was one of great natural strength. It afterwards appeared that they had intended to break out in this quarter, so that Rundle must be held to have scored a distinct success in foiling their efforts to escape, even if he himself was not able to win ground.

Clements' and Paget's advance had been unhappily delayed by want of supplies, which compelled them to wait near Bethlehem for the arrival of a convoy from Kroonstad. On July 16, however, Paget was able to move out across dismal burnt veldt, in a piercingly cold gale, towards Slabbert's

Nek, which he was to bar. He had in the meantime been reinforced by the 2nd Northamptons—one of the finest battalions in the Army—and the 4th (Militia) South Staffordshire. He took post

**Escape of De Wet
and Steyn.**

at the farm of Bultfontein, a little to the north of Slabbert's Nek. Here he was joined by Clements on July 20. But already the quarry had taken alarm. De Wet, whom above all others the British generals wanted to secure as a prisoner, had marked our manœuvres and had come to the conclusion that if he remained in the Brandwater Basin his capture would be certain. He endeavoured to convince the other commandants of the correctness of his views, but they were in no wise ready to agree to a hurried flight

which must involve the loss of hundreds of waggons and thousands of cattle. Probably they thought in their heart of hearts that the British would never succeed in breaking into the basin. De Wet, therefore, collected some 2,000 of the boldest and best mounted men, and with ex-President Steyn, five guns, and a few light carts, made his way through Slabbert's Nek during the night of July 15-16. His movement does not appear to have been detected till he had got clear of the British cordon. Only in the afternoon of the 16th did he come in contact with a British force, engaging the City Imperial Volunteer Battery and a small detachment of infantry who were stationed on the road between Bethlehem and Senekal. He escaped from these with little difficulty and rode off as fast as his horses would go in the direction of Lindley. The moment his escape was detected, Broadwood with the cavalry of Hunter's division was dispatched in pursuit, but the chase which followed must be dealt with hereafter.

The stable door was locked when the steed had escaped. On the 21st supplies reached Bethlehem; on the 22nd a general forward movement began. Rundle concentrated all his available men opposite Commando Nek; Paget and Clements pressed in to Slabbert's Nek and reconnoitred it; Hunter, with Macdonald's Brigade, Lovat's Scouts, a battery, and two 5-in. guns, marched to Retief's Nek, starting

at midday, and

at first
Concerted making
attack. as though

Naaupoort Nek was his destination. General Bruce Hamilton, who had previously detached the City Imperial Volunteers at Heilbron, the Derbys at Frankfort, and the Sussex Regiment at Bethlehem—the latter battalion to reinforce Paget—and who now had



A DIVISION ON THE MARCH: ARTILLERY AND SUPPLIES.



A BOER HOWITZER DAMAGED IN BATTLE. Photographed at Winburg.

in trees. Beyond rose tier on tier of hills, ending on the sky-line in snow-clad mountain peaks." The column pushed past the site of a Boer laager, less malodorous than usual, and descended into this new land of promise, where the men were able to regale themselves amid a plenty which had been long strange to them. Here, in the Brandwater Basin, they met Hunter's column, whose fortunes must now be recounted.

Hunter had camped at Boshof's Farm, close to Retief's Nek, on the 22nd. The Boer positions on the nek had already been reconnoitred by Lovat's Scouts. At the risk of their lives three of them had crawled through the Boer picket lines and examined the enemy's trenches. The information which they obtained proved of the utmost value, and it was mainly through their efforts that a passage was so easily forced. Here, as at Slabbert's Nek, the approach to the nek is funnel-shaped, bordered on either side by great rocky bastions. For the attack on this position the Sussex battalion was brought round from Slabbert's Nek on the night of the 22nd, so as to raise to four the battalions of Macdonald's Brigade. They arrived late on the 23rd, and thus somewhat delayed the opening of the attack. They were

Hunter attacks
Retief's Nek.



Stanley L. Wood.]

[After a sketch.

THE VIEW-HALLOO: COLONIAL SCOUTS CATCH SIGHT OF THE ENEMY.

thrown against the heights flanking the entrance to the pass on the right, while the Highland Light Infantry were directed against the bastion on the left. The 5-inch guns and field artillery, meantime, paved the way for an assault by vigorously bombarding the heights. Well away to the left the Royal Highlanders (Black Watch) were employed in a turning movement, attempting to reach the summit of the ridge by a precipitous and difficult mountain path. They discovered that the Boers held the ridge in this quarter in some force, and, though they carried some outlying points on the lower slope, they were not able to reach the summit so long as daylight enabled the Boers to shoot straight. Unhappily, they lost a brave and distinguished officer, Major Willshire, mortally wounded. The Highland Light Infantry were even less fortunate, though they displayed great gallantry. They found the side of the bastion which they had been ordered to assault too steep to be scaled. The Sussex Regiment showed equal bravery, but could not reach the heights dominating the nek. With the Highland Light Infantry they fell back at dusk. In the twilight the Black Watch were able to gain some ground on the left. They had stubbornly retained their position, and at nightfall rushed forward with bayonets fixed and secured the highest point of the ridge to the east. The fighting of the day

only the Camerons and the mounted men attached to his brigade left—to such an extent do armies melt in war—was directed to watch both Naauwpoort Nek and Golden Gate, and, if he could, to



[Photo by Mr. W. L. Langman.]

DE WET'S SON.

force his way in through them. The Boers, of course, had not the slightest idea at which of these various passes the serious attacks would be made, and were compelled to guard them all. As their force at this time numbered about 6,000 men, it is probable that they had from one to two thousand men at each point. Yet, had they thrown their whole force on the weak column of Bruce Hamilton, they might have at one and the same time made good their escape and have inflicted a severe check upon the British, seeing that, at the outside, Bruce Hamilton could not dispose of more than 2,000 men.

On the 23rd the attack was pressed in all quarters. At Commando Nek, however, Rundle had been instructed only to demonstrate, and demonstrate he did. Leading out the Scots Guards, Leinsters, 1st South Staffordshires, Yeomanry, and Driscoll's Scouts, with six field guns, he shelled the Boer positions in front of the nek from July's Kraal to Zoutkop, deployed his infantry, and threatened an assault. His object being merely to keep as many Boers as possible occupied, no assault was delivered, and at nightfall his force withdrew. A

similar demonstration was made by others of his troops at Wit Nek. At Slabbert's Nek Paget and Clements delivered a serious assault. The artillery—City Imperial Volunteer Battery, 38th Battery, and the 5-in. guns—pushed into the mouth of the pass, which is described as “a mere gash in the face of the cliff,” and bombarded the Boer position. “We are exactly opposite the mouth of the nek,” writes Driver Erskine Childers, of the City Imperial Volunteers, “stretching back into the mountains like a great grass road, bordered with battlements of precipitous rock, which at this end—the gate we are knocking at—swell out on either side into a great natural bastion of bare rock. On these are the Boer trenches, tier above tier, while their guns are posted on the lower ground between. It looks like an impregnable position.”

The Yeomanry with the column pushed up into the nek, while under cover of the fire of the guns, the Royal Irish assaulted the right bastion and the Munsters the left. The ground was difficult and the enemy's position strong, so that progress was slow. At nightfall some of the lower Boer trenches had been taken in face of a heavy “Pom-Pom” fire, but others remained uncaptured. The Royal Irish suffered considerable losses.

The troops bivouacked where they stood, and skirmishing went on well into the night. But under cover of darkness the Boers withdrew their guns and the main body of their force, leaving only a rear-guard. This, too, was driven back at dawn of the 24th, so that the British troops were able to march up into the

nek, whence they gained a magnificent view of the land beyond. “The nek,” says Driver Childers, “flanked by its frowning crags, opened out into an immense amphitheatre of rich, undulating pasture-land, with a white farm here and there, half-hidden



Du Toit. De Wet.

[Photo by Mr. W. L. Langman.]

DE WET, HIS SECRETARY MR. DU TOIT, MAJOR STONHAM (OF THE YEOMANRY HOSPITAL), AND MR. STEYN (A RELATIVE OF THE EX-PRESIDENT).

had thus brought some result, as from the point gained an attack could be directed upon the Boer forces holding the nek. The British casualties were 12 killed and 74 wounded.

The night which followed was thick and misty. In the darkness, the Boers, fearing an assault with the bayonet, had fallen back from the rock-bastions commanding the entrance to the pass. They still held the nek where it became a mere narrow ravine between precipitous cliffs. In the mist four companies of the Highland Light Infantry, guided by two of Lovat's Scouts, succeeded in reaching the summit of the ridge a little to the right of the Black Watch. They encountered no opposition. Meantime, Rimington's Mounted Infantry, the rest of Lovat's Scouts, and the Seaforths began a wide turning movement on the left of the Black Watch, covered by a field battery. When day broke and the mist lifted, the Boers shelled the Black Watch heavily with a Creusot gun, and opened a sharp rifle fire upon the Highland Light Infantry. The British artillery replied with effect; the heavy guns made the Boer Creusot their target, and at the third shot one of the 5-in. "cow" guns silenced it. The Seaforths closed in on the Black

Watch, and then received orders to charge and capture the point where the mountain-path disappeared over the ridge. At this point the enemy had many sharpshooters concealed behind the rocks. To assist the assault, the Black Watch were directed to maintain a rapid unaimed rifle fire upon the Boer position. This had been found by experience to be a most useful auxiliary. "The most effective method of driving the Boers from their generally



MAJOR-GENERAL R. A. P. CLEMENTS, D.S.O., A.D.C.

[Photo by Chancellor.

On January 18, 1900, General Clements, in command of the 12th Brigade, reinforced General French in the Colesberg district; on February 27 he occupied Rensburg, and on March 8 he crossed the Orange at Norval's Pont to join Lord Roberts' army at Bloemfontein. On March 27 he occupied Fauresmith; in May and June he took part in the operations against Prinsloo; in August he operated with Paget in the Pietersburg district, and at the close of the month took charge of the troops around Krugersdorp.

**Moral effect of
unaimed fire.**

well-chosen ground," says Major Callwell, who fought with General Buller's army throughout the campaign, "is to pour fire in the direction of the spot whence the hostile bullets appear to be coming. The enemy is often quite invisible. The exact position of the hostile marksmen can only be guessed at. But the rain of bullets does its work . . . the moral effect of the incessant 'ping-ping' around each lurking place is more than the average Boer can stand."

Helped by such a stream of lead directed upon the enemy's cover, the volunteer company of the Seaforth's made a splendid dash, and about mid-day reached the crest of the ridge. The Boers now gave way in all directions. Dressed in khaki, they could be seen bolting down the inner slope of the mountains to the Brandwater Valley, till the whole wide plain below was covered with twos and threes of them in precipitate retreat.

**Boers driven from
the ridge.**

Hon. Hugh Fraser. Lieut. MacDonald, Skibost. Lieut. Ewen Grant. Capt. Stewart, Ensay. Lieut. Hunt. Lieut. Brodie of Brodie. Lieut. Sir A. J. Campbell-Orde.



Lieut. Fraser-Tyler.

Major Hon. A. D. Murray
(commanding).

Lord Lovat.

Capt. MacDonald
(Adjutant).

Capt. Ellice.

OFFICERS OF LORD LOVAT'S CORPS.

This corps of "Scouts" was recruited mainly from Highland ghillies. The officers represent some of the bluest blood of the Scotch Highlands.

The "cow" guns sent a few shells after them with some result. Thus the pass of Retief's Nek was won and access to the valley behind it secured at a total cost of only about a hundred casualties. The comparative ease with which the victory had been achieved must be ascribed to the excellent reconnoitring of Lovat's Scouts as much as to the courage and endurance of the troops

engaged. It is not surprising to learn that General Hunter publicly thanked the Scouts for their work. In the afternoon of the 24th the baggage was got

over the pass, and the troops, effecting their junction with Paget and Clements, camped inside the Brandwater Basin. They were now able to threaten from the rear the Boer positions at Commando Nek and Wit Nek, which henceforth became quite untenable.

**British camp in the
Brandwater Basin.**

Further to the east, at Naauwpoort Nek, Bruce Hamilton, with his attenuated force, had been able to do nothing more than to demonstrate against the debouch from the nek. He was reinforced on July 25 by Macdonald's Brigade, and Macdonald himself took charge of the operations. It was a strange chance that had brought these two men together. Years before, in old Majuba days, as lieutenants, they had both served under the

**Strange re-union of
Bruce Hamilton and
Macdonald.**

ill-fated Colley, though fortune had willed that they should not fight side by side; and now, as Major-Generals, they were confronting the self-same enemy in a campaign which was to retrieve the dishonour that followed upon Majuba.

On the 26th Macdonald detached the mounted infantry to seize a group of kopjes lying to the east of the entrance to the nek, and commanding it. These kopjes Bruce Hamilton had found to be

held by
Seizure of kopjes at the ene-
Naauwpoort Nek. my, but,

perhaps alarmed at the arrival of Macdonald with reinforcements, the Boers had already retired, so that the mounted infantry encountered no opposition. At the same time the Black Watch assaulted a precipitous ridge jutting out from the main range of the Roodeberg, through which runs Naauwpoort Nek, and flanking the pass. The attack was successful, and the troops pushed along the summit of the ridge towards a square kopje, which stood up like a natural fortress with scarped sides, at the further end of the ridge, where it joins the main mountain chain. Here the Boers had two guns, and these plied the advancing Highlanders with shell till the fire of a British field battery made things so hot for the enemy that they limbered up and retired to the left. As they did so, a large force of Boers in hiding to the left of the kopje mounted and hurried off, running the gauntlet of the big lyddite shells from the

British 5-in. "cow-guns," which had now opened. Presently it was seen by the British that the

Escape of Boer guns.

Boer guns had got into a tight corner. They had dashed off to the left of the nek, along the plain at the foot of the main ridge; but the ridge in this direction was impracticable for artillery, owing to its steepness, and the guns had in consequence to wheel and pass along the British front in order to reach the nek and effect their safe retreat. Desperate attempts



H. C. Seppings Wright.

[After a sketch on the spot.]

THE BOERS RETIRING AFTER THE ACTION AT RETIEF'S NEK

were made to stop them. A field battery with the 5-in. weapons opened on the Boer guns, which were hauled by a couple of hundred men in addition to the gun teams. The field battery could not



FIRING A 5-INCH "COW GUN" AT LONG RANGE.

The 5-inch military gun goes in South Africa by the name of "cow gun," because, like the 4.7-inch naval gun, it is drawn by teams of oxen. The heavier guns travel, when possible, by rail, and the lighter are horsed.

reach them; the "cow-guns," from their weight, could not be rapidly brought to bear upon them. But when the "cow-guns" did at last fire they planted two heavy shells, as it seemed to all, right upon the Boer guns. Orders were now sent to the mounted infantry, who were watching the

mouth of the nek from a distance, to try to cut off the escaping artillery. In doing this they were to keep clear of the field of fire of the entrenchments in the nek, which were known to be most strongly held. "The mounted infantry spread out," says an eye-witness, "in a wide, sweeping line, extending on the right towards the nek, on the left—with which I continued—towards the guns. It was too late to head the guns, however, and at the same time to avoid coming within range of the hills of the nek, which they were now rapidly nearing. Suddenly, but luckily at very long range, a deafening roar of fire burst out from the right side of the nek, and simultaneously one of the Boer guns swung round, and fired three or four shells in quick succession point-blank on our left wing. Those who had been through the campaign declared that they had heard no such storm of fire since Paardeberg." If the range had been nearer the mounted infantry would have been annihilated; by dismounting and instantly taking cover, their casualties were limited to thirteen.

Thus the attempt failed, and the Boer guns were able to reach the pass, over which, in spite of several shots from the "cow-guns," they speedily disappeared. At nightfall, as an attack on the pass was out of the question with the enemy present in such force, the troops fell back. Next day, however, the Boer positions were carefully reconnoitred, and the British hold on the eminences commanding the nek from the east strengthened.

Reports that day reached the British generals to the effect that the enemy were escaping through the Golden Gate, a pass yet further to the east. The whereabouts of this pass in that wild mountain region was uncertain; it did not figure



EARLY MORNING ON THE VELDT.

in the maps, and as to its capabilities, the most divergent accounts were given by Boer witnesses. Some declared that it was quite impassable, others that it was perfectly practicable for mounted men and waggons. Accordingly, it was determined to move towards it and secure it on the 28th. A force was left to look after Naauwpoort Nek, while Macdonald and Bruce Hamilton marched with the rest of their brigades along the bad track which runs below the great mountain ridge of the Roodeberg. The country was favourable to delaying tactics on the part of the enemy, and the British generals had to fight every mile of the way, though the opposition was nowhere very serious. At nightfall, however, the outlet to the pass was reached; here Bruce Hamilton encamped, while Macdonald marched back to Naauwpoort Nek.

But the British troops had arrived at the Golden Gate too late. Already the Boer commandant Olivier, with the Harrismith commando and others of the Boers, to the strength of about 1,500 men, had made a dash through the mountains and got away. It is not probable that they succeeded in withdrawing any of the waggons and carts, for the tracks along which they passed were extremely bad, yet—how we do not know—they did carry off five guns. “They made

Flight of Olivier.



Percy F. S. Spence.]

[After photographs by a British officer.

THE ATTACK ON THE BOER POSITION NEAR FOURIESBURG.

their way,” says a correspondent with General Rundle’s force, “through a piece of ground known as Witzies’ Hoek, and from thence through a ravine which almost beggars description. . . . The ravine was a long, narrow gap between mountain ranges of immense height. . . . The only track which a horseman could possibly follow wound in and out alongside the face of the cliffs, so narrow that even the horses bred in the country found it difficult to keep their feet upon it, and could only proceed at funeral pace in single file.”

On July 29th Macdonald succeeded in capturing Naauwpoort Nek. The enemy had left only a weak rearguard, which retired after firing a few shots as the Seafortths advanced to the left of the Nek, and the Highland Light Infantry, Sussex Regiment, and Bedfords deployed and pushed up into the mouth of the pass. Thus an entrance into the

Naauwpoort Nek secured.

Little Caledon Valley at its northern end was secured, and the work which had begun with the forcing of Retief’s Nek and Slabbert’s Nek was carried a stage further. The enemy within the valley had now no possible means of retreat, unless they were willing to abandon their waggons and cattle. Naauwpoort Nek, by which they had expected to be able to get away, had

been captured; Golden Gate was closely watched; and from the south a strong British force was advancing up the Little Caledon Valley to attack them.

Rundle, the moment Retief's Nek and Slabbert's Nek had been captured, was able

**Rundle's dash for
Fouriesburg.**

to make his way
through Com-

mando Nek, now abandoned by the Boers, and to march on Fouriesburg. On the 25th he was within a few miles of the place, and, determined to snatch the prize, he sent on in advance a small party of mounted men of Driscoll's Scouts—under that famous and daring Irishman, Captain Driscoll—and of the Scots Guards—these last commanded by Lord Kensington. They were to ride

"hell for leather," as the saying is,

and secure for the Eighth Division the honour of hoisting the British flag over Fouriesburg. "It was a reckless ride," says the war correspondent, Mr. Hales, "as they, with the captain on his grey stallion, half a length in front, darted through gullies, drew rein and unslung rifles up hill, now standing in



EX-PRESIDENT STEYN (on the left) HOLDING A CONSULTATION WITH BURGHERS DURING HIS RETREAT WITH DE WET.

the stirrups to ease their cattle, now sitting tight in the saddle to drive them over the open veldt, taking every chance that a dare-devil crew could take, pausing for nothing, staying for nothing. Right into the town of Fouriesburg they galloped, down from their saddles they leaped, up went the rifles, the foe poured in a few shots, and appalled by the devilish audacity of the deed, fled before a handful. It was a proud moment then, when in the last stronghold of the foe in all the Free State, Kensington, the aide of the general of the Eighth Division, with a little band of officers grouped around him, with the Scouts and Scots Guards lying behind cover, rifle in hand, pulled down the Orange Free State flag in the very teeth of the foe."

There was some fighting in the village with a handful of Boer snipers, and then General Rundle himself arrived at the head of the Yeomanry with his column. He was greeted with wild cheers from the British prisoners and the few British sympathisers in the place. An hour or so after him a column of mounted men moved in from the north, led by General Hunter. Behind him rode Brabant's Horse and Rimington's Scouts. He, too, had a splendid reception from the men whom his efforts had rescued from captivity.

On the 28th Rundle and Hunter advanced from Fouriesburg to Slaapkrantz, the pass leading from the valley of the Brandwater into the valley of the Caledon, at its south-western

**Slaapkrantz, a
natural fortress.**



A TROOPER OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY.

end. The Boer position in this quarter was of extraordinary strength. "Four miles east of Fouriesburg," says a correspondent with Hunter's army, "the ground becomes a perfect series of natural fortifications that would defy the most scientific designer of redans, fosses, precipitous scarps and glacis, with smooth turfy parapets crowning the summits of the bastion-like kopjes, to improve upon.

The final position, Slaapkrantz, was a wonder of Nature's efforts at military engineering. The approaches to the heights are flanked by precipitous spurs, up which the road, zig-zagging between overlapping rows of steep, fort-like kopjes, winds through a narrow natural gateway. Above this rise massive tiers of rocky walls surmounted by a level parapet or platform on which the Boer guns and trenches were placed. At the top of the cliff, commanding the entrance, was a huge mass of rock hollowed or water-worn so as to form a perfect pent-roof with apertures ready made for a man to deal death to those below, as from a machicolated tower of stupendous strength."

Against this fantastic fortress, which could only be adequately depicted by the brush of a Doré, the Royal Irish, Leinsters, Scots Guards, Wiltshires, and Brabant's Horse advanced. It was garrisoned by some 800 Boers with two guns. The proceedings opened with a vigorous artillery bombardment.



J. H. Thornely.]

THE RUSH FOR FOURIESBURG.

Driscoll's Scouts and Lord Kensington's Scots Guards racing for the honour of pulling down the Free State Flag in the last stronghold of the Orange River Boers.

conducted by two 5-in. guns, a Hotchkiss, and three field batteries. So effective was the fire of the 5-in. weapons that the Boer guns only discharged five shots and then retired from the contest.

The height carried. Impregnable to frontal assault, the fortress was threatened by turning movements on either flank. The Scots Guards and Leinsters pushed up on the left, the other troops on the right, but so long as daylight lasted the final assault could not be pressed home. The Scots Guards and Leinsters, however, succeeded in reaching a donga which was favourably placed to shelter them from fire until the attack could be made, and in it they remained, pouring bullets upon the Boer position till nightfall. In the dusk they dashed forward and carried terrace after terrace in the finest style. The enemy showed signs of retreating, and towards midnight the British officers called on their men to rush the final position. The reply of one of the Leinsters is recorded, "Put a tot of rum at the top and we'll get there." They got there all right, and they got the rum next day. Owing to the half-hearted resistance of the enemy this success was achieved with less than a

dozen casualties. A few Boer prisoners were taken, who confessed that the burghers had lost heart and would surrender if they were treated as prisoners of war.

The performance of the Scots Guards on this occasion was enhanced by the fact that on the day before they had completed a march of twenty-seven miles in forty-two hours, and this in country of exceptional difficulty. The beaten Boers fell back up the Caledon Valley towards

Boers hemmed in.

Naauwpoort Nek, where Macdonald's guns had been heard all day. But that way there was no exit for them. Some 5,000 men strong, with an immense number of cattle and waggons, they were now penned up in the valley, bordered on either side by snow-clad mountains, the passes through which were securely held. Prinsloo, who was in command, already despaired. Early on the 29th, immediately after the capture of Slaapkrantz, as the Middlesex Yeomanry were out reconnoitring, they saw three men with a white flag. They were brought into the British lines and examined, when they proved to be

Emissaries negotiate.

Boer emissaries sent to negotiate a surrender. Taken before General Hunter, they informed him that Prinsloo requested four days' armistice in which to consult his burghers and fellow commandants. Such a demand was, of course, preposterous; if granted it would probably have issued in the escape of the bulk of the enemy. But Hunter was not a general to be played with. He replied that within twenty minutes the enemy must unconditionally surrender, or his guns would open on the nearest Boer position. The twenty minutes passed in earnest protestations by the chief Boer emissary, while the general stood, watch in hand, unmoved. The time elapsed; Hunter called up his aides and orderlies and directed them to give orders to the troops to put themselves in motion and to the 5-in. guns to open fire. Before the aides had ridden off, the head of the Boer deputation, a Mr. Vilonel, whipped from his pocket a letter from Prinsloo, ready signed, tendering his unconditional surrender.

This piece of useless duplicity was amusing. General Hunter did, however, make one preliminary concession with Lord Roberts' consent. This was that the surrendered burghers should be considered as prisoners of war. Technically, under

Hunter's diplomatic concession.

British proclamations, they were rebels, but it was, of course entirely out of the question to treat them as such. Hunter also consented to allow all who surrendered the use of their horses, until the point on the railway where they were to entrain for ultimate transport to Ceylon was reached, and to pay them a fair price for waggons surrendered, so that they would go into banishment with a good sum in their pockets. This astute move was dictated by the consideration that it was, above all, important to get hold of the Boers. It was impossible for them to carry off their waggons, which must inevitably have fallen a prey to the British.



THE FLAG WHICH FLOATS OVER PRETORIA.

The three ladies represented in this photograph, whose home is near Capetown, made the flag as a present for Lord Roberts, with the request that it should be used at Pretoria. This request was complied with, and the flag, which is 12 feet long, was hoisted by the Duke of Westminster after that by Lady Roberts had been hauled down. (See "With the Flag to Pretoria," p. 650.)

But it was possible for the burghers themselves to steal away over the mountains in twos and threes, and then to escape, since 20,000 British troops could not effectively guard at night a line of twenty or thirty miles long. Hunter doubtless argued that, loving their waggons as the Boers did, they would prefer to stay and sell them to him, rather than to escape and roam that wild corner of the Orange Colony without resources.

And so it proved. Some of those who had actually got out of the trap before it closed, came back and surrendered, anxious that no one else should pocket the payment for their waggons.

On a hill to the north-east of Slaapkrantz the British force encamped. "It was a fine prospect before us," writes Captain Mildmay of the Yeomanry. "The scenery was quite Alpine; in the distance the Basuto Mountains, at our feet peak after peak of wildest grandeur, stretching up to the Golden Gate. . . . Very lovely it looked in the early morning in the brilliant sun, after a very frosty night, a sunrise haze in the valleys to our immediate front, looking at the rising sun, while the golden colour of the bold ranges on each flank was relieved by shadows of the deepest blue. The air at this elevation of 5,000 feet was quite splendid."



H. C. Seppings Wright.

[After a sketch by M. F. R.]

GENERAL PRINSLOO'S LAST STAND IN THE VALLEY OF THE LITTLE CALEDON,
Showing the positions held by the Boers on the heights.

The air at this elevation of 5,000 feet was quite splendid."

On the 30th General Clements, escorted by the Yeomanry, rode up to the first Boer camp to arrange the details of the surrender. Prinsloo was among the first of the Boers to come into the British lines, and was received with every honour, but his words did not increase confidence



GENERAL PRINSLOO.

From a photograph taken since his surrender.

in Boer good-faith. It appeared that many of the 5,000 burghers, for whom he had acted as spokesman,

Prinsloo surrenders. repudiated his right to pledge them, and that it was more than

doubtful if all would lay down their arms, and if they would give up their seventeen guns. Commandant Roux, a minister of the Dutch church, was especially indignant at the surrender, and disputed Prinsloo's authority. But after some hours of waiting a large commando came into sight, marching in, in double file. Hunter and Rundle drew up with their staff to meet it, under a tall post on which floated the British flag; infantry two deep, with fixed bayonets, lined the road for a mile; and a great array of mounted men and artillery, with the two big 5-in. "cow-guns," completed the spectacle. The Boers rode up, headed by Commandants Crowther and Villiers; Crowther in person handed his rifle and bandolier to the British generals, with whom he remained in conversation while his men were stacking their arms. As at Paardeberg, they were a strange

Condition of the prisoners.

crowd and made no very favourable impression. There were white-haired old men and young boys mingled with those of fighting age. All rode small ponies, with bright coloured rugs—the only touch of colour in the display. Their clothes were of rough country cut and make, with here and there a khaki tunic or service overcoat, stripped

from some captured British soldier. One and all they seemed glad to be out of the war. In all, on the 30th, 986 men, with 1,432 horses and one Krupp 9-pounder, made their surrender.

As the other commandos delayed to come in, operations against them were at once resumed; but the wise measures of General Hunter and sober reflection led the Boers to think better of escape. On July 31 Commandant Roux, with 1,200 men, laid down his arms near Slaapkrantz, while on the same

Sheds of military guard.

Tents of Royal Engineers.



CAMP OF THE BOER PRISONERS IN CEYLON.

(Photo by J. W. Andree, Colombo.)


Diyatalawa ("The Happy Valley") is a salubrious cup-like depression, over 5,000 feet above sea level, in a group of mountains in the centre of Ceylon. The Boers are located in long wooden houses with corrugated roofs, 150 feet by 25 feet, each accommodating forty-eight prisoners and lighted by electricity. The encampment is protected by barbed-wire fences and dominated by Maxims. The skeleton buildings seen in the foreground of the photograph have since been completed as kitchens. To this spot the Boers who surrendered with Prinsloo were transported.



K. H. H. H. H.

[After a sketch by Major Komily, D.S.O., commanding 2nd Scots Guards

SURRENDER OF GENERAL PRINSLOO. July 30, 1900



H. C. Seppings Wright.]

[After a sketch on the spot.

SURRENDER HILL, THE SCENE OF THE FORMAL SURRENDER OF GENERAL PRINSLOO AND HIS FORCES, July 30, 1900.

day Commandants Duploy, Potgieter, and Joubert, with about as many more and with one cannon, surrendered to Bruce

Other commandos yield.

Hamilton at Golden Gate, whither they had gone hoping to escape. During the next day or two other scattered parties came in,

completing a total of 4,140 men who surrendered and were sent to Ceylon as prisoners of war. Three guns in all were captured; at least a dozen, including a heavy Creusot, must have been buried or concealed in caves in the mountains. At Naauwpoort immense quantities of ammunition were destroyed, but

there must have been large reserves hidden. The hundreds of waggons and thousands of horses and ponies taken were handed over to the transport and remount departments of the Army.

Thus General Hunter's operations were crowned with signal success, and he has to his credit much the largest haul of prisoners made during the war. A certain number must have escaped besides Olivier's and De Wet's men, but there were no means of preventing this. The number of detached columns, whose movements had to be timed simultaneously, and the extraordinary difficulty of the country, added to the brilliancy of the achievement. There now remained in arms in this quarter of the Orange River Colony, De Wet having gone elsewhere, only Olivier's 1,500 men and a few scattered bands, totalling between them perhaps as much as a thousand more.

**Pursuit of Olivier.
Capture of Harrismith.**

Olivier was at once pursued. Macdonald, on August 1, started to march to Harrismith, in which direction Olivier had retreated, and Rundle, with a brigade of infantry, a battalion of Yeomanry, and three batteries, followed a day behind, moving through Naauwpoort Nek. Macdonald entered Harrismith on August 4, where on the following day he was joined by Rundle and by two squadrons of cavalry from Natal, who pushed up through Van Reenen's Pass. The railway to Ladysmith was at once repaired and used to provision the troops. Meantime, Olivier, though closely followed, succeeded in eluding envelopment and capture.

At Harrismith a general order was issued to the men of the Eighth Division, thanking them for the cheerfulness with which they had faced "exceptional privations," and for the zeal with which they had co-operated in carrying out Lord Roberts' orders. The privations, it stated, had been necessitated by military exigencies, but with the opening of communications with Natal they would cease.



ANOTHER PORTRAIT OF PRINSLOO.



[Photo by W. L. Caney.]

HARRISMITH: THE MARKET SQUARE, COURT HOUSE, POLICE STATION, AND DUTCH CHURCH.

The town was entered by General Hector Macdonald August 4, and by General Sir Leslie Rundle August 5 (see p. 36). The photograph shows in the foreground two of the long Cape waggons, with their teams of oxen, such as are used for carrying supplies for the armies of both combatants.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST PURSUIT OF DE WET.

De Wet escapes from Slabbert's Nek—Skirmishes near Lindley—Destroys rolling stock on the railway—Reaches the Vaal—Feeble opposition—Broadwood and Little in pursuit—Attempts to hinder De Wet's crossing—Kitchener blocks the drifts—Boers' feinted move east—Cruel treatment of British prisoners—De Wet crosses the Vaal—Kitchener follows him—Hardships of Methuen's troops—Skirmish at Tygerfontein—Potchefstroom evacuated—Pursuit of the enemy's rearguard—De Wet crosses the Gatsrand—Smith-Dorrien attempts to intercept him—Methuen's attack near Cyferbult—Recovery of waggons and prisoners—De Wet barred by the Magaliesberg—Escapes by Olifant's Nek—Failure of the combined movement—Baden-Powell occupies Rustenburg—Hanbury Tracy finds the town evacuated—Determines to hold the position—Recovery of the passes—Colonel Airey attacked at Koester River—Arrival of reinforcements prevents surrender—Baden-Powell cut off at Rustenburg—Boers attack the garrison at Eland's River—Relief attempted by Carrington—De la Rey's overtures rejected—The garrison relieved by Kitchener—Baden-Powell leaves Rustenburg for Eland's River—De Wet occupies Rustenburg—His further movements.



De Wet escapes from Slabbert's Nek.

CHRISTIAN DE WET, his younger brother Pieter, and Mr. Steyn had passed through Slabbert's Nek late on July 15, with a force which is variously estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000 men, accompanied by several guns. Each burgher had one, if not two spare horses besides that he rode; what little baggage was with the commando was mainly carried in light, fast-travelling carts, though there were a few ox-waggons with the Boers. De Wet headed towards Lindley, and on the morning of the 16th he detached a rearguard

of 400 or 500 men to occupy General Paget's attention while he slipped away. Paget had not sufficient mounted men to follow him closely; the few he had were needed for the work of closing the exits from the Brandwater Basin. The moment De Wet's escape had been ascertained, however, Hunter gave orders to General Broadwood with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and Ridley's Brigade of Mounted Infantry to follow in pursuit. At the same time Colonel Little, temporarily commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Heilbron, was directed to



MULE CART OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY. [Photo by Gregory.]

join in the chase. Unhappily De Wet had already gained a considerable start, and this gave him a signal advantage even apart from the facts that he knew every inch of the ground on which he was manœuvring, and that the heavy burdens carried by the horses of the British cavalry, who rode 18, 20, or even 22 stone and who had no led remounts like the enemy, rendered rapid progress on their part almost impossible. It is indeed wonderful that Broadwood was able to do so much, and it speaks well for the energy of his character and the military qualities of the men he led that twice he came into contact with his enemy.

During the 17th-18th De Wet appears to have

Skirmishes near Lindley. passed round Lindley,

possibly intending to attack the place if he found it weakly held, possibly with the object of digging up or removing from their hiding-places guns and ammunition which are believed to have been concealed there. All this time he was being steadily pursued. "Morning after morning," says an Australian correspondent with



THE LACE DIAMOND MINES, NEAR KROONSTAD.

The Lace Diamond Mines are situated about seventeen miles north-west of Kroonstad, and are of comparatively very recent exploitation. During 1899, before the war, about 10,000 carats of diamonds were extracted, valued at about 30/- a carat. As yet there is no rivalry with De Beers.



THE TOWN HALL OF KROONSTAD.

The Government Buildings of the Free State, during the short time that Mr. Steyn occupied the town as his "capital" (March 13 to May 11, 1900). Kroonstad is a little town of a normal population of about 2,000. It is 877 miles from Capetown, and on the main line from there to Pretoria. It is situated on the banks of the Valsch River, which encircles the town on three sides. Before the war, the Dutch in the neighbourhood were particularly well-disposed towards the English.

till dusk—a long, resultless, uneventful skirmish. He broke up the enemy into two detachments and killed at least five of them, since that number of bodies were buried by his men. Broadwood struck the enemy at Palmietfontein, and fought a protracted rearguard action with them, in which the Australian Mounted Infantry particularly distinguished themselves. The West Australians charged, and got within fifty yards of a stone kraal held by De Wet's rearguard, losing their commandant, Major Moor, and six men. "They played with some success," says the correspondent already quoted, "the game which the Queenslanders started early in the campaign—that is, they held up their helmets on their rifles above cover, while their comrades shot the unsuspecting Boers who were firing

at the helmets. One of the enemy thus despatched we found with a bandolier full of soft-nosed bullets." The New South Wales Mounted Infantry had six casualties. At nightfall Broadwood had to report five killed and sixteen wounded in his column, but he buried eight dead Boers, so it is certain that the enemy suffered more severely. De Wet was able to escape in the darkness, marching his transport, as was his custom, by night, and it would seem that for a short time Broadwood lost touch of him.

From Palmietfontein De Wet turned sharply south and reached Paardekraal, seventeen miles east of Honingspruit station, on the

**Destroys rolling stock
on the railway.**

20th. Thence he moved rapidly to the railway, which he crossed a little to the south of Serfontein on the night of the 21st. He must have had perfect information as to the British movements and dispositions, since a train with £100,000 in specie on board, as was supposed, was proceeding north along the railway at the very moment when his force crossed the line. There were in all three trains. Of these the first two carried only details and stores, and were not troubled. The third had started from Kroonstad with the money and large quantities of hospital requisites and supplies under the escort of 100 details. This train De Wet stopped, but he learnt to his chagrin that an axle of the waggon containing the gold had become heated, and that the waggon had been detached and left at the preceding station. None the less the stores were an invaluable acquisition, and served to replenish his exhausted supply train. The railway was at once cut, and the telegraph line to Pretoria and Potchefstroom broken. Already his force had grown greatly in numbers. Picking up recruits from the occupants of farms on the line of march, most of whom had

been paroled by the British authorities and were supposed to have surrendered their arms, he was now followed by at least 2,500 men, if prisoners' reports can be believed. After burning the train and derailing the locomotive De Wet passed westwards. English scouts now showed behind him, and, to shake them off, he turned directly to the north, and rode towards the Vaal at Schoemann's



A. Pearse.]

[After a sketch by Capt. St. Leger.

THE PIPE OF PEACE.

This picture illustrates an incident which took place at Rhenoster River, where about twenty Free State burghers surrendered to the 1st Mounted Infantry. These Boers had been among the ambuscading party at Sanna's Post. The British soldier in the foreground of the picture also fought on that occasion and was attacked by three of the enemy, one of whom he struck in the face with the butt of his rifle, whereupon the others fled. When Captain St. Leger sketched the group, the soldier in question was asking tenderly after the man he had injured.

Drift. There he halted to rest his oxen and horses, worn out as they were by continuous rapid movements. The time, however, was not wasted. Small parties were detached, plundering, commandeering, foraging, and "sniping" in all directions. Entrenchments were constructed close to the line to protect the Boer camp.

Meanwhile the headquarters staff seem to have taken no very energetic measures to block De Wet's path north. The British army with its wretchedly inadequate supply of mounted troops had, it may be, no more mobile columns to spare for such a purpose; at any rate nothing effective was done. And yet Lord Methuen was not far off, and if he had received orders in time might have changed the issue of events. It does appear that at this juncture there was a want of judgment; yet, as all men know, mistakes are the commonest of occurrences in war.


Broadwood, with Ridley's Mounted Infantry and his own cavalry brigade, reached Vaalbank, midway between Lindley and Paardekraal, on

Broadwood and Little in pursuit. July 22, and on the 23rd marched to Roodeval, where he had to halt for supplies

and remounts. Little with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was somewhat behind. Broadwood moved with the utmost rapidity after De Wet, and on July 24 was close to the Vaal, near Reitzburg, in sight of the Boer camp. Had De Wet been the fine fighting general that he is commonly supposed, he should have seized the opportunity and handled Broadwood severely, since the British force was indubitably much inferior in number. Sharp skirmishing began, and Kitchener's Horse succeeded in capturing six waggons and a few prisoners, the latter tricked out in British uniforms. Broadwood rapidly entrenched himself in the neighbourhood of De Wet's camp, and sent for reinforcements, which only came up after exasperating delay. He was not, however, left unmolested by the enemy. Continual skirmishing went on between the British and Boer outposts, and De Wet made constant demonstrations as though he intended a serious attack. While he waited he constructed mountainous earthworks, to give the impression that he intended to stay and make a last desperate fight, but all the while he was quietly preparing a new drift across the Vaal, the waters of which river were now running low, as the two drifts known as Schoemann's and De Wet's were in some degree commanded by the British artillery.

To aid Broadwood, Generals Knox and Hart with about 3,000 infantry and mounted infantry were ordered to march up the Rhenoster from Kroonstad. On August 2 Knox fought a sharp skirmish with a party of Boers at Rhenoster Kop, capturing some waggons and a large quantity of cattle. The Colonial Division were now withdrawn from

General Rundle's command, and they also were pushed up the Rhenoster to Winkel Drift, which they watched. At the same time Lord Methuen was directed to march from Frederikstad upon Potchefstroom. This place he was to occupy, but he was not to move to the drifts of the Vaal and hold them, as we might have expected. On the contrary, he was directed not to prevent.



DE WET'S MOVEMENTS IN JUNE, JULY, AND AUGUST, 1900.

incorrect information had been received by the British headquarters at Pretoria, to the effect that De Wet intended to cross the Vaal without delay. In that case Methuen would not have time to get down to the drifts and block them, but would do better to wait where he was until De Wet showed his head. It was unfortunate, for the best opportunity of crushing De Wet that occurred in the whole war was thus thrown away. Finally, Smith-



LIEUT.-COLONEL VINCENT,
Of the Scottish Rifles, Commandant of Diyatalawa
Camp, Ceylon.


Dorrien was ordered to Frederikstad, there to be ready to support Methuen.

Lord Kitchener arrived at Broadwood's camp on August 5 and took over command.

Kitchener blocks the drifts.

At the same time
General Hart,

with some infantry and two 4·7-inch guns, reinforced the British line south of the Vaal. Steps were at once taken by the new commander to block the drifts. On the 5th orders were sent to Lord Methuen, now at Potchefstroom, to move his troops to Scandinavia Drift, which lies on the Vaal, eight miles below Schoemann's Drift. At the same time he was required to keep an eye upon Winkel Drift, which crosses the Rhenoster, some twenty miles to the south of Scandinavia Drift. Whether orders were given to other troops to watch Schoemann's Drift is uncertain, but presumably this point was not forgotten, and we can only conclude that whoever received the orders failed to arrive in time, since in the end the drift was left



THE DIYATALAWA DUM-DUM,
The organ of the Boer prisoners in Ceylon.

The prisoners include those who surrendered with Prinsloo (see p. 34). The little paper is about the size of a foolscap sheet and is printed by means of a gelatine copying apparatus. The reference in the third column to "the immortal Barkis" goes to show that Dickens is not unknown to some, at any rate, of the Boers, though the copying clerk has managed to mis-spell the name. The paper is, of course, "censored" by the British authorities.

unguarded. On August 6, Methuen was duly in position at Scandinavia Drift, and Knox was at Winkel Drift, Broadwood and Kitchener still confronting De Wet near Vredefort. But the wily Boer

had marked the growing strength of the British, and had determined that Cronje's fate should not be his. On the night of August 6-7, notwithstanding a heavy bombardment from the British guns, he forded the river, leaving a rear-guard to occupy Lord Kitchener's attention. Then he turned eastwards

Boers' feinted move east.

and marched along the north bank of the Vaal towards Lindeque's Drift, as though his intention was to recross into the Orange River Colony and move southward to his old hunting-ground on the railway. On this march the British prisoners

with his column were treated with the utmost brutality. According to the statement of Private Hastings, of the Railway Pioneers, who had been captured at Serfontein, "some of the prisoners

Cruel treatment of British prisoners.

dropped from sheer exhaustion. Their guards, after threatening them with death, freely used the sjambok and endeavoured to flog them along. Some who were too weak even to stand were placed in the waggons, the Boers saying that they

would not leave them behind to give information. Whenever possible the veldt was fired, and the country denuded of all food-stuffs. Every Dutchman *en route* was commandeered, and it was currently



DRYING CLOTHES AFTER A WET NIGHT.

stated that some who refused to serve were shot. Thinking he had left the British, De Wet proposed to camp for three days, but in the early dawn they heard the British artillery in the rear, and a scene of terrible confusion ensued. De Wet, in person, commanded the rearguard, and held the British until his convoy and main body moved to the west."

As will be seen from the above, the British had not allowed De Wet to slip away without an effort to overtake him. The moment Lord Kitchener realised that his enemy was across the Vaal

De Wet crosses the Vaal.

Kitchener follows him.

and hurrying east, he too broke camp and marched along the south bank of the Vaal, pressing his oxen and mules to the utmost. Unhappily they were in bad condition. The British had been compelled to camp in an unhealthy position, where the animals suffered much; moreover, the constant convoy work, dragging

supplies from the railway, more than 20 miles off, had exhausted them. De Wet had lived on the land and had swept it clear of all supplies, so that nothing was to be obtained in the neighbourhood. It took Lord Kitchener from August 7 to August 9 to reach Lindeque's Drift, only 25 miles from the point at which he had been encamped. On the 9th he crossed the river and moved north.

Lord Methuen, on hearing that De Wet was crossing at Schoemann's Drift, had at once hurried east from Scandinavia Drift. No baggage was carried and his troopers rode light, but only at the price of the most terrible discomfort. Even blankets were left behind, and the meaning of this in wintry weather on a plateau 4,000 feet high will be clear to those who find cold weather sufficiently trying at sea-level under the shelter of a roof. To lie out night after night on the cold earth in hard frost with little to eat and no covering is the severest possible test that can be imposed upon civilised men. Yet this had been the experience of Lord Methuen's command for week after week from the beginning of May. In this round of daily discomfort, fighting, upon which the attention of those at home is focussed, becomes the merest incident.

From Scandinavia Drift Methuen marched swiftly to Tygerfontein. Here De Wet's rearguard was encountered holding a line of kopjes, but was quickly ejected, and the road north from



[J. Finnemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

BRITISH PRISONERS IN THE HANDS OF THE BOERS EXPOSED TO BRITISH ARTILLERY FIRE (p. 45).

Schoemann's Drift seized. Further to the east, however, the Boers were found in a yet stronger position. The Imperial Yeomanry attempted to outflank this position, without success. On this the British artillery opened fire, and the infantry prepared to storm the Boer line by a frontal attack. The Boers, too, brought up guns, but did not use them, for some unexplained reason—possibly because the Yeomanry directed a heavy rifle-fire upon the gunners. Finally, the Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced and carried the position with trivial loss, the enemy retiring only at the very last moment; and, according to an eye-witness, displaying more stubbornness under a tremendous shell-fire than they had evinced at any time since Magersfontein. One ammunition waggon was captured. In all the British casualties amounted to 15 killed and wounded. That night Lord Methuen camped at Tygerfontein, and there he remained next day—the 8th—as he was in doubt as to De Wet's intention. On the 8th he received despatches

Skirmish at Tygerfontein.



(Gregory, Photo.)

THE INSPECTION OF IMPERIAL YEOMANRY AT ALBANY STREET BARRACKS, January 26, 1900, PREVIOUS TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

The Prince of Wales (now King Edward VII.) shaking hands with the officers, who included Lord Chesham in command.

from Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts. The latter directed the evacuation of Potchefstroom, and accordingly Lord Methuen had to see that the stores there were destroyed; while the garrison of infantry had to join his column, thus further reducing its mobility—already none too great. Moreover, great quantities of supplies had to be burnt—supplies for which some days later the British would have given everything—and the moral effect of the abandonment of a place which was the old capital of the Transvaal was supremely bad.

**Potchefstroom
evacuated.**

Early on August 9 he moved east once more, and speedily located De Wet's rearguard in the mountains near Buffelshoek. The Boer waggons were seen moving north-east; the 4th Battery instantly unlimbered and opened upon them a heavy fire. The 3rd, 5th, and 10th Yeomanry were at once put in to the attack of a line of kopjes, which the enemy had seized to protect the retirement of their convoy. Covered by a heavy "Pom-Pom" fire, the 3rd Yeomanry advanced on the right, the 5th on the left, while the 10th protected the 5th from any counter-attack by the Boers on the exposed left flank. The line of kopjes was finely rushed, but beyond it was, as usual, yet another line, and in capturing this the 3rd Yeomanry lost their Colonel, Younghusband, and several men. Pushing forward, a number of killed and wounded Boers were seen, and the guns were able once more to open on the rear of the Boer convoy; but most of the waggons got away. Still, the shelling was not wholly ineffective. It is thus described by a British prisoner with the Boers: "I saw at a glance we were in an awkward fix, with two alternatives—either to be blown to pieces where we stood, or to run the gauntlet of a direct flank fire. De Wet soon settled it, and ran the gauntlet. Away we went helter-skelter up the steep slopes of the hills, aiming for an almost impossible-looking pass, strewn with gigantic boulders and small stones. We had just reached the pass when three waggons toppled over and fell down the gorge, and every moment we expected the same fate. The pass selected was an inconceivable place for vehicles to get through, but the Boer has a happy knack of negotiating difficult country. Over through

**Pursuit of the enemy's
rearguard.**



A SECTION OF THE POM-POM DETACHMENT OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

the nek we went, bumping and thumping on the boulders, and directly we showed on the other side we were greeted with shell, as British artillery had gained a position covering our exit. Shell after shell came whizzing over our heads; one struck ten yards on the right of our cart, another shaved our left, a third whizzed close by my head, causing a deafening sensation in my ears, and a fourth plumped right down in front of our leading horses, killing both. A crash, and over went the cart, flinging us through the air in company with mail-bags, Mausers, and cushions, landing amongst a pile of boulders. With great difficulty the Boers righted the cart, pulled the hood down, as being too conspicuous a mark, and putting in two horses we dashed off. Fortunately, when we toppled over the British stopped shelling; but, directly we started, whiz! bang! came the shells, until we reached a dip in the road which shielded us from view; and, dashing on, we caught up their main body, a mass of Cape carts and guns, yelling and shrieking drivers, flogging their oxen and urging them on, while the rattle of Mausers and boom of guns showed that a fierce rearguard action was in progress." Large parties of the enemy retired across the British front, offering a splendid target; yet, when it was seen that there were men amongst them who looked like British prisoners, they were spared. Lord Kitchener's guns were heard towards evening on the enemy's right rear, and the two British columns opened signalling communication. In all, during this day of arduous marching and continuous skirmishing, Lord Methuen captured six Boer waggons and two ambulances.



[Photo by Cowell, Simla.

COLONEL YOUNGHUSBAND,
Of the 3rd Yeomanry. Wounded at Buffelshoek.

During the night of August 9 Lords Kitchener and Methuen were encamped about eight miles apart; Kitchener on the right and east, Methuen on the left and west. On the 10th Methuen continued the pursuit, and by evening was at the foot of the Gatsrand range. Before him was the pass known as Buffelsdoorn, from which rose a cloud of dust, betokening that De Wet's transport and waggons were even then crossing the ridge. The enemy had escaped once more. Methuen at once decided not to attempt to force a passage across the range, but to turn west, and move round it to Frederikstad, in order to cut off De Wet from the western Transvaal, and to prevent any chance of a dash south-west to regain the

De Wet crosses the
Gatsrand.



[Photo by R. Weyt.

THE TABLES TURNED: BOER PRISONERS IN THE PRISON PREPARED FOR THE BRITISH OFFICERS JUST OUTSIDE PRETORIA.

Orange River Colony. As the guerilla was now evidently heading north-westwards a messenger was sent to General Smith-Dorrien, who had hurried up the Krugersdorp-Potchefstroom railway to the neighbourhood of Bank, asking him to do his utmost to keep De Wet from crossing the line. Unluckily the messenger did not arrive. But as Smith-Dorrien could not dispose of a good force of mounted men there is no

Smith-Dorrien attempts to intercept him.

doubt that he would not have succeeded in achieving this object. He had three

battalions of infantry and but 250 mounted men. The boots of many of his men were so worn that it was impossible for them to march. Half the reduced number of the City Imperial Volunteers that remained efficient had to be left behind at Bank for this reason, under Lord Albemarle. With the remnant of his force, strengthened by the West Yorkshires, he did, however, march rapidly back to Frederikstad on the 11th. There he was within signalling distance of Lords Methuen and Kitchener. There, too, he gave them the unwelcome news that in the course of the night De Wet had crossed the railway at Welverdiend, moving with such extreme rapidity that it was impossible to keep touch of him or even to feel certain whither he was going. It was no fault of

Smith-Dorrien or his men. All that energy on their part could accomplish had been done. The 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry had marched no less than 43 miles in 32 hours, and the City Imperial



[Photo by E. B. Ross.]

MAJOR-GENERAL BADEN-POWELL.

This portrait, which was taken in Mafeking during the siege, is interesting as being the one from which the siege stamps were made. (See "With the Flag to Pretoria," p. 621.)



LORD ROBERTS AND MAJOR-GENERAL BADEN-POWELL DISCUSSING THE WAR.

The photograph was taken in the grounds of the British Residency at Pretoria. Major-General Baden-Powell, after occupying Rustenburg on June 16, went to Pretoria to consult with Lord Roberts (June 18), whence he returned to Rustenburg, June 20.

Volunteers 30 miles in 17 hours. These astonishing performances prove how futile it was to dream of running down such an enemy with unmounted men. It may safely be said that no troops have ever marched better than these British infantry battalions; yet, after all their desperate exertions, all their cruel privations, they found their efforts were in vain.

At Frederikstad, which he reached after a harassing march across burned

Methuen's attack near Cyferbult. veldt, with a bitterly cold wind driving the dust and ashes into

the faces of the troops, "choking eyes, mouth, and nostrils," information reached Lord Methuen that the enemy was at Cyferbult with a large convoy. Cyferbult lay in the direction of Ventersdorp, and thither Lord Methuen marched with about 1,700 mounted men, two howitzers,

three "Pom-Poms," and ten guns. The force moved lightly, equipped with a bare minimum of supplies, as speed was all-important. The infantry followed in support. About noon of August 12 Cyferbult was passed, and to the north a few Boers were seen. Hurrying forward, the British advance guard suddenly discovered the enemy in force, with an immense convoy, crossing the front towards the north-east, and only four miles away. It afterwards appeared that De Wet felt confident of having out-distanced pursuit—he had covered some ninety-five miles in forty-eight hours—and had halted to rest his men. The Yeomanry instantly attempted to seize an eminence, which would have commanded the Boer line of retreat, but received so heavy a fire that it was plain nothing could be done until the guns came up. The ground, however, was extremely marshy, and this caused so much delay that De Wet's convoy was able to increase its lead greatly. When the artillery did come into action, it poured a most effective shrapnel fire into the Boer rearguard. A single projectile from the 78th Battery killed five horses dragging one of De Wet's guns, and compelled him to abandon the weapon, and nine waggons with it. It was captured and examined, when it proved to be one of the two guns lost at Stormberg—the other had been retaken at Bethlehem. This success encouraged the British troops, and led them to redouble their efforts. Dashing forward, the 5th and 3rd Yeomanry on the left, 10th Yeomanry in the centre,

Recovery of
waggons and
prisoners.

and Colo-
nials on the
right, not-

withstanding the utter
exhaustion of their horses,

compelled the Boers to abandon and set fire to five waggons and release some sixty of the British prisoners. Before dusk two more waggons were captured, and then, after thirty-two miles of the hardest marching, the British troops halted for the night, without food or water, to the north of Modderfontein, a farm which lies to the north-west of Potchefstroom. The darkness was lighted up by the lurid blaze of the burning waggons abandoned by De Wet; the released prisoners reported the utmost confusion and disorder in his ranks. Had the cavalry of Broadwood's and Little's Brigades been at hand, complete success was within our grasp; but there was no sign of Broadwood or Little.



J. H. Thornely.

THE DESTRUCTION OF DE WET'S GUN TEAM AND RE-CAPTURE OF ONE OF THE
15-POUNDERS LOST AT STORMBERG.

Though so far the pursuers had not succeeded in getting within reach of De Wet's main convoy or "rounding up" his force, hope still ran high. He had behind him Methuen, Kitchener, Hart, and Smith-Dorrien with, between them, 7,000 or 8,000 men. In front of him rose the Magaliesberg range, a wild, difficult, and almost roadless chain of mountains, across the western end of which the only passes practicable for wheeled vehicles are Commando Nek to the east, Olifant's Nek in the centre, and Magato's Nek to the west. Magato's Nek was supposed to be closed by General Baden-Powell; Olifant's Nek had been fortified, and a battalion of British troops had been left by Lord Methuen, some weeks before, to hold it; Ian Hamilton was expected to secure Commando Nek. Everything therefore seemed to indicate that the British forces, following De Wet from the south, would be able to drive him up against this mountain chain, and even if his burghers made good their escape by Kaffir tracks, to capture all his waggons and guns. At 3 a.m. of August 13, Methuen's column marched out upon what was fondly hoped would prove the last day of De Wet-hunting. Methuen speedily came into touch with the

**De Wet barred by
the Magaliesberg.**

Boer rearguard, and made himself reasonably certain that De Wet was heading for Olifant's Nek. It now seemed impossible that the Boers could escape.



MAJOR-GENERAL BADEN-POWELL LEAVING PRETORIA FOR RUSTENBURG AFTER HIS VISIT TO LORD ROBERTS.

Later on the 13th, however, a message came in from Lord Kitchener to the effect that the troops at Olifant's Nek had been withdrawn from the pass, and Rustenburg evacuated by Baden-Powell.

**Escapes by Olifant's
Nek.**

Apparently this measure had been taken without Lord Kitchener's knowledge. But it was added that Ian Hamilton was under orders to occupy the two passes by the 13th, and therefore, no uneasiness was felt by Lord Methuen. Only one line of escape now seemed open to De Wet, and soon after midnight of the 13th-14th, Methuen left camp, marching light with half a day's rations, to close it. This line of escape was the road running westwards to Zeerust, along the base of the Magaliesberg and giving access to the northern Transvaal by Magato's Nek. Moving all night, he found that the Boers had taken the precaution of placing men in a position commanding his advance, and auguring from this that De Wet was racing west, he made a long detour to head the enemy once more. While engaged in this detour



Lance Calkin.]

(After the most recent photographs.

CHRISTIAN DE WET.

De Wet is described as a kindly and just man, respected and loved by those under him, although he can be stern even to cruelty, as has been proved by his shooting of peace delegates and sjamboking of laggards. He is of medium height, square built, with blue eyes and fair hair.

signals were exchanged with General Broadwood, who was now in action with the Boer rearguard and who reported De Wet's whole convoy to be moving towards Olifant's Nek. At this welcome news Methuen at once took up a strong position to beat off the enemy, when they discovered their mistake and attempted to double back. It now seemed that the prey was secured. But as the panting British columns raced up from all quarters towards the pass, they were sadly disillusioned. In a cloud of dust the last of the Boer waggons were seen just vanishing over the ridge of the nek. There came no splutter of fire, no popping of rifles to indicate that their progress was opposed. From the very celerity and ease of the enemy's movements it was certain that there was no British force barring the road. The great combination had miserably failed; the troops had suffered the cruellest hardships to no purpose; the finest opportunity of destroying an enemy, who had won laurels by the simple process of cutting up small detachments and running away from anything stronger than a battalion, had been lost.

Failure of the combined movement.



[Photo by A. Reis & Co.]

THE FAMILY OF DE WET.

Photographed during their stay at Johannesburg, under British protection, while the British army was hunting De Wet himself.

"I cannot describe to you the consternation and disgust experienced by all ranks, from general to native driver," writes a correspondent with Lord Methuen. "All those exertions of days past—and really supreme ones—made nugatory by some bungling form of inactive administration! These passes were the key of the whole operation. It must have been obvious from the start, and yet, somewhere, trouble was not taken to send the necessary troops to close them. Rustenburg, like Potchefstroom, had suffered the same fate, and at one of the most crucial moments of the campaign, when the presence of troops there became imperative to success. Possibly people in England hardly appreciate the importance of capturing De Wet and his 4,000 or 5,000 followers to the same extent that we out here do, with our constant experience of his power. Thrice has he evaded a British cordon, and he is fast earning for himself a fame quite out of proportion to his real worth, due more to British mistakes than to his own Boer ability. He is now abroad once more, and free to roam where he may. Ultimately he will, I suppose, be caught, but that date is still far removed, unless some better co-operation is effected by columns that pursue him, and more concerted action by those who conduct the operations of this campaign."

Certainly it was no fault of Lord Methuen's or Lord Kitchener's. In the words of *The Times* correspondent with Lord Methuen's column, on whom we have drawn for many of our facts, "Nothing could have exceeded his zeal and generalship. He was untiring in his efforts. Shortness of food and forced marches, both by night and day, were counted as nothing. No movement of De Wet's was left unchecked, and to Lord Methuen alone belongs the credit of having driven the Boer army, a force far exceeding his own, into a corner from which, save through the mistakes of others, there was no escape." Had De Wet been the good soldier public opinion in England seems to have considered him, he would have turned on Methuen and torn him to bits.

This miserable issue of an arduous pursuit lasting eight days, in which 160 miles of exceptionally difficult country were crossed, and four actions fought, demands further examination. How was it that neither Baden-Powell nor Ian Hamilton were at the appointed positions in time? With regard to Ian Hamilton it would seem that an unpardonable mistake had been made in informing Lord Kitchener that he would be at Olifant's Nek on the 13th, since on that day he was at Blaauwbank, twenty-seven miles away to the south-east of the nek. It was therefore physically impossible for him to cover the distance and arrive in time.

There remains General Baden-Powell, whose move-

ments must
**Baden-Powell occupies
 Rustenburg.** now be nar-
 rated and

explained, as also certain incidents at Eland's River and the neighbourhood, with which Baden-Powell was indirectly concerned, and which may be best treated of here. Baden-

Powell on his march through the Western Transvaal in June had occupied Rustenburg—a place of great strategic importance, both from its proximity to Olifant's Nek and because it was a half-way house on the road from Pretoria to Mafeking. A small garrison of 80 men was stationed in the town and patrols were sent out to disarm the neighbouring country. Unfortunately no care was shown in collecting the weapons of the Boer population. Farmers, when asked if they had any firearms, would smilingly produce a blunderbuss or a muzzle-loader or a flint-lock, and the obsolete arm thus tendered would be unsuspectingly accepted by the British. The fruits of this careless lenity will be seen later. Had a vigorous search been made when the first two or three farmers palmed off these old guns on our troops, and had the farms been destroyed upon the discovery of concealed modern rifles, the effect of the example would have been salutary and the



A BOER AMAZON.

Mrs. Otto Krantz, the wife of a hunter, accompanied her husband to Natal and fought by his side at Elandslaagte, also in the battles on the Tugela, and afterwards in the Free State. She is not by any means the only Boer woman who has carried a rifle in the war, and used it.

disarmament something more than a farce. As it was, some hundreds of deadly enemies were left behind the main body of our troops, fully armed and prepared to join the first commando that appeared.

In the first days of July armed Boers began to beset all the roads round Rustenburg. In June it had been possible for individuals to move to and fro with safety, now large bodies found it difficult to pass from point to point without fighting. The Boer had discovered that the pastime of "sniping" Englishmen could be practised without harm or punishment to himself, and almost without discomfort, since at night he returned to his farm. It was a new, safe, but highly-exciting form of sport. German, Russian, French, or American generals would have promptly met such acts by the destruction of every farm in the region, and would thus have rendered it impossible for the Boers to subsist. But the British officers had to bow to authority at home, and to a certain type of British opinion, which, in its hysterical zeal for every cause but the British, holds the property of an enemy more sacred than the life of the British soldier. Still this deference does not excuse or explain away the carelessness displayed in disarming the Boers.

On the night of July 4 an order arrived from Pretoria directing the abandonment of Rustenburg and the destruction of all stores that could not be removed. The why and the wherefore of this order is hard to understand in the absence of the full official records and despatches. It may have been part of the policy of abandoning small posts which was half-heartedly adopted about this time, but from Lord Roberts' despatches it would seem to have been a mistake on someone's part. The garrison promptly retired from Rustenburg towards Zeerust, marching all the night of the 4th, all the 5th, and the morning of the 6th; but when close to Zeerust a counter-order arrived, directing the garrison to return. Meantime Baden-Powell was kept moving to and fro to the east of Rustenburg by contradictory orders, and Colonel Plumer, at Zeerust, received during July 7 no less than eight conflicting commands. Such were some of the results of an improvised headquarters staff—confusion and complete paralysis in the western field of war.

While things were in this condition a small force of 120 men, under Major Hanbury-Tracy, had returned to Rustenburg under the full impression that the town was still held by the British.

Hanbury-Tracy finds the town evacuated.

They found themselves in a most critical position. The withdrawal of the garrison had immensely encouraged the Boers in the neighbourhood, and the enemy's commandos had grown rapidly in strength. Hanbury-Tracy seized the jail and a kopje near at hand; here he was speedily beleaguered by 300 men. Not only did they demand his surrender, but orders also arrived from Pretoria directing him to abandon the place. To the Boer summons he replied in terms of humorous contempt; to the Pretoria order he returned the somewhat audacious answer, "I consider a retirement would be most impolitic, and I purpose holding out." His judgment was justified by events. Though on July 7 the enemy began to bombard him, at noon two squadrons of Australians, with a 12-pounder, came up from Zeerust, rode impetuously into the town, and with the co-operation of Hanbury-Tracy drove the Boers before them in flight, losing only two killed and two wounded. A day later Baden-Powell re-entered the place.

Determines to hold the position.

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[Photo by E. B. Ross.]

MAJOR-GENERAL BADEN-POWELL AND MAJOR HANBURY-TRACY.

The photograph was taken in Mafeking during the siege, and represents the gallant officers in their shell-proof "dug-out." They were both operating in the Rustenburg district in July, 1900.



CLEARING THE KOPJES AT RUSTENBURG.

R. Caton Woodville.]

It was now important to reoccupy the passes—Magato's Nek and Olifant's Nek—by which communication with the west and with Pretoria was maintained. The Boers, however, succeeded in seizing Olifant's Nek on the 10th; Commando Nek, a pass much further to the east and near Pretoria, they captured on the 11th. Magato Nek, now the only exit from Rustenburg, was, however, secured by the British in the very nick of time. As was advisable in view of the ever-growing strength of the enemy, Rustenburg was put in a position to offer a good defence, but the Boers had had enough of sieges and preferred to "snipe" the convoys and waggon trains moving from Mafeking and Zeerust to Baden-Powell's force.

**Recovery of the
passes**

It was absolutely necessary to clear away the enemy from Olifant's Nek, and to achieve this object a combined movement was ordered from Pretoria. From the south Lord Methuen was to march from Heckpoort with a column 4,000 strong. Baden-Powell was ordered to co-operate from the north, and to prevent the escape of the enemy in the nek, whose force was estimated at about a thousand. Lord Methuen's sudden appearance in this quarter is a good example of the rapid manner in which troops can be moved to and fro by railway. Methuen on July 13 was 33 miles to the east of Kroonstad. On July 18 he was at Krugersdorp with his whole force. The troops under his command were Douglas's brigade of infantry, consisting of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Loyal North Lancashires, and 2nd Northamp-tons, reinforced by the 2nd Shropshires and 1st Gordons from Smith-Dorrien's Brigade, and his own immediate command of Yeomanry, with the 4th and 78th Field Batteries, two howitzers, and two "Pom-Poms."

At 8.30 a.m. of the 21st he moved out to attack the nek. The enemy did not show in any great strength, and gave way slowly before a prolonged bombardment carried on by ten field guns and the two "Pom-Poms." The British troops, however, only forced them up into the hills, and did not succeed in driving the main body through the pass into the arms of Baden-Powell, who was supposed to be on the other side. As a matter of fact, Baden-Powell was not there. He had learnt that other commandos proposed attacks on Rustenburg from the north-west and east, and so decided to hold back his men at Rustenburg till he heard the sound of Methuen's guns. But the wind and the ground prevented the noise of battle from reaching Rustenburg till late in the morning. It was then impossible to achieve much. Plumer, with the Protectorate and Rhodesian regiments, rode in hot haste towards the pass, but only arrived there in time to see the enemy streaming away to the east. The Canadian battery opened at extreme range, and may have done some little damage to the enemy.

Methuen had to leave Olifant's Nek—stationing a battalion, however, to garrison it—and march south on the 22nd, as he heard that the enemy had slipped round him and were breaking the railway between Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp. This was a fairly exasperating state of things, since he had hoped that the country behind him was clear. Fresh misfortunes befell Baden-Powell's



BOERS RE-ARMED WITH SPOILS FROM THE BRITISH.

The man on the right, standing, is wearing British cartridge-pouches; the man in the centre has a British Lee-Metford rifle and bayonet.

column to the north of the Magaliesberg. Hearing that a Boer camp had been seen 25 miles from Rustenburg on the Zeerust road, Baden-Powell determined to attempt its surprise, as it was imperative to clear a road along which convoys were perpetually

**Colonel Airey attacked
at Koester River.**

passing. Accordingly, he ordered Colonel Airey, with 270 New South Wales, Queensland, Victorian, and West Australian troops, to leave Magato's Nek on July 21, attack the Boers, and bring in a convoy expected from Eland's River. Early in the morning of the 22nd, while it was still dark, the column was on the march, when several shots were fired at it, followed by two well-directed volleys.



HOSPITAL TRAIN WRECKED BY
DE LA REY.

On July 19 De la Rey put dynamite on the line near Bank Station, thirty miles south of Krugersdorp, and blew up a train which was carrying about twenty convalescents, some civilians, supplies of fodder, mealies, oats and potatoes. He took thirty-five prisoners, but afterwards released them. The supplies he distributed to Boers living in the neighbourhood; but these also were eventually reclaimed by the British.

Only one horse was hit, and, though none of the men in the detachment had previously been under fire, there was no confusion. The troopers hurriedly dismounted and felt their way through the bush in the darkness.

But no trace of the enemy could be discovered; the volleys seemed to have been delivered by impalpable ghosts. Taken thus by a concealed enemy, it was unsafe to proceed; the "Retire" was sounded, and the men fell back to the point at which they had dismounted, and there halted till dawn, shivering in the bitter cold, with the terrible sense of being beleaguered by invisible enemies. At dawn there



REPAIRING THE LINE BROKEN BY DE LA REY.

Lord Methuen, in a white helmet, talking to an officer of the Coldstream Guards, is watching soldiers repairing the damaged line.



TRUCKS WRECKED AND SET ON FIRE BY DE WET, NEAR KROONSTAD, July 21, 1900.

was still no indication of the Boers' presence. The march was resumed along a well-defined track leading to Eland's River, the force moving in column of twos, but with a good number of scouts ahead and on the flanks. The Koester River, which was crossed by a track leading off to the right and north, was generally parallel to the line of march. Colonel Airey, with two squadrons, crossed the river, so as to scout upon and clear its northern bank; three other squadrons followed the southern bank. Just as Airey had got well across a heavy fire was opened upon the



PATROL OF THE QUEENSLAND MOUNTED INFANTRY.

horsemen to the south of the river. Fortunately, the Boers fired carelessly and their aim was bad, or they might have destroyed the three squadrons. As it was, however, in very few minutes no less than 200 of the Australians' horses were put out of action. The troopers flung themselves flat in the long grass, or sought shelter behind trees and bushes; not a stone or boulder was to be seen anywhere.

It was 8 a.m. of July 23, when the Boers began this action. The only chance of safety for the Australians was to lie quiet on the ground, husband ammunition, and pray for the arrival of a relief force. When the Boers first opened fire in the night, Airey had sent a messenger back to Rustenburg, and he despatched others when morning came and matters looked serious. But for some reason or other his hurriedly scribbled notes gave the impression at Rustenburg and at Magato's Nek, which the messengers passed on their way, that the capture of the Boers, and not the surrender of the British, was possible. A brave Englishwoman named Miss Buck, who was living in a house on the Koester River, also rode at the peril of her life to Rustenburg to inform General Baden-Powell of what was happening.

The Boer fire, though at first inaccurate, soon became exceedingly galling. "Our intermittent firing," says Captain Echlin, of the Queenslanders, "did not cause the enemy to save his powder.



COMMANDO NEK.



POTCHEFSTROOM: THE COURT-HOUSE, WITH THE TRANSVAAL FLAG FLYING.

Possibly he surmised our object and kept pegging away. Gradually his aim got better, and the men got more cautious, never without absolute cause showing a particle of their anatomy." Lieutenants Leask and Walsh were severely wounded early in the fight. Several troopers were speedily killed or wounded. No ambulances could be found—possibly because they had driven into the bush when the enemy opened fire—and no shelter could be obtained for the wounded men.


About 2 p.m. Colonel Airey consulted his second in command, and, as the force was completely surrounded and there seemed no hope of relief, arrived at the conclusion that surrender was inevitable. Accordingly a white flag, made of five knotted handkerchiefs was shown. But here a source of embarrassment—indeed, something which the Boers might almost have described as a white-flag outrage on our part—occurred. A part of the force under Major Vial, at some distance from Colonel Airey, absolutely refused to surrender, and continued firing. It is only just to say that none of the Boers had shown themselves, and that there is no evidence of their suffering from our fire as had our men from theirs on the many occasions when they treacherously displayed a white flag.

Arrival of reinforcements prevents surrender.

They made no attempt to secure and disarm Colonel Airey and the men

about him, and while they were hesitating the first reinforcements arrived to save the British force.

About 2.30 p.m. the Australians heard several volleys sharply delivered to their rear. The sound cheered them, for they knew it meant British troops. A few minutes later, first 200 West Australians from Magato's Nek, under Colonel Lushington, came up, and then Captain FitzClarence with the Protectorate Regiment from Kustenburg. The heavy volleys were from the Protectorate men. They drove back the Boers by threatening their flanks and rear, and reached the scene of action. The greater part of the Australians were huddled together round two or three huts near the drift over the Koester; above the huts flew the white flag; about them were the wounded and dead horses. A general retirement was at once ordered, and the relievers and relieved returned to Magato's Nek, the Roman Catholic chaplain



A SERGEANT OF RHODESIANS.

with the Rhodesians carrying off the white flag as a memento. In all, the British losses in this affair were six killed and nineteen wounded.

These events produced consternation at Rustenburg. Baden-Powell was now

Baden-Powell cut off at Rustenburg.

cut off from the west, owing to the presence of the Boers, in how great force he could not know, between him and Zeerust. He was cut off from Pretoria, owing to the management which had allowed the Boers to make themselves masters of Commando Nek and Uitval's Nek.* He was short of supplies, through the disastrous evacuation of Rustenburg, in obedience to the orders from headquarters. He had given to Lord Methuen five waggo, -loads of food from his own small store, which had yet further depleted his reserves. He had not the faintest idea of the strength and whereabouts of the enemy, as the Intelligence Department had reported one strong Boer force—probably De la Rey's—in his immediate neighbourhood,



WHAT BOER "SNIPING" MEANS TO THE BRITISH SOLDIER.

This set of drawings was made from actual photographs representing an incident which occurred during the fighting with De Wet and De la Rey. A trooper employed on scouting duty dismounted to cut a wire fence; whilst doing this he was killed by a "sniping" shot; within two hours he was buried and the column to which he had been attached had marched on.

twenty miles north of Rustenburg, and yet Lord Methuen had now been recalled south to drive this same De la Rey from the railway line between Potchefstroom and



Krugersdorp, fifty miles south of Rustenburg. Were there two De la Reys? or had the real De la Rey a magic carpet to transport his army seventy or eighty miles in a single night? Baden-Powell's only channel of communication with the outside world was now by way of Olifant's Nek; but south of the nek the country was haunted by "snipers" and small commandos, so that it could not be safely traversed, except by considerable bodies of men. Thus, for the next fortnight, Rustenburg was practically besieged. Such were the fruits of carelessness in disarming the district, and of leniency, in permitting able-bodied burghers to go to

* This is the name given in official despatches. It appears on maps as Mosilikatze, or Nital's Nek.

their homes after taking an oath of neutrality, in passing over their breaches of this oath, and in leaving unpunished the acts of "snipers" and guerillas.



Edward Read.]

A CAMP SING-SONG.

Meantime, fresh incidents, some honourable, others quite the reverse, were occurring to the west of Rustenburg. At Eland's River, a little to the west of Koester River, where the action of July 22

had been fought, was a small British post. It consisted of four men of the Protectorate Regiment; eight of the British South African Police with one of the muzzle-loading pop-guns, which the up-to-date British officials thought good enough for use against the Boers, and one Maxim; 63 Mashonaland Horse; 145 Queenslanders; 51 Victorians; 111 New South Wales men; 22 Rhodesian Regiment; and 101 Southern Rhodesia Volunteers; a total of 505 men. The number of regiments and detachments which figured in this total illustrate to what an extent units had been broken up. Colonel Hore was in nominal command. The little force had been busy collecting weapons from among the Dutch farmers and protecting the lines of communication: it was encamped on a square kopje not far from the river. A convoy of eighty waggons had arrived on the morning of August 3, and was apparently waiting the advent of an escort from Rustenburg. The post continued in the most placid security. Stone schanzes had indeed been thrown up, but they were of such a nature as to give no shelter against artillery

**Boers attack the
garrison at Eland's
River.**



H. Dixon.]

TROOPER FORTUNE CUTTING LOOSE THE LIVING OXEN UNDER A HEAVY FIRE.

fire. There were no trenches, and, if the evidence of members of the garrison can be trusted, "the scouts used to consider that all they had to do was to ride round to the neighbouring friendly farms and purchase eggs, chickens, pork, and various other luxuries."

On the night of August 3 the garrison held a great "sing-song." Huge camp-fires lighted up the darkness, and the men sat round, echoing chorus after chorus. And all the while, guided by the glow of these very fires, the Boers, stealthy and noiseless as Red Indians, were slipping through the tropical bush which surrounded the post, and training their guns in readiness for an attack on the morrow. They were under De la Rey; their strength was placed at anything from 1,000 to 3,500 men, with seven guns, but certainly exceeded the lower figure.

At daylight of August 4 the enemy suddenly opened a terrific fire upon the camp. From the bed of the river, where the Boer marksmen had already crawled within 700 yards of the British line, an enfilading fire was poured upon the Colonials. No sign could be seen of the enemy; only from every side they rained bullets from behind perfect cover. One of the first shells fired passed right through.

the side of an Australian trooper, carrying off his arm, took off another man's leg, and smashed the rifle of a third to splinters. "We heard," says Captain Ham, of the Victorians, "the whistle of bullets just like a hive of bees swarming, splashing, and splintering on the rocks. Soon the enemy found the dense mass of 700 cattle close to us and within five yards of us, and two guns and a 'Pom-Pom' played into them. The oxen went down, and there was a panic among the wounded. They broke loose, and for half an hour threatened to trample us to death in their wild stampede."



THE UNION JACK AT ELAND'S RIVER.

This is the flag under which the brave Bushmen made their gallant defence. The photograph was taken by Captain F. J. W. Porter, R.A.M.C., on the day after the relief.

Trooper Fortune at this juncture displayed magnificent courage, releasing the uninjured from the wounded oxen. But barely had the cattle been killed or driven away when two "Pom-Poms" and a Boer 7-pounder opened on the horses. In a couple of hours, 200 or 300 of them had been killed or stampeded. At last one of the "Pom-Poms" was located and steady volleys fired at it, with the result that it withdrew. As for the solitary British cannon, it jammed at the fourth round and became useless. Yet the Colonial troops displayed the utmost courage, though many of



"MOUNT!"

The Bushmen on the road to Eland's River.

them were for the first time under fire, and though they had no chance of replying to the Boer artillery. To the Rhodesian Volunteers, under Captain Butters, who held the most exposed position on the kopje, the greatest credit is due. They fought like heroes. Lieutenant Annet, of the Queenslanders, was not less conspicuous for his courage. He crept forward into some bushes, whence he fired with deadly effect at one of the Boer "Pom-Poms."

Night fell at last, and with the darkness the Boer fire abated. Forthwith efforts were concentrated upon improving the defences. "All that night and till nearly daylight next day," says an Australian officer, "we worked to entrench ourselves. I had not to ask my men twice to dig for their lives. The formation of the kopje was rock, and our tools limited; even our bayonets were used, and we were fairly under cover by the dawn of day. . . . We had no water and had been in a hot sun all day. The enemy held all points of the hills round us, but we had to get water or surrender, so we decided to fight for it." The loss during the first day's bombardment had been seven killed and twenty-two wounded. During the night two more men were put out of action in the fight to reach the river. One quart of water for each man was brought back, and the surviving horses were permitted to drink their fill.

At daybreak the Boer bombardment recommenced. It was hotter than ever, and in the early hours of the morning no less than 600 shells were fired into the British camp. But, fortunately, the trenches constructed during the night were so excellent that there was little loss. Moreover, sufficient shelter was afforded by them to enable the men to dig rapidly and continuously, and with each hour the works grew stronger. At first the British replied with their rifles to the Boer fire, but the enemy's marksmanship was so excellent that this soon became very dangerous. "We had been told," says Captain Ham, "that the Boers cannot shoot, but this is all nonsense. If a head appeared above ground, four or five bullets whistled in close proximity. Several men were wounded in this manner and from long ranges."

The garrison was aware that a force under General Sir Frederick Carrington was on its way from Mafeking to its relief. Many eager glances were turned to the west during the morning of the 5th. What followed must be told in the words



GENERAL CARRINGTON AND THE MAYOR OF KIMBERLEY.

The photograph was taken at Marandellas on May 27, 1900, when an address was presented to General Carrington from the people of Kimberley.

of a Rhodesian with the garrison, but it should be stated that his account does not agree with the stories of corre-

**Relief attempted by
Carrington.**


spondents with General Carrington's column, and it may be hoped that it is exaggerated. He says: "We saw five men approach from the direction of Zeerust. These were Carrington's scouts. They had arrived at the drift across the river when the enemy fired at them. Four were taken prisoners, and one was killed in trying to escape. An hour after this we could plainly see a body of men and waggons coming from the same direction and marching in column. With my glasses I looked in vain for any sign of advance guard or flanking parties. I could hardly believe it possible that a man of Carrington's reputed colonial experience could march so carelessly through an enemy's country. . . . When Carrington's column arrived under a range of hills, the Boers opened fire with 'Pom-Poms' and heavy guns. I saw Carrington's 15-pounder come out, fire five shots, then limber up, and away. It was more than a retreat, it was a stampede; for, a fortnight afterwards, when we had been relieved and marched over the same ground with Methuen's force, we found the place of Carrington's camp littered with bandoliers, cartridges, and saddlery." Such was the attempt to relieve the place, as seen by the garrison, and whether their accounts are trustworthy or not, they all agree on the general facts. They further assert that the Boer force opposed to Carrington did not exceed 350 men and one "Pom-Pom." The versions of those with Carrington's column will be dealt with later, when we come to trace the fortunes of that column.

Carrington having precipitately retired, the British at Eland's River were left to their own devices. The enemy resumed the bombardment of the camp, and that night the garrison had to fight another sharp skirmish to get water. Only a few horses now remained out of the original total of 700, but the efficacy of good trenches in preventing loss is shown by the fact that the casualties of the second day did not exceed four or five men. With dawn of the third day a flag of truce came in from

De la Rey. He congratulated the British on their

defence
**De la Rey's over- under
tures rejected.** such a

fire and paid the Colonials the delicate compliment of stating that they were the best men he had as yet encountered. He demanded their surrender, offering to allow the officers to retain their swords; the men were to give up their rifles, and all the stores and food-stuffs in the camp were



THE TRENCHES AT ELAND'S RIVER.
The men are engaged in filling them in after the gallant garrison had been relieved.



[Photo by Captain F. J. W. Porter, R.A.M.C.]
PART OF THE INTERIOR OF THE "HOSPITAL" AT ELAND'S RIVER.
The Red-Cross flag which floated over this hospital was twice shot away by the enemy.

to be handed to him, but he promised to give the force two days' rations and a safe-conduct to Zeerust. A consultation was held, after which it was determined to fight to the last. A messenger was sent to De la Rey with this reply, and brought back the news that the enemy would next day open with a 94-pounder upon them. All day the Boer fire continued, and well after dark that night, when the British had left their trenches, a heavy salvo of shells was poured into the camp. One of the projectiles struck the gallant Lieutenant Annet in the stomach and killed him instantly. He was one of the best and bravest of the Queensland officers, and had already distinguished himself at the relief of Mafeking. Previously he had been wounded, but not in such a manner as to incapacitate him for duty.

To dishearten the garrison, the Boers circulated the report that Carrington had surrendered, but the Colonials stoutly declared that they would fight to the last, give no quarter and take none, and that if the white flag were shown they would go on firing. They told the Boers: "We are



THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND SOME OF THE REFUGEES WHO WENT THROUGH THE SIEGE OF THE ELAND'S RIVER POSITION.



THE BOMB-PROOF SHELTER AT ELAND'S RIVER IN WHICH THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE ACCOMMODATED.

all underground now: we have dug a tunnel down to the river and you can shoot away as much as you like—we shall fight to a finish." The tale about the tunnel was, of course, something of a piece of "bluff," as every night there was fighting to reach the river. The Boers, knowing that the Colonials fetched water after dark, trained their guns on the space intervening between the British camp and the stream, and the moment our men left their cover, fired. Fortunately only trivial losses were thus inflicted.

For thirteen days the siege continued monotonously with little incident. The bombardment was renewed, but it was languid, and there were no more such shellings as had to be endured

during the first two days of the siege. The nights, however, were frosty, and the force suffered much from cold and sleeplessness. The Boers regularly fired salvos of shells in the small hours of the morning, accompanying these heavy projectiles with a hail of rifle-bullets. The rents in the Union Jack bear testimony to the severity of their fire during the siege. At times, too, they tried to crawl up to the works under cover of darkness. The Colonials, however, were always ready for them, and gave them so warm a reception that the practice was soon abandoned. One Boer climbed into a tree near

the trenches during the night and "sniped" everyone he saw moving. He was quickly located, and brought down after a few volleys, when he proved to have £50 upon him in a belt. From some houses



Percy F. S. Spence.]

DEAD HORSES OUTSIDE THE LAAGER AT ELAND'S RIVER.

[After a photograph.


near at hand, which, of course, flew the white flag, the Boers poured volleys into the British. It is to be hoped that these houses were destroyed when the enemy were driven back.

Meantime, it was supposed at Pretoria that the garrison had surrendered. This was due to the fact that Ian Hamilton, who had moved to Rustenburg to bring away Baden-Powell and the Rustenburg garrison, had reported that on August 7 the firing at Eland's River had ceased. He had heard it distinctly on his arrival at Rustenburg on the 5th, and drew from the silence the conclusion that Colonel Hore had surrendered. It was only by accident that the British generals near at hand gained an inkling of the true facts. Lord Kitchener, while chasing De Wet, intercepted a message from De la Rey to that general, stating that he, De la Rey, had surrounded 500 Britishers and was keeping them under a heavy bombardment, but could not induce them to surrender. De la Rey asked De Wet to come to his help. Kitchener acted with the vigour and decision for which he had won a name in Egypt. He at once put his men in

**The garrison relieved
by Kitchener.**

motion for Eland's River and sent on a runner to the garrison to tell them that he would relieve them by 8 a.m. of August 17. The runner got through on the 16th; with daylight of the 17th a great dust-cloud appeared on the horizon, the Boers bolted, and the siege was at an end.

The officers of the relief force expressed the most unqualified admiration for the bravery and



MAP OF THE DISTRICT ABOUT ELAND'S RIVER AND RUSTENBURG.

determination of the Colonials. Certainly this defence must stand among the most honourable achievements of the war. It is worthy to rank with Colonel Dalgety's determined resistance at Wepener, and like it should be acknowledged by a special clasp. It is to individuals, to the rank and file of the Colonial force engaged, that the high credit belongs. "It is impossible," writes an Imperial officer who saw the place, "to give you anything like an idea of what they must have gone through. I do hope Great Britain will show its gratitude to these Australians [and Rhodesians] for the brightest page in

G. J. Bolman (secretary to Dr. Leyds).

Dr. Muller (representative of the Orange Free State at the Hague).

Dr. Leyds. C. de Bruyn (secretary to the Commission).

the history of the war. . . . Come out and see the place, and if your heart doesn't tingle with pride, or a lump get in your throat, and if a prayer doesn't fly to Heaven at the sight, you must be harder and colder than an iceberg. . . . These men deserve anything the old country can give them." The sights and smells were as terrible as those in Cronje's laager at Paardeberg. Hundreds of dead horses, poisoning the air, were heaped up to the rear of the camp. No less than 1,800 shells had been fired into the British lines, so that the ground was covered with "Pom-Pom" projectiles and the splinters of heavier shells. Yet the total



Wessels.

Dr. Fischer (President).

Wolmarans.

(Photo by Strauch.)

THE BOER ENVOYS WHO VISITED EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE SUMMER OF 1900.

During the early part of March, 1900, a growing feeling arose among the Boers, fostered no doubt by the pro-Boer section of the European press, that the intervention of the Great Powers might be obtained to stop the war by a personal appeal from influential Boers. Consequently a deputation sailed from Delagoa Bay on March 16 for this purpose. The members thereof were (1) Mr. Andreas Daniel Wynand Wolmarans, a prominent Transvaaler, ex-member of the First Volksraad, the prospective successor of Paul Kruger, and forty-seven years of age; (2) Mr. Wessels, of Boshof, in the Orange Free State, a well-known and prosperous farmer, with influential connections throughout South Africa; and (3) Abraham Fischer, the mouthpiece of the party. The last-named, when interviewed in the United States, made this statement: "If England wants the suzerainty of the Republics she will have to come and take it." This was long after England had come and taken it. Again, at the Hague, in September, 1900, in reply to the question, "How is your mission getting on?" Mr. Fischer said: "Well, if the voice of the people is the voice of God, we shall be successful. Everywhere we are received with unbounded enthusiasm; of course we have not been given any positive hope by the Powers and politicians with whom we are negotiating." No definite purpose was served by this mission, and after a fruitless tour, the efforts of those who composed the deputation relapsed into a state of hopeless inanition. Dr. Leyds, whose portrait is included in the group, has been since 1898 the accredited representative of Mr. Kruger's Government in Europe.

trenches had been dug. The subsequent days of the siege only accounted for twenty-one casualties. Of the horses, but sixty survived the siege.

Among those who displayed transcendent courage, by the common consent of all, was the Queenslander, Dr. Duka. "He was the hero," says one Rhodesian, "working coolly, amputating and dressing under heavy fire in the hospital in the middle of the square of the laager." He went to and fro unconcernedly at his business, though "sniped" by the Boers whenever they caught sight of him. By the strange fortune of war he escaped wounds and death, yet it may truly be said that he ran graver risks than any of his comrades, and that he, if anyone, fully earned the Victoria Cross. It

may be hoped that this distinction will be conferred upon him, if only as a recognition of what he and his comrades achieved for the honour and glory of the Empire.

But the failure of General Carrington to relieve Eland's River had other and more serious results than the prolongation of the siege of that place. It indirectly affected the operations against De Wet. In consequence of the failure, General Baden-Powell was directed to move with all available troops to the relief of the Colonials. To collect a sufficient force, he had to call in the detachment from Olifant's Nek, leaving that all-important pass unwatched. He had also to withdraw his men from Magato's Nek. With a total of about 1,500 men, leaving a garrison in Rustenburg, he pushed towards Elands River, and was within twenty miles of the place, on or about August 6, when a message reached him from Lord Roberts to the effect that Eland's River had surrendered. This was based upon reports received from

**Baden-Powell leaves
Rustenburg for
Eland's River.**



F. J. Waugh.

TREKKING HOME.

General Carrington. It should be added that Baden-Powell heard no sound of firing. The consequence was that he and his men marched disconsolately back to Rustenburg, there joined Ian Hamilton, and with that general, as supplies were now exhausted, moved eastwards, withdrawing the garrison from Rustenburg. Thus the force which was to have played a great part in the capture of De Wet, in fact played no part at all, and its absence rendered nugatory the efforts of Lords Methuen and Kitchener. In obedience to orders from Lord Roberts, Baden-Powell took up a position near Com-mando Nek. De Wet, admirably informed as to his enemy's movements, shortly afterwards occupied

**De Wet occupies
Rustenburg.**

Rustenburg, and placed his British prisoners in a cattle-pen there, crowding together British officers, troopers, civilians, and Kaffirs. This occupation did not last long, as the movements of Lords Kitchener and Methuen compelled him speedily to abandon the place. On this occasion several of the prisoners managed to escape. When De Wet's column halted for the night after leaving Rustenburg, they quietly stole through the Boer

picket-lines into the bush and made their way to the nearest British camp. They represented De Wet's force as formidable in the extreme, crediting him with some hundreds of waggons and with 6,000 men. It seems that De la Rey had now effected a junction with him and had thus raised his strength. But there is some uncertainty as to when De la Rey left Eland's River with his main force.

As for Ian Hamilton, the staff had directed him to move from Rustenburg, *via* Commando Nek, to the south of the Magaliesberg, instead of placing him at Olifant's Nek, to bar the Boer passage. He next appears to the south of the Magaliesberg, thus starting, as it were, behind the Boers, instead of being in such a position as to head them back into Lords Kitchener's and Methuen's arms. After

His further movements.

some skirmishing with detached parties of De Wet's men in the neighbourhood of Heckpoort,

he marched to Olifant's Nek, now in the possession of De la Rey's men, and with them fought a sharp action on August 18, with a loss to his force of only three wounded. He took two guns, one ammunition waggon, and two transport waggons, and crossed the Magaliesberg Range, marching along its northern slope in the direction of Commando Nek. Here on the previous day De Wet had appeared, and, finding Baden-Powell in position guarding the nek, sent in a summons demanding his surrender, with the threat that if resistance were made the Boers would put the British to the sword. The object of this impudent summons was probably to gain information as to the British strength and dispositions, since De Wet seems to have had no serious intention of attacking. Baden-Powell was too weak to engage him, but knowing that other British columns were in the neighbourhood, and expecting the approach of Ian Hamilton, he attempted to delay his adversary by entering into a correspondence with him. Accordingly he asked De Wet what terms the Boers proposed to grant, in case he saw his way to surrender. But the Boer guerilla was too wily to be taken in in this fashion. Having ascertained that Commando Nek was strongly held, he marched north-eastward with all speed, followed, however, by Mahon and Baden-Powell's mounted men. On the 19th he was seen with a large force at Hebron, north-east of Pretoria. To this point Paget's Brigade had been moved by rail from the Brandwater Basin, on the close of the campaign against Prinsloo.

Paget occupied Waterval after a skirmish with the Boers, on the 18th, at Hornies Nek, in which he lost a man wounded and several Yeomanry taken prisoners. He was joined by Baden-Powell, and the men of both columns were inspected by Lord Roberts. De Wet, when he saw that the British were present in such force to the north of Pretoria, seems to have abandoned the intention, which he had perhaps entertained, of making a dash at the capital of the Transvaal. It has not as yet been explained how it was that in the presence of some 6,000 British troops he was allowed to get away unmolested. It would appear that after this dash at Pretoria the Boer force broke into two. One half, under Grobler, went northward; the other half, under De Wet and De la Rey, turned back and headed once more for the South-western Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.



[From the painting by J. S. Sargent, R.A.]

IAN HAMILTON.



A BOER COMMANDO IN LAAGER, WITH ITS AMBULANCE.

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL.

Constitution of Carrington's column—Advance to Eland's River—Precipitate retreat—Arrival at Zeerust—Evacuation of the town—Disastrous results—Carrington again ordered to relieve Eland's River—Skirmish near Ottoshoop—Methuen occupies Zeerust—Theron's raiders seize a train—Insecurity of railway traffic—De Wet and De la Rey threaten Bank—Theron frees prisoners at Klip River—De Wet's power underestimated—Desultory fighting in the South-western Transvaal—Boers capture a supply train—Surrender of Klerksdorp—Escape of British prisoners—Savagery of guerilla warfare.



AFTER following thus far the progress of De Wet, it is now necessary to turn back to the operations of General Carrington's column, and the deeds of a small commando, detached from De Wet's force, under the leadership of the desperate partisan, Theron, who acted as De Wet's chief scout.

On August 1 General Carrington led out his column from Mafeking. It consisted of four and a half squadrons of New South Wales Bushmen under Colonel McKaye—a squadron's effective strength at this date may be put at 80 or 90 men—four squadrons of Paget's Horse (19th Yeomanry), one squadron of the Rhodesian Frontier Force, one squadron of the Kimberley Mounted Corps, half a squadron of Yeomanry Scouts, a squadron of details, one New Zealand battery, and four "Pom-Poms," a total of about 1,200 combatants of all ranks, with ten guns. The orders were for the column to march by way of Eland's River



[Photo by the Press Bureau.]

LEAVING MAFEKING AFTER THE SIEGE: BECHUANA BOYS BEGGING.

to Rustenburg, picking up at Eland's River 80 waggons laden with supplies, which were waiting there. It was known that the enemy were in the neighbourhood of Eland's River. On August 4 Marico River was reached, and the same day very heavy firing was heard in the direction of Eland's River. The reports of several guns could plainly be distinguished. To ascertain what was going on, a squadron of Bushmen was sent forward to scout. A small force of Boers was speedily located on the left front and another upon the right. But no serious opposition was offered, and the main force reached Doorndrift late in the evening without loss. At this point signal fires were seen on either flank. Carrington's men lay down by their horses and were not allowed to light fires themselves, lest these should disclose their position to the enemy's sharpshooters. The column had already been greatly weakened, as 350 men had been detached to guard the baggage, which was left at Marico



A NEW SOUTH WALES BUSHMAN.



RUSSIAN NURSES WITH THE BOERS.

River. The leaving of so large a detachment under the circumstances would seem to have been a grave mistake, especially in view of the fact that fighting was evidently imminent and that every man would be wanted at the front. At Doorndrift the force was further weakened to garrison a kopje, which was entrenched and occupied by the Kimberley Mounted Corps with one "Pom-Pom." Thus General Carrington's available strength was reduced to some 750 men, and this on the eve of an engagement.

Early on the 5th the advance to Eland's River was resumed. Patrols, it is stated by

**Advance to Eland's
River.**

The Times correspondent, in distinct contradiction of the evidence given by members of the garrison of Eland's River, were sent out on both flanks, and three lines of scouts preceded the main body. A little before 11 a.m. the Yeomanry scouts came under a heavy fire from a kopje to the right. No trace of the enemy could be seen. Here, as ever, the invisibility which smokeless powder has made the characteristic of a defending force was most trying to all. The firing only lasted a few minutes, but after it had ceased two Bushmen, who rode close up


to the kopje to ascertain whether the enemy had retired, were received with a hailstorm of bullets at the shortest range, and had a narrow escape. One had his horse killed under him, whereupon the other went back to his aid and gallantly brought him out, giving him a stirrup under a heavy fire.

A squadron of Bushmen was ordered to carry a kopje to the left, where the enemy had not as yet shown themselves in any force. This was accomplished, but when the kopje was captured, the Bushmen found themselves under a heavy fire from other kopjes yet further away. In a few minutes five shells landed amongst them, though happily without causing any loss. The British artillery then came into action and began a vigorous bombardment of the wooded kopje. Before our guns could open, the enemy had their range and placed two shells amongst them. But the effect of our

fire was speedily manifest. The Boer guns were silenced for the time being and the Boers were driven from the wooded kopje and shelled on their retreat. All this time the post at Eland's River had been in full view. Unfortunately, to reach it, it was necessary to cover a wide plain under fire from the positions on both flanks held by the Boers.

An attempt to get through was made by the squadron of details, supported by a "Pom-Pom." As soon as the squadron had advanced a couple of hundred yards, the enemy opened a terrific fire from the flank. But the advance was not pressed, although this fire proved comparatively innocuous, only bringing down one horse and wounding one man, who

Precipitate retreat. was picked up and rescued at great risk to himself by Lieutenant Moore. On the contrary, orders were sent the Australians to retreat, and back they came, sick at heart and indignant at what some of them thought an uncalled-for retirement. With their retreat, the enemy opened upon the British front a rapid shell-fire from, it is roundly said, not less than seven guns and "Pom-Poms." One of the Boer projectiles burst at General Carrington's very feet; others fell among the artillery horses, killing or disabling several of them. One of the British 15-pounders is said to have had a narrow



A VICKERS-MAXIM AUTOMATIC GUN ('POM-POM') IN FIRING POSITION.

The "Pom-Pom," or one-pounder automatic gun, resembles in many respects the Maxim gun illustrated on p. 40 of "With the Flag to Pretoria." Its barrel has a diameter of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and is surrounded by a water-jacket. The gun having been started continues to fire from a belt of cartridges so long as the gunner keeps the trigger pressed, the motive force being supplied by the recoil. Each shell on bursting splits into 15 pieces, and as they are delivered at the rate of 300 per minute, the work of the gun is equivalent to 4,500 separate projectiles in the same short space of time.




AN AUSTRALIAN 15-POUNDER—A SIMILAR GUN TO THOSE WITH CARRINGTON'S FORCE.

The photograph was taken at Vriburg, and shows the camp of the Cape Special Police.

escape of being captured. At the unexpected strength of the enemy's resistance, General Carrington determined to order a general retreat. He argued that it was quite impossible with the men under his command to fight his way through under the Boer guns and past the entrenched kopjes. He was new to Boer warfare, and perhaps did not realise that before a vigorous attack the enemy's defence was liable suddenly to collapse, as it did before Mahon on the relief of Mafeking. He has been greatly blamed by the Colonials under his command for this withdrawal, and if, as the garrison at Eland's River asserted, there were only 350 Boers before him, it was indefensible. Even if the Boers were as strong as he thought them to be, we should have expected a more determined effort to reach the post at Eland's River, which he had every reason to think was in grave difficulties. His losses were only twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, ten of whom were accounted for by a party of Bushmen cut off while scouting. Lord Roberts' opinion of the proceedings was shown by an immediate order, when he learnt the facts, directing Carrington once more to advance to Eland's River.

The retreat to Marico River must have been precipitate in the extreme, as, though seventeen miles distant, the river was reached late that night. Naturally, the enemy, encouraged by General Carrington's withdrawal, pressed fiercely upon him, and a continuous rearguard action went on for six or seven miles. It says much for the courage and endurance of his Colonial troopers that they did not become demoralised or lose heart; on the contrary, they fought so well that all the guns and waggons with the column were able to retire in safety. At Marico River the column encamped for the night. After the hurried movements of the 5th it was understood that the retreat would not be resumed until the 7th. But in the morning of the 6th heavy firing was heard towards Zeerust. The patrols reported the enemy in force in that quarter, holding kopjes on both sides of the road. The firing was caused by a Boer attack on a British convoy of six waggons which had been sent out from Zeerust. Five of the six waggons were captured; the oxen of the sixth bolted and so saved it. The escort got away with a loss of only three men wounded and captured.

Carrington at once led his men forward against the Boers. The "Pom-Poms" and field guns shelled a kopje to the right of the road, and after a prolonged bombardment the skirmishers carried



ZEERUST.

Zeerust is a tiny little village with a normal population of about 800. It is in the centre of what will probably before long become the chief agricultural district of the Transvaal. The land is extraordinarily fertile, and the climate extremely healthy under ordinary conditions. There are minerals in the neighbourhood, such as coal, iron, and gold, which have not yet been thoroughly exploited. The place contains five churches and two hotels.

it without loss. While this action was proceeding in his front, firing had broken out to the rear, where scattered parties of Boers in the bush had started "sniping" the British transport. However,

Arrival at Zeerust. the Boers in front did not offer a prolonged or strenuous resistance, and the column was able to move on into more open ground near Zeerust. This place it reached at 2 a.m. of the 7th, having covered 41 miles in 31 hours.

Here another unfortunate decision was taken. Zeerust had been for many weeks in the occupation



S. Begg.]

IN MEMORY OF THE FALLEN.

Colonial troops at Canterbury Cathedral, August 13, 1900, listening to the "Dead March."

The wounded Colonials who were invalided to England and recruited at Shorncliffe Camp, received an invitation to Canterbury, where they were enthusiastically welcomed. Conducted by Lieut. Satow of the 2nd Middlesex, they paid an interesting visit to the Cathedral. As they passed up the aisle, the organist began to play the "Dead March" in *Saul* in honour of the fallen in South Africa. Immediately the men stood at attention and saluted. A few days later many of the Canadians sailed for home.

of the British. Colonel Plumer had selected an easily defensible position as the site of the British camp, and had stationed there 300 men, with a small town-guard of loyalists, the whole under the

Evacuation of the town.

command of Major Lord Edward Cecil, of Mafeking fame, and Major Pilon. There were eight guns and Maxims. "Every position, every tree, every mark that could be used," says a member of the garrison, "had been measured and the range marked off to make our artillery as efficient as possible. Nothing was lacking that care and military skill could accomplish to make the position secure. I know, too, that both Lord Edward Cecil, the Resident Commissioner, and Major Pilon, the officer commanding the garrison, considered they could hold their own against any force of Boers that could possibly be brought against us. Our water supply was abundant, and could not have been interfered with from outside, and we had provisions of all kinds sufficient to last for six months, with enormous stores of forage for all animals for an equal period." But on the morning of August 7 General Carrington examined the position and rode out to a nek near at hand. He decided that Zeerust was untenable, if a correspondent with his force can be believed, because it was inadvisable to have "a force of men besieged, as the Boers were reported in great strength in the surrounding districts," and because "the town was an exceedingly difficult one to hold, owing to its situation in a valley commanded by high kopjes." But these arguments left out of sight the bad moral effect of such an evacuation. The



(Photo by Bassano.)

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK CARRINGTON,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Born 1844; joined the 24th Regiment (South Wales Borderers), 1861; Captain, 1878; Major, 1878; Lieut.-Colonel, 1879; Colonel, 1884; Major-General, 1894; Lieut.-General, South Africa, 1900. Commanded Carrington's Horse in the Kaffir War, 1877-8; the Transvaal Volunteers, 1878-9; and Colonial Forces in the Basuto War, 1881; served with Sir C. Warren's Expedition, 1884-5; commanded native levies, South Africa, 1885-93, and British and Colonial forces in Rhodesia, 1896; appointed to command the Rhodesian Field Force in February, 1900, and operated to the north of the Transvaal with the object of joining Colonel Plumer in his attempt to relieve Mafeking.



(Photo by Lafayette.)

LORD EDWARD CECIL.

Fourth son of the Marquis of Salisbury; joined the Grenadier Guards in 1889; served in the Dongola Expedition of 1896; with the Abyssinian Mission of 1897; in the Nile Expedition of 1898; and took a prominent part in the defence of Mafeking.

people of Zeerust and the neighbourhood had accepted British rule, had taken the oath of neutrality, and some of them had even been appointed to posts under the new administration. They could not safely remain, fearing, as they did, the vengeance of the Boers, while to withdraw meant ruin. Moreover, Lord Edward Cecil was certainly a good judge of the defensibility of the town, as he had been through the siege of Mafeking, and knew what could be done against the Boers and how far they were dangerous. He is reported to have protested strenuously against the evacuation. There was a considerable force at Mafeking, within easy reach of Zeerust, and as for the "overwhelming" Boer commandos, neither then nor afterwards was anything seen of them.

However, the evacuation was ordered. Lord Edward Cecil, according to one Australian, "wept like a child, and declared that it was the bitterest day of his life."

Disastrous results.

All the stores that could not be carried off were destroyed. Carrington left on the morning of the 8th, directing the garrison to follow him with all that could be loaded upon the waggons in the town. In all seventy-five waggons with about one hundred refugees were placed under their escort. Had the Boers been anywhere near they would certainly have swooped down upon this immense, valuable, and ill-guarded train; but as a matter of fact not a Boer was seen. They did not even enter Zeerust till thirty-six hours after the British had retired. Then thirty men rode into the place and occupied it. The abandonment had three serious results.

It deprived General Baden-Powell of an important base of supplies and of stores to the amount of not less than £80,000 value, which had been brought there with infinite labour. It led the Boers who had submitted, to distrust the British and to disbelieve in their power to give protection to such as voluntarily laid down their arms. It encouraged the burghers on commando with De Wet and De la Rey, and increased their contempt for us. The war blazed up again in this quarter, and the district has not since been pacified. Such is one of the most mortifying episodes of the war.

Lord Roberts, when he heard of the performance of this unlucky column, as we have seen, ordered it once more to advance to Eland's River. On its return to Mafeking it had been strongly reinforced, and on August 14 it marched out 2,500 strong, with 310 waggons. On the 15th the Boers



C. E. Fripp.]

BARGAINING FOR GEESSE.

The wives of Boer farmers are only too glad to dispose of their produce to our troops, who pay fair prices for their purchases, and of whom, contrary to the reports sedulously spread by Boer partisans, the women stand in no kind of fear.

were found on kopjes on both sides of the road, east of Ottoshoop. At dawn of the 16th their positions were shelled by the 88th Field Battery, New Zealand Battery, and the "Pom-Poms." The kopje on the right was then carried by Paget's Horse and the New Zealanders, with the loss of only eleven men. The Boers retreated to a farm which was full of women and children and over which flew the Red Cross flag; but though they halted and made a stand there this farm was not shelled.

**Carrington again
ordered to relieve
Eland's River.
Skirmish near
Ottoshoop.**

On the left the Kimberley Mounted Corps had a very hot time. At nightfall the Boers, who were afterwards ascertained to have been in insignificant force, fell back, leaving six dead. The British loss was four killed and eleven wounded. As an instance of the effects of leniency, this passage from the letter of *The Times* correspondent with the column deserves quotation: "All the Boers who were killed had passes on them. This again goes to prove the utter absurdity of this system at present in vogue of giving indiscriminate permits to all men who give up their arms. Permits were granted by the chief staff officer at Ottoshoop to men who gave up absolutely obsolete rifles, which it was

quite clear had not been used for some time. Surely it must appear perfectly clear to every one that, when Lord Roberts gave the order that 'all Boers delivering up their arms and wishing to return to their farms should be granted a permit of protection from the English Government,' he meant the Boer who wished to secure such permit was bound to give up a weapon which satisfied the officer detailed to give these permits that the arm was one which corresponded with the class of weapon which the wounds on our men showed had been used in warfare, and not an antiquated blunderbuss or ten-bore duck gun which had been brought to the country by the early settlers." So slow was the progress of Carrington's

**Methuen occupies
Zeerust.**

column that eventually the credit of occupying Zeerust fell to Lord Methuen, who with a strong force had arrived at Eland's River in the wake of Lord Kitchener. Thence he moved to Mafeking to refit, remount, and re-provision his force, exhausted by weeks of incessant effort and arduous campaigning. Kitchener from Eland's

River had marched back to Pretoria.

On his march across the Orange River Colony De Wet had

detached Sarel Theron with a body of about a couple of hundred well-mounted desperadoes on a railway-cutting and foraging mission. Theron on the night of August 2 appeared

**Theron's raiders
seize a train.**

at Holfontein, south of Kroonstad, laid mines under the rails and waited for the approach of a supply train from the south.

In this train Mr. Stowe, the American Consul-General at Capetown, was travelling, as was also Lord Algernon Gordon-Lennox with despatches for Lord Roberts. The mails for the troops were on board and the trucks were filled high with flour, oats, hay, biscuit, meat, and ammunition for the Army. The Boers, as usual, must have had perfect information to have been able to make this rich haul. What happened may best be told in the words of a passenger in the train: "Suddenly I was awakened with a start, and the train stopped with a jerk. As one naturally does under similar circumstances, I sat up on my bedding, but fell back again with some rapidity on hearing the ping! ping! ping! of bullets whizzing past my face. Instantly there was an enormous explosion, followed by three others, which tore up the rails. The firing went on for some minutes, shots rattling on our truck and battering on the saloon carriage at the end of the train most unpleasantly. In my rapid glance over the side when I awoke I saw that a party of Boers were shooting at us from the wire fencing alongside the railway, a distance of perhaps twenty yards. We lay very low until the firing stopped, and when the chief of the enemy's party, which was about eighty strong, Captain Sarel Theron, came up to our truck, crying 'Hands up, tumble out,' we tumbled out with the least possible delay." There were only



MR. STOWE, AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL
AT CAPETOWN.



[From a sketch by Mortimer Menpes.]

LORD ALGERNON GORDON-LENNOX.

Lord Algernon C. Gordon-Lennox, 2nd son of the Duke of Richmond, was born in 1847; educated at Eton; served in the Royal Navy 1862-5; joined the Life Guards, 1867; transferred to Grenadier Guards, 1867; Captain, 1870; Lieut.-Col., 1877; served in the Egyptian Campaign, 1882; Regimental Major, 1883; A.D.C. to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, 1883-95; Colonel (Army), 1887; Hon. Assistant Military Secretary to Sir A. Milner in the Boer War, 1899-1900.

three officers and forty privates, unarmed and returning from hospital at Bloemfontein to the front. Placing a guard over their prisoners, the Boers set fire to the train, after removing every portable article of any value. They did not meddle with Consul Stowe; indeed, they apologised profusely to him for the annoyance they had caused him; nor did they detain Lord Algernon Gordon-Lennox for more than a few minutes. They also overlooked one of the officers in the train—a Colonial. The other forty-two officers and men were marched five or six miles from the line and then released, as the Boers had no means of removing them. They carried off, however, two officers and a British civilian.

The prisoners talked a good deal to the Boers, and their reports are of value as illustrating the composition of De Wet's half-brigand commandos. Theron's men, engaged in this affair, numbered eighty in all, of whom one half were French, Germans, Russians, and Belgians. In their attack on the train they killed three of the British troops and wounded three more, including the engine-driver. This man displayed magnificent pluck, for, though badly hit in the knee, he went to the locomotive the moment the Boers released him and emptied the boiler, to prevent an explosion. Immediately on Theron's retirement messengers were sent to Ventersburg Road for help. A hundred mounted infantry were despatched from that point to give chase to the Boers, but though they did come into touch with the enemy, the horses were so dead-beaten that it was impossible to inflict any serious punishment upon the raiders. Three of the



G. Soper.]

THE ATTACK ON A TRAIN AT HOLFONTEIN.

Boers, however, were killed, seven more were wounded, and one, hopelessly drunk with plundered whisky, was captured. In the mounted infantry only one man was wounded. A day or two later another attempt was made to damage the line a little to the north of Kroonstad, but on this occasion without success. Theron's attack had serious results, as it led to a stoppage of all traffic for some days, and weeks later it was not considered advisable to send trains forward by night, so that the railway could not be used for twelve or fourteen hours out of the twenty-four. No system of detached posts could ensure complete safety from attack

**Insecurity of railway
traffic.**

by small mounted bands of the enemy, and, though proclamations were issued to the effect that where the railway was broken or trains derailed the neighbouring farms would be destroyed or heavy fines inflicted upon their owners, and though prominent Boers were required to travel upon the trains as hostages, the enemy continued to interfere with the lines of communication.

From the neighbourhood of Ventersburg Road, Theron must have ridden with the utmost speed in De Wet's wake, as prisoners with De Wet report that he effected his junction with the guerilla leader on August 11. But when De Wet returned south, after his brush with Paget near Hebron, Theron once more left him, and, probably to divert attention from De Wet's movements, hovered around Pretoria and Johannesburg.

De Wet and De la Rey threaten Bank.

On August 23 De Wet and De la Rey appeared at Bank, a station on the Krugersdorp railway west of Johannesburg, and demanded its surrender. The only British garrison was a small force of City Imperial Volunteers. They were commanded by Lord Albemarle. De Wet's summons was to the effect that if the post did not immediately surrender he would "exterminate" every member of it within half an hour. Lord Albemarle's reply was to the effect that the Boers could "exterminate" away and had better begin at once since half-hours were precious. However, no attack was made; De Wet merely crossed the railway and headed for the Vaal.



[Photo by Bassano.]

LIEUT.-COL. THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE, Commanding City Imperial Volunteer Infantry, was born in 1858, joined the Dorset Militia in 1876, and served in the Scots Guards, 1878-1883; next year he joined the Volunteers and became Lieut.-Col. of the 12th (Middlesex) Volunteer Battalion of the King's Royal Rifles.

On August 24 Theron with his band suddenly descended upon Klip River, a station on the railway ten miles to the south of Johannesburg. Here there were only eight British soldiers, commanded by a corporal, yet there were in the gaol forty-three prisoners, some of them criminals, others burghers taken in arms and waiting removal to Ceylon. The guard, of course, could offer no resistance, and Theron at once liberated the prisoners and added them to his command. The news of this exploit spread in

Theron frees prisoners at Klip River.



CAMP OF THE ATTACHÉS WITH THE BOER ARMY.

all directions, and was speedily magnified into a raid upon Johannesburg itself and the release of 500 Boers. The tale was eagerly caught up and served to unsettle the country yet further. Around Pretoria and Johannesburg the British sentries were now "sniped" every night—a

cruel and purposeless form of war in which the Boer guerillas showed all the savage resourcefulness of the Afridis.

Notwithstanding De Wet's escape, with so little difficulty and loss, from the British columns, the British headquarters viewed the situation with complacency. Lord Roberts, in a message home, dated August 22, telegraphed: "De Wet will arrive in the Orange River Colony in a very different condition from that in which he started from Bethlehem. Then he had six or eight guns and some 2,000 men with him, and left Prinsloo with 5,000 or 6,000 in the Bethlehem hills. Between 4,000 and 5,000 of these are on their way to Ceylon, the guns have mostly been buried, and De Wet's personal following cannot amount to much more than 300." Unhappily Lord Roberts was misinformed. Not many weeks passed before De Wet was at the head of from 2,000 to 3,000 men, well supplied with guns and ammunition, and more troublesome than ever. The great mistake had been made of underestimating his energy, force, and resources.

De Wet's power underestimated.

Duke of Marlborough. Mr. Ford Barclay. Dr. Cheatle. Captain Howard (East Kent Yeomanry).
Lord Edmund Talbot (Kitchener's Horse). Commander Fortescue, R.N.
Sir C. Ross. (11th Hussars). Duke of Norfolk. Mr. Murray Guthrie, M.P.



Lieut. Noble (Oxfordshire Imperial Yeomanry). Mr. Battersby (Morning Post). Lady Arthur Grosvenor. Captain Chaplin (10th Hussars). Lady Sarah Wilson. Captain Davenport (A.D.C. to Sir A. Milner). Major Nugent. [Photo by Reinhold Thiele.

BACK FROM THE WAR: A GROUP ON BOARD THE S.S. "BRITON."

In this place certain incidents which occurred in the South-western Transvaal may be fitly described, though they had little or no connection with the pursuit of De Wet, and occurred before his arrival in the Transvaal. The war, it must be remembered, had become after the capture of Pretoria a series of independent and disjointed operations, conducted by columns which were often parted by immense distances. In this field of the war the Boer commander was Liebenberg, with a force which probably did not exceed 1,500 men, and which from time to time combined with and acted under De la Rey. The British general was Smith-Dorrien, with the greater part of a brigade of infantry and some companies of Yeomanry, mustering about 2,000 men. There was continued fighting of a desultory kind in this region throughout the early weeks of July, and train after train was wrecked on the railway between Johannesburg and Potchefstroom. One such incident occurred on July 19, when a train was derailed to the west of Krugersdorp, near Bank Station. No one was killed or wounded, but thirty-five officers and men who were on board were made prisoners and detained for ten days.

Desultory fighting in the South-western Transvaal.

A more serious affair occurred on July 31 near Frederikstad. On the morning of that day Smith-Dorrien, who was encamped close to the station, received a summons from Liebenberg to



GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN.

surrender, with the threat that if he did not comply he would be attacked in half an hour. The flag of truce had not had time to leave the British camp with an abrupt refusal, when the Boers opened a heavy fire and attempted to rush the British lines. Signals were at once made to call up Lord Methuen, who was at no great distance, but before he could arrive the attack was repulsed with a loss to the British of two killed and seven wounded. The real object of the enemy was none the less attained. This was the capture of a supply train on its way to Frederikstad from Johannesburg, under the escort of a

detachment of the Shropshire Light Infantry. The Boers loosened the rails at a dangerous point and lay in wait there. Presently the train came thundering along, and, as no break was visible, ran on to the damaged part of the line and left the rails, with terrible results.

Boers capture a supply train.

Of the men on board the train no less than thirteen were killed, including the engine-driver, and thirty-nine wounded or injured, either by the derailment



GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, KLERKSDORP.



CROSSING THE SCHOONSPRUIT AT KLERKSDORP.

This stream separates the old village from the new town, which dates from 1888, owes its rise to the discovery of gold, diamonds, and coal, and even at one time bade fair to rival Johannesburg. Over-speculation and mismanagement, however, hindered its progress, and it still remains little more than a village, though it boasts a handsome suite of government buildings.

or by the fire which the enemy poured in upon the wreck of the trucks. The line should have been patrolled to prevent the possibility of so serious an accident, but it would seem that the Boers had taken steps to make away with the patrol. At any rate the bodies of two engineers and three Kaffirs were found next day on the railway to the west of Frederikstad, at no great distance from the scene of the derailment. They were riddled with bullets, and farmers in the neighbourhood reported that they had been murdered

by the Boers. Nor was this by any means the only occasion upon which the enemy were guilty of such a crime. On that very day Colonel Helyar, of the Yeomanry, was murdered by two

Boers, not far from Pretoria, and his body was not found for some days. We shall see, as this narrative proceeds, that such crimes show a tendency to increase, the enemy displaying week by week more and more savagery.

Meantime, at Klerksdorp, further to the south-west, there had been yet more unpleasant happenings. At this place there was a garrison of about 120 men, half of them armed civilians, and half belonging to the Kimberley Mounted Corps, with a few Kaffir Police, under Captain Lambert. No attempt had been made to throw up entrenchments; a few schanzes of stone, which were absolutely useless against shell-fire, had, however, been constructed. On July 24 the Boers under Liebenberg appeared between Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom, and broke the railway between these two places; with the telegraph they did not interfere. Instructions had already been issued to the Klerksdorp garrison to fall back upon Potchefstroom in case the town was attacked.

On the 24th an attack was known to be impending and the schanzes were manned. But on the 25th, for some reason or other, the men were withdrawn from two outlying kopjes to the west which



Edward Read.]

TEARING THE BRITISH FLAG AND MALTREATING KAFFIRS AT KLERKSDORP.

commanded the town, and the enemy were able to draw closer in. They did not show in any great force, but they "sniped" anyone they saw. Very early in the morning of the 27th a patrol of nine Kaffir police went out to reconnoitre. They were at once surrounded, and after a protracted fight were compelled to surrender, having fired away every round of ammunition. That same morning two little detachments from the garrison, holding two kopjes to the north and east of the town, found the Boers close to them in great strength. They were preparing for a last desperate stand when a white flag entered the town with a peremptory summons to surrender. Captain Lambert

did not consider his force sufficiently strong to offer

**Surrender of
Klerksdorp.**

any resistance, and at once complied with the summons, the outlying detachments retiring into the town, grounding their arms, and surrendering, with curses loud and deep. The civilians and those burghers who had accepted the British *régime* were especially indignant. The Boers rushed into the town, endeavouring to stop the transmission of the news

of the surrender by telegraph to Potchefstroom, but they were just too late. The operator had seen them and rapped a message; as they led him off a prisoner he saw the needle signal the receipt of the intelligence. The enemy threw the civilian and Colonial prisoners into the common gaol. A Dutch woman, a Mrs. Roos, whose husband was on commando, but who had been living untroubled under the protection of the British, took the flag which had been hauled down, struck one of the British soldiers across the face with it, tore it to tatters, and then stamped and spat upon it. As for the Kaffir police who had been captured, they were sjamboked upon the back and face till deep red gashes showed in the flesh. In the words of the *Daily News* correspondent, "That was the last ghastly scene in the surrender of Klerksdorp, and British officers blushed as they looked on it, with shame, to think that these poor natives alone had been allowed to fight and bleed in defence of a British garrison."

The prisoners were taken some days later to Liebenberg's laager, where they were well treated. Several of them succeeded in making their escape, dropping into the long grass while the column was on the march.

Two lieutenants slipped away under pretence of bathing; aided by Kaffirs they succeeded in gaining Ian Hamilton's column at Commando Nek, having narrowly escaped capture at Rustenburg, which was held by the Boers.

In the last fortnight of August, as we have already seen, the South-west Transvaal was yet more disturbed by the passage of De Wet through it. On or about August 23 a party of natives under a British engineer who were engaged upon repairing the line were murdered. Only one Kaffir escaped.



A SOLDIER'S FUNERAL.



A BREAKDOWN.

A correspondent in difficulties; ambulance men coming to his assistance.



MERCENARIES WHO FOUGHT WITH THE BOERS.

CHAPTER V.

THE BOER PLOTS AND THE ADVANCE TO MIDDELBURG AND BELFAST.

Johannesburg plot frustrated—Arrest of the conspirators—Banishment of Boer women and children—Ingratitude of those deported—Plot against the Headquarters Staff—Cordua tried and executed—Stringent measures to check Boer treachery—Advance to Middelburg—Resistance at Pienaar's Poort—Eleventh Division at Bronkhorst Spruit—Boer women as decoys—Seizure of Wolmarans' hidden treasure—French's march to Balmoral—Middelburg surrenders to him—Gordon occupies Wonderfontein—Roberts returns to Pretoria—Ian Hamilton's operations west of Pretoria—Paget moves north towards Pietersburg—Advance to Warmbaths—Retirement to Pretoria—Renewed advance eastwards—General Buller's column to co-operate—Its progress to Twyfelaar—Country around Machadodorp—Boers dislodged at Van Wyk's Vlei—Action at Leeuwkloof Farm—Cunning tactics of the enemy—Cruel treatment of the wounded—Combined attack planned—Actions near Lydenburg and Bergendal—Buller reinforced.



IN Pretoria and Johannesburg, throughout July and August, there was constant friction with the Boer and foreign residents, who were thoroughly disloyal to the British. They had outwardly accepted the new conditions, but in secret they continued to plot against the new régime, and their conspiracies at times came very near

Johannesburg plot frustrated.



TELEPHONE TOWER, JOHANNESBURG.

success. The first dangerous plot was hatched in Johannesburg in July. In this city there was a large and undesirable foreign element with a strong sprinkling of Anarchists. Many of these foreigners, without doubt, had fought for the Boers, and had only abandoned the cause of the Vierkleur when success deserted it. They were justly described as the "scum of the earth," and they were ready for any desperate enterprise. Finally arrangements were made for a great rising on July 14—the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. The first point was to overpower the weak garrison, which about this date did not much exceed 1,200 men. On the 14th military steeplechases were to be held on the race-course. It was known that all the British officers would be present at them. This offered a favourable opportunity. The conspirators had a good supply of rifles and revolvers hidden on the outskirts of the town; armed with these the boldest of their number proposed to attend the races, and, at a given signal, mercilessly to shoot down the "khakis." Meantime a large number of determined men were to assemble, ostensibly to celebrate the French national *fête*, and were, at the moment when the firing began on the racecourse, to sally forth and dispose of the newly-raised police, seize the Government offices and all available treasure, and cut the telegraph wires. Arrangements had previously been concerted with the Boer leaders outside the town, and the plotters were promised that a strong commando should be near to take advantage of the confusion, or to lend a helping hand if all did not go well.

It was a daring, if an infamous, scheme, and it came very near to success. Many well-



TELEGRAPH OPERATING-ROOM AT JOHANNESBURG.

[Photo by Bennett.]

Arrest of the conspirators.

known and apparently estimable Boers were involved in it, for the true Boer considered it only a mark of "slimness" thus treacherously to murder his enemy. But, unfortunately for the conspirators, one of their number informed a woman of the plot, and the woman warned the British authorities. These acted with the utmost vigour. On the night of the 13-14th the chief conspirators met in a house to make their final arrangements. After all of them had arrived, a strong body of British troops surrounded the house and arrested everyone who was found inside it. Other captures were made in the course of the night, and by daylight of the 14th nearly 500 of those concerned were in custody. The foreign Consuls were requested to meet the police authorities and the facts were set before them, with the promise that those for whom they could vouch would be released. About 75 were liberated upon satisfactory guarantees being given. The others were not punished as we should have expected and as they had undoubtedly deserved. It would have been wise to put a few ringleaders to death, if only as a warning and example. But instead of this being done, they were merely expelled from South Africa, and there is actually good reason to believe that not a few of them after a time came back by various channels and rejoined the enemy in arms. Certainly in this case mercy was hardly merciful to our troops.

This affair, however, called attention to the inexpediency of permitting a large number of

Banishment of Boer destitute Boer women and
women and children. children to remain in Pre-

toria. Their husbands were in the enemy's fighting line, while their families were being maintained at the expense of the British nation. This absurd inversion of the natural order of things could not be allowed to continue. The feeding of these destitute people was a serious embarrassment to the Army Service Corps and the British commissariat at a time when supply trains from the south were constantly being derailed and captured, and when the British troops had to go on short rations. Moreover, the enemy were relieved from what must otherwise have been a source of anxiety and embarrassment. On July 17, accordingly, a proclamation to this effect was issued: "The wives, children, or relatives, residing in the town and district of Pretoria, of burghers in arms against the forces of Her Britannic Majesty shall, failing proof by them to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police on or before July 19, 1900, that they possess adequate means of subsistence, be deported to a place, or places, beyond the British lines to be hereafter



BOER PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE FORT AT JOHANNESBURG.

of Her Britannic Majesty shall, failing proof by them to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police on or before July 19, 1900, that they possess adequate means of subsistence, be deported to a place, or places, beyond the British lines to be hereafter



COMMISSIONER STREET,
JOHANNESBURG, 1889.

determined." Those pronounced to be without resources were to be put across the British lines at Eerstefabrieken, where Botha was to take charge of them. Further instances of Boer "slimness" came to light. It was found that many of those who had been accepting British charity were really well-to-do people. They were not spared; they had to go to the commandos and rough it with their husbands.



COMMISSIONER STREET, JOHANNESBURG, 1899.

[Photo by Edwards.]

Various circumstances, however, prevented the despatch of these most undesirable refugees to Botha's lines before August 11. On that day they were sent by rail to Belfast under a flag of truce. Though

most courteously treated by the British military authorities and given a supply of food for the journey, they showed no gratitude, but jeered at our soldiers and flaunted the Vierkleur. "That's right, missis,"

**Ingratitude of those
deported.**

said one private, caustically, to a vrouw who was waving a

banner in his face, "you hold it up and show your pluck, but try and get your old man to wave it a spell." The measure was furiously denounced by the anti-national press in England, which about this time had re-christened Lord Roberts by the name of Alva, and had brought every monstrous accusation that it is possible to conceive against Lord Kitchener. One British worthy, indeed, went so far as to suggest that De Wet would have the approbation of the world if he tied Lord Kitchener to a tree, flogged him, and pistolled him with his own hand. To such lengths will factious violence lead men.


While the "undesirables" of Johannesburg were plotting, those of Pretoria

Plot against the Headquarters Staff.

were not idle. Here, too, a conspiracy of long standing came

to a head on August 7, when fifteen of

the most important criminals were arrested. The plotters were headed by a lieutenant of the Staats Artillery of German nationality, Hans Cordua by name. He had taken the oath of neutrality the better to hide his schemes. The intentions of the conspirators were to set fire to two large houses in the



[Photo by Edgcombe.]

BOER CONSPIRATORS, WHO ATTEMPTED TO CARRY OFF LORD ROBERTS, BEING CONVEYED FROM PRETORIA TO CAPETOWN.



LOUIS BOTHA AND STAFF AT BELFAST, August, 1900.

Botha stands in the centre of the group. Next him stands his adjutant, handing a letter to the Rev. P. McQueen, for the *Boston Globe*.



LOUIS BOTHA.

(See note, p. 266, Vol. I., of "With the Flag to Pretoria.")

west of the town. This, it was thought, would cause confusion and lead to the assembling of the troops at the scene of the conflagration for the purpose of extinguishing the fire. In the meanwhile, the residences of all the leading British officers and officials in the capital were to be watched by armed men, and at the height of the uproar the assassins were to enter and make away with the occupants. Not only this, but Lord Roberts' house was to be beset and the British commander-in-

chief kidnapped and carried off on horseback to the nearest commando. As at Johannesburg, the Boers outside the town were informed of everything and had men at hand. Inside Pretoria hints were given to hundreds of sympathisers, who also were to be on the alert. The whole scheme was cleverly prepared, and, had not the newly-organised police got wind of it, the consequences might have been most serious. The kidnapping or murder of so many distinguished officers of the Headquarters Staff must have completely paralysed the army, if only for some days, and this at a very critical moment. Here again the plotters, all of whom had broken the oath of neutrality, did not shrink from meditating murder, and some, at least, of the Boer generals in the field abetted their atrocious design.

An informer named Gano disclosed the plot to the police and prevented a great catastrophe. On August 16 Cordua was brought to trial before a court-martial, presided over by General Marshall, Military Governor of Pretoria, and was charged with breach of parole and attempt-

Cordua tried and executed.

ing to abduct British officers. He pleaded guilty, but afterwards was induced to withdraw his plea. He was young-looking, cool, and spoke English well, though with a slight foreign accent. It was proved that as far back as July 4, Cordua had approached certain burghers with the proposal to carry off Lord Roberts and hand him over to Botha. He had further produced cipher letters which either were, or purported to be, from Botha himself, promising co-operation. Among the inducements held out by Cordua was this—and it is an important point as showing the result of clemency—that at the worst, if the plot were detected, there was nothing more to be feared than transportation to Ceylon. He proposed to collect 250 men, all of whom had passes and would therefore not be liable to be arrested in the streets, and to seize



HANS CORDUA.

Formerly Lieutenant in the Staats Artillerie; executed for complicity in the plot against the Headquarters Staff.



THE FOUNTAIN IN BURGERS PARK, PRETORIA.

In the distance is the house of Mr. S. Heys, valued at £35,000. Lord Roberts occupied it for some months in 1900. The Park is named after the Rev. T. F. Burgers, a progressive and philanthropic clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, who was elected President of the Transvaal in 1872. This recreation ground covers an area of about two acres, is situated some three-quarters of a mile away from Church Square, and has become a more or less fashionable pleasure resort. Before the war the Staats Artillerie Band occasionally played in the band-stand shown in the picture.

7,000 rifles which, he had learnt, were stored in the Police Barracks. It was proved that he had held communication with the enemy outside the British lines, and a considerable amount of damaging matter was found upon him, including a rough draft of the plot, a map of Pretoria, on which were marked the houses occupied by British officers, and a detailed plan of Lord Roberts' residence. There could be not the faintest doubt as to his guilt, and on August 21 he was convicted after a five-days' trial in which the utmost fairness was shown him. The sentence was death; on its confirmation by Lord Roberts, Cordua was shot on the morning of August 24. He behaved to the last with courage and firmness, walked calmly to the chair in front of the firing party, and, having requested that he might not be bound, only his eyes were covered. The order "Fire!" was given, and in an instant he expiated his misdeeds. He left behind him a letter acknowledging that his sentence was just. The other individuals implicated in the plot were expelled the country.



Sydney P. Hall.]

ARREST OF AN OATH-BREAKER.

[After a sketch by H. Lea.

Among the most disagreeable duties required of our soldiers is the arrest of men known to have broken the oath of allegiance, or suspected of having done so. When a "peaceful agriculturist" who pots Brits in his spare time has to be sought and arrested at his home there is always a harrowing scene with his family, and often a really pathetic one.

These plots and the persistent treachery of those who, notwithstanding the oath of neutrality, again took up arms on any favourable opportunity, led Lord Roberts to issue a new and stringent proclamation, in which he recalled his earlier promise to guarantee from molestation the non-combatant population and to allow all burghers who would lay down their arms to return to their farms after taking the oath. Experience had shown that in the Transvaal and Orange Colony non-combatants did not exist. Even women and children were guilty of treacherous attacks on our troops, and as for the men, there was no means of distinguishing the Boer trooper from the "peaceful agriculturist." "It is manifest," said the proclamation, "that the leniency which has been extended to the burghers of the South African Republic is not appreciated by them, but, on the contrary, is being used as a cloak to continue the resistance against the forces of

Stringent measures to check Boer treachery.

Her Majesty the Queen." It was now ordained that all breaking the oath of neutrality should be punished with imprisonment or death; that all burghers of the districts occupied by our troops should be seized as prisoners of war, except where they could prove that they had already taken the oath; that all buildings or farms in which the enemy's snipers and scouts were harboured should be razed to the ground, and that when damage was done to the railways and the farmers near did not give notice of the presence of the enemy, they should be regarded as aiding and abetting the guerillas. Had this proclamation been issued at an earlier stage of the war, it might have proved highly efficacious, but by August probably the greater part of the male population of the Transvaal had taken the oath of neutrality, and obtained passes, so that the "peaceful agriculturists" of the districts into which our troops marched could not be sent out of the country to Ceylon or St. Helena, until some fresh crime could be proved against them.



THE 5-INCH GUN HORSED AS A "GALLOPER."

While the Boers plotted, the army did not remain inactive. Preparations were made in mid-July for an advance eastwards along the Delagoa Bay Railway to Middelburg. The object, perhaps, was rather to clear the Boers away from the immediate vicinity of Pretoria, where they had caused endless trouble, than to deal any deadly blow at Botha's army. General Ian Hamilton was directed to march eastwards, to the north of the railway, scouring the country, while General Pole-Carew with the Eleventh Division followed the

Advance to Middelburg.

line. Ian Hamilton had under him Mahon with a mobile column, composed of 1,000 mounted infantry, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, 1st Connaught Rangers, one Horse Artillery Battery, and two 4.7's; General G. C. Cunningham's Brigade—a new formation—consisting of the 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Border Regiment, 2nd Berkshires, and 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; and Hickman's Mounted Infantry, a Canadian Battery, the Elswick Battery, two 6-inch howitzers, and two 5-inch guns. Hutton's Brigade of Mounted Infantry, with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades, four batteries, two 5-inch guns, the 1st Suffolks, and the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, under General French, marched to the south of the railway, protecting the right of the Eleventh Division. Lord Roberts was with the British centre, and personally directed the operations.

Now, as always, the enemy were elusive. The blows of our ponderous, slow-moving army were delivered in the air. French and



COLT AUTOMATIC GUN

Belonging to the Australian Mounted Infantry, on Dundonald carriage, and presented to the Colonials by Colonel Gordon. An Australian is explaining the mechanism to one of the City Imperial Volunteers.

his cavalry had been re-horsed, but the old trouble remained—that our mounts could not carry the heavy weights which were placed upon their backs. The Boers, riding light, could always escape from our overburdened horsemen. They were first encountered on July 21 near Pienaar's Poort, close to the scene of the battle of Diamond Hill. Here Colonel Henry with the 4th Mounted Infantry came into touch with them. They were holding a line of kopjes, and, according to their invariable custom, reserved their fire till the British were within 1,000 yards. Then a "Pom-Pom," two guns, and the Boer rifles opened upon the South Australians. The Australians replied with a Colt machine-gun, but had the gun-carriage smashed, and were compelled to retire. They succeeded in getting the gun itself away; the ammunition for it, however, had to be flung into a spruit and abandoned. Anticipating a vigorous resistance at this point, Lord Roberts moved French's cavalry nearer in to the main column. But the Boers did not intend serious fighting. In the night they retired, leaving behind them only a few scattered sharpshooters, who incessantly "sniped" the British scouts and patrols. The strength of the Boer main force, under Botha and Viljoen, was placed at this time by trustworthy witnesses at from 5,000 to 8,000 men.

From Pienaar's Poort the Eleventh Division marched unopposed to Bronkhorst Spruit, which was reached on

July 24. The battlefield of 1880 was the camping ground of the troops. The graves of Colonel Anstruther's gallant 94ths were found grievously neglected and almost hidden in the long grass. The land was bare and desolate, but the cottage still stood from which a Boer woman saw the emissary with the flag of truce go forward and order the retreat of the British troops. The whole scene rose vividly before the eyes of the army; the little column of red-coats and waggons marching carelessly along in what they supposed complete secu-

rity; the sudden appearance of the rebel messenger; the peremptory refusal of his demands; then from behind every stone and tree the flash of rifles; the tempest of death descending upon the unhappy column; and finally the dishonour of the white flag and surrender, with 120 out of 250 men down in ten minutes. And now, twenty years later, an avenging army was marching over their graves. Through defeat, and surrender, and dishonour, and bloodshed unimaginable, the flag had come back at last.

Meantime Ian Hamilton marched through the bush veldt, north of the Delagoa Bay Railway—a country in which it was almost impossible to see the enemy or to come to hand-grips with them, and in which peculiar precautions had to be taken against ambushes and surprises. Here a new



THE WIFE OF GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

Mrs. Botha is descended from Robert Emmet, the famous "United Irishman," who was executed for high treason, September 20, 1803. It is a curious fact that one of Emmet's disciples, Lord Edward Fitz-Gerald, was the ancestor of one of the Englishmen who have had so much to do with the conduct of the present campaign, namely, Mr. George Wyndham, Under-Secretary for War. After her husband's appointment as Commander-in-Chief, in succession to Joubert, Mrs. Botha helped to instil new courage into the Boers, for she and Mrs. Lukas Meyer used to visit the laagers and encourage the burghers when they seemed likely to yield to despair. Mrs. Botha acted as intermediary between Lord Kitchener and her husband in the futile negotiations of March, 1901.

species of Boer treachery was encountered. At the farms "women," in the words of the *Standard* correspondent, "are put out as decoys to invite small parties to collect arms or to descend and refresh themselves with coffee. A patrol drew near to a farm, when a woman appeared and invited the men to enter and take food. They hesitated, whereupon this Jael

Boer women as decoys.

declared that there were arms to be taken. Two troopers approached, and immediately a score of hidden rifles opened on the patrol, while women, rushing out of the house, clapped their hands and screamed delight at the success of their treachery. These are the guileless peasants who deceive, not only people at home, but shrewd men who fall under the spell of their tongue." In spite of these tricks, the column was to the north of Bronkhorst Spruit on the 22nd, where it halted to allow the Eleventh Division to come into line with it.

At Bronkhorst Spruit General

**Seizure of
Wolmarans'
hidden
treasure.**

Pole-
Carew
made
an in-

teresting discovery. Sleeping at the house of Mr. A. D. Wolmarans, he found £10,000 in gold, thirty-nine rifles, and a large quantity of dynamite hidden there. Presumably the gold had been

taken from the Pretoria banks when Mr. Kruger hurriedly and ignominiously fled from his capital. The secret of the concealed treasure was betrayed by a Kaffir who had served Wolmarans for years, and never received anything but kicks for his labour. The money was naturally confiscated, but the buried rifles showed that little dependence could be placed upon surrendered Boers.



J. Finnemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

FALLEN OUT: AN INCIDENT ON THE MARCH.

[After a sketch by Ernest Prater.]

French, on the British right, crossed the Wilge River on July 23, directing his march upon Balmoral, whither the other columns advanced on the 25th. The weather was about the worst that had been faced in the whole campaign—icy wind, which cut the men to the bone, accompanied by constant thunderstorms and deluges of rain. The tracks became mere seas of mud, through which the troops floundered miserably. The sufferings of the infantry, in particular, were terrible, as many of the battalions were marching light. Many soldiers were invalided, and one officer actually died of exposure. The effects of the stormy weather upon the horses and transport animals were disheartening. "To say that altogether a thousand animals belonging to the main column perished would not be an exaggerated estimate," writes Mr. Bennet Burleigh. "Oxen, mules, and horses lay in rows where they had fallen in the yokes and harness. Upon one small space of a few acres 300 dead animals were counted." Of opposition from the enemy on the awful march there was little. The Boers threatened French and

**French's march to
Balmoral.**



Gordon Browne, R.I.]

[After a sketch by C. Morley.

GENERAL IAN HAMILTON'S RETURN TO PRETORIA: HIS FORCE MARCHING PAST LORD ROBERTS, July 30, 1900.

Hutton with an attack on the 24th, but when Alderson's Mounted Infantry assailed their right and the two cavalry brigades, making a wide détour, menaced their left, they hurriedly retired, leaving several killed and wounded behind them. The British loss was one Australian officer killed.

On the 25th Hamilton's column entered Balmoral, and Pole-Carew bivouacked for the night at the Wilge River. Here the Boers had destroyed the railway bridge and in other ways damaged the line. French was still well in front. This same day, after a skirmish with the Boers at Vlaklaagte, in which he lost one man killed, he crossed the Olifant's River and occupied a position from which, far away over the undulating country, Middelburg could be seen. The enemy were made out in some force, retiring in the utmost confusion; for miles the road eastward towards Machadodorp was blocked with their waggons and guns. Only the falling of night and the severity of the weather prevented a

great haul from being made by the cavalry. In the pitch darkness, upon almost unknown roads, it was impossible for French to press the enemy further. On the 27th he rode into Middelburg and received the surrender of the place, which lies in an important mining district. Here he received the submission of a fair number of burghers,

**Middelburg
surrenders to him.**

and established himself, covering a very wide front from the junction of the Wilge and Olifant to the headwaters of the Little Olifant. Behind him Pole-Carew's division held the railway from Balmoral to Middelburg. Determined to gain as much ground as he could, French, on August 1, pushed forward along the railway, to the neighbourhood of Wonderfontein, and, as no resistance from the enemy was encountered, Gordon

**Gordon occupies
Wonderfontein.**

First Cavalry Brigade occupied that place. At Pan, a station half-way between Wonderfontein and Middelburg, half a battalion of Irish Fusiliers and two guns were stationed. The post was very strongly entrenched.

The Boers had destroyed the bridge

**Roberts returns
to Pretoria.**

over the Olifant, and Lord Roberts, learning that its restoration and the repair of the other damaged bridges would be a

work of some time, and feeling that a stronger force than was as yet available would be required for operations in the direction of Machadodorp and Komati Poort, returned to Pretoria. Ian Hamilton was no longer required along the railway, so he too, with Mahon's and Cunningham's brigades, was recalled to Pretoria, which place he reached on July 30. He was then directed to march into the disturbed Rustenburg district and to bring back to Pretoria Baden-Powell's force, then supposed to be



[Photo by Davies Bros., Johannesburg.]

GENERAL GORDON AND PERSONAL STAFF, COMMANDING THE 1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE.

in front is Captain Lawson, General Gordon's A.D.C.; on the left of the picture is General Gordon; on the right Major Butler, and standing behind, Captain Home.

beleaguered in Rustenburg. On August 2 Ian Hamilton attacked Uitval Nek, his infantry advancing against the Boers from the south of the Magaliesberg, while his mounted men, who had been marching to the north of the range, threatened the enemy from the other side. Two companies of the Berkshires climbed the steep height to the east of the pass, whence the Boers had attacked on the ill-fated 11th of July. The enemy made no protracted resistance. When they found themselves under fire from above they precipitately retreated; unhappily the mounted men under Mahon had been delayed, and could not get up in time to intercept the enemy's retreat. Several waggons were captured. The total loss to the British in this affair was forty killed and wounded. Ian Hamilton then pushed on to Rustenburg, where he met Baden-Powell. Their subsequent movements up to August 18, in chase of De Wet, have already been chronicled.

An advance northwards along the Pretoria and Pietersburg Railway began on August 19. From Waterval, Paget with his Brigade, reinforced by Baden-Powell's command, pushed north, while on their left from the Crocodile River Ian Hamilton and Mahon swept the country. The object of the movement was at once to divert the enemy's attention from the eastern Transvaal, in which quarter Lord Roberts had determined to resume the offensive, and to drive back the Boer commandos which had been hovering to the north of Pretoria, where their presence was dangerous. The line of march lay across the bush veldt, a tract of land covered with small trees and thick undergrowth, in which

Van der Westhuyzen.

Grobler.



COMMANDANT GROBLER AND LIEUT. VAN DER WESTHUYZEN ON THE STOEP OF A "ROOINEK" AT PALAPYE.

Commandant Grobler (brother of General Grobler) during the early stage of the war fought in the Tuli, Colesberg, Winburg, and Pretoria districts, and later on at Pienaar's River, Crocodile River, and Warmbaths. He was arrested in his home at Nylstroom, tried by the Boers for treason, sentenced to death, but released on finding bail in £1,000. Hearing that a fresh warrant was issued for his arrest, he fled to Palapye, and surrendered to the British. His Secretary, Lieut. van der Westhuyzen has been his faithful ally in many combats.



LIEUT. G. G. E. WYLLIE, V.C.

Lieut. Guy G. E. Wyllie, of the Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, on September 1, 1900, was one of a scouting party of eight near Warmbaths. Passing through a narrow wooded gorge, they were attacked by the enemy. Lieut. Wyllie, though wounded, went to the assistance of one of his men, Corporal Brown, whose horse was shot, and who was badly wounded in the leg, insisted on the man's taking his own horse, while he himself, from behind a rock, covered the retreat of the others, at the risk of himself being cut off. For this act he was awarded the V.C.

Private J. H. Bisdee, another Tasmanian Imperial Bushman, gained the V.C. on the same occasion, when he assisted on to his horse a wounded officer, whose own mount had bolted, and rode with him under heavy fire to a place of safety. (See portrait on p. 1 of this volume.)

whole armies might have lain hidden. Paget's men were much "sniped," but had little serious fighting. The Wiltshire Regiment was so unfortunate as to lose an officer and several men, cut off from the column in the bush. It was, indeed, impossible to go any distance from the main columns, as the enemy hovered around. Watering the horses at night-fall was a tedious and even

dangerous business from the presence of "snipers," who put in a shot whenever the British troops gave them an opportunity.

On the 21st Paget continued his march through country which, in the words of Driver Erskine Childers, was "very like the New Forest," to Haman's Kraal. Baden-Powell, who was in advance, was engaged all day with the rearguard of the Boer force, commanded, as it proved, by Grobler, and there was something approaching a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy, two bodies of mounted men, Boer and British, charging each other. In the encounter the Rhodesians suffered severe loss, Colonel Spreckley, a remarkably gallant and beloved Colonial officer, falling dead with four of his men, while eight more were wounded. On their side, the Boers did not escape scatheless. They left several killed and wounded, and fled as far as Cyferkuit on the Plat River. Baden-Powell that night occupied Pienaar's River, the railway bridge over which stream he found destroyed. Next day he hurried



Ernest Prater.]

A STERN CHASE: BRITISH SHELLS FINDING THE BOER REARGUARD WHILE CROSSING A STREAM.

forward to Warmbaths, and though the enemy attempted a stand south of this place he drove them back without any difficulty, capturing twenty-five of them and rescuing a hundred prisoners whom they were taking with them. Among the Boers captured was a German captain of the Staats Artillerie. From Warmbaths Baden-Powell continued his progress in the direction of Nylstroom, which he seized by a daring and well-calculated flank movement. Nylstroom was a place of great importance to the enemy by reason of the supplies which it afforded and with which it was filled. These were promptly "commandeered" by Baden-Powell. The Boers broke up into small parties and scattered up and down the bush-veldt.

Behind Baden-Powell Ian Hamilton advanced to Warmbaths, capturing on his way a few prisoners and a great quantity of cattle. Paget also moved to this place, while behind Paget again, Clements' Brigade, which had now arrived in the Transvaal from the Bethlehem district, marched to Haman's Kraal. But at this point Lord Roberts, needing more men for his great move eastwards

along the Delagoa Bay Railway, had to suspend the advance northwards. He recalled Ian Hamilton to Pretoria; withdrew Clements

and sent
Retirement to Pretoria. him into the

Krugersdorp district, and left only Baden-Powell and Paget to continue operations to the north of Warmbaths. This necessitated Baden-Powell's evacuation of Nylstroom. It was unfortunate, as Grobler with the bulk of his men was believed to have been on the verge of surrender, and he and they were thoroughly wearied and disheartened. Their prospects, so long as the rich grain country round Nylstroom was in British hands, were most unfavourable. On August 29 Grobler sent in to the British camp the last of his prisoners, who numbered 34 in all. Two days later, on the 31st, Colonel Plumer, who was operating with a mounted column from Pienaar's River, attacked and defeated a party of the enemy, capturing twenty-six burghers and thirty-one waggons. On September 1 he surprised the Boers at Rooikop, twenty-five miles east of Pienaar's River, and made a great haul of cattle and ammunition; on the 2nd, near Warmbaths, he seized more cattle and supplies. At Warmbaths he took over command of Baden-Powell's column, Baden-Powell himself proceeding upon leave. Next day the Boers attacked a British outpost near Warmbaths, but were driven off with heavy loss, the younger Cronje being killed. On the 7th the whole British force began to retire upon Pretoria, clearing the country as it passed. The explanation of this retrograde movement must be found in the want of men. On the 14th Paget was at Hebron, with over 2,000 head of cattle that he had seized.



[Photo by Maurice Hack.

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, V.C., &c.
Photographed since his return from South Africa.

The chase of De Wet had intervened after the Middelburg campaign to prevent an immediate advance to Komati Poort. But as soon as the columns which had been pressing the great guerilla

were once more free, Lord Roberts' thoughts turned eastwards. Kitchener had marched back to

Pretoria with Smith-Dorrien's, Ridley's, and Broadwood's Brigades at the end of August, so that a large body of troops was available at the Transvaal capital. East of Middelburg was General French with 3,800 men and fourteen guns; along the line from Middelburg to Balmoral was, we have seen, Pole-Carew with the Eleventh Division, now totalling 7,500 men and twenty-four guns. The co-



BOER WOMEN
VISITING THEIR IM-
PRISONED HUSBANDS
AT STANDERTON.

The scene does not suggest a very rigorous military discipline. One of the vrouws has brought the baby in a perambulator; the others are talking to their men-folk quite unhampered by official witnesses.

operation of further troops had

seemed
General Buller's ad-
column to v-
co-operate. sable,

and General Buller, early in August, had been directed to move, with Lyttelton's Fourth Infantry Division and the mounted brigades of Brock-



(Photo by Lieut. A. L. Langman.)

INSIDE THE CAMP OF THE BOER PRISONERS AT SIMONSTOWN.

Showing some typical specimens of the rustic Boers. On the right of the picture is an English visitor.

lehurst and Dundonald, eastwards from Standerton to Amersfoort, and thence northwards through Ermelo and Carolina to the neighbourhood of Machadodorp.

The total strength of General Buller's column was 8,000 officers and men, of whom about 1,900 were mounted, with 10 howitzers and position guns, 4 naval 12-pounders, 24 field and horse artillery guns, and 4 "Pom-poms." The composition of the column was as follows:—

FOURTH DIVISION.

LIEUT.-GEN. LYTTELTON.

Seventh Brigade.

MAJOR-GENERAL F. W.
KITCHENER.

1st Devon.
1st Manchester.
2nd Gordon Highlanders.
21st, 42nd, and 53rd Field Batteries.

Eighth Brigade.

MAJOR-GENERAL F. HOWARD.

1st Liverpool.
1st Leicester.
1st King's Royal Rifles.
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
21st, 42nd, and 53rd Field Batteries.

Second Cavalry Brigade.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. F.
BROCKLEHURST.

5th Lancers (2 squadrons).
18th Hussars (2½ squadrons).
19th Hussars (3 squadrons =
whole regiment).

Third Mounted Brigade.

MAJOR-GENERAL LORD
DUNDONALD.

South African Light Horse.
Strathcona's Horse.
"A" Horse Artillery Battery.

CORPS TROOPS.

2 5-in. guns. 2 47-in. guns. 4 12-pr. guns. 61st (Howitzer) Battery. 2 "Pom-Poms."

It will be observed that the infantry, with the exception of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, were composed entirely of battalions from the Ladysmith garrison, whose health had now completely recovered from the strain of the siege. By August 6 the column with its transport was collected at Meerzicht, to the north of Paardekop, and only a day's march from Amersfoort. It was confronted by the Ermelo, Wakkerstroom, and Pietretief Commandos, under Christian Botha, mustering about 2,000 men, with three guns and two "Pom-poms." The Boers held the line of the Rooikopjes, intersecting the road from Meerzicht to Amersfoort.

On the 7th Buller led out his force. The enemy fought a rearguard action all the way to Amersfoort, holding ridge after ridge, but retiring as the British approached. They made something of a stand, however, to the west of the town. But their guns were speedily silenced by the overpowering strength of the British artillery, and when the King's Royal Rifles and the Gordon Highlanders advanced to the assault the position was carried with little difficulty. On nearing the town the King's Royal Rifles received a heavy fire from

**Its progress to
Twyfelaar.**



F. A. Stewart.]

BULLER'S INFANTRY CLEARING THE HILLY GROUND AT ROOIKOPJES, August 7, 1900.

[Sketched on the spot.

the houses, notwithstanding which they fought their way into the place. Our total loss was two killed and 23 wounded; the Boers fell back to the north, leaving several dead and wounded behind. On the 8th a thick fog covered the country, so that it was impossible to move, and the column remained all day at Amersfoort. But on the 9th, marching with the enormous front of twenty miles, it reached Rietspruit on the Ermelo road. Dundonald's mounted men had a skirmish with the enemy on the extreme right, in which one of the "Pom-Poms" did good service, and drove the Boers from the village of Rolfontein. Next day the enemy still fell back, and now did not even attempt to fight rearguard actions. Beginderlyn was reached with scarcely a skirmish. On the 11th the cavalry rode into Ermelo, and secured the public offices and a considerable quantity of forage, the main column halting at Klipfontein, some distance to the south. The enemy headed north-eastwards, evidently fearing that, if they fell back northwards towards Belfast, General French's cavalry would cut their line of retreat. On the 13th the advance was resumed, and Klipstapel at the source of the Vaal was reached after an



BRITISH SOLDIERS CONSTRUCTING A DEVIATION-RAILWAY AT STANDERTON.

encounter between Dundonald's Brigade and the Boer rearguard, in which the enemy lost several¹ men wounded. On the 14th Carolina was entered by the main force, while the cavalry rode on yet further to Twyfelaar and opened up heliographic communication with the 6th Dragoons, stationed at Goedeheop, who formed part of General French's command. Next day the infantry advanced to Twyfelaar, and there halted for a week in obedience to Lord Roberts' orders, until the column which was to strike from Middelburg along the railway should be ready to move forward. Some skirmishing on the British right, in which three of the South African Light Horse were wounded, was the only incident.

The Boers were known to have been for weeks past constructing fortifications between Bergendal, Dalmanutha, and Machadodorp, on the Delagoa Bay Railway. The country was similar to



DEFENCES AT STANDERTON.

A 12-pounder quick-firing gun in position.

CRICKET ON DUBLIN HILL, STANDERTON.
Notice the home-made bat and the wicket of rough sticks.

that in which General Hunter had carried on his campaign against Prinsloo. The mountains

Country round Machadodorp. in the Machadodorp district reach an elevation of 6,000 feet, rising from a vast tableland, which lies about 5,000 feet above sea-level, bleak and barren in the extreme in winter. The tracks are bad; the mountain ranges are broken up by deep

ravines, through which dash brawling torrents; here, as elsewhere, the maps were rarely trustworthy. The railway near Belfast reaches the summit level of 6,587 feet in its passage across the Lebombo Range. The line is one continuous ascent from Middelburg; beyond Machadodorp it falls rapidly, and between Watervalboven and Watervalonder has to make use of cogs and racks to climb and descend the steep gradients. The region is the coldest and windiest in the Transvaal. The fantastic outlines of the lofty mountains, the names of which—Devil's Knuckles, Devil's Head, and Devil's Counter—reflect their savage appearance, give it a weird melancholy and impressiveness. Yet it is a land rich in coal and gold, in which, in days to come, a teeming population will temper, by the evidence of its presence, the sternness of nature.

So far as could be ascertained, the strength of Botha's army was about 6,000 or 7,000 men, with at least twenty guns, of which two or three were of large calibre. On August 21 Pole-Carew began the concentration of his division at Wonderfontein, a task which he had completed by the 23rd.



Sidney Paget.]

[After a sketch by an officer.

A PATROL OF LANCERS IN DIFFICULTIES UNDER A CROSS-FIRE.

In the meantime French spread his two cavalry brigades from Wonderfontein to Twyfelaar, in close touch with Buller's column. This column, in obedience to orders from Lord Roberts, had already begun its march in the direction of Belfast. After a reconnaissance of the Boer positions on the 20th, in which the 5th Lancers got into difficulties, on the 21st it advanced to Van Wyk's Vlei, fifteen miles to the south-east of Belfast. Some opposition was encountered by the cavalry and mounted infantry. The 18th Hussars saw a body of Boers in apparent retreat, but on giving chase were drawn

**Boers dislodged at
Van Wyk's Vlei.**

under the rifles of 100 of the enemy, who were cleverly ambushed. They were extricated by the mounted infantry and the "Pom-Poms." The 5th Lancers had a similar experience, but when a battery of artillery came to their aid, the Boers, whose object was delay rather than serious fighting, beat a precipitate retreat. Later in the day a reconnaissance was made towards the north, in which Strathcona's Horse, the South African Light Horse, the Manchesters, and the Devons were engaged attacking a series of kopjes whence the enemy delivered an irritating fire. Their attack was covered by General Buller's howitzers and by the

21st Battery. In all, the British losses on this day amounted to seven killed, twenty-four wounded, and five missing. At times the Boer fire was exceedingly hot, though the enemy had no guns in action, and their strength was estimated at only 600 men. It was one more instance of the power of a small force, under the present conditions of war, with smokeless powder and long-range rifles, to delay and annoy a large body of men.

The position captured from the enemy had to be abandoned by the British, and in the course of the night the Boers returned and re-occupied it. On the 22nd they were once more dislodged by the British without much difficulty. After a bombardment by the field guns and howitzers the Manchesters carried the line of kopjes. On the 23rd Buller marched to Leeuwkloof Farm, eight miles to the south of Belfast.


Action at Leeuwkloof Farm.

His cavalry, under Dundonald and Brocklehurst, came into contact with the main force of the Boers, who were holding the rolling downs south of Dalmanutha. On his left was French, moving in the direction of Geluk Farm. The country was of exceptional difficulty. "Serried ridges," says a correspondent, "swelling here and there into rocky kopjes, the mere ascent of which on foot is a task in itself, and where horses cannot go, offer typical ground, like the line of the Tugela, for the Boer mode of fighting. In such positions a couple of hundred men, armed with the magazine rifle, may easily hold thousands at bay." All day the enemy withstood our advance with 15-pounders, "Pom-Poms," and rifle fire. Towards evening the 18th and 19th Hussars were warmly engaged on a ridge facing the main Boer position. Two companies of the Liverpool regiment went to their aid, but made the mistake of pushing forward too far from the reach of support. They crossed the ridge, beyond which the enemy were hidden in some force, behind

Cunning tactics of the enemy.

great boulders and stones. The Boers artfully ceased fire to lure them forward. They had received warning from more than one quarter, it is said, to show the extremest caution, and they were told that the enemy were ambushed in their front. They could see before them a donga in the hill side, and from that donga rose a kopje, one mass of boulders. All looked still and peaceful in the calm evening air. Nothing moved upon the stony slope of the kopje. Along its crest ran a low stone wall, but nothing showed above it.

The Liverpools in open order scrambled carelessly down into the donga, out of sight of the rest of the troops, and moved quietly and unsuspectingly towards the kopje. Now their foremost line began to climb the kopje; the second line was entangled in the donga. The leading men were about 200 yards from the wall. At this instant the boulders and wall broke into life. Heads showed behind



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE BULLER'S ADVANCE AND THE ACTIONS AROUND DALMANUTHA AND BELFAST.



F.J. Waugh

THE FEIGNED SURRENDER WHICH DREW THE LIVERPOOLS INTO A DESPERATE POSITION.

the wall: burghers arose just behind the boulders; all held their rifles above their heads, and made signs as if they meant to surrender. They moved towards the British, and only revealed their real meaning when but forty or fifty yards away. Then one and all they flung themselves on the ground, and poured a terrible magazine fire upon their guileless opponents. While the attention of the British was thus occupied, another body of Boers by a flanking movement had striven to cut off the retreat of our men, but this movement had not been completed when the first shots were fired, otherwise not a man of the Liverpools would have escaped. The two companies behaved with remarkable courage and steadiness. Though many were brought down by the first deadly volley, the survivors flung



THE MARKET SQUARE AT LYDENBURG.

themselves flat on the ground and replied to the enemy with their rifles. A desperate encounter began, the British holding their ground in the hope that reinforcements would be sent to their aid. But after a time, when it was clear that there was no chance of this, they slowly retired section by section. Yard by yard they fought their way back, suffering more in this retreat than in the surprise of the outset. About nightfall the remnant, with scarcely a round of ammunition left, regained the British lines.

Their losses were heavy. Out of a total of about 200 men, ten were killed, forty-six wounded, and thirty-two taken prisoners. The enemy behaved with the utmost savagery to the wounded.

Cruel treatment of the wounded.

They were seen deliberately shooting at men who were lying in agony on the ground, and this though from the shortness of the range they were easily able to distinguish between the combatants and the wounded. One Boer tore the boots off a man lying with a shattered thigh, careless of the fearful pain he caused. All the captives and the wounded were plundered of everything of the slightest value, even their food being taken from them. There were, however, some among the Boers who showed humanity, though these unhappily were the exception and not the rule. Late in the night the ambulances went out and recovered by lamplight all the wounded who could be found. As the Boers had used expansive bullets—a regular practice of theirs in the later months of the war—the injuries were very severe and many of the wounded died.

There is no report of this strange affair in General Buller's despatches, so it cannot be known whether the Liverpools had received an order to advance or whether they were acting on their own initiative. Whosoever the fault, they paid dearly for it. The other casualties on this day were small—one killed and seven wounded. French's cavalry had some skirmishing with the enemy, a party of scouts being suddenly attacked while preparing breakfast. On the 24th and 25th Buller remained inactive, waiting till Lord Roberts should have completed the arrangements for a combined attack on the Boer positions before Dalmanutha. The two days passed in conferences between the generals

in face of the Boer lines. The enemy's heavy guns and "Pom-Poms" fired an occasional shot as if to remind the British of the work that yet remained to be accomplished. "One went to sleep," says a correspondent, "with the noise of firing round three sides of the camp, and the alarm at daybreak was the 'cluck-clack' of the rifle, the resonant sound of that most demoralising of weapons, the 'Pom-Pom,' and the deeper boom of the cannon. A stranger visiting the camp would have imagined that the column was in a tight as well as a hot place. But Sir Redvers was merely keeping the Boers in play until the time came for the advance on the railway line." On the 24th Pole-Carew, who with his division formed the British left, pushed forward along the railway from Wonderfontein to Belfast, encountering only a trifling resistance. At the outset he was "sniped," and later in the day he was shelled by a Boer gun which had taken up its position on one of the highest hills near Belfast—a hill crowned with a monument celebrating the independence of the long-forgotten republic of Lydenburg. His loss was sixteen killed and wounded. Here Lord Roberts arrived on the 25th and at once conferred with Buller, Pole-Carew, and French.



[Sketch by F. A. Stewart.]

BULLER'S CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY ADVANCING ON BERGENDAL.

The British commander-in-chief's plan was at first to watch the Boer front with the Eleventh Division while turning their left with Buller's and French's troops. This idea was abandoned because the ground on the Boer left did not favour a turning movement, and it was decided to bring French's troops round to the Boer right, and with them and the Guards' Brigade and Henry's Mounted Infantry to attack the enemy in this quarter. The Boer position was somewhat of the shape of a U, and covered an immense extent of country, being more than twenty miles from north to south. It began at Zwart Kopjes, a little to the north of Helvetia and followed a rough ridge to Bergendal, a farm close to Dalmanutha, where was a station on the Delagoa Bay Railway, eight miles south-west of Machadodorp. From Bergendal the line curved round to the neighbourhood of Machadodorp. The Boers held a ridge which descended on the side to the British in a gently rolling declivity, quite devoid of shelter. Their works, however, were not upon the crest, where they would have been exposed to the direct fire from the British guns, but just behind it, in a slight hollow. A correspondent who had been through

**Combined attack
planned.**

the Natal campaign and who examined the position after its capture pronounced it almost as strong as the Colenso lines, which for so many weeks had withstood the assault of 20,000 men. Schanzes, and earthworks, where there was any earth, had been erected, but the ground was generally rocky, a fact which told heavily in favour of the British artillery. There was, however, no obstacle in the enemy's front at all comparable with the Tugela.

On August 26, very early in the morning, General French left Geluk with all his cavalry, and, riding round the British rear, was by nightfall at Lakenvlei, well to the north of Belfast. At the same time Pole-Carew with his infantry marched up the Lydenburg road, so as to support the cavalry. His progress was slow and



THE GORDONS IN LUCK.

Arrival of a consignment of winter clothing from friends at home.

Time after time all the tedious work of an artillery preparation had to be undertaken. As the day went on, the boom of French's guns was heard far to the north, and drew off some of the enemy's attention, so that a little more progress was achieved. The Eighteenth Brigade had a very hot and unpleasant time in the immediate neighbourhood of the Lydenburg monument. They were holding the hill on which this monument stands, while the Guards were advancing on their left, when the enemy poured in upon them a furious fire. The Boer "Pom-Poms" chipped flakes off the granite of the monument, and played upon the British trenches with effect. One trench, which was their chief target, as it seemed, was held by eight Warwicks. All retired, says Mr. Stuart, the *Morning Post* correspondent, except one man. "Confound it all!" said a private, "I can't see one man holding a trench alone; I'll go and reinforce him." He went, but the man was dead. The "Pom-Pom" splinters which struck him had not removed his helmet. But the day closed with one object attained—touch had been established with General French, who had continued his advance and, after brisk skirmishing, was nearing Zwart Kopjes, where he would be in a position to threaten the enemy's extreme right. With evening a bitter wind blew from the sea over the desolate upland, numbing the troops and causing them great suffering. The British loss in this quarter of the field was three killed and thirty-four wounded.

On the British right General Buller had moved forward from Leeuwkloof to Vogelstruis Farm,

**Actions near
Lydenburg and
Bergendal.**

difficult, and he did not get much more than two miles to the north-east of Belfast. The Boers cunningly utilised all the advantages that the broken ground gave them; they held ridge after ridge, and the instant our troops showed in any force directed upon them a heavy rifle, "Pom-Pom," and field-gun fire.



THE CAMP WATCH-DOG OF THE 1ST GORDONS.

This is one of the many pets which have been adopted by our soldiers in South Africa, which include several dogs and goats and at least two monkeys—those of the City Imperial Volunteers and the 4th Derbyshires.

which lies immediately to the south of Bergendal. He had to advance under a heavy and annoying fire from the Boer cannon and rifles. On the 26th so vigorous was the opposition that he could only gain ground with extreme difficulty. The Boers did not show in any strong force, but small parties of them were omnipresent. "In the operations, exacting and dangerous to a degree, Buller's infantry," says the *Standard* correspondent, "always cool and disciplined, as usual did splendid work. The artillery were magnificent in their devotion. A section of the 21st Battery, under Lieutenant Rainsford Hannay, who was wounded, stuck to their guns amid a perfect hail of 'Pom-Pom' shells and projectiles from the enemy's 'Long Tom' and high-velocity artillery. When one of the ammunition carriers retired wounded, Colonel Hannay, who had come round from Cork to see his son, worked like a Trojan in his place." Towards the close of the day the enemy were pushed back upon Bergendal and Dalmanutha, and the troops came in sight of the main Boer position.

As the progress of the British troops upon the left had been slow, and as it was clear that the enemy were stronger in that quarter than had been supposed, another change in Lord Roberts' plans was made. It was now decided that on the 27th General Buller should storm the formidable Bergendal position. As it was advisable to strengthen the British force Lord Roberts brought up reinforcements from Pretoria. Smith-Dorrien's Brigade was ordered to entrain at Pretoria on August 26, while Mahon and Cunningham—the first with a mounted force, the second with an infantry brigade—were also directed to move east. Their arrival would add about 5,000 men and twenty-four guns to the 20,000 men and eighty guns already operating under the Commander-in-Chief about Belfast. Since the reports of inhabitants of Belfast placed Botha's strength at 15,000—an over-estimate as events showed—and since the Boer lines were of exceptional strength, this was a wise precaution. Botha had bitterly reproached his men for their frequent and precipitate retreats, and had threatened them that if this time they ran away, he would lead them no more.

Bergendal.




H. C. Seppings Wright.]

[After a sketch by Lieut. R. Hennessy, 2nd Gordon Highlanders.

THE BRITISH ADVANCE AGAINST THE BOER POSITION AT BERGENDAL, August 26, 1900.

The troops engaged are, on the left, the 1st Devons, in the centre the Gordons, and on the right Dundonald and the 8th Brigade, supported by siege guns, a howitzer battery, a field battery, and two naval guns.



[Photo by the Press Photo Bureau.]

SIGHTING A NAVAL 47 GUN.

This photograph represents the gun of the *Powerful* which was christened "Joe Chamberlain," and the crew consists of the same men as manned the weapon in South Africa, though they were then clad in khaki jackets. Two guns of precisely similar pattern played an important part in the operations described in this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF BERGENDAL AND THE ADVANCE EASTWARDS.

Bergendal a natural fortification—Plan of attack—British artillery fire—Assault of the infantry—The kopje taken—Boers retreat to Machadodorp—Scene on the field of battle—Brave Boers—French captures Zwart Kopjes—Buller advances to Helvetia and Watervalboven—The Eland Valley—French secures Watervalonder—Rescue of prisoners at Nooitgedacht—Boer forces divide—Annexation of the Transvaal—Buller moves along the Crocodile Valley—Ian Hamilton joins him—Fall of Lydenburg—Boers shell the town—Ineffectual attempt to dislodge the surrounding enemy—Buller renews the attempt—Determined stand of Botha's rearguard—Capture of the Knuckles—Arrival at Spitzkop—Buller occupies Pilgrim's Rest and Kruger's Post—Natal army redistributed—Buller returns to England—Work of the Natal Army.



AT dawn of August 27 the British troops held a semi-circle twenty miles long, from Zwart Kopjes to the neighbourhood of Dalmanutha—French on the left, Pole-Carew in the centre, and Buller on the right. Everywhere the Boers confronted our men, and with the first rays of light came the sound of heavy ordnance and the banging of "Pom-Poms," as they opened fire through the mist.

At Bergendal, which was to be the centre of interest in the battle, the roads to Carolina, Belfast, and Dalmanutha met, and the ridge held by the Boers attained its utmost elevation. Just to the west of the farm, a trim and snug white structure bowered in trees, rose a peculiar square kopje, "formed," says General Buller in his despatch, "of a conglomeration of immense stones, covering about three acres in extent." With "its immense stones and rocky crevices" this kopje was a natural fortress of no mean strength. Around it for 2,000 yards the ground afforded no shelter of any kind, but sloped gently like an artificial glacis up to the foot of the kopje. Behind the kopje the ridge attained its topmost level and then fell again to the railway beyond. On the other side of the railway and about three

Bergendal a natural fortification.



BOER "LONG TOM."

Captured by the British and mounted on railway trucks for use against its former owners.

miles from the square kopje was yet another kopje of similar formation. Both were seen to be held in force by the Boers; on the square hill near Bergendal a "Pom-Pom" was located; on the ridge to the east of it two guns and several trenches were made out; and on the far-away kopje again there were signs of the presence of two guns.

The main attack was to be delivered upon the square kopje near Ber-

Plan of attack. bergendal, which was the key to the whole position, as it lay at the point where the Boer line curved from a direction generally west and east to one north and south. From the west, General Pole-Carew's guns were ready on the hills near Belfast to direct an enfilading fire upon the Boer position; Buller's assault was to come from the south. Early in the morning of the 27th Brocklehurst's Cavalry Brigade, with the A Horse Artillery Battery, 53rd Field Battery, two "Pom-Poms," and the 4th Mounted Infantry, was directed to work to the left round the bend of the Boer U, to connect with General Pole-Carew's Division, and to shell Bergendal farm and kopje from the reverse side. Then the 7th Infantry Brigade under General F. W. Kitchener moved from Vogelstruispoort towards Bergendal, detaching the Manchester Regiment, which was



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN FIELDEN BROCKLEHURST, M.V.O., Esq.

Born in 1852 in Lancashire. After being two years in the Militia, he joined the Royal Horse Guards, 1874; Captain, 1881; Major, 1885; Lieut.-Colonel, 1891; Colonel, 1899; D.A.A. and Q.M.G., Egypt, 1884-5; Equerry to Her late Majesty, 1899. Served in the Egyptian War of 1882 with the Royal Horse Guards and with the Nile Expedition of 1884-5 in charge of the Remount Depot; as Major-General accompanied Lieut.-General French to Ladysmith, fought at Elandslaagte, and commanded the Cavalry force in besieged Ladysmith. Equerry to Queen Alexandra, 1901.

ordered to entrench itself on the right. The extreme right flank in this direction was covered by the 3rd Mounted Infantry. Lastly, protected by the long-range fire of the infantry, the guns got into position, in this order from right to left: 42nd Field Battery, entrenched with the Manchesters, two naval 4'7's, two 5-in. guns, two naval 12-pounders, 61st Howitzer Battery, and 21st Field Battery. The early morning was foggy and misty, and it was not till 11 a.m. that the British guns were ready to open fire. The line of artillery was prolonged on General Buller's left by the 53rd Field Battery, "Pom-Poms," and A Battery, and by two 4'7's and two 5-in. guns in General Pole-Carew's command. The wind rose during the morning and blew with the strength of a gale, rendering accurate shooting with the long-range weapons most difficult. The range for Pole-Carew's weapons was about 9,000 yards, for Buller's heavy guns 4,000, and for the field guns 2,500.



F. Dadd, R.I.]


GETTING A 4'7 GUN OVER A NASTY PLACE.

[After a photo by Newman & Guardia.]

At 11 a.m. the line of artillery began to pour a hail of shells upon Bergendal. "We saw," says a correspondent with General Pole-Carew, "that the kopje which had been the chief position of the Boers against Buller for the two previous days was being mercilessly shelled . . . There seemed to be no intermission in the drop of our lyddite shells. The place was wrapped at times in dense clouds of light brown smoke, and the roar of heavy guns was like the laughter of fighting gods." The Boers replied with "Pom-Poms" and long-range weapons, but their guns were so dispersed that concentration of fire was impossible, and they worked but small harm. One of Pole-Carew's 4'7's took the reverse side of the Bergendal kopje, its big projectiles, as they exploded, throwing up great brown clouds in the shape of Prince of Wales' feathers. On this side the Boers had tethered the horses of the men holding the kopje, who were for the most part of the Johannesburg Police, the best-disciplined and bravest fighters of all commanded by Botha. As Brocklehurst's guns joined in, the reverse slopes of the kopje were swept

with such a torrent of shrapnel that the reinforcement or the retreat of those holding the summit seemed alike out of the question.

Terrible was the ordeal of the Johannesburg Police. As the day went on the British batteries slowly increased the rapidity of their fire. The line of thundering guns, four or five miles long, dropped projectiles on the kopje at the rate of four or five a minute, and these, falling on the hard rocky surface, burst with the most terrible effect, hurling splinters of steel and granite far and wide among the defenders. "The howitzer fire," said General Buller, "was particularly effective, especially, as we heard afterwards from prisoners, the combination of a salvo from the howitzers with a salvo of shrapnel from a field-gun battery directed on the same target, the latter being fired as the first shell of the howitzer salvo exploded on the target." Never, not even at Pieter's Hill, was artillery more skilfully and scientifically handled, and the results of that handling were seen




[Photo by Gregory.]

HOW OUR BIG GUNS ARE MADE.

The photograph shows the process of coiling wire around the inner tubes of a heavy gun. Thirteen miles of wire are wound on a 6 in. gun. The outer tube is afterwards shrunk on. It is found that guns made in this way withstand the enormous strain involved in the use of high explosives far better than if forged out of solid metal.

when the infantry advanced to the assault. On the kopje itself boulders were riven to fragments, schanzes demolished, trees shattered, holes excavated in the ground, and the rocks smeared in all directions with the bright yellow stain of the high explosive from the huge 50-pound lyddite shells of the howitzers. Never be-



[Photo by Gregory.]

WHERE SOME OF OUR BIG GUNS ARE MADE.

One of the boring mills at Woolwich Arsenal, showing the huge lathes on which the boring is done.

fore in the war, declared Captain Bearcroft, who commanded Pole-Carew's naval guns, had he seen so intense and concentrated a fire.

Yet, in this hell of bursting shells and dense, choking fumes, the Johannesburg Police held their ground. Artillery alone could not dislodge them; they cowered hidden in their shelters with quaking hearts, but they did not run. And now, about 2 p.m., Kitchener was ordered to assault. From the west the 1st Rifle Brigade, under Colonel Metcalfe, was to advance, supported by the

long-range rifle and Maxim fire of the 1st Devonshires; from the east the Inniskilling Fusiliers, under Colonel Payne, were to attack, aided in the same way by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders.

**Assault of the
infantry.**

Long practice had made the British infantry perfect in the art of war. In the words of Major Callwell, who commanded a section of heavy artillery, "Each man knew almost by instinct what to do, what to fire at, and how far the ammunition carried on his person would be expected to go. . . . When the plot was thickening, and the enemy's bullets rained around, he could be trusted to maintain an unaimed and rapid fire in the right direction, and to add his quota to the storm of lead under which his unit made its final rush."

The Rifle Brigade deployed and advanced with the utmost steadiness, while the artillery redoubled its efforts to cover the attack. But the moment the British infantry showed, the Boer fire blazed up, and the "Pom-Pom" on the kopje, which not all the projectiles of our guns had been able to silence, poured in a deadly fire. The Inniskillings, as they went forward, were received with a hail of bullets and shells which staggered their leading companies. "The zone of flying lead," says a correspondent, "threatened to sweep away every living thing that rose up to it—how it did not do so is a marvel." The explanation of the marvel was, no doubt, the accuracy and deadliness of the British artillery fire, which shook the nerve of the enemy's sharpshooters. In a minute or two the Inniskillings reformed and continued their advance in splendid style, in a series of rushes. On the left the Rifles were pressing on, through the same sheet of lead, alternate companies dashing forward and throwing themselves prone in the long veldt grass to fire while their comrades advanced. That the Boers had never dreamed of an infantry assault on the kopje was manifest, since they had not taken the trouble to burn the grass—a precaution



[Photo by Heath, Plymouth.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL METCALFE.

Commanding the Rifle Brigade. Wounded at Bergendal.



WAITING FOR THE WOUNDED.

Warrant officer and N.C.O.'s of No. 16 Field Hospital breakfasting while the battle begins. The photograph was taken under fire from the enemy's artillery.

which they never omitted where they thought the British troops would attack. On the black surface of the burned veldt khaki shows up plainly, but in the brown, withered grass our uniforms were completely lost to view. And this had a great influence in reducing the casualty list.

And now the Rifles were within 400 yards of the foot of the kopje, with, before them, a space utterly devoid of shelter. Now

The kopje taken.

the artillery fire rose in a terrific crescendo to cover the final rush. The hill smoked like a furnace, and the crash of bursting shells and shrapnel was incessant. Colonel Metcalfe marshalled his men for this last effort, moving coolly about among them as though there had been no flying bullets, no strings of "Pom-Pom" shells whistling through the air. They began to mount the kopje, when he fell, with a bullet through his right arm and a grazing wound over the

stomach. At this instant the howitzers fired a salvo and dropped with admirable precision six shells in line along the top of the kopje. Some of the Boers broke, and could be seen running from out of the cloud of dense yellow smoke, but those who ran were followed by the tornado of shrapnel from Brocklehurst's guns. "Many mounted, others fled on foot," says Mr. Pearce, a correspondent with the army, "all at their utmost speed, running like hares across the wooded ridge to gain the shelter of ravines. They had to get over a stretch of dry grass, where man and horse showed up distinctly amid the dust stirred up by storms of shrapnel bullets and the yellow fumes from bursting

lyddite. It appeared to spectators that several fell there, and how any got through the leaden rain is a mystery. There scarcely seemed to be room for a man to walk unscathed between the shrapnel bullets. It was from the Horse Artillery batteries, previously hidden, that the most rapid and accurate fire was brought to bear on the fugitives as they ran. But artillery rarely does much damage to men scattered in full flight." A gallant handful of men, some forty or fifty at the most, even now would not take to flight, but stood up amidst the smoke and blaze of the exploding shells and fired steadily



George Soper.]

THE LAST STAND OF THE JOHANNESBURG POLICE AT BERGENDAL.

from out of that inferno at the oncoming infantry. Relentlessly and coolly the British infantry, with a stolid contempt for death that amazed all the onlookers, swept up the slope, now covered by the very steepness of the kopje. They neared the top; they reached it; the glint of their bayonets was seen against the afternoon sky as the uproar of the bombardment ceased with an almost startling suddenness. The kopje was carried. The last remnant of the Boers ran frantically back towards a stone cattle-enclosure some little distance to the rear. There nineteen of them were captured, with the "Pom-Pom" which had so annoyed our advance.

"The honours of the assault belong to the Rifle Brigade," wrote General Buller, in his despatch, "as they had to attack that part of the kopje which had been most protected from our artillery fire; but all the troops did splendidly, and the carrying of such a position, held as it was by resolute men, will always remain present to the minds of those who witnessed it as a most gallant feat of arms." It should be said that at the final rush the Devons came in on the left and the Gordons on the right. Thus four battalions shared in the glory of the achievement.

The moment the kopje and Bergendal Farm were won, the whole Boer line

**Boers retreat to
Machadodorp.**

broke and fled, pursued by the shrapnel of our heavy guns

and by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which had galloped forward the instant that the British troops were seen on the summit of the kopje. The ground, however, was too rough and broken for a prolonged pursuit; the Boer guns were far away and quite out of the reach of Brocklehurst's horsemen, so at General Kitchener's order the brigade was recalled.

General Buller's force bivouacked on the high ground overlooking Dalmanutha Station, within sight of Machadodorp, whither the Boers were retreating in great disorder. Sharp though the fighting had been, terribly perilous though the assault had appeared to onlookers, the casualties in his division were not heavy. Thirteen were killed, 103 wounded, and 4 missing. The Rifle Brigade suffered by far the most heavily. As for the enemy, they left fourteen dead at Bergendal, and it was afterwards learnt that a large number of wounded had passed through Machadodorp. There is then every reason to think that they had lost rather more heavily than General Buller's men.



[Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.]

GENERAL FRENCH.



A BOER AMBULANCE.

Mr. Stuart, the *Morning Post* correspondent, who visited the

**Scene on the field of
battle.** Bergendal kopje after its capture, thus

describes the scene:—"The fresh soft grey of the granite showed you where the shells had done their work. One boulder as tall as a man heaved out of its place, great splinters lying wherever the spinning shell had flung them, and over all the majesty and the horror of death. The dead lay where they had fallen, alone in their schanzes, though three, over whom a single shrapnel had burst, lay close together as if they had been set in a row. They

had narrow-brimmed hats and their coats; only some had their trousers, and none their boots, for their own friends, in their need, had robbed them. Their coats were dark brown or blue; several had light trousers that might once have served for some rustic festival; one man had worn a straw hat. The blood lay at the mouths of their wounds like frozen port. Not one ill-featured face was there; no man could be ill-featured who had the heart to hold his post against that hurricane of death. The faces were yellowed, and a powder of dust lay over them. One man, handsomely bearded with curly hair, lay with his hand thrown back to the nape of his neck, like a sleeping god.

Brave Boers.

No old men were there, and none, I think, much less than thirty. They were massive in their repose, these dead Vulcans. Except a fair, slight, clean-trimmed German's, their faces and figures were like the Vulcan of ancient sculpture, rudely built, with thick, stiff-set muscles. Over them the wind whispered and the thin brown dust settled, and above them was the pallid African sky. Peace, unbroken peace, to their souls, for they were brave men."

On the British left, far away to the north of Belfast, out of sight and hearing of Bergendal, General French and the left wing of Pole-Carew's Division had been gaining ground all day. French



KRUGER'S CAPITAL ON WHEELS: VIEW OF THE RAILWAY SIDINGS AT MACHADODORP.

was opposed by 1,000 or more Boers with rifle and "Pom-Pom" fire, but he drove them back and succeeded in capturing Zwart Kopjes. Beyond that point the enemy were in greater force, and opened on him with a Creusot. Pole-Carew's infantry were kept deployed, threatening the Boer centre, but they did not actually attack. Thus in every quarter the British had been successful. The much-vaunted Bergendal position, which the Boers had avowed their intention of holding to the last, had fallen with just 120 casualties. Lord Roberts rode to meet Buller on the battlefield, and there conferred once more with his second in command. In the evening he visited the 1st Gordons in their camp, and congratulated them upon the conduct of their brother battalion in Buller's army.

**French captures
Zwart Kopjes.**

Early on the 28th Buller entered Machadodorp, meeting with little opposition other than a few shells from a Creusot in the neighbourhood of Watervalboven. Dundonald with Buller's mounted

**Buller advances to
Helvetia and
Watervalboven.**

infantry rode north to Helvetia, where he came into touch with French, who had pressed forward eight miles to the east, to Elandsfontein, through very difficult country, keeping within signalling communication of General Buller. Pole-Carew had also advanced to Helvetia with the bulk of his division. On the following day Buller divided his force, pushing one half north to Helvetia, where it cleared the

Zwart Kopjes of a party of snipers, and sending the other half to Watervalboven, into which place the South African Light Horse rode in face of a sputtering fire, driving the enemy in a demoralised condition from the village. Lord Roberts carefully refrained from an advance directly along the railway line, as he wished to make certain of securing the British prisoners, who were confined at Nooitgedacht, and who could best be liberated by a dash of French's cavalry through the mountains on the north of the line, before the Boers could remove them.

On the 29th French's cavalry rode to the high ground above Watervalonder, while Dundonald's

men hurried down the valley of the Eland towards Nooitgedacht. "The river," writes the *Standard* correspondent, "ripples over a stony bed between banks covered with coarse yellow



[Photo by Robertson.]

THE VALLEY OF WATERVALONDER.



THE WATERFALL

Which gives its name to Watervalonder and Watervalboven, the one being below and the other above the fall.

grass. Here and there are deep pools, where the rhinoceros once sported, and where the crocodile is said to have his haunt. Mountains of clay, slate, and trap-rock tower on either side, now rising sheer from the valley and losing themselves in the blue sky, now rolling in immense masses, like gigantic waves suddenly arrested as they threatened to overwhelm the defile. The heat is oppressive. A pitiless sun pours its rays upon the brown slopes and the parched plain. The hills are clothed with sickly cactus and aloes, whose upright stems and scaly tufts have the appearance of men advancing in extended order. The resemblance is often startling in the waning light, and is calculated to bring the solitary traveller to a sudden halt when, for the first time, he finds himself confronted by the orderly advance of these phantom battalions. In the valley are patches of unwholesome grass six or seven feet high, and stunted acacias with shrivelled branches. Here, too, is the fever tree that warns one of malaria—a gaunt, bare tree, from whose snake-like branches hang a few sickly yellow leaves. Nature, through her trees and her grasses, proclaims this beautiful valley a haunt of fever that

burns men's blood and brings the strongest down to the weakness of a shivering infant. But you doubt even Nature herself when the sun begins to tint the broad mountain tops and the shadows steal over the valley, filling it with a subdued and fleeting charm of form and colour that the fierce sunlight cannot give." The advance was much delayed by mist and by the immense difficulty of the country.

On August 30 the Guards' Brigade came up to support General French, and he was able to secure Watervalonder, which lies at the foot of a steep descent of 1,000 feet, accomplished by the railway only with the use of cogs on a special locomotive. The enemy had considerably removed the only two engines thus fitted, so that it was impossible for trains to descend the sharp decline until the engineers had devised contrivances to replace them. On the same day Dundonald's men, overlooking Nooitgedacht, saw that the 1,800 British prisoners confined there had been released, and were making their

**French secures
Watervalonder.
Rescue of prisoners
at Nooitgedacht.**

way in a continuous stream towards Watervalonder. Most of the officers had been carried off by the Boers and sent to Barberton or into the mountains near Lydenburg. A few, however, had managed to escape to caves in the mountains. The rescued captives for the most part complained bitterly of their treatment, alleging against the Boers the withholding of proper food and clothing. They reported that up to the 29th Mr. Kruger had been at Nooitgedacht, living in a saloon carriage on the railway, and that on the 29th he had left, with most of the members of the Transvaal Government, for Nelspruit, nearer to the Portuguese frontier. The rescued prisoners



[Photo by P. McQueen.]

THE IRISH FUSILIERS IN THE PRISON AT NOOITGEDACHT.

When photographed the men were eating "mealie-pop," and had not tasted meat for eleven days, the supplies allowed by the prison regulations being conspicuous by their absence.

were sent back to Pretoria to be distributed among their various units. Among the prizes which this day fell to the British cavalry was Mr. Kruger's cook, who had been left behind when his master bolted.

It was clear that the Boers had split into two, if not three, distinct



LORD ROBERTS REVIEWING THE RELEASED PRISONERS FROM NOOITGEDACHT AT WATervalBOVEN.

Boer forces divide. forces. One, and this the largest, with which Botha was present, had retired northwards in the direction of Lydenburg. A second, in which there were many foreigners, had fallen back with a large number of guns along the railway. A third had scattered to the south in the direction of Barberton. Lord Roberts determined to follow up each of these three bodies. Buller was directed to move with the division under his orders towards Lydenburg; Pole-Carew in the centre, aided by Henry's Mounted Infantry, was to advance along the railway from Watervalonder; French, who had returned to Machadodorp with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades, was to move through Carolina upon Barberton. In conformity with Lord Roberts' usual practice, the centre was

held back till the two wings had made considerable progress, so as to encircle the Boers, if possible, and pen them in, compelling them either to surrender or to cross the Portuguese frontier, when they would necessarily be disarmed and detained as prisoners till the close of the war.

But before the final movement began, Lord Roberts issued a proclamation at Machadodorp, annexing to the British Empire "certain territories in South Africa, hitherto known as the South African Republic." Thus, after nineteen years of mis-government, the mistake of 1881 was undone, and the final blow was struck at the Boer dream of expelling Britain from South Africa. It was not the Union Jack which had had to go, but the Vierkleur.

On September 1, Buller began his march on Lydenburg, moving from Helvetia to Schoeman's Nek, where the road attains a high altitude and the Crocodile River comes into view. Here the soldiers saw before them "a vast amphitheatre of bold mountains, outlined in fantastic shapes, crested by precipitous cliffs, intersected by dark and forbidding ravines, looking down on a smiling plain dotted all over with picturesque homesteads and cultivated

Annexation of the Transvaal.

Buller moves along the Crocodile Valley.



ELANDSPRUIT.



THE CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS CROSSING A SPRUIT AT DULLSTROOM.

lands, traversed from west to east by the swift Crocodile and numerous other clear mountain streams; in the light of the setting sun a picture of rare beauty, rich in colour and grand in effect." Descending a steep and bad track which wound down the slopes of the mountain, Buller reached Elandspruit in the valley of the Crocodile River, and crossed that stream.

Next day he resumed his advance, but after only a short distance had been covered came into contact with the Boers, who were in considerable force holding a kopje in the valley and the heights which shut in the valley to the north. With three Creusots, several field guns and some "Pom-poms," they opened on the British column, fairly raining shells among the mounted infantry. The South African Light Horse, the Composite Mounted Infantry Regiment, and the A Battery had a very warm time. Caught in a basin among the hills, it was most difficult for the British to reply effectively to the Boer fire. Buller did not feel himself strong enough to clear the enemy away from the heights, which were almost inaccessible, and so asked Lord Roberts to

threaten the Boer rear by a movement up the Dullstroom road, himself retiring to Badfontein, where he encamped.

Lord Roberts at once despatched Ian Hamilton with three battalions and ten guns up this road. Cavalry were supplied by Brocklehurst's Brigade with the A Battery from Buller's Division, which joined Hamilton on the march. He entered Dullstroom on the 4th, meeting with only half-hearted resistance from small bodies of the enemy. In the afternoon of the 5th signalling communication was opened with General Buller, and the effect of the British movement upon the nerves of the Boers was clearly visible. A derrick showed on the skyline above one of the enemy's 6-inch guns on the British right. The gun was mounted upon an easily-accessible ridge at no great distance from General Buller's camp—a ridge that had not been occupied by the enemy when, on the 2nd, they forced him to suspend his advance. The weapon had proved a source of great annoyance, shelling the camp at close range, pitching its projectiles among the shelters of the Rifle Brigade, and compelling the men to take cover in a

**Ian Hamilton joins
him.**



(Photo by Lieut. A. L. Langman.)

THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL: THE HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY MARCHING PAST AFTER THE READING OF
THE PROCLAMATION IN THE MARKET SQUARE OF PRETORIA.

donga. The moment the derrick was seen, the conclusion—a correct one, as it proved—was reached that the enemy were on the point of withdrawing, and General Howard was directed to attack with two battalions and three batteries to accelerate their retreat, and if possible to secure the gun. He reached the summit of the ridge without opposition, but, in their usual wonderful fashion, the Boers had managed to spirit away their gun. How they continued to move, and move rapidly, such ponderous pieces of ordnance among these almost pathless mountains, is still something of a mystery. On the 6th, as Ian Hamilton had now completely turned the Boer right, General Buller was able to advance. He sent forward Dundonald with the mounted brigade, followed by Kitchener's Brigade, while General Howard demonstrated vigorously on the British right. By the afternoon the column, with its transport, had reached Witklip, at the summit of the ascent from the Crocodile Valley to the plateau on which stands Lydenburg. The town itself was just in sight, bowered in gum-trees, some miles off over the table-land. On the left could be seen the dust raised by Ian Hamilton's

column on its march. Before night fell detachments of mounted men from both columns rode forward over the veldt to Lydenburg, and, notwithstanding half-a-dozen shells from a Boer 6-inch gun mounted in the direction of Spitzkop, received the surrender of the place, which was found to have been deserted by the enemy. The Boer positions at Witklip turned out on examination to be of great strength. Admirable emplacements had been constructed for their heavy guns on each side of the road, while deep trenches, giving perfect shelter, had been excavated for their riflemen.

On September 7 both columns entered Lydenburg simultaneously. It proved to be a pretty place, with babbling brooks, and more trees than are to be found about the usual Dutch town. The Dutch

women and children remained sullenly in their houses as the dust-stained British troops marched in, but the British residents, who were numerous, flocked into the street and gave our men a hearty reception. At noon the Union Jack was solemnly hoisted, and thus the place which Boers six months earlier had declared would withstand the British for years, the place which they

had determined to make their last rallying-point, fell without a struggle, and with a loss to the two British divisions of only 1 killed and 20 wounded. But as the British flag went up, as if to remind the conquerors that their task was not yet over, the Boer 6-inch gun on the Spitzkop road began to shell the transport. Orders were at once issued that only the waggons urgently needed were to enter the town; at the same time one of the 5-inch guns was



BOER SHARPSHOOTERS SIGHTING A BRITISH PATROL.

directed to reply to the Boer "Long Tom." On this, another Boer gun opened, and shells fell right

and left in the town and among the British camps near it. "At least forty Boer families had been left," says the *Standard* correspondent, "yet it was through no fault of the Boer commander that some of their houses were not demolished by their own guns, and the inmates killed or wounded." Many of the women and children were panic-stricken at the terrible missiles, which seemed to drop from the clouds, and which burst on all sides with terrific violence. A good story is told of one mother, who explained that her house "was close to one of the camps, and that the shells were bursting around the dwelling. Her baby was inside, asleep, she said, and she wanted to know if a message could not be sent to the Boers telling them to stop 'Long Tom;' if not, she was sure the child would be awakened by the noise of the shells!" Shrapnel dropped among the British staff, and one shell fell in the tents of General Buller's escort. It must have seemed like Ladysmith over again to the army of Natal. Nor could the British 5-inch gun manage to silence the irritating and quite futile fire.

The British generals could not clear the enemy away from the neighbourhood of the town that day, but they made all preparations to dislodge them on September 8. To the east of Lydenburg the Spitzkop road runs up a precipitous ridge which faces the town, curving like a horseshoe.

The summit of the ridge is reached about five miles from Lydenburg, and is here some 1800 feet above that town, which itself stands at an elevation of 5,000 feet above the sea. The ridge is furrowed at many points with deep ravines, affording admirable cover, and rendering it exceptionally difficult for

ment to climb.

**Ineffectual
attempt to
dislodge the
surrounding
enemy.**

Ian Hamilton's infantry advanced against it on

the right, Buller's on the left, while the British 5-inch guns endeavoured with no great success to silence the Boer artillery. The moment the British infantry deployed and began their advance across the level plateau from Lydenburg to the foot of the ridge, the Boer heavy guns fired at their fastest and compelled our men to run the gauntlet. One great shell burst fairly among the Volunteer Company of the Gordon Highlanders, which was marching in column, at a distance of no less than seven miles, as was estimated, from the enemy. Three men were killed and sixteen wounded by the explosion, but none the less the company went forward, without flinching and with the utmost steadiness. Not till a kopje was reached near the foot of the ridge was there any good cover from the Boer fire.

In a six-mile-long line, Devons on the right, Royal Irish in the centre, and Royal Scots on the left, the British infantry climbed the ridge, and the Boers, seeing that

they were in earnest and that the heights were to be taken at all costs, withdrew the two guns and all their force except a couple of hundred men, and hastily retired. But this rearguard gave much trouble. It clung to the ridge, remaining just below the sky-line, and was only dislodged by a turning movement, accomplished by the Devons, under cover of a vigorous Maxim fire. Then at



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS HOWARD, C.B., C.M.G.,

Was born in Berlin in 1838. Educated privately and at Sandhurst, he joined the Rifle Brigade in 1866, and served in the Jowaki Expedition, 1878, in Afghanistan, 1878-9, and in Upper Burma, 1887-9. Captain, 1878; Major, 1882; Lieut.-Colonel, 1889; Brevet-Colonel, 1895; A.D.C. to Queen Victoria, 1895. He served in the Sudan Campaign of 1898, and in Crete the same year. He retired on half-pay in December, 1898, but in October, 1899, was appointed to the command of the 7th Brigade in South Africa, with local rank of Major-General, and went through the siege of Ladysmith.

last the enemy took to flight under a storm of bullets; but fortune as usual favoured them. Just as it seemed that nothing could save them, a thick, cold mist spread over the hills, rendering pursuit quite out of the question. Nothing more could be attempted, and as night fell the British infantry marched back down the steep slope and bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Ian Hamilton was due to return to Machadodorp on the 9th, and so he with his force withdrew down the valley next morning, leaving General Buller to complete the discomfiture of the Boers.

On the 9th Buller resumed his advance. Lydenburg was garrisoned with the cavalry, who were useless among the gorges and precipices of the mountains, a battalion of infantry, and two 4·7-inch guns. The rest of the force marched up the heights, and was quickly in action with the Boer rearguard, which had the support of two "Pom-Poms." Yet, notwithstanding the enemy's tenacious resistance, the infantry, headed by the 1st King's Royal Rifles, forced their way up the culminating summit of the Mauchberg, and from its

lofty height of 8,000 feet looked out upon the sea of desolate mountains to the east, among which lay by report the last remote fastnesses of the Boers. The ridge fell abruptly, almost precipitously, towards the Knuckles, two great rocky humps away to the east. The road hereabouts was cut into the side of the precipice, and was so narrow in places that a single false step meant death. Away on the Knuckles could be seen an immense train of waggons—the transport and guns of Botha's army. Hopes of a great capture ran high. Forthwith the South African Light Horse and Strathcona's Horse dashed forward; simultaneously two white flags showed in the Boer convoy.



H. C. Selpings Wright.

[After a sketch by Lieut. R. Hennessy, of the 2nd Gordons.]

THE ADVANCE OF THE 2ND GORDONS ON THE DEVIL'S KNUCKLES.

What followed must be told by the only correspondent who saw it and described it—the representative of the *Standard*:—"What, from the heights of the berg, appeared to be a level road,

Determined stand of Botha's rearguard.

was, in reality, a steep incline, while the winding of the road in the valley between the berg and the Knuckles deluded one into the belief that a rush would bring the South African Light Horse on to the rear of the convoy. Instead, a series of ridges lay between; also, the Boers were waiting for us, having drawn up guns and 'Pom-Poms' behind the Knuckles, while the fighting rearguard held the ridges in front of the convoy as boldly as ever position had been held before. Hardly had the Light Horse got into the valley, jumped off their tired horses, and sought to rush the ridge, than they were glad enough to seek cover from the

furious rifle fire poured into them. Neither the shell fire nor the raking shower from the 'Pom-Poms' troubled them much, protected as they were by the inequality of the ground. The rifle fire, however, was quite another matter, and do what they could, nerved by the thought of the prize almost within their grasp, they made but little headway. The Boer rearguard, indeed, hardly gave way at all. They fought like tigers to protect their convoy, and presently the latter, taking courage, removed the white flags, and slowly made up hill to the shelter of the Knuckles. The fight went on until dark, when the Irregular Horse, finding it impossible to achieve their object, withdrew up hill again, and the last of the convoy trekked onwards into safety." This was one more example of what this campaign has shown to be a feature of war with the new weapons—the power of a small body of determined men in difficult country to hold back a large force.

In the fighting to the east of Lydenburg the British loss was thirteen killed and twenty-five wounded, the large proportion of killed being due to the enemy's artillery fire. On the 10th, with break of day, General Buller again pressed forward. Two 5-inch guns opened on the Knuckles, and the Gordon Highlanders were put in to carry these eminences by storm. The Boer convoy could be seen in the distance, so that the hope of capturing

J. Finemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

THE BOERS DESTROYING THEIR WAGGONS NEAR SPITZKOP.

it was an additional incentive to vigorous action. But again the enemy's rearguard offered a stubborn and protracted resistance. A "Pom-Pom" and a 6-inch gun played upon the advancing troops, while the rifle fire was so hot and well-maintained that a protracted artillery preparation was necessary before the infantry could capture the heights. Not till four in the afternoon were the Knuckles in our hands. The tackle for lowering the 6-inch Creusot gun was captured, as also a quantity of ammunition and food, and the Boers were forced to hurl thirteen of their waggons over the precipices to prevent them from falling into our hands.

**Capture of the
Knuckles.**



There was only one casualty in the British column. On the 12th Spitzkop was reached, with nothing more to record than continuous skirmishing. The Boers fell back, one party retreating northwards,

to the remote mining town of Pilgrim's Rest, and the other towards the south-east, in the direction of Nelspruit, while Buller halted his men for a short rest. Large quantities of Boer supplies were left behind by the enemy, chiefly rice, sugar, flour, and coffee, and the request was made by one of the Boer commandants that these should be distributed among the women and children, who had been abandoned in that wild and unproductive country. During the

stay of the British force at Spitzkop a considerable number of burghers made their surrender: fifty-eight came in at Spitzkop, twenty at the Knuckles, and about as many more at Lydenburg. They were promised that they should not be sent out of South Africa.

On September 26 Buller once more marched north-



PILGRIM'S REST.

east to the Mac-Mac Pass, under a harassing fire from Boer snipers and from a small quick-firer. The pass was carried after the usual artillery preparation by the A Battery, the Devons turning the

**Buller occupies
Pilgrim's Rest and
Kruger's Post.**

enemy's flank with a loss of only four men. On the 27th the pass was negotiated by the column, and Pilgrim's Rest was occupied by the mounted men. The Boers, however, lurking in kloofs and dongas to the British rear, reappeared in small parties behind General Buller's column, and cut his telegraph. Next day

the mounted men, after a night march, dislodged the enemy from a strong position to the west, on Pilgrim's Hill, and that day and the next were spent in dragging the guns and waggons up the terribly steep road towards the west, which rose continuously at a sharp angle for four miles. All the waggons had to be double-spanned; some of the guns required fourteen mules and two horses, as well as the assistance of men on drag-ropes. After these exertions a day's halt was necessary, but the cavalry brigade on September 30 pushed out from Lydenburg to Kruger's Post and occupied that place, encountering only a few Boers with one "Pom-Pom." Here, on October 1, Buller's column met it, and bivouacked quietly near Kruger's Post. Just as the British had comfortably encamped, the enemy opened fire from a height far away to the north-west with a big Creusot and a howitzer. "For an hour and a half," says the *Standard* correspondent, "it rained shells." Two men were killed and nine wounded by this fire. Efforts were at once made to dispose of these annoying

**Natal Army
redistributed.**

guns. Major Henderson, the hero of one of the night sorties of Ladysmith, moved out with a small force of cavalry to capture them; but, though he did not march till darkness had fallen, when he reached the place whence they had

been firing he found them gone. This was the last exploit of General Buller's column. Forthwith



[Photo by Frith.]

RECEPTION OF GENERAL BULLER AT ALDERSHOT ON HIS RETURN FROM AFRICA.

it returned to Lydenburg, and there the Natal Army ceased to exist; it was absorbed, split up, and redistributed, and became merely a part of the South African Field Force. At Lydenburg General Buller bade his men "Good-bye."


Such an occasion was sure to evoke deep emotion, and it did evoke it. Whatever his merits or demerits as a general, Buller was beloved as a man. Few leaders have been followed by their army with such devotion, even in the hours of defeat and disaster. His men were ready to go anywhere and do anything for him. It may even be that his mistakes in generalship arose from his tenderness of heart and from his reluctance to see those whom he led killed and wounded on the battlefield. Though blunt and abrupt in manner, he inspired much the same feeling of passionate personal attachment in his army as did the American general McClellan, whom in many respects he resembles. If now we know that the true credit for the relief of Ladysmith rested with Lord Roberts, who ordered the final movement to be made at all costs, and any sacrifice

to be offered that Sir George White might be set free, yet there will always be in the heart of the nation a tenderness for General Buller, because of his affection for his men. As for the Natal Army, its deeds are

Work of the Natal Army.

written in letters of gold in the book

of history, and need no panegyrics. Yet truly it may be said



[Photo by Browning, Exeter.]

SWORD OF HONOUR PRESENTED TO GENERAL BULLER BY THE COUNTY OF DEVON.
General Buller's family has for centuries been associated with the county of Devon, and his own seat is at Downes, near Crediton.



[Photo by the Biograph Co.]

WITH THE ARMY OF NATAL: WOUNDED ENTRAINING FOR DURBAN.

hand of man had availed to prevent its advance. And now all the intimate associations of general and soldier in it belonged to the past, as Buller trotted down the straggling street of Lydenburg, cheered by thousands of devoted men.

At Machadodorp—at every place where he halted—the returning general was received with like enthusiasm. It was a triumphal progress, as though he had been the great victor of the war. And so he passes out of the story—a brave, upright, sympathetic, honourable man but as a soldier scarcely equal to the trials and responsibilities of a difficult and protracted war.



WOUNDED VOLUNTEERS OF THE ARMY OF NATAL IN HOSPITAL AT THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY BUILDING, PIETERMARITZBURG.



UNDER THE WHITE FLAG.

The incident represented in this photograph occurred near Lydenburg. A party of four of the enemy, carrying a white flag (which is seen in the hand of the man in the centre of picture), approached the British outposts and requested the British authorities to hand over to her relations a Boer lady and child who had been left in Lydenburg. As the photograph shows, the negotiations were successful.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL POLE-CAREW'S MARCH TO KOMATI POORT.

Pole-Carew's position at Watervalonder—Hutton clears the way to Tafel Kop—Panorama from Kaapsche Hoop—Eleventh Division occupies Godwaan—Mr. Kruger's flight to Lourenço Marquez—Failure of his ambitious schemes—His miserliness—Botha resigns in favour of Viljoen—Lord Roberts' appeal for surrender—Pole-Carew advances along the Crocodile River—Enters Kaapmuiden—French leaves Machadodorp for Barberton—Capture of supplies, ammunition, and rolling stock—Boers retreat to Portuguese frontier—Pole-Carew at Hector Spruit—Enemy retire north from Komati Poort—Stores destroyed by bogus Red Cross train—Komati Poort Bridge saved—Foreign mercenaries at Lourenço Marquez—Boer camp at Komati Poort—Discovery of railway plant and guns—Troops withdrawn to Pretoria—Plans for clearing lines of communication—Kaffrarian Rifles in a desperate position—Hart leaves Krugersdorp for Potchefstroom—Death of Theron—Forced night march to Potchefstroom—The column retires to Krugersdorp—Clements' attempt to clear the Magaliesberg—Operations in the South-eastern Transvaal—Attacks on the railway.



WHILE Buller on the British left had been engaged in the Lydenburg country, Pole-Carew in the centre had not been inactive. On August 31, it will be remembered, he had occupied Watervalonder. Here he remained for some days till French and Hutton on his right had made fair progress, and till Ian Hamilton had returned from Lydenburg and had moved to his support. Hamilton reached Watervalonder on September 13, on which day Pole-Carew was able to advance. The Boers faced

**Pole-Carew's position
at Watervalonder.**

him in some strength on the high ground to the east of the hamlet, where he had his headquarters. The scene just before the forward movement began is thus described by a New Zealand correspondent :—
“From a military point of view the position is terribly bad. Great mountains, their topmost ridges lost in white mist, overlook the village from every point. With their slopes held by the enemy, the place might become a veritable valley of the shadow of death; but at present they are crowned by our own pickets, and we are able to sleep without fear of the sneaking sniper, nor is the voice of the ‘Pom-Pom’ heard any longer in the land. As the purple gloaming falls over the river bank, the valley becomes a picture by Doré. Down along the river bank the camp fires of the Coldstreams and the Grenadiers begin to glow dully red; as it grows later the outlines of the great hills stand out black and clear against the sky; then, as the half-lights deepen into darkness, away upon the topmost of the commanding peaks little flash lamps begin to talk to each other and the town. Upon

one of the highest of the northern peaks General Pole-Carew has established his camp, and the little flash lights fling his orders far and wide in the streets of the village."

To clear the enemy from his front, Hutton was ordered on September 7 to strike east from Belfast, through a wild sea of tangled mountains and precipitous gorges, past Rietvlei and Uitkomst, to Tafel Kop, a summit which lies about 13 miles south-east of Godwaan station on the Delagoa Bay line. He had under him Alderson's Mounted Infantry, Brabant's Horse, 300 of the 1st Mounted Infantry, one 15-pounder, one Hotchkiss, and two "Pom-Poms." Co-operating with him and under his orders was Colonel Henry, with 500 of the 4th Mounted Infantry, two "Pom-Poms," and J Horse Artillery Battery. The force marched from Belfast to Dalmanutha through freezing fog so thick that it was impossible to see fifty yards ahead.

Hutton clears the way
to Tafel Kop.



[Photo by Bassano.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDWIN ALFRED HERVEY ALDERSON, A.A.G.

Born 1859; entered the 1st Foot, 1878; 97th Foot, 1878; Royal West Kent, 1881; Captain, 1886; Major, 1896; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 1897; D.A.A.G. Aldershot, 1897-9. Served with the Mounted Infantry in the Boer War of 1881 under Sir E. Wood; in the Egyptian War of 1882; in the Nile Expedition, 1884-5; in the operations in South Africa under Sir F. Carrington in 1896, in command of troops in North Mashonaland; commanded a Mounted Infantry Corps in the Boer War, 1899, and was promoted by Lord Roberts to the command of a Brigade, 1900.

wheeled vehicle over it," says a correspondent. "About every three miles there was either a very steep descent necessitating the use of drag ropes for guns and waggons, with twenty or thirty men hanging on behind, all horses or mules, except the wheelers, being taken out; or, again, a very steep ascent, in which it was necessary to double-span everything. By this means, after a two days' march through some of the most beautiful scenery in the Transvaal we reached the top of Kaapsche Hoop, one of the most splendid and commanding of all the mountains of the Drakensberg Range."

Kaapsche Hoop was reached on September 12, having been evacuated by the Boers just two hours before General Hutton's appearance on the scene. From this lofty eminence he was in signalling communication with General French to the south and General Pole-Carew in the valley of the Eland. Before him spread a magnificent panorama. To the west, from which direction

From Dalmanutha it moved over the battlefield of Bergendal, and descended a terribly steep mountain track which led to the lower ground of the Eland River valley at Rietvlei. On the 10th it moved across the mountains to Uitkomst, where it fought a sharp little skirmish with the enemy, in which the Boers lost five men killed and one man wounded and taken prisoner. From Uitkomst towards Tafel Kop a dreadful track had to be negotiated. The mountain path suddenly descended at an angle of about thirty degrees, while to add to the troubles of the transport the road was not horizontal in section, but had itself a steep lateral slope. The waggons did not balance upon it, and no less than seven upset on the descent. After this followed an excessively steep rise, on which every vehicle had to be double or treble-spanned. Even then all the waggons could not accomplish the ascent, and many of them had to be sent back to Machadodorp. The rest of the train accomplished the climb, taking two days over it. Meanwhile Hutton pushed on to Tafel Kop, and found that the ground grew more and more difficult with each mile that he covered.

"It was almost impossible to get any

he had come, the mountain range fell in ravine-seamed terraces for nine miles. To the east it dropped sheer to the strange wonderland of the De Kaap Valley, known to the natives as the "Valley of Death,"

**Panorama from
Kaapsche Hoop.**

by reason of its miasmatic and malarial climate. Across the De Kaap Valley rose range upon range of blue mountains, limiting the horizon, and far to the south, nestling in the Drakensberg, could be faintly seen the houses of Barberton. To the north was the Crocodile Valley, with its richly wooded slopes haunted by chattering baboons, and its clear, swift streams, so different from the muddy, turbid rivulets of the Orange River Colony. The land was of rare beauty and promise—the first that thousands of the army had seen in South Africa which tempted and allured with its charm and did not appear to live under a curse. Yet even here there was fever to be confronted, though nature seemed to smile.

At Kaapsche Hoop Hutton was well to the rear of the



REFUGEES COMING INTO LYDENBURG.

The coach is of the usual type found in South Africa. Its freight consists of refugees who are seeking the protection of the army after the occupation of Lydenburg.

Boers confronting Pole-Carew, and could threaten their retreat, consequently they at once fell back.

**Eleventh Division
occupies Godwaan.**

The Eleventh Division then marched forward on September 12, and occupied Godwaan, moving through "rugged and precipitous mountain ranges, narrow valleys broken by dongas, passes that a score of men might hold against an army," but moving unopposed. Already the rapid and irresistible British advance had produced such an effect upon Mr. Kruger and those around him, that he considered immediate retirement to



TOMMY'S WATER-RATION.

Measuring out the precious fluid in the Lydenburg district.

Portuguese territory the wisest measure in his own interests. He saw that his disheartened burghers, whatever they might be able to achieve by guerilla warfare, could not prevent the march of the invading army to Komati Poort. If he hesitated, if he waited longer, he might find the railway cut behind him,

**Mr. Kruger's flight to
Lourenço Marquez.**

and be compelled to take refuge with the nomad bands of Boers who ranged the mountains. In his old age he felt no inclination to face the incredible hardships of such a life. Accordingly, on September 11 his special train left Nelspruit. With him were Mr. Marais, Auditor-General of the Transvaal, Mr. Grobler, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the archives of the Transvaal, and a vast quantity of the gold which he had appropriated.



ACTING-PRESIDENT SCHALK BURGER

Was born in the Lydenburg district some forty-five years ago on a farm adjoining one of Paul Kruger's. He is fairly well educated, a land-surveyor by profession, and a fluent speaker. Was a member of the Executive Council of the Volksraad.


What exactly was the amount is not known, but it is believed to have been near £2,000,000. He disguised his flight under the specious appearance of "six months' leave of absence," and appointed Mr. Schalk Burger, who was chiefly famous for having run away at Spion Kop, Acting-President in his absence. Late in the evening of September 11, his train reached Lourenço Marquez, and the fallen President took shelter beneath the roof of Mr. Pott, the omnipotent Transvaal agent in the Portuguese town.

Thus ended Mr. Kruger's lifelong struggle with Great Britain upon African soil. Notwithstanding his humble origin,

**Failure of his
ambitious schemes.**

the Boer peasant had proved perhaps the most astute and formidable enemy that England ever encountered, and had he been given time to complete his plans, which unquestionably aimed at war with her in combination with European allies—had not his plot been divined by the quick and resolute mind of Sir Alfred Milner—he might well have succeeded. Even as it was, alone and without allies, he came very near to attaining his objects. There were moments in December 1899 and January 1900 when it might be said with perfect truth that the Boer forces, intelligently used, could have gained the victory. Had the great assault of Ladysmith on January 6 been pressed home and properly supported, had Sir George White's Division been driven to surrender, a blow would have been struck, the results of which not all the skill of Lord Roberts could have repaired.

Not without reason did Prince Bismarck award to Mr. Kruger the palm for strength of mind and determination as a statesman. It may be that to Bismarck Mr. Kruger had unbosomed himself, and revealed the immense projects which floated always before his mind. To expel England from



MAP OF THE DISTRICT NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE RAILWAY FROM MACHADODORP TO KOMATI POORT.



MR. KRUGER IN PARIS. RECEPTION BY THE CROWD AT THE GARE DE LYONS.

Mr. Kruger arrived in Marseilles on board the Dutch warship *Gelderland* on November 22, 1900. He was received with great enthusiasm, thanks to the efforts of the Boer Independence Committees of Paris and Marseilles, and on proceeding to Paris, crowds, perhaps not so enthusiastic, but more inquisitive, awaited him. He was received with rigid correctness by M. Loubet and the Ministers, but no hope of official intervention was held out to him. After spending several days in Paris he suddenly announced his intention of proceeding immediately to Berlin; but this project was promptly quashed by an intimation that he would not be received at the Imperial Court. He accordingly went on to the Hague.

South Africa, and to found a great Afrikander Empire, was the aim and desire of his life. Nor was the ambition an altogether unworthy one. He and his people had come to regard the English as a weak and cowardly race, unfit to rule, certain to bend and yield before the strain of war. Thinking themselves better than this degenerate race, they concluded that empire must pass to them by the law of the survival of the fittest. But now the whole scheme had miscarried. In spite of an indolent administration and a careless War Office, the British had fought their way from the Cape frontier to Pretoria, from Pretoria to the Lebombo Range, and were fast nearing the extreme eastern frontier of the Transvaal. The intervention of foreign powers, which had been promised, had not occurred. France, Germany, and Russia had made no move. Rightly may Mr. Kruger have called down vengeance upon the auxiliaries in whom he had reposed so much hope, and who had now disappointed him.

For him there remained nothing but retreat to Europe, where he hoped that his presence as the arch-enemy of England might awake the carefully fomented fires of popular passion. At first he intended to sail in the German mail-steamer *Herzog*, but then, it may be fearing the British cruisers, though under a neutral flag his person would have been perfectly safe from molestation, he applied to Holland for a Dutch warship, and after some delay the cruiser *Gelderland* was sent out to bring him away. Meantime he remained at Lourenço Marquez, seemingly in no way discontented with his position or with the utter ruin of his plans. Unlike the Confederate ex-President Jefferson Davis, he had enriched himself at the expense of his country. He had accumulated hundreds of thousands out of his salary, his perquisites, and his stealings, as he had lived with a thrift so extreme that he was

never known to pay a charitable subscription, and rarely to promise one. At

His miserliness.


Lourenço Marquez he whiled away the dull hours by drawing up despatches, which bade his deluded burghers be of good cheer, and which urged them to protract their resistance. He even printed proclamations at a private press which he had brought with him, until he was politely but firmly informed that such conduct was a distinct infraction of Portuguese neutrality. Lourenço Marquez swarmed with penniless and destitute Boer men, women, and children, who had lost all for him; but he never opened his full coffers to their needs. A compound of abject meanness and heroic greatness he had been from the beginning and he continued to the last.

When Mr. Kruger took to flight, Louis Botha, the gallant and capable Boer commandant-general, resigned his post for the time being. The reason he gave was bodily sickness, but it is more likely that the sickness was of the mind, since he had been greatly disheartened at the manner in which his burghers refused to obey his orders, and bolted at the first sign of a turning movement. He appointed Viljoen, a notorious fanatic and Anglophobe, but as a soldier not inhumane or unjust, to fill his place, and there are some indications that for a time he thought of surrender. His wife, who had remained at Pretoria, was in constant conference with the British military authorities. Efforts were made by Lord Roberts to convince

**Botha resigns in
favour of Viljoen.**

**Lord Roberts' appeal
for surrender.**

the enemy of the utter futility of their resistance. At Machadodorp a proclamation was issued on September 13, pointing out that Mr. Kruger's flight was a sign that the Boer cause was desperate; that there was no hope of foreign intervention; that the territory of the Transvaal and the former Free State was being rapidly overrun by the British; that, except in the case of the area controlled by Botha and his



Harry Dixon.]

FAUNA OF THE CROCODILE RIVER VALLEY.

The baboon, bippopotamus, crocodile, leopard, and "mamba" snake are still found in this beautiful valley.

force, the war was degenerating "into operations carried on in an irregular and irresponsible manner," which must inevitably lead to the adoption of measures by the British entailing "endless suffering on the burghers and their families"; and that no less than 15,000 of the Boers were prisoners in British hands, not one of whom would be released till those in arms surrendered unconditionally. Unhappily this appeal had no effect. So ignorant or so prejudiced were the enemy that they would not believe that Mr. Kruger had fled, or that this great host of prisoners was in our hands. They continued the war, in the firm belief that if no foreign power came to their aid, the peace party in England, which about this time began to raise its head, would break down British firmness and compel concession.

Beyond Godwaan Pole-Carew found that the railway bridge across the river of that name had been destroyed, and so a short halt was necessary to allow of its being patched up. On September 14 he marched to Kaapsche Hoop, while Ian Hamilton, following some miles in the rear, pushed on to Nooitgedacht. Next day Pole-Carew with the Guards and Henry's Mounted Infantry

started for Kaapmuiden, where the branch line from Barberton joins the main Delagoa Bay line, and where General French was to effect his junction with the central British column. On the 17th General Stephenson with the Eighteenth Brigade of the Eleventh Division arrived at Nelspruit, a day's march behind Pole-Carew. Hereabouts the Crocodile River flows in clear pools through a deep valley, richly wooded and infested with chattering baboons and more dangerous leopards. In the river pools lurk the crocodiles from which the stream takes its name, yet, notwithstanding the peril from these

PROMINENT OPPONENTS OF THE WAR.



[Photo by W. & D. Downey.]

WILLIAM T. STEAD.


Born in 1849, son of a Congregational minister. Was apprenticed to a merchant at Newcastle-on-Tyne; edited *The Northern Echo*, Darlington, 1871-80; assisted in editing *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 1880-83; editor, 1883-9; founded *Review of Reviews*, 1890; preached the Peace Crusade after visiting the Czar, 1898; wrote "Shall I Slay my Brother Boer?" and other pro-Boer publications. His sincerity and energy have made him a power with some sections of the public.

huge saurians, such was the delight of the soldiers in the swift and cool water, that they could not be restrained from the unfamiliar delight of bathing. Here and there in the remote and sequestered valley the hippopotamus was still to be found, protected by a penalty of £500 imposed on whosoever kills it, but still more effectually protected by the fever which in summer assails the daring man who makes this strange land his home. There were even tales of lions roaming the mountains and descending at night upon the unwary sentry—a more terrible enemy than the deadliest of Boer "snipers." Not less fearful was the black "mamba," the most poisonous snake known to Africa, which has a habit of dropping hissing from boughs of trees above, and killing in two minutes those whom it stings. Thus novel and unfamiliar were the surroundings in which the town-bred Englishman and the country-bred Australian and Canadian found themselves, within sight of the railway and yet upon the very confines of civilisation. "It is a beautiful land," says the *Standard* correspondent, "through which the Crocodile River flows—a land of mountain, and stream, and wood. Yet no man builds his house here; no plough turns the soil. There is no sign of human habitation. In winter men drive their cattle into the valley, and feed them on the grass that makes the mountains gleam like massive emeralds. But when spring comes they fold their tents, pack their waggons, and depart. A curse hangs over the land. It is the fever country."

On the 19th Pole-Carew entered Kaapmuiden, finding the great bridge over the Kaap River destroyed. Here in the goods sheds were

Pole-Carew advances along the Crocodile River.


behind Pole-Carew. Hereabouts the Crocodile River flows in clear pools through a deep valley, richly wooded and infested with



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

RIGHT HON. LEONARD HENRY
COURTNEY, P.C., M.A.

Born at Penzance, 1832; educated at St. John's College, Cambridge; Barrister, Lincoln's Inn, 1858; Professor of Political Economy, University College, London, 1872-5; Under-Secretary of State for Home Department, 1880-1, and for Colonial Affairs, 1881-2; Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1882-4; Chairman of Committees and Deputy-Speaker, 1886-92; was M.P. for Liskeard, 1876-85, and M.P. for Bodmin, 1885-1900. Contributor to *The Times* and *Nineteenth Century*. The Boers themselves have quoted him in justification of their continued resistance.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

HENRY LABOUCHERE, M.P.

Born in London, 1831; educated at Eton; entered the Diplomatic Service, 1854, and left it for journalism, 1864; M.P. for Windsor, 1866; M.P. for Middlesex, 1867; M.P. for Northampton since 1880; proprietor and editor of *Truth*. There is enough perversity in "Labby's" composition to make one doubt whether his pro-Boer utterances are altogether serious.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

HENRY WILLIAM MASSINGHAM.

Born 1860, and educated at Norwich; joined the staff of *The Norfolk News and Daily Press*, Norwich; became editor of the National Press Agency, assistant-editor and editor in succession of *The Star* and of *The Daily Chronicle*; resigned his editorship of the latter in consequence of his pro-Boer opinions, and is now an influential contributor to *The Daily News*.

collected nineteen locomotives, all more or less injured, and with their vital parts in many cases removed. Burnt and smouldering

Enters Kaapmuiden. trucks crowded the sidings; heaps of coffee and sugar and flour smoked in the station, proclaiming the haste with which the Boers had fled. This destruction is said to have been accomplished by an Irish-American mercenary, known as "Dynamite Dick" or King. Here Pole-Carew came into touch with General French, whose doings must now be narrated.

French leaves Machadodorp for Barberton. On September 1 General French left Machadodorp for Carolina and Barberton with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades; Mahon's Colonials with two infantry battalions following a day's march behind. On the 4th he reached and captured the bridge over the Komati River, half-way between Machadodorp and Carolina; two days later he occupied Carolina itself without encountering any serious opposition. Recrossing the Komati at Hlomohlomo, on September 10, he fought his way next day to the high ground between the Komati and Kaap valleys at Derdekop, with his usual brilliance and skill. From this point he could look down upon the mining town of Barberton,

Capture of supplies, ammunition, and rolling stock. fourteen miles away, but so difficult was the country, so bad were the tracks, that he did not enter it till the 13th. The Boers fled, leaving provisions, wines and all manner of dainties in the stores and hotels, leaving also 23 officers and 59 soldiers whom they had removed from Nooitgedacht and confined here in a barbed-wire enclosure. Over a hundred Boers were captured, with a good number of rifles, much ammunition,

fifty waggons, and three weeks' supplies for the British force. An immense number of sheep and cattle, covered the neighbouring hills and valleys, and only required to be collected. They were much needed, as the British army, owing to the constant cutting of the railway to the south of Pretoria and Johannesburg, was decidedly short of supplies. Not less valuable prizes were forty-three locomotives and a large quantity



LOCOMOTIVES AND FLOUR SUPPLIES CAPTURED AT KAAPMUIDEN.

Although large quantities of flour and other supplies had been set on fire by the Boers, their haste had been so great that the work of destruction was by no means completed, and welcome additions were made to the British commissariat.



BARBERTON.

[Photo by Lazarus.]



[after photographs taken on the spot.]

TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES AT BARBEKTON: HOW THE GUNS AND WAGGONS WERE GOT UP THE MOUNTAINS.

A. C. Ball.]

of rolling stock. The engines had not been damaged at all, or only slightly damaged, and were a welcome addition to the material of the railway department, depleted, as this had been, by the constant derailment and destruction of trains, till it could only muster some ninety rickety locomotives. Several convoys moving to the Boer armies in the north and south were captured, Barberton having for months been a main base of supplies for the enemy. Among the prisoners taken were the landdrost of the place and the former chairman of the Free State Raad. General Schoeman, who had commanded against the British at Colesberg, surrendered at Pretoria and taken the oath of neutrality, and who had subsequently fallen into the hands of the enemy and been condemned and imprisoned by a Transvaal court-martial for refusing to take up arms afresh, was set free. The extraordinary low standard of honour in the Boer ranks is obvious when a brave and capable soldier could be condemned because he refused to have any part or parcel in an act of disgraceful treachery. Only with the sanction of generals and leaders could such treatment of him have been possible.

Final position of British guns. Generals French and Gordon and staffs. Red Kopje held all day by the Boers. Inniskillings.

Boers.

Boers.

Line of retreat of the Boers.



F. C. Dickinson]

[After a sketch by Capt. F. S. Jackson.

THE FINAL STAGE OF THE FIGHT WHICH LED TO THE CAPTURE OF BARBERTON.

"Red Hill," in the above picture, is where the road from Carolina to Barberton crosses the range. Fifty-six oxen had to be inspanned to each ox-waggon to drag it up this mountain, and sixteen horses to a field-gun only succeeded in drawing it a few yards at a time.

On September 17 French's Cavalry entered Avoca, a station on the railway line between Barberton and Kaapmuiden, and there captured 50 more locomotives and a large quantity of rolling stock.

Boers retreat to Portuguese territory.


On the 19th they came into touch with Pole-Carew; two days later the latter was reinforced by the Imperial Light Horse, who had come down across wild country from the north, capturing on the way some 20 Boers and a large quantity of ammunition. Pole-Carew pressed forward towards Komati Poort as the Boer force in his front melted away and scattered. The enemy's main body, 3,000 strong, had already broken up, about 700 men crossing the Portuguese frontier in scattered bands. They were disarmed by the Portuguese and carefully watched; others had dispersed over the Lebombo Range; the remnant, perhaps not much exceeding a thousand men, was in position between Komati Poort and the Portuguese frontier, and had made all necessary preparations for destroying the great bridge over the Komati. Across the frontier waited a considerable force of Portuguese troops, anxious to prevent any infraction of their country's neutrality. They had a battery of artillery and several Maxims ready near Ressano Garcia, watching the Boers, who could be seen digging trenches, erecting sangars, dragging their

"Long Toms" into position, and giving every outward indication of a determination to fight to the last.

From Kaapmuiden Pole-Carew marched to Hector Spruit. The country was now less mountainous; the road lay through dense and tangled bush, "a wilderness of acacia and thorn, whose bare branches weave a weird network over the parched, sickly-hued earth." There was something uncanny in the solitude, says a correspondent with the column. Even from many of the trees life had gone; the white ants had devoured the heart, leaving only the outer husk. Of animal life there were few signs. The baboons, the leopards, the gorgeous birds of the Eland and Crocodile valleys had vanished. In their place was only here and there a springbok or blue jay, and rare and far between a wandering lion. On the 21st the Portuguese at Ressano Garcia saw signs that the Boers did not mean fighting. A party of twenty Boer scouts rode in at top speed

Enemy retire from north from Komati Poort.

Oorsprong to the Boer headquarters on the eastern side of the great Komati bridge. The news they brought must have determined the leaders upon an instant retreat. Trains appeared and into them were loaded the "Pom-Poms" and Maxims that had been so carefully



Edward Read.

BOGUS AMBULANCE MEN DESTROYING STORES AT KOMATI POORT UNDER COVER OF THE RED-CROSS FLAG (p. 138).

placed in position, stores were placed in the trucks, and then the whole of the material was transferred to the point where the Selati Railway branches off to the north. Here it was removed into waggons,



WATCHING THE FLIGHT OF A SHELL DIRECTED AGAINST THE BOERS
HOLDING CAROLINA.

and these presently retreated northwards along the road which follows the Selati line, escorted by 150 mounted burghers. All the pickets withdrew and fell back to the north. Komati Poort was deserted, except for a couple of hundred Boers.

On the 23rd the Portuguese heard the first signs of the British advance. The booming of guns came from the far west, and the thud of exploding shells was plainly audible in the direction of the Selati Railway. Late in the day the crackle of rifles told that the British advanced guard was in touch with the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Komati Poort. Most of the remaining Boer inhabitants and burghers promptly entrained, and hurried across the bridge into the small Boer camp which lay beyond the bridge; on the farther bank of the Komati there was now no sign of life. On the 24th, however, a train carrying the Red-Cross flag once more steamed out of the camp and crossed the bridge. The appearance of this ambulance train led all to think that fighting was at hand. It was not really so. Under cover of the sacred Red Cross—safe, as they perfectly knew, from the fire of the British outposts—the enemy intended to destroy the vast accumulation of stores and war material in the Komati Poort station. The bogus Red Cross doctors descended from the train. They were seen to be busy for hours among the sacks of corn and sugar and coffee. Others went to the two great Creusots, still in position. Then two prodigious reports rent the still air, the guns were burst with dynamite, and the British outposts saw that they had been tricked. The train hurriedly retired; simultaneously came a series of explosions and the popping of British rifles. A huge cloud of smoke rolled up from the mountain of stores. The Irish-Americans, under the leadership of King, had strewed the bottoms of the hundreds of trucks collected at Komati Poort with cartridges. On the top of these they had piled coffee, sugar, flour, and forage, to the extent of hundreds—some say thousands—of tons. Then they drenched the top layer with paraffin and set light to it. In this way 200 trucks were so damaged as to be useless, and immense supplies were completely destroyed—all treacherously, under cover of the Red Cross.

Stores destroyed by
bogus Red-Cross train.

advance. The
booming of
guns came

from the far west, and the thud



[Photo by P. MacQueen.]

A MIXED GARRISON AT "FRENCH BOB'S."

"French Bob's" was a Boer outpost on the Swaziland border near Barberton. The garrison consisted of mixed nationalities, including Scotch, English, and Colonials, who objected to fight their own kith and kin, and were placed as guards on this remote post under the command of a Boer captain—the bearded man in the centre.

Satisfied with their handiwork, the bogus ambulance men and the remnant of the Boers crossed the frontier and laid down their arms. Only one or two were left to explode the mines under the railway bridge when the British should attempt to cross it.

But at this point the cupidity of the Irish-American, King, stood the British cause in good stead. He hurried down to Lourenço Marquez and at once sought the office of Captain Crowe, the British

Komati Poort Bridge saved.

Consul. There, through an intermediary, he stated that the bridge was mined, but that for a payment of £3,000 he would guarantee its safety. The captain, having obtained this valuable information, at once telegraphed it to General Pole-Carew, but took care to detain the Irish filibuster in negotiations. Pole-Carew hurried his march. The story may best be told in the report of the Portuguese journal *O Futuro*:—"When the sun rose on Monday the 24th, the only living things to be seen in Komati Poort were a small boy and his dog. Ten minutes later a man in khaki suddenly appeared from behind one of the houses. A minute after another was seen, then two more, and one man riding one horse and leading some others across the open space by the railway station. And for more than an hour these men of the Yorkshire Mounted Infantry held the town entirely by themselves, visiting house after house, and disarming the few Boers lurking about. At half-past eight a little cloud of dust could be seen rising about eight or nine miles away beyond Oorsprong. Then as the cloud came nearer



[Photo by Lieut. A. N. Campbell, R.A.]

CAPTAIN FRITZ CROWE, R.N.,
H.B.M. Consul-General for Portuguese East Africa.

and increased in size, two men could be seen in front, then other twos on the flanks, quickly followed by a company in extended order, and after them the supports. Gradually out of the cloud the main body of the division was evolved. It was a magnificent sight to watch the deploying of the column, company after company, battalion after battalion taking position on either side of the town, filling the town



BRITISH REFUGEES WAITING FOR AN AUDIENCE OF THE CONSUL AT THE
BRITISH CONSULATE, LOURENÇO MARQUEZ.

itself and then lining the river. At ten o'clock the first big gun passed the railway station, and a few minutes afterwards a machine gun was placed in position to command the bridge, and then six men took their lives in their hands and crossed the bridge, not knowing one instant to another but what they would be blown to atoms by the expected explosion, for it was well known that the bridge had been mined by the Boers, and it was thought that they would take the opportunity of blowing it up while the troops were upon it. But to the relief of all who witnessed the sight, the little party

got safely over, and others soon followed." The moment the advance guard was across, the river was dredged for the cables to explode the mines; the charges were withdrawn from the holes in which the Boers had placed them; and word was sent to Mr. King that he was perfectly free to do his work. But as a matter of fact the gentleman was not free; the British Consul had seen to that, fearing some further mischief. A stranger in a tavern had got into a quarrel with Mr. King, the result of which was that King found himself arrested and removed to a Portuguese warship, where he was speedily joined by many companions of like nationality and morals.

In all, at this date, there were some 2,000 burghers and mercenaries collected at Lourenço Marquez. The burghers were harmless enough; many of them

were Cape rebels, who now found that through their treason to Her Majesty they had lost all. But the foreign mercenaries were a truculent and dangerous crew. "A worse collection of scoundrels,"

says the *Standard* correspondent, "could not be found in Paris, New York, or London. One of them, Prokofski, a Russian, has since been denounced by a German officer for cutting the throats of two British soldiers who had surrendered. Some, no doubt, had come to South Africa out of love of adventure and hatred of Britain, but the majority must have left their country for their country's good. Looking at them and listening to their loud, boastful talk, one realised the



SOME OF THE BURNT TRUCKS AT KOMATI POORT.



HOW THE 1ST SCOTS GUARDS MARCHED TO KOMATI POORT, AND HOW THEY RETURNED.

On the return journey the boiler of the engine broke down, and the men had literally to push engine and train up the hill.

character of this cowardly scum that war had swept up from the foulest depths of society. For a day or two they carried themselves like tin warriors with pistols in their boots. They were the guests of the Portuguese Government—at least, so they believed, though the cost of their food and lodging will in due time find its way into the British Budget. One night there would be a row in some public-house, and a score of these ruffians would be carried off to a Portuguese

transport in the Bay. Next night there would be another row, and their numbers would be further diminished. Why these quarrels arose with such regularity, and why the Portuguese military police



were always at hand, is a conundrum that the Irish-American Brigade will have time to solve during their voyage across the seas."

In the Boer camp the British on their arrival found tents standing, furnished with chairs, tables, and beds; food ready prepared, on which the half-starved privates of the Guards' Brigade rioted; thousands of Martini and Mauser cartridges with the murderous soft-nosed or Dum-Dum bullet, which the Boers falsely accused the British of employing, shells for the big Creusots, and, strangest of all, hundreds of hand-grenades. Telegraphic instruments to the value of hundreds of pounds, saddles, harness and damaged waggons lay about in all directions. The railway for half a mile ran between banks of smouldering coffee and sugar and flour. Further back on the line stood abandoned, but disabled, locomotives, travelling cranes, and trucks for the conveyance of heavy guns. Among the prizes captured were 300 rifles, 30 boxes of rifle ammunition, 40 shells for the big Creusots, and 130 boxes of smaller shells. One cog-wheel engine was amongst the varied assortment of rolling-stock taken; it was at once sent back to work on the steep incline between Watervalboven and Watervalonder.

Nor was this all. The Selati Railway, which branched off to the west of Komati Poort, was found to be blocked with engines and rolling-stock for a distance of eight miles. Many of the engines had been temporarily disabled by the removal of working parts; of the trucks a large number had been damaged by fire, but almost all were capable of repair. This railway plant was of the utmost value to the army, as the constant

Boer camp at Komati Poort.

Discovery of railway plant and guns.



SECTION OF A HAND-GRENADE.



F. Dadd, R.I.]

[After a sketch on the spot.

THE COLDSTREAMS DEFENDING THE DERAILED TRAIN AT PAN (p. 142).

losses of trains and engines in the guerilla attacks on the line had greatly depleted the British supply of rolling-stock. On September 24, Ian Hamilton recovered a large number of guns, all damaged, from the bed of the river at Hectorspruit. They had been noticed, but not examined, by Pole-Carew's

men on their march through that district. Amongst them were two 12-pounders of Q Battery, lost at Koornspruit, two 3-inch Creusot field pieces, two Krupps of the same calibre, one Vickers-Maxim, two "Pom-Poms," and four muzzle-loading mountain guns. Besides these the débris and shattered fragments of other weapons could be seen, so that in all about 15 guns were accounted for. At Nelspruit a further search revealed several gun-carriages and limbers in a damaged condition; what had become of the guns was not known.

On September 26 Ian Hamilton joined Pole-Carew at Komati Poort, and on the same day trains began to arrive from Delagoa Bay bringing up provisions. As there was now no more work for a large force in this quarter, the bulk of the troops were moved back to Pretoria,

Troops withdrawn to Pretoria.

only small garrisons being left in detached posts to guard the line. A serious mishap occurred during the return journey. On October 1 the Boers succeeding in derailing a train at Pan, on board which were 300 men of the 2nd

ONE OF COLONEL LONG'S GUNS,
CAPTURED AT COLENZO,
DESTROYED AT HECTORSPRUIT.



GUN-CARRIAGES AND LIMBERS DESTROYED
BY THE BOERS AT BARBERTON,
Including a 12-pounder field-gun carriage and Maxim
gun-carriage captured from the British at Dundee.



Coldstreams. The enemy opened a terrific fire upon the wreckage of the train and killed or wounded 23 men. The troops behaved splendidly and eventually drove back the Boers.

Throughout these operations in the Eastern Transvaal the enemy had continued their irritating attacks upon the lines of communication near Pretoria. To

**Plans for clearing lines
of communication.**

clear them away, Lord Roberts toward the close of August organised two columns. One under General Clements, consisting of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Worcestershire, 1st Border Regiment, 2nd Yorkshire, Ridley's Mounted Infantry and the 8th Battery, was ordered to clear the Magaliesberg, moving from Commando Nek to Hekpoort. The other, under General Hart, consisting of the 2nd South Wales Borderers, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, half the 2nd Somersetshire, a battalion of Yeomanry, and the 28th Battery, was to operate round Krugersdorp, where the enemy had for many weeks been exceedingly troublesome. To aid Hart, the Colonial division and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade were directed to march from Zeerust to Krugersdorp. Fighting all



WRECKED GUNS IN THE RIVER AT HECTORSPRUIT.

the way with small parties of Boers they reached Kwaggafontein, near Krugersdorp, on August 31. Here the Kaffrarian Rifles had a terrible experience. They were sent to clear a force of Boers from a group of rocky kopjes on the British flank. True to their invariable practice, the enemy allowed the

British to approach closely before opening fire, and then poured in a hail of bullets. "We had no cover but the grass, and had to take our hats off and lay our heads close to the ground and wait for darkness," says one of the Kaffrarian Rifles. "Our Sergeant-Major was shot dead next to the Colonel; a Lancer officer was shot through the leg and another man in the stomach. Our position was desperate, the explosive bullets bursting just over our heads, our ammunition pretty well spent, and the Boers advancing. We could not move a hand. The Boers advanced in skirmishing order and when about 50 yards away called out to us to surrender, but the Colonel would not, although we were nearly surrounded. He yelled out 'Fix bayonets' and mine was the only one fixed, no one else having one."

Colonel Cumming kept his men well in hand and there was no wavering. Fortunately evening was coming on and the light was now bad. The Kaffrians worked rearwards through the grass, the Boers all the time yelling to them to surrender; fired one volley; jumped up, and ran for their lives. In this fierce little skirmish the regiment lost no less than 27 men out of 58. In all, the Colonials suffered on their march to Krugersdorp a loss of 60 men. The Boers nowhere would meet the troops in the open; they simply lay in wait

on kopjes, exceedingly difficult of access, and from their ambush sniped everyone who passed. In the British accounts the enemy are said to have suffered heavily, but some doubt will be felt as to the accuracy of estimates of loss based on such reports as that a trooper "saw several men fall."

General Hart left Krugersdorp on August 29 and marched slowly towards Potchefstroom. The bulk of his column being infantry, he was powerless to drive the Boers into a corner and capture



J. Finmemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

[After a photo by Rev. R. Glynn.

BOER PRISONERS IN THE PALACE HOSPITAL AT SIMONSTOWN.

The prisoners are nursed by English and Dutch nurses. Some of the nuns from the convent at Mafeking happened to be visiting the hospital when the photograph was taken.

them. His object was to clear the district; but as the enemy could always, without any immoderate difficulty, get out of his way, that object was imperfectly attained. "The routed and broken-up

Hart leaves Krugersdorp for Potchefstroom.

bands of the enemy," writes an officer with his force, "disappear into thin air, or rather scatter, by twos and threes into inaccessible hills, and for the time being are not. But they have a knack—most unpleasant for us—of coming together again when we have passed by, and of starting upon the war-path again. Thus all our cannonadings and fusilladings go for very little." A thorough search was made of all farms passed. Boers who had passes were examined; those who had none were made prisoners. Where the males of a family were absent from a farm without good explanation, the farm was burnt. All supplies were seized, only sufficient being left to maintain life, where there were women and children. The aim was to deprive the enemy of subsistence. Small bodies of Boers were encountered from time to time, and in one of the little fights which occurred on the line between Krugersdorp and Bank, four Boers were



EARLY MORNING AT BARBERTON.

[From a photo by Lieut. Toppin.]

killed. Upon examining the bodies, one of these four proved to be the redoubtable Theron, head of De Wet's scouts. He had been struck by a shrapnel bullet. He was a man

Death of Theron.

of great dash and cunning. Upon occasions he would assume the uniform of a British major, and ride into our lines with an orderly suitably disguised. Owing to the lax watch kept, and the carelessness usually displayed in demanding the password, he was thus able to obtain much valuable information with perfect impunity.

On September 8 Hart suddenly marched from Welverdiend northwards to Klerkskraal on the Upper Mooi River, and there halted to scour the country. On the 10th Boers were sighted in various directions, especially to the west, and 100 mounted men with two guns


Forced night march to Potchefstroom.

went out to drive them back. In the evening, to the astonishment of all, orders were issued to the column to march that night to Potchefstroom, thirty miles off in a direct line, and over forty by road. The intention was to surprise the enemy by an extremely rapid movement. First went the mounted men, staff, four guns, one "Pom-Pom," and two companies

of Dublin Fusiliers in waggons; then came half a battalion with a 47, following the advance-guard at their best pace; last were the rest of the infantry and guns with the transport. Marching under a bright moon in thick, choking, red dust, the advance reached Potchefstroom without misadventure at 3.30 a.m. of the 11th. But all this energy was wasted. The enemy must have got wind of General Hart's intentions, and for all practical purpose the town was empty of men. The infantry pushed into the town after the exchange of a few shots, and searched the houses. In all, seventy unwounded Boers were taken prisoners, besides eight wounded men. The bulk of the Boer force had withdrawn a day or two previously. For the British infantry, who made the march on foot, the strain was terrible. They had to cover a distance of thirty-eight miles in fifteen hours; they arrived in a state of complete exhaustion, "dead beat, some scarcely able to lift their feet from the ground," in the words of an eye-witness.

This second occupation of Potchefstroom did not last long. To the despair of the loyalists, who were here fairly numerous, a proclamation was posted up announcing that on the 16th the town was to be abandoned. On the day appointed the British marched out with a great convoy of refugees in waggons and carts, and the railway not being open west of Welverdiend, moved to that point, where the women and children were entrained and sent into Johannes-

burg. A part of the force was left behind at Frederikstad, and here was attacked by the Boers with a long-range Krupp on the 17th. The enemy fired twenty-four shells with the greatest rapidity into the British camp, and only withdrew when the naval gun with General Hart's force got to work. Fortunately little harm was done. The total loss was one horse killed and another wounded, but several men were knocked down by the concussion of the bursting shells, though without sustaining serious injury. After this the column



[Drawn from life by Mortimer Menpes.]

GENERAL FRENCH.

The distinguished Cavalry leader, whose rank in the British army was that of Colonel, was promoted (April 1901) to the substantive rank of Major-General (while still holding the local rank of Lieut.-General) for distinguished service in the Field; the promotion dating from October 1899.

The column retires to Krugersdorp.

returned to Krugersdorp, and from that base patrolled the country for some weeks, capturing 6,000 cattle and sheep and ninety-three Boers.

Clements meantime was skirmishing in the Magaliesberg with De la Rey, but was not able to force the Boer general to a pitched battle.

**Clements' attempt
to clear the
Magaliesberg.**

On September 9 and 10 he fought two actions near Hartebeestefontein, losing sixteen killed and wounded. De la Rey finally retired in the direction of Rustenburg, but was not pursued. He was short



SUPPLY TRAIN DESTROYED BY THE ENEMY AT NELSPRUIT.




THE TUNNEL AT WATERVALBOVEN,
Showing the central cogged rail by means of which the ascent of the steep gradients is accomplished.

mounted men the Boers could not be run to earth and captured. The same complaint came from all quarters, and yet at home no attempt whatever was made to send mounted reinforcements to the front. The whole army was, in the peculiar vernacular of the private, "fed up" with war. Officers and men were weary of continuous campaigning, with its endless hardships, nights spent in the open without even the shelter of a tent, poor food, and incessant marching.

In the South-eastern Transvaal, during the last days of August and the opening weeks of September, General Hildyard was engaged with a small column in attempting to pacify the Utrecht and Wakkerstroom districts, while General Clery was similarly occupied near Standerton. In neither case did the Boers make any stand.

**Operations in the South-
eastern Transvaal.**

of ammunition, and was powerless for mischief till he could re-stock his limbers and waggons from the stores in the northern Transvaal. Clements moved back to Pretoria through Heckpoort; but the Magaliesberg could not be considered really cleared, as the work which he had done on this occasion had to be repeated three or four times, because for want of



A MILITARY BALLOON WITH ITS CARRIAGE,
Showing the drum around which the anchoring cable is wound.

On August 29 Colonel Bradley with the 2nd North Staffordshire had a fight with the enemy at Modderfontein, near Johannesburg. But nothing could clear the Boers off the railways. Taking a typical week in the beginning of September, we find that on the 1st the rails were torn up at Klip River, south of Johannesburg, a train was derailed and captured, the engine hopelessly disabled by the use of dynamite, and 38 men killed, wounded or taken prisoners, though the captives were released by the Boers upon a patrol of Brabant's Horse giving chase to the raiders; on the 2nd the line was cut in two places in the Orange River Colony—to the south of Kroonstad, where a train with ordnance supplies was captured, and at America Siding. On the 3rd the Natal line was broken at Heidelberg; the same day the Pietersburg Railway was tampered with, north of Pretoria, an engine derailed, and several men of the West Riding Regiment

**Attacks on the
railway.**



Reginald Cleaver.

[After a photograph.]

WHAT "EVACUATION" MEANS TO THE LOYAL COLONISTS.

A loyal family returning to their wrecked home after a temporary "evacuation" by the British troops.

slightly injured; on the 4th, in the Orange River Colony, the line was cut at Honing Spruit; on the 5th the Boers broke the Krugersdorp line; on the 6th it was the turn of the Delagoa Bay Railway, on which at Balmoral an engine was blown up and five trucks derailed. Finally, on the 7th, the Orange River Colony line was cut at Roodeval. The difficulty of maintaining communications and sending up supplies can be understood from this brief summary. Nor was this week an exceptional one in any way. Since the end of May the Boers had week by week displayed the same activity. There was no obvious means of protecting the lines in any other way than by the devastation of the country on either side of them. For such a measure public opinion in England was by no means prepared.

Sometimes the enemy would attack the British posts on the line. On September 5, 125 Canadians, holding a point on the Delagoa Bay Railway midway between Pan and Wonderfontein, were suddenly assailed by a considerable force of Boers with two guns and one "Pom-Pom." An outpost of six Canadians was cut off; but the garrison easily repelled the assault, suffering only four casualties.



THE BOER PRISONERS AT SERVICE IN CEYLON.

The prisoners are guarded by the King's Royal Rifles, under Colonel Gore-Brown, Colonel Vincent being Commandant, and Colonel Jesse Coope in immediate charge of them. Temporary hospital huts have been erected and brightened with pictures and illustrated papers, and officials of the local branch of the Bible Society have distributed Bibles and portions of the Scriptures in Dutch. These were welcomed and specially acknowledged by a letter of thanks from a prisoner known as "the fighting parson." Colonel Jesse Coope, who is very popular, fosters productive manufactures and artistic activity among the men, disposing of their work through an agent. Tanks for the storage of water being required, the prisoners were invited to volunteer for the work at a reasonable rate of pay, and many availed themselves of the offer. The population of Ceylon does not exceed 6,000, and the settlement of the Boer prisoners has had a wholesome effect, not only on themselves, but on the Cingalese. The minister who is officiating (in the above photograph) is the "fighting parson" alluded to—the Rev. Mr. Postma—and General Roux stands beside him. Olivier can be identified nearer to the right margin of the picture and several rows further back.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REVIVAL OF THE WAR IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

The situation in Orange River Colony—Hunter's campaign against Olivier—Attack on Colonel Ridley at Helpmakaar Farm—Bruce Hamilton and Colonel White relieve him—Boers attempt to rush Winburg—Capture of Olivier—Ladybrand threatened—Uneasiness at Bloemfontein—Major White defends Ladybrand—Boers ransack the town—Bruce Hamilton relieves the fort—Redistribution of forces near Ladybrand—Boer activity—Amazing orders from Headquarters—Patrol in danger—Skirmishing around Bloemfontein—Activity near Kroonstad—Operations against De Wet—Boers occupy Wepener, Rouxville, and Dewetsdorp—Return home of troops—Want of Mounted Infantry—Reinforcements from the Transvaal—Attack on Jagersfontein—Boers repulsed at Fauresmith and Philippolis—Capture of Hanna's detachment—Philippolis relieved—Situation at Jacobsdal—Boers steal into the town—Night attack on the Market Square—Four artillerymen effect a rescue—British retire to Modder River—Hertzog demands the surrender of Koffyfontein—Change of Boer tactics—Disastrous withdrawal of troops.



THE situation in Orange River Colony. WHEN we left the British armies in the Orange River Colony in the early days of August, Prinsloo and some 4,000 Boers had just been captured, and though Olivier had escaped with about 2,000 men, it seemed that the north-eastern corner of the Colony had been fairly cleared. British troops occupied Harrismith, Bethlehem, Fouriesburg, and Heilbron. The roads and the railway through the Drakensberg passes into Natal were open. Everything appeared to indicate that the time would soon be reached

when the pacification of the Colony could be pronounced complete.

To deal with Olivier, who was reported on August 8 at Frankfort, moving west, with the apparent intention of aiding De Wet, or effecting a junction with him, General Hunter was ordered to march

with a column from Bethlehem to Heilbron. He had with him three battalions of the famous Highland Brigade, half the 2nd Bedfordshires, 200 Yeomanry, Lovat's invaluable scouts, and fifteen guns. Lindley

**Hunter's campaign
against Olivier.**

was reached on August 11, and the sick were sent into Kroonstad with the enormous train of sheep, cattle, and waggons captured in the Brandwater Basin. On the 13th the Rhenoster was reached and crossed; next day at Witpoort, to the north of the river, and some miles south of Heilbron, Hunter found the enemy, under Froneman and Olivier, holding a strong position across his road. The Boers had about 1,800 men with six guns. There was a sharp skirmish of six hours' duration before the enemy could be dislodged by the inevitable turning movement. The resistance was stubborn and the loss somewhat heavy, amounting to four killed and forty-one wounded, though it is some compensation to know that the enemy suffered in much the same degree. On the 15th Heilbron was reached without further incident. The Boers fell back to the north-east towards Frankfort. But from that point they must have pushed south with the utmost rapidity, as on August 23 they were in the neighbourhood of Winburg.

On the 22nd Colonel Ridley, of the Imperial Yeomanry, moved out of Winburg upon a reconnaissance with 250 mounted men—among whom were the Queenstown Volunteers—25 infantry of the Manchester Regiment, and two Maxims. He marched ten miles to the north-east, as far as a farm named Helpmakaar, and there halted for the night. Next day, leaving at Helpmakaar the waggons and the infantry, the mounted men pushed some eight miles further on, when suddenly a number of



[Photo by Salmon Winchester.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. RIDLEY, M.A.,
Imperial Yeomanry. Served in the Egyptian War,
1882, and in the operations in South Africa, 1896-7.



W. B. Wollen, R.I.]

[After a photograph.]

THE CAPTURE OF HORSES IN THE BRANDWATER DISTRICT NEAR FOURIESBURG: ROUNDING UP THE DROVE.



A. Morrow.]

THE ATTEMPT TO APPROACH ONE OF THE ENEMY'S GUNS,
In which a lieutenant and four men out of six were killed or wounded.

Boers appeared on the left, seized a Kaffir kraal, and from it opened a heavy fire on the British. Fearing for his waggons, Ridley beat a hasty retreat, his men falling back by alternate sections. When

**Attack on Colonel
Ridley at Helpmakaar
Farm.**

the waggons were reached, it was found to be impossible to retire further without abandoning them and the infantry. Ridley accordingly determined to make a stand till he could be relieved, and sent messengers to the nearest British posts with the news that he was hotly attacked. The camp was speedily surrounded by the enemy, who poured in a terrific fire from every point of vantage. "We were under a very heavy fire from all sides," writes Trooper Sladdin, of the Queenstown Volunteers, "and had absolutely no cover at all. I know I just lay down on a raised spot from which I could shoot well, and blazed away for all I was worth." All day the firing continued, and the British were unable to move without drawing showers of bullets; at nightfall, however, the fusillade abated, and the bulk of the men were withdrawn to Helpmakaar Farm, where there was good water, and where a low stone wall afforded some cover. Fifty men were detached to hold a small kopje, which commanded the farm and the farm garden. During the night there was no firing and no attack. The British loss on the first day of the fight was one killed and two wounded.

With daybreak of the 24th it was seen that the enemy had brought up three guns, which at once opened on the camp from three different points, hurling shell into the farm and among the men on the detached kopje. The Boers also employed explosive bullets, which inflicted the most fearful wounds. A lieutenant and six men crept down the river bed from the farm toward one of the guns, hoping to be able to stop its fire with a few well-directed bullets at close quarters, but so



[After a sketch by Private Sladdin.]

PLAN OF THE ATTACK ON HELPMAKAAR FARM.

accurate was the marksmanship of the enemy, that of the seven five were immediately killed or wounded. The sufferings of all were extreme. Not a man could budge from behind the schanzes or the slight cover afforded by the stone wall. "I cannot possibly describe our feelings," writes Trooper Sladdin; "how we watched the sun and longed for night. One could not leave the little shelters we had built, even for a drink of water, and we had to wait till dark to get something to eat."

Twice the Boers sent in messengers to demand the surrender of the little force. The first messenger came in on the evening of the 24th, the second day of the siege, with the threat that if the British did



J. Finnemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

THE CAPTURE OF FIELD-CORNET SWANEPOOL (p. 153).

not within ten minutes lay down their arms, the Boers would begin a more terrible bombardment, and would continue the fire all night. This menace, however, had no effect. The British returned a polite negative to the summons, and the Boer threat proved to be all "bluff." At any rate, there was no bombardment during the night. Early in the morning of the 25th a second emissary appeared from General Olivier. He stated that he had four guns in position, and that he was prepared to bring up six more if necessary. Therefore he suggested that Ridley should hoist the white flag to prevent

further effusion of blood. Once more a refusal was returned. The British went frantically to work to dig trenches and strengthen the schanzes, but the Boer guns did not fire, and presently, to the joy of all, they were seen to be retiring. A few minutes later groups of khaki-clad men came into sight. They were the scouts of the relief force.

Immediately upon hearing of Colonel

Bruce Hamilton and **Colonel White** relieve him.

Ridley's plight, Lord Roberts

had directed General Bruce Hamilton to move by rail from Heilbron to Winburg with 200 mounted infantry, 700 infantry, and eight guns, and thence to march to the help of the beleaguered detachment. Another force of 300 infantry, four guns, and some mounted men, under

Colonel White, was to co-operate from Ventersburg. These two columns successfully accomplished their mission, and arrived, by dint of the hardest marching, in time to save Colonel Ridley. All the troops concerned deserve the utmost credit—the relief column for their good marching, the relieved for their gallant resistance. Colonel Ridley's losses were 41 killed and wounded, of whom the Queenstown Volunteers lost no less than 33. About 100 horses and oxen were killed by the Boer fire, and the farm was reduced to a mere wreck. General Hunter telegraphed to Colonel Ridley: "Your grand defence compels our proud admiration. We all congratulate you and your brave command."

Kelly-Kenny from Bloemfontein and Rundle from Harrismith sent messages in the same strain.

On the 25th the troops returned to Winburg. At dawn of the 26th all were awakened by the rattle of rifles and the boom

Boers attempt to rush Winburg. of guns. Olivier and his men were audaciously attempting to rush the town. After two hours' heavy firing the Boers were repulsed, and the mounted men among the British were ordered to follow them up. The Queenstown Volunteers pressed close on the enemy's extreme left. Sladdin, whose modest and interesting narrative of these events we have followed, with seven

others found himself, in the heat of the chase, a long way in advance of the British and right in the midst of the enemy. Reaching a small eminence, this little band halted there, when one after another



THE EIGHT QUEENSTOWN VOLUNTEERS WHO CAPTURED TWENTY-FIVE BOERS (including General Olivier and his three sons).

The names of the men, reading from left to right, are: (top row) Pourchier, Stilwell, Niland, Currie; (lower row) Barton, Sergeant Tenlett, Corporal Hayes, Sladdin. The medal for distinguished conduct in the field has been awarded to each of these men.

Informatie-Bureau van het Roode Kruis, Pretoria.
(IDENTITY DEPARTMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL BRANCH OF THE ORANGE RED CROSS SOCIETY, PRETORIA)

BEWIJS-VAN IDENTITEIT.

Proof of Identity. No 8845

Naam *Leunis Joragum*
Name
Ouderdom *18 jaar*
Age

Woonplaats *Bloemfontein*
adres familie
Residence

Commando *Winburg v. Kommandant*

The Identity Department of the Red Cross Society will forward to English authorities information about wounded English soldiers who might be made prisoners.

Telegraphic and Postal Address:

In geval van dood of verwonding van houder dezes wordt men dringend verzocht deze kaart ingevuld op te zenden aan bovenstaand adres.

In case of bearer of this being killed or wounded, you are requested to send this card through the nearest Commanding Officer, or Responsible Official, to the Identity Department above mentioned.

Plaats	Locality
Datum	Date
Wond	Nature of Wound
Plaats	Locality
Datum	Date

Molengraaf, Pretoria.

BOER IDENTIFICATION CARD.

burghers rode up to them, taking them for Boers, and were compelled by their levelled rifles to surrender. "Among the first we took," says Sladdin, "were General Olivier and his three sons. We had captured

Capture of Olivier. 24 prisoners by now, and they were being taken over the eminence to a kraal on the other side, where they were dismounted and sent on on foot. I was riding up in the rear, when I turned round and saw another man coming towards me. I rode towards him, and ordered him to give up his gun. He said he was damned if he would. He had his rifle loaded, but was uncertain whether to fire or not. The instant I saw him hesitate he was lost, for I was only a couple of yards from him, and I dug the spurs into my horse, bounded on to him, and caught the muzzle of his rifle in my hand. At the same time I called to one of our fellows to shoot him. On hearing this he gave me his gun." He proved to be Field-Cornet Swanepool, a well-known Boer leader. As soon as he had been secured, the captors returned to the summit of the kopje, and were startled to see 200 Boers galloping towards them. There were now only five of the British left, as two messengers had been despatched to beg assistance. But these five put on a bold face, and opened a hot magazine fire. The Boers were so surprised at this unexpected shower of bullets that they bolted incontinently. Three were killed, the rest made good their escape. As for the Queenstown Volunteers, they brought their prisoners back in safety to the British lines, and were received as heroes. They deserved all the credit they obtained, as their pluck and presence of mind were extraordinary.

The Boer force which had attacked Colonel Ridley and the town of Winburg now moved in a south-easterly direction



Field-Cornet Van Zehl.

General Olivier.

Field-Cornet Olivier
(son of the general).

GENERAL OLIVIER IN CEYLON.

[Photo by the Biograph Co.]

Ladybrand threatened. towards Ladybrand, where were large supplies protected by a garrison of only 43 of the Wiltshire Yeomanry and one company, or about 90 men, of the 1st Worcestershires, the whole under Major F. White, of the Marine Light Infantry. On the 28th the enemy was at Thaba N'chu, threatening the Bloemfontein Waterworks and Ladybrand. To deal with them Colonel White's column was hurried by rail from Ventersburg Road to Bloemfontein on the 28th, while on that and the two following days General Bruce Hamilton's command was also directed upon Bloemfontein. Further, General Macdonald, with his indefatigable Highlanders, was brought from Heilbron to Winburg. The intention was to capture the Boer force by a great combined movement. Unhappily, on this occasion the enemy were able to dodge through the gaps between the British forces. Had our troops been mounted to a man it might, indeed it probably would, have been otherwise. But the folly of chasing mounted enemies with unmounted men was not yet apparent to the home authorities.

Bloemfontein was all excitement at the unexpected appearance of the Boers. It was known that the south of the Orange River Colony had been almost denuded of troops, and great uneasiness was felt as to what might happen.



CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS REMOVING PRISONERS FROM HEILBRON.

The Caledon River had risen in flood, and was absolutely impassable. He determined, therefore, to stand his ground, and on September 1 telegraphed to say that the enemy were in strong force within a few miles of him. After destroying all the stores he could within the time, he withdrew his little detachment from the town to a small fort on a hill commanding it, which, in the face of much ridicule, Colonel Main, a former commandant of the garrison, had constructed in May. The Colonel's wise caution saved the British cause from a humiliating mishap on this occasion, as, without the fort, it is doubtful if so small a force could have avoided surrender.

On the morning of September 2 observers in Basutoland saw that across the river the British garrison was being furiously bombarded. Eight or nine Boer guns and "Pom-Poms" were seen to be in action. About mid-day the bombardment ceased, and attempts to open signalling communication with Major White met with no response. It was concluded that the place had fallen. Yet, as a matter of fact, White was still

**Major White defends
Ladybrand.**

holding out, only he had no heliograph, and could not reply. That morning, before their guns opened, the Boers had sent in a message to him requiring him instantly to capitulate. To this he had returned an indignant refusal. Lord Roberts had forwarded by telegraph an order to him on no account to lower the flag, but to hold out to the last, promising that assistance should be speedily sent him. The mere fact that such a message should be thought necessary points to a certain degree of demoralisation in the British Army; but, happily, Major White was a brave and competent officer, and though there is reason to think that the order never reached him, he did his duty like a good soldier. The bombardment, in fact, inflicted little harm. His men, behind good cover, suffered but two or three casualties. The Boers entered the town and

**Boers ransack the
town.**

sacked the stores, removing clothing, coffee, and sugar. They were joined by many of the residents in the town, though these had given their parole and made their submission. Indeed, several of the leading inhabitants who had, only a few days previously, dined with the British officers, and had then expressed ultra-British sentiments, now appeared with bandoliers attacking their late hosts. On the 3rd all their guns, except one, were withdrawn; this one gun still remained, and steadily shelled the kopje on which was the British

**Uneasiness at
Bloemfontein.**

Colonel White, immediately on his arrival at Bloemfontein, pushed out to the Waterworks, a point of the greatest importance, and there waited reinforcements. On September 1 the advance of Bruce Hamilton behind him enabled him to move forward to Thaba N'chu, where the two joined forces next day. Messages were sent to Major White at Ladybrand directing him to retire with his men and stores through Basutoland to Ficksburg. But, perhaps fortunately, this was impracticable.



[Photo by Russell, Southsea.]

MAJOR F. WHITE, R.M.L.I.

fort. It afterwards appeared that they had learnt of the approach of the relief columns, and were anxious that their forces should not be impeded by artillery when a retreat became necessary. Large crowds of Basutos witnessed the bombardment from across the Caledon. On the 4th it was seen that the last Boer gun had departed; but, as if to make up for its retreat, during the early morning the rifle fire upon the British position was unusually heavy. About 10 a.m., however, this also ceased, and the observers in Basutoland could see the Boers inspanning their teams and moving off. That the garrison was still holding out was ascertained by the flashes of a piece of looking-glass, out of which Major White had extemporised a heliograph, and with which he was able to reply to the heliographic inquiries from Basutoland. Early on the 5th the relief force under Bruce Hamilton came into sight,

**Bruce Hamilton
relieves the fort.**

and, after a brisk skirmish, drove back the enemy and effected a junction with Major White. The relievers had covered no less than 80 miles upon bad roads in four and a half days. Though 320 shells had been fired by the Boers into the British lines, the casualties were only four wounded. The Boer losses were placed at 24 killed



BOYES' 17TH BRIGADE ON THE MARCH.

The photograph was taken on the way to Vrede, whence the Brigade was ordered to Bethlehem. The town in the distance is Harrismith.

and 35 wounded, but this figure is probably grossly exaggerated. The enemy left a certain number of wounded behind them in the town. Ladybrand was at once evacuated by the British; and the garrison was withdrawn.

Meantime, the presence of the Boers at Ladybrand led the British headquarters to order a kind of "general post" in the neighbouring British forces, presumably to meet the commandos, which were reported in all directions. There was one commando, it was said on August 30,

**Redistribution of forces
near Ladybrand.**

in the Korannaberg, while another was stated to be moving north towards Senekal. General Rundle was ordered to send Campbell's 16th Brigade with seven guns and 350 mounted men from Bethlehem to Fouriesburg, and to move Boyes' 17th Brigade, with a like number of guns and mounted men, from Vrede to Bethlehem. Three days earlier, in obedience to orders, Senekal, which was garrisoned by a small force under Colonel Oakes, of the Worcestershire Regiment, had been evacuated. The troops who occupied it spent three days in pouring rain under the most awful conditions, marching upon roads that were quagmires and fording spruits that ran roaring, impassable torrents, before they reached Ficksburg, on August 30, worn out and soaked to the skin. Immediately on their arrival they found orders directing the garrisoning of Willow Grange, near Ficksburg, and of Commando Nek. A force of 300 men was at once sent out to occupy these positions. The

Boers were located by patrols between Mequatling's Nek and Clocolan; at the same time refugees began to pour into Ficksburg with blood-curdling stories of Boer plundering and Boer atrocities.

Boer activity.

The enemy, it appeared, were commandeering all the burghers who had been paroled and allowed, by the fatal leniency of the British administration, to go to their farms. These unfortunates were given the choice between a military execution and the breach of their parole. Such were the Boer generals' ideas of honour. Certainly such acts should have been

sternly punished, if only in justice to the burghers who had made their submission. Had punishment been inflicted promptly, it is possible that the misdeeds would not have been repeated. Yet though it is simple justice that the man who forces another to break his parole should be regarded as the real culprit, we cannot find that, where Boers guilty of this offence afterwards fell into our hands, any penalty was exacted.

Late September 1 news reached Ficksburg that the enemy were approach-



"HAIR-CUTTING BY MACHINERY."

ing Ladybrand. This placed their intentions beyond doubt. On the 2nd came an extra-

Amazing orders from Headquarters.

ordinary message, purporting to be from Pretoria, and signed "Lord Roberts." It ordered the British to abandon Ficksburg and to retire into Basutoland. Thinking it must be a forgery, Colonel Oakes telegraphed to Pretoria and to General Rundle's headquarters for confirmation, but he took the precaution to draw in his detachments and got ready to move. To the amazement of all the message proved to be genuine, in so careless a manner were orders issued from headquarters. It was one more example of the disastrous results of the absence of a trained and fully prepared General Staff in the British Army. On the top of the confirma-

tion of the message came a telegram from General Rundle: "I beg and implore you to hold out. I will come in ample time for your relief." Since Ficksburg was not besieged, this was certainly puzzling. Finally Colonel Oakes decided to stay, and stay he did without being attacked. As for the Boers from Ladybrand, they got away, dodging Bruce Hamilton, Macdonald, and Campbell with their usual slimness. It would appear that their real object in descending upon Ladybrand was to supply themselves with stores and clothing, since they ransacked all the houses and shops.

The British troops, after some delay, marched upon the Korannaberg and Doornberg, whither the Boers were reported to have retreated. Rundle, with Boyes' Brigade, had moved from Vrede to

Patrol in danger.

Bethlehem, receiving on the way reports that De Wet was once more in his old haunts near Lindley, engaged in recruiting his forces and threatening to march on Bethlehem. At the last-named place the British arrived on September 11. On the 12th Rundle despatched a patrol, under Lieutenant Power, of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, to reconnoitre. The



A TRADESMEN'S SHOP IN CAMP.

This photograph shows four very useful members of society—a carpenter, a tailor, a shoemaker, and a butcher.

patrol had covered six miles, when it was surrounded and cut off by a commando of Boers under Froneman, who sent a missive to Power demanding immediate surrender, with the threat that if the demand was not complied with, he would attack at once and give no quarter. Power returned as his answer the letter with "no surrender" written across it. The Boer movements had been noticed from Bethlehem, and reinforcements arrived in time

**Skirmishing around
Bloemfontein.**

to save the gallant patrol. Campbell had simultaneously advanced through Fouriesburg to Trommel; Hector Macdonald was already at Winburg; while Bruce Hamilton was at Leeuw River Mills, halfway between Ladybrand and Thaba N'chu. But, notwithstanding these dispositions, the Boers suddenly turned up at Brandfort, on the railway, in the rear of Bruce Hamilton and Macdonald, on September 12. They seem to have intended breaking the line; but if so, they were not able to do any serious damage. General Kelly-Kenny, from Bloemfontein, strengthened his posts and drove them off. At the same time he communicated with Macdonald, whereupon that officer crossed the Vet River, and on the 13th, to the west of Tafel Kop, struck the raiders. There was a sharp skirmish, which led to the enemy's precipitate retreat. They fled north across the railway, leaving behind them 31 waggons, 270 oxen, and large quantities of dynamite and ammunition. Only seven Boers, however, were captured, and the enemy succeeded in removing three guns, which they had in action, besides 30 waggons.



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THOMAS KELLY-KENNY, C.B.

(A biographical note on this officer appears on p. 389 of Vol. II. of "With the Flag to Pretoria.")

In February, 1900, he commanded the Sixth Division in the Colesberg District, proceeded to Modder River Camp, and, with Lord Roberts' Army, advanced to the relief of Kimberley. He took part in the battles of Paardeberg, Oosfontein, and Driefontein, and in the march to Bloemfontein, which the Sixth Division was left to garrison. Lord Roberts left him General Officer Commanding the Orange River Colony, and he subsequently held command of the lines of communication in the same Colony.

Lovat's scouts greatly distinguished themselves in the pursuit; it is satisfactory to be able to add that neither they nor the rest of the British force suffered any casualties. On September 18 Rundle came upon another detachment of the enemy at Bronkhorstfontein, near Bethlehem, put them to flight, and captured from them 30 waggons and one gun. No further result was obtained by the British columns operating against the Doornberg and Korannaberg. The enemy's force broke up into small detachments, which scattered, the burghers retiring to their farms for a few weeks' respite before again engaging in the exhilarating and safe pastime of worrying the "rooinek." There was a deceptive appearance of calm, and on September 20 General Kelly-Kenny was able to telegraph, "There is now no organised opposition in the south of the Orange River Colony." Unhappily it was found a little later that un-organised opposition still existed, and was far more troublesome and difficult to deal with than organised opposition.

Among the incidents which occurred just before or during this lull in the war,

Activity near Kroonstad. was an attack by the British mounted infantry stationed at

Ventersburg Road upon a party of the enemy in the Cyfergat Kopjes, where the Boers had a camp. A quantity of cattle, but no prisoners, were taken, with a loss to the British of four killed and wounded. On September 13 General W. Knox, with a small mounted column, scoured the Rhenoster country, and scattered some small parties of the enemy. Nevertheless a few days later, on September 17, the Boers descended upon the railway at Leeuwspruit in the same region, to the north of Kroonstad, and blew up the line in no less than 21 places. The damage done was not serious, and was all repaired in a single day. More significant, perhaps, as indicating the recrudescence of opposition in a quarter where the enemy had been inactive for many months, was a sudden attack upon Bultfontein, a mining village to the north-west of Brandfort, on September 15.

The garrison mustered only sixteen men under Lieutenant Slater, of the Yeomanry; the Boers were at least a hundred strong. Notwithstanding these odds, the British held their own till the 16th, when a force of mounted infantry from Brandfort arrived to relieve them. The Boers scattered and retired. A fortnight later the enemy were again about the place, and on October 4 drove back a small British column, under Captain Henty, inflicting on it a loss of seven killed and wounded.

In view of De Wet's return to the Orange River Colony, Lord Roberts had decided to concentrate a strong mobile column for operations against him. Accordingly the Colonial Division, after refitting at Elandsfontein and replacing the horses and material lost in the desperate pursuit of De Wet during August, was directed upon the Rhenoster. There it was joined by De Lisle's Australian and Colonial Mounted Infantry and by



[Photo by Knight, Aldershot.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS COLE PORTER.

Born, 1851; entered 6th Dragoon Guards, 1872; Captain, 1878; Major, 1886; Lieut.-Colonel, 1895; Brevet Colonel, 1899; Brigadier-General commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade in South Africa, 1899-1900. Served with the Carabineers in the Afghan War, 1879-80.



R. Caton Woodville.]

THE YEOMAN'S LAST RIDE.

Kitchener's Horse. At the same time Porter, who had replaced Little, wounded in the Zeerust district, in command of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, moved to Kroonstad. Four infantry columns were

next directed upon Lindley, to attempt the envelopment of the enemy in that quarter. Macdonald marched from Kroonstad to Kaalfontein on the Valsch River. Bruce Hamilton moved on Lindley from Senekal, Boyes though Lindley was flown through the was no very satisfaction with a considerable deal of "sniping," of the mountain guns



COLOUR-SERGEANT
FERRETT,

Of the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment, was the recipient of one of four scarves made and presented by Queen Victoria to "the best all-round men taking part in the South African campaign." He sent to his wife in England the scarf, which is crocheted in khaki-coloured Berlin wool, with the initials "V.R.I." on one of the little knots of wool. Colour-Sergeant Ferrett took part in the battle of Colenso, and was with General Hildyard, under General Buller, throughout the campaign.

The other (Colonial) recipients of the late Queen's scarves were—Trooper L. Chadwick, of Roberts' Horse, who was one of the boat's crew who cut the cable across Santiago Harbour in the Spanish-American War; R. Thompson, of the Royal Canadian Regiment; Private Dufrayer, of the New South Wales Mounted Infantry; and H. D. Coutts, of the New Zealand Mounted Infantry.



[Photo by Bryant, Slough.]

SCARF CROCHETED BY QUEEN
VICTORIA FOR "THE BEST ALL-
ROUND MAN IN THE ARMY."

Worn by the wife of the winner.

stores and bank, and took possession in the name of the Free State Government. A little later Rouxville and Dewetsdorp were also occupied by the enemy. Macdonald with the Highland Brigade was at once hurried south from Kroonstad to place detachments in these towns. This he did in early October, driving out the Boers; but the moral effect of the enemy's sudden appearance in a quarter where they had not been seen for months was great, especially as no severe defeat was inflicted upon the raiders. It was obvious, indeed, that small Boer commandos could move backwards and forwards, much as they liked, among the various British columns. Well mounted and impeded by no baggage, living upon their friends and enemies, and knowing exactly where food could be found, they could only be dealt with by a large British mounted force, and such, we have seen, was lacking.

But re-occupied on the 25th, the bird, as usual, had wide gaps in the encircling cordon, and there factory result. Campbell, however, came in contact body of Boers on the 26th, and after a good camped at a farm, where he had learnt that one lost at Nicholson's Nek was buried. This gun he dug up and carried off, with two waggons. According to the official reports he "captured" the gun. If so, "capture" has acquired a new meaning. It was now reported that De Wet with 900 men and several guns was in the neighbourhood of Kopjes Station, to the north of Roodeval. Just when dispositions were being made to surround him, came news of trouble in yet another quarter. Wepener, since the withdrawal of the Boers after the unsuccessful attack upon Colonel Dalgety, had been left in peace and quiet. Indeed it may be said that, to the south of a line drawn from Boshof through Bloemfontein to Ladybrand, the Orange River Colony seemed to have accepted British rule and to have been

practically pacified. But on September 29 a small force of Boers, about 200 in number, appeared in the Wepener district, which

**Boers occupy
Wepener, Rouxville,
and Dewetsdorp.**

was without any garrison other than a handful of police. A detachment entered the town, raided the



SENEKAL.

Nor was this all. Other and more disquieting incidents followed. On October 7 a column of Boers was seen moving from Abraham's Kraal towards Poplar Grove and Petrusburg. There was no force available to deal with them, and not many days passed before reports of their activity in the south-west of the colony began to come in. Sniping of detached posts broke out; it was unsafe for Englishmen to move about the colony; even Bethulie, on the Orange River, was not secure, since near it a militia post of twelve men was captured, after a brisk fight with the enemy in which four men were wounded. Parties hung round Bloemfontein itself, and on the 16th looted a farm eighteen miles from the colonial capital. The raiders gave out that they were the advance guard of a much larger force, and it may have been the fact that De Wet at this time intended to follow them and to move into the south-west, or even into Cape Colony, since as far back as early October there were vague rumours



THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

The photograph represents Major-General Pretymann, Military Governor of the Orange River Colony, seated with a book in his hand, with Major Holland Pryor (chief staff officer to Military Governor) on his right, and Captain Hitchcock (Assistant Provost-Marshal) and Lord Acheson (A.D.C. to Major-General Pretymann) on his left. The two civilians are, on the left, Mr. Tancred (Legal Adviser), and, on the right, Mr. A. Brown (Financial Adviser). Other members of the Staff are Major Lorimer (Commandant of Police), Captain Pearce (Intelligence Officer), Lord Alexander Thynne, and Mr. Hole (Private Secretary).

that he was preparing for such an enterprise. By bad luck just at this very moment troops were returning home. It does not appear by whom this return was ordered or sanctioned, or whether it met with the full approval of Lord Roberts, but from the excessively optimistic tone of his despatches, it is at least possible that he was responsible for it. For us it is easy to be wise after the event, and to see that it was extremely dangerous to weaken the South African Field Force at such a moment. A melancholy, yet, we fear, not exaggerated picture of the situation is given in the letter of an officer stationed to the north of Bloemfontein. The letter is dated October 27. "Bloemfontein," he writes, "is practically in a state of siege. The Boers have held up the mail train, and, I presume, collared and destroyed our letters. They have been playing about all round us for two months in parties and small commandos, all well mounted and equipped. They pass their time sniping us, cutting up the railway and telegraph wires, shooting at sentries, capturing small detached posts and unprotected convoys. I have just returned with my company

**Return home of
troops.**

from a detached post a few miles north of our camp, where for a fortnight I spent rather an anxious time. We stood to arms most nights, and tried to sleep during the day. But the heat in these bell tents is unbearable, and the dust storms too awful to describe, and no shelter anywhere from either. I was alone, and to add to the discomfort we were only allowed one pint of water per man per diem. The enemy never attacked, although we expected them to do so at any moment.

"Before we put an end to the war there will have to be numerous changes in our present military system and tactics.

Want of mounted infantry.

Corps of mounted infantry must be raised, say 200 or 300 strong, and each corps given a district (not too big), and told to live as much as possible on the country; two or more guns to be given to each corps; all the infantry to garrison the towns and places of importance. Then, and not till then, will this brigandage cease and peace be established. We can go on till Doomsday hunting these Boers with infantry—they only laugh at us. These generals will, if given a free hand, continue to allow the commandos to escape, unless each receives the credit of the capture. Reorganization is what we require and men who will rise above these petty jealousies, and fight, not for self-glorification, but for their



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

SIR GODFREY YEATMAN LAGDEN, K.C.M.G.,

Has been resident Commissioner of Basutoland since 1893. He has had wide experience of natives both in North and South Africa, and in Basutoland especially has obtained and maintained a curious personal influence over them, which is very exceptional. He is a famous big-game sportsman, and an enthusiastic ornithologist. He was Chief Clerk to the late Secretary of the Transvaal under British administration as far back as 1878.

Queen and country."

Burghers who had submitted, with their families, poured into Bloemfontein,

Reinforcements from the Transvaal. now that the country had become unsafe.

Troops were withdrawn from the Transvaal and rushed south to garrison the very country that was supposed to have been pacified. And yet it was impossible to press the enemy continuously, for no infantry in the world could stand perpetual forced marches through what was virtually a desert. The mounted men were so few, that in that vast area they were unable to draw effective cordons.

Towards the end of October the state of affairs in the south of the Orange

Attack on Jagersfontein. River Colony grew worse. On the 13th

the Boers were near Jagersfontein, a diamond-mining town in the south-west, and a militia patrol was cut up. Laagers appeared in close proximity to Kimberley. Horses and forage were commandeered, and a native was cruelly shot by the enemy as far south as Orange River Station. On



BASUTOS IN THEIR WAR-GEAR.

The Basutos are perhaps the most interesting South African native race, after the Zulus. They are active, energetic, and very agricultural, nearly the whole of their country being under careful cultivation. Every Basuto owns a pony and a gun, and is a perfect horseman and a good shot. Basutoland was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1871. In 1879-80 the natives revolted, and there was an arduous campaign, conducted solely by Colonial troops and volunteers. The dispute, which was in connection with the boundaries of the territory, was settled by arbitration in 1884. Thanks to the influence of Sir Godfrey Lagden the Basutos have given little trouble during the war, though they would gladly have fought with the British.

the 16th a serious attack was made upon Jagersfontein. The weak detachment of 300 men occupying the place under Major King-Hall was divided between two small forts to the south of the town

and a position on the kopjes to the west of it. During the night of the 15-16th a party of 25 Boers crawled into the town, passing the British outposts by following the shadow of a wall. Inside the town they were joined by many sympathisers, who produced buried rifles and ammunition. Even the women aided them. At daybreak the Boers without attacked the British forts in the most determined manner, and when the attention of the garrison was thus occupied, the party inside the town joined in the assault, pouring in from the houses a heavy fire upon the British rear. The enemy succeeded in reaching the prison and releasing all the prisoners inside it; they also shot down with expanding bullets eight unarmed and non-combatant Kaffirs. But the garrison fought so well that it repulsed the assault and drove the Boers from the town after a two hours' conflict, with the loss of their commandant, Vischer, and 27 men killed. The British loss was nine killed and 12 wounded. Severe measures were at once taken to punish the treacherous inhabitants. Their houses were burned, and they themselves, where they had not escaped, were seized and imprisoned.



H. M. Paget.]

[After a sketch made at Greylingstad by Lieut. E. Blake Knox.

SWEARING THE OATH OF NEUTRALITY.

Close to Jagersfontein is the small town of Fauresmith. Here, on the morning of October 19, an attack was made upon the garrison by a Boer commando. A Mr. Schweinberg, a Boer of good position, who had made his submission and taken the oath of neutrality, and who had been retained by the British as mayor, gave full information to the enemy as to the dispositions of our troops. But even this intelligence did not enable the Boers to win success. The British force, 150 strong, composed of Seaforth Highlanders and Yeomanry, under Captain Stewart, held a kopje to the south-east, a low ridge to the north, and two houses in the west of the town. The affair at Jagersfontein had put the garrison on the *qui-vive*. At daybreak 400 Boers advanced in the most determined manner against the kopje, and came on in the face of a heavy fire till they were only ten yards from the British picket. Then they recoiled; but the attack was not completely repulsed till some hours later, when the Boers withdrew towards the south. The British casualties were three killed and six wounded. Further to the south the village of Philippolis, in close proximity to the Colesberg road-bridge over the Orange,

**Boers repulsed at
Fauresmith
and Philippolis.**

was closely besieged and constantly attacked from October 18 onwards. It was held by a force of 30 men, civilians or police, under Mr. Gostling, the resident magistrate, and Lieutenant Jenkin, who were entrenched on a kopje just outside the place. The first assault, made on the 18th by 80 Boers, was beaten off, after eighteen hours' fighting. On the 20th the commandant at Colesberg sent 34 men of Nesbitt's Horse, under Lieutenant Hanna, to reinforce the garrison, but on the 21st 600 more Boers appeared in the neighbourhood, and Hanna, on the 22nd, walked unwittingly into their midst. The kopje had again been unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy on the 21st; Hanna entered the town of Philippolis and there posted his men. At dawn of the 22nd he was heavily

attacked,
Capture of Hanna's and all
detachment. his little

detachment were overwhelmed and captured, with the exception of himself and six men. They got away, and joined Gostling on the kopje.

The plight of Philippolis being made known to the



FIELD PRINTING PRESS OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

The pictures represent the exterior and interior of the travelling printing office originally with the Natal Field Force, and afterwards with Lord Roberts. It was in this van—which was in Ladysmith at the time of the siege—that the *Ladysmith Lyre* and other siege literature was printed. (See "With the Flag to Pretoria," Vol. II., p. 505, note.) Its primary object, however, is the printing of military orders, proclamations, &c.



military authorities—through the skill of a telegraph operator who stole through the Boer lines, made a con-

Philippolis relieved.

nection with the broken wires outside, and then called for assistance—immediate efforts were made to relieve it. General Kelly-Kenny directed a column under Colonel White to move to its help from Bethulie, while another column under Colonel Barker was to come down from the north, from Jagersfontein. White carried his infantry by train to Prior's Siding on the Colesberg line; the mounted men and artillery marched by road. At 5 p.m. of the 24th the column was at Osfontein, eight miles east of Philippolis, having covered a long stretch of rough and difficult country from Prior's Siding. As the sound of guns could be heard away towards Philippolis, the Yeomanry were instructed to push forward, and arrived there just after nightfall, having marched no

less than fifty miles in twenty-six hours. They found Barker had preceded them. He had marched from Jagersfontein early that morning, neared Philippolis about five in the evening, and had then engaged and driven back the Boers. The total casualties in Mr. Gostling's and Lieutenant Hanna's detachments were 3 killed and 12 wounded. The Boer losses are unknown.

Other attacks of the same nature occurred at Jacobsdal and Koffyfontein. Jacobsdal had been the first headquarters of Lord Roberts in the Orange River Colony so far back as February. Since February it had remained undisturbed, garrisoned by a small detachment, which
Situation at Jacobsdal. was withdrawn when the pacification of the south of the Orange River Colony seemed to be really complete. But in mid-October, when the Boers re-appeared south of the Bloemfontein-

Boshof line, a small garrison of 45 Capetown Highlanders was despatched from Modder River to occupy it. They were commanded by Captain Jardine. With them were eight of the Orange River Colony Police and eight of the Prince Alfred's Artillery Guards, in charge of one 15-pounder gun. Thus the total strength all told was just about 60 men. So small was the force that the mere provision of outposts and pickets exhausted it. It had to be continually on the alert, as the Boers were known to be in the neighbourhood, and might at any moment attack. In the three days up to and including October 24, the members of the garrison had but four hours' sleep. Thus they were worn out and rendered quite unfit for the fierce conflict that was impending.

Jacobsdal itself is a congeries of houses, standing in large open plots, with stone walls round them, built of rubble without mortar. The Riet River, in a wide and deep bed, flows through the middle of the town. The troops were not quartered in the houses, where they would have been able to defend themselves with ease if attacked; the exaggerated British regard for property—which is too often preferred to the interests and safety of the soldier—led to the men being encamped in the market square, a wide, open space

Boers steal into the town.



Ernest Prater.]

BRITISH SOLDIERS ASSISTING BOER REFUGEES.

[After sketches made in South Africa.

Overwhelming testimony is borne to the habitual courtesy and helpfulness of the British soldier towards the Boer women and children. The fact that so many of the enemy, including Kruger himself, left their families to the care of their conquerors, should be sufficient answer to those who are so ready to think evil of their fellow-countrymen.

surrounded by houses. A concert was to have been held on the night of the 24th, and the Boers had indubitably received information of this: it was afterwards ascertained that they had been in constant communication with sympathisers inside the town. At the time when they expected the concert to be in full swing, a party of something less than a hundred crawled up the river bed unobserved by the weary and worn-out sentries. They reached the centre of the town and then made their way, under shelter of the stone walls, into the houses on the market-place. Others stole to the police barracks, where was the 15-pounder, and took up a position close to it, behind a stone wall, which they loop-holed. In the course of the night some ten Britishers on sentry or outpost duty were seized and disarmed before they could give the alarm.

About 4.30 a.m. of the 25th the sentry on duty at the barracks saw figures moving in the darkness, heard whispering close to him, and challenged. As reply came a volley, which fortunately missed him. At the sound of these shots the Boers cut the telegraph wire, and opened from the houses

upon the tents in the market-place. "We jumped up at once," says a private in the Capetown Highlanders. "Our men fell in their tents right and left, wounded and dying. Four men tried to make for the barracks, fifty yards distant, but were shot down. One reached there; the others fell simply riddled with bullets. The only thing for us to do was to lie flat on our backs and take our chance. All around the wounded were groaning, and now and then we heard a voice saying, 'Good-bye; I'm hit.' The position was awful. There we lay, expecting every moment to be our last, and unable to do anything. To show one's hand meant death. After an hour and a half of this kind of thing five of us made a rush for the hospital. Three reached the building, one being killed on the very threshold. One of the Cape Artillery made a rush to save a wounded man in the square. As he was bandaging his comrade he was shot dead, with two bullet wounds." Out of the 34 men in the square only eight were left untouched; the other 26 were shot down like dogs. The small party in the police barracks with the gun were not so much exposed, yet they were fired upon by the Boers from behind the loop-holed wall at a distance of only twenty yards. All the morning fighting continued, the British refusing to surrender, and offering a most gallant and meritorious resistance. The enemy behaved very savagely, firing out of sheer devilry at the dead bodies of the British, until they had placed eighteen or twenty bullets in some of the corpses. In the meantime four Kaffirs had hurried with all possible haste to the British post at Modder River to ask for aid. Here the only available force was

**Four artillerymen
effect a rescue.**

a small detachment of four mounted

artillerymen and 40 infantry. They were far too weak to have attempted the relief of the place, had considerations of prudence had any weight, yet on the news that the Boers were in the market-place of Jacobsdal they hurried off without an instant's delay. The mounted men boldly galloped on ahead, and when six miles from Jacobsdal saw a large number of Boers riding towards the town. The enemy must have taken the four artillerymen and their commandant, Mr. Finlayson, for the advance-guard of a large force, as they at once retired, and the five neared the town about two. They rode into the market-place without a shot being fired, but when they had reached that point saw only the tents and bodies of the unhappy Capetown Highlanders, and could discover no signs that any resistance was still being offered. At this juncture a hot fire was suddenly opened upon them by the inhabitants from the houses in the square. The artillerymen replied with such effect that the Boers bolted in the direction of Koffyfontein, when, perhaps arguing, "in for a penny—in for a pound," with amazing audacity the artillerymen gave chase. Then, returning, they went to the barracks, joined ranks with the survivors of the detachment garrisoning the place, and proceeded to arrest all the occupants of houses from which shots had been fired.



[Photo by Spalding.]

A CYCLIST TELEGRAPH ENGINEER.

Showing arrangement for laying a field telegraph wire as the rider proceeds.



Artist's Sketch.

THE ATTACK ON THE BRITISH CAMP IN THE MARKET-PLACE OF JACOBSDAL.

The British dead numbered 14; all had been hit with explosive bullets, and the wounds were of a most horrible nature. The wounded were 13 in number. The Boers left their commandant and two others dead; the commandant had been quietly living in the town for some days, and in the enemy's ranks had been recognised many of the inhabitants of the town and district, who had made their submission and outwardly protested satisfaction with British rule. As soon as the killed and wounded had been collected, 36 houses from which shots had been fired were burnt to the ground. As they burned, great quantities of concealed ammunition exploded, showing how little confidence could be reposed in the good faith of the surrendered Boer. That night relievers and relieved slept on a well-

entrenched hill close to Jacobsdal, but they returned to the town next day and buried the dead. While thus engaged the enemy reappeared in large numbers, and a hurried retreat had to be made to the entrenchments. The Boers, however, probably because they saw that the British were ready for them, made no attack, and in the afternoon all the stores were burnt, all the available carts in the village commandeered for the transport of the wounded, and the British force retired to Modder River. At that point the danger from the enemy was still great. At Klokfontein, some

**British retire to
Modder River.**



[Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.]

THE HOSPITAL AT ORANGE RIVER STATION.
Bringing in a patient.

miles to the south, there was a strong Boer commando which was reported to be meditating attack. Passengers and goods could only move along the railway under the escort of an armoured train.

On the 25th the diamond-mining town of Koffyfontein, near Jacobsdal, was attacked by the enemy. The place was in charge of Captain

**Hertzog demands
the surrender
of Koffyfontein.**

Robertson, who had under his orders a

few police and a townguard composed of loyal Afrikaners and mining employés. These took up a position near the town round the mine. A letter from the Boer commander, Judge Hertzog, was sent in to Captain Robertson. It ran as follows:—"I have come to occupy the town and mine of Koffyfontein. I demand from you the immediate surrender of the same, together with the men under your command. For the purpose of a reply I grant you ten minutes from the time that this summons is handed over to you by bearer, during which time I shall abstain from any act of hostility, unless the same be commenced by you at an earlier time. I may inform you that I shall consider any movements of armed men in town or mine as an act of hostility. I wish further to inform you it has been brought to my notice in other places that natives and burghers of the Orange Free State, as also the employés of the mine, have on various occasions been armed for the sake of making a defence



[Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.]

A WARD IN THE HOSPITAL AT ORANGE RIVER STATION.
The doctor's visit.



F. de Haenen.

QUEEN VICTORIA INSPECTING INVALIDED COLONIALS IN ST. GEORGE'S HALL, WINDSOR.

[After a sketch by D. Macpherson.]

On November 16, 1900, Queen Victoria received at Windsor Castle one hundred invalided Colonial soldiers—representatives of forty-five different regiments from Australia, Canada, Natal, Cape Colony, Ceylon, India, and New Zealand. At the station they were welcomed by the Mayor, and, after visiting the State Apartments, they assembled in the Waterloo Chamber to await the Queen's arrival in St. George's Hall into which Her Majesty, who was accompanied by Princess Beatrice and her children, was wheeled by her Indian attendants. Thereupon the troops were marched in, headed by Major Sykes, the detachment of each Colony being addressed in turn. Two non-commissioned officers, Sergeant Legge (one of six brothers who had served at the front) and Sergeant Macdonald (an Australian badly wounded), were singled out for special notice. After prolonged cheers the men left to be entertained at luncheon by the Mayor.

against the forces of the Orange Free State. I wish to draw your attention to the inevitable consequences of such an act on your part, as I am fully determined to have every native or burgher of the Orange Free State found in arms against the Government of the said state punished with the utmost

CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND AT THE WAR OFFICE.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MR. BRODRICK.

The Parliamentary Election of October, 1900—whatever side-issues may have been brought forward by individual candidates—was, generally speaking, fought on purely "khaki" lines. The Boer war, its justice or injustice, and the methods of its waging, were the questions on which the electors were asked to pass their verdict. The result showed that the country was fully determined to support Lord Salisbury's Government in the prosecution of the war, the majority for the Government being increased by six votes, from 128 to 134. The balance of parties in England and Ireland was not affected, but Scotland returned 38 supporters of the Government, as against 31 before the dissolution. On the other hand, Wales elected only 4 ministerialists, as against 8 in the previous Parliament. Of the Welshmen in Parliament, Mr. Lloyd-George has distinguished himself by his enthusiastic support of the Boer claim to arbitration. Among the notable exclusions was that of Dr. Clark, M.P. for Caithness, 1885-1900, who had passed some years in South Africa, was once Consul-General for the Transvaal in London, and whose correspondence with General Joubert was generally felt to have been inimical to the interests of this country. The non-election of Captain the Hon. Hedworth Lambton, in spite of the popularity which attached to him in consequence of the part he had taken in the defence of Ladysmith, but who stood as a Liberal candidate for Newcastle, may also be noted as significant. Reforms in the administration of the Army had been promised, and were now initiated. The Marquis of Lansdowne was transferred from the War Office to the Foreign Secre-



[Photo by Dickinson & Foster.]

LORD RAGLAN.

taryship and Mr. W. St. John Brodrick appointed Secretary of State for War, with Lord Raglan as Parliamentary Under-Secretary in place of Mr. Wyndham (who became Chief Secretary for Ireland), and Lord Stanley as Financial Secretary in place of Mr. Powell Williams. Lord Wolseley's tenure of the office of Commander-in-Chief expiring about the same time, Lord Roberts was recalled from South Africa to take up the arduous duties and responsibilities of that office.

severity, and in the case of the mine to have the same, with all the machinery, utterly destroyed, as the 'Law of Nations' permits me to do." Captain Robertson replied in terms of derision, and beat off a very fierce assault. He and his men succeeded in repulsing all attacks, until on November 2 they were relieved by Sir Charles Parsons with a mounted force. This was the epoch when such attacks were by no means always chronicled in the official telegrams, which had long ceased to give the British public an accurate idea of the war or of the real progress that had been effected. Consequently

TWO BRITISH SUPPORTERS OF BOER INDEPENDENCE.



[Photo by Russell.]

DR. CLARK, EX-M.P.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE, M.P.

(See the note above.)

the country was in utter ignorance of the urgent need of reinforcements. On October 26 the Boers displayed further activity; on this occasion in the neighbourhood of Jagersfontein Road. They derailed a goods train there, and did a great deal of damage between Jagersfontein Road and Edenburg. At the same time they walked into Reddersburg, captured the garrison of 32 officers and men, and commandeered all the goods upon which they could lay their hands, leaving in exchange a cheque for £1,608 payable by the "Free State Government." Farther to the east they were now in full possession of Ficksburg, Ladybrand, and Fouriesburg, and at the last place they had established the Free State

Government. Mobile British columns careered up and down the country, but as they never encountered the enemy, or, if they did encounter them, failed to inflict heavy loss upon them, the result was

small. Practically the south of the colony was given over to complete anarchy, and it is certain that the Boer forces were swelled by hundreds of burghers who had taken the oath—this, too, at the very moment when the British army in South Africa was reduced by the loss of some thousands of its best and most trustworthy troops. But at Pretoria and in England men still lived in a dream-land of optimistic illusions.

Not the least disquieting features of the situation was the readiness to attack which the Boers seemed to have suddenly developed. In the earlier period of the war they had generally been content to defend themselves. There were exceptions, of course, but these exceptions had now become the rule. No feebly-held post was secure, for nothing can be more exhausting than the vigilance required to combat the perpetually present danger; nothing more certain than that, sooner or later, this vigilance must break down. An unusually dark night and a careless sentry are combinations that must, in the progress of time, occur. Thus the British forces on the lines of communications were harassed and worn out, and the Boers who had made their submission were allowed to see that the British Army was impotent, or all but impotent, against a well-mounted foe. The moral effect of this was profoundly bad, as it took away all sense of security from the farmers of the "pacified" districts.

**Change of Boer
tactics.**



[Photo by F. R. Mann, Melbourne.]

THE RETURN OF THE COLONIALS: RECEPTION OF AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENTS IN MELBOURNE.

Seven hundred of the Victorian, Tasmanian, and New Zealand troops arrived in Melbourne on December 4, 1900, and were accorded a reception of the most enthusiastic character. The photograph represents the contingents, led by Colonel Price, passing the Town Hall.

Had the real truth been telegraphed home, there can be no doubt that the nation would have insisted at once upon the despatch of reinforcements. But the correspondents were muzzled, and the official messages chronicled only incidents, and failed entirely to picture the true situation. Who was responsible for this will never be known, yet the disastrous consequences which flowed from the ignorance at home, and the concealment of facts at the front, have not yet been removed. Surely, if the people of Great Britain had merited nothing else by their patience and determination, they had earned the right to be told the painful truth. And thus, while London was decked with gala-flags, welcoming back her sons from the war, which England supposed all but over, on the very sound of the cheering came the cries of the newsboys telling of the sudden attack upon Jacobsdal. In the weeks which were to follow, the horizon was to darken once more; the Boer armies were to arise again, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of past defeats; Cape Colony itself, which had been clear of the invader since the early days of March, 1900, was to be once more attacked, and the Boers were now at last to fulfil their boast of bathing their horses in the Indian Ocean. It was a strange transformation scene. The first cause of the revival of the war is no doubt to be found in the withdrawal of the mobile and intelligent Colonial contingents before men had been enrolled to take their place. On this withdrawal we shall have to dwell at greater length in the later pages of this work.

**Disastrous with-
drawal of troops.**



RECRUITS FOR DE WET

(Photo by N. P. Edwards)

CHAPTER IX.

THE SECOND PURSUIT OF DE WET—FREDERIKSTAD AND BOTHAVILLE.

Scouring the Heilbron district—Colonial Division weakened—De Wet in the north of Orange River Colony—Barton proceeds to reinforce De Lisle—De Wet in the Gatsrand—British position near Frederikstad—Arrival of the Imperial Light Horse—De Wet's attack repulsed—Preparations for a siege—Frederikstad invested and bombarded—The garrison reinforced—Boers put to rout—Third occupation of Potchefstroom—De Wet crosses the Vaal—Recovery of a gun captured at Koorn Spruit—Columns converge on Rheebofontein—Bothaville reconnoitred by Le Gallais—Major Lean surprises the Boer laager—Steyn and De Wet escape—Positions of the opposing forces—Boers' concentrated attack on the farmhouse—Death of Colonels Ross and Le Gallais—Timely arrival of Knox and De Lisle—Boers surrender—British losses—Small successes on both sides—Rundle's movements in the north-east—Skirmishes between Bethlehem and Harrismith.




WE must now return to the war in the north of the Orange River Colony. Here, as we recorded

in our last chapter, a mobile force was in process of concentration

Scouring the Heilbron district.

to deal with De Wet. The first operation undertaken was the scouring of the country between Lindley and Heilbron by the Colonial Division, who were ordered to clear it of cattle and forage. On October 2 De Lisle's Australians surrounded Eland's Kop, near



MAP OF THE COUNTRY ABOUT FREDERIKSTAD AND BOTHAVILLE.

Heilbron, where the Boers were supposed to be assembling, but the enemy must have received warning, as the results were insignificant—a mere half-dozen of burghers killed, wounded, or captured. About this same date a police patrol of five men fell into an ambush near Clocolan and surrendered. After the surrender the Boers, if report can be trusted, fired upon them, killing two and wounding two. Against this we could place a trifling success near Frankfort, where a party of twelve Boers, who had cut the telegraph line between Frankfort and Heilbron, were surprised, surrounded, and captured on October 6.

From the north-east of the Colony the Colonials and De Lisle's men moved back to Kopjes, and there came into touch with De Wet, whose force had now grown to formidable proportions. The guerilla leader worked north-westwards before them towards the difficult country round Vredefort and

**Colonial Division
weakened.**

Reitzburg,
where in August
he had faced

and eluded Lord Kitchener. The Colonial Division had been greatly weakened by the return home of men who had served their year, and who, because of friction with the military authorities, were not willing to prolong their term of service. Consequently it was but a shadow of its former self, nor was the temper of the men all that could have been desired. To this feeling, no doubt, the indignation felt by the loyal Colonials at the manner in which British subjects of doubtful loyalty, and Boers who had been notorious for their hostility to all things English, were being appointed to most of the posts in the newly-organised governments of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, had contributed; moreover, all ranks had many grievances, not the least being the extreme difficulty of obtaining their pay. Yet though his force was weak, De Lisle, after three days' skirmishing with De Wet from October 5 to 7, succeeded in driving him over the Vaal. It was announced, of course, that the Boers



Wal Paget.]

CAUGHT CUTTING THE TELEGRAPH WIRES.

[After a photograph.

**De Wet in the north
of Orange River
Colony.**

were "dispersed and demoralized," but by this time these phrases had ceased to convey any meaning; there was no tangible evidence of any demoralisation in the capture of prisoners and guns. De Lisle was not strong enough to press De Wet hard, and as the potentialities of the guerilla for mischief were now more clearly appreciated at the British headquarters, other forces were called up to deal with him. General Barton was directed with a weak brigade to proceed to Buffelsdoorn, a pass over the Gatsrand, where in August there had been fighting with De Wet. He was faced by small but very troublesome Boer commandos under Douthwaite, Van der Merwe, and Liebenberg.

**Barton proceeds to
reinforce De Lisle.**

With one of these commandos in the Krugersdorp district the Welsh Fusiliers were sharply engaged on October 9, losing several men. Barton marched to Bank, skirmishing all the

way, on October 11. The Boers retired before him, causing him the maximum of annoyance and suffering themselves the minimum of loss, and crossed the Mooi River. He halted on the 13th at Welverdiend, and encamped there, proceeding next day to Frederikstad. It would seem that he had received from the staff no information as to the approach of De Wet; on the contrary, reports had come in that the slippery guerilla had recrossed the Vaal, closely pursued by De Lisle and Le Gallais. Barton's infantry were busy repairing the bridge over the Mooi, and mounted patrols and foraging parties had been sent out to the neighbouring farms to obtain supplies and ar-



[Photo by the Press Photo Bureau.]

WHERE THE CLOTHING FOR THE ARMY COMES FROM.

If our men in Africa have gone for months in ragged clothes it has been for lack of means to convey clothing to them, and not from lack of zeal or efficiency at the Army Clothing Department in Grosvenor Road. The value of the garments made here exceeds £300,000 per annum. The great hall with its crowd of women and girl-workers is here depicted. Each table is furnished with a sewing-machine, driven by a shaft from the steam-engine. One machine is supplied to each thirteen workers, the bulk of the work being done by hand. In the shirt department 15,000 shirts are turned out weekly. Some idea of the enormous output of the establishment may be gathered from the fact that the sale of waste cuttings from the uniforms, &c., realizes between £5,000 and £6,000 per annum.



THE ARMY CLOTHING DEPARTMENT: ONE OF THE HYDRAULIC PRESSES IN THE PACKING WAREHOUSE.

The packing department forms an immense section of the building. Here crates full of helmets, uniforms, caps, &c., may be seen being beautifully sealed up in cases lined with stout brown paper. The clothes are packed in sacking. Each bundle is placed under a hydraulic press, worked from below the floor. The contents are thus pressed into as small a compass as possible, while the thick sacking cover is sewn on by hand. Skilled men do this part of the work.

at Buffelsdoorn. Supported by the Welsh Fusiliers, the Yeomen drove back De Wet's advance-guard, killing six burghers. They ascertained that the strength of the Boer force was about 1,800, and that De Wet had with him four guns.

Barton determined to stand his ground, feeling certain that there would be a British force in De Wet's rear. The enemy had been joined by the commandos of Doulthwaite and Liebenberg, and

De Wet in the Gatsrand.

rest burghers, when on the 15th the news was suddenly heliographed from the south-east that a large force of Boers, admirably mounted, every man with two or even three led horses, and without baggage, was moving into the Gatsrand from the south-east. The news was particularly inopportune, as Barton's force was weak; patrols and detachments were absent in all directions; convoys with large supplies were momentarily expected; and, worst of all, the reserve of ammunition was running low. There was complete uncertainty as to whose the strange force might be. If commanded by De Wet the situation would be extremely serious; yet it grew evident upon reflection that the force could be no other than De Wet's. A number of Yeomanry, under Sir James Miller, speedily came into contact with the enemy

were hourly growing in strength and boldness. Barton promptly occupied and entrenched the two drifts over the Mooi River, extended his camp and strengthened its defences, occupied the chief passes over the Gatsrand, despatched a small



THE ARMY CLOTHING DEPARTMENT: THE CHEVRON ROOM.
The tables in this section gleam with the gaudy colours of epaulettes and chevrons.

column north-eastwards to assist in escorting a convoy which he expected from Wel-verdiend, and placed three companies of the Welsh Fusiliers and two guns on the south side of the ridge overlooking Frederikstad. To take these precautionary measures he was compelled to scatter his force, and this led the Boers to make a bold attempt to capture his men in detail. Luckily,

**British position near
Frederikstad.**

**Arrival of the Imperial
Light Horse.**

on the 18th, the incomparable Imperial Light Horse, the best and bravest of all the many volunteer regiments that gave

their services for the flag, came in under their not less tried and trustworthy Colonel, Wools Sampson, now recovered from his wound at Elandslaagte. They were a host in themselves.

On October 20 the Welsh Fusiliers and the Imperial Light Horse on the ridge near Frederikstad were vigorously attacked by De Wet. The Boers rode furiously at the British in face of a heavy fire

**De Wet's attack
repulsed.**

from the rifles and from two field guns; 300 of them, indeed, forced their way to a point only 100 yards from the British position. Here many of them were shot down and the survivors driven back. The British artillery, concentrating its

fire upon the Boer centre and right, prevented an advance in support in these quarters. The British lost only 14 men, of whom one was killed. The Boer attack having been repulsed, preparations were made to stand a short siege at

Frederikstad.

**Preparations for a
siege.**

The 4.7 gun with the column and

two Horse Artillery guns were placed on a hill north of the station; two companies of Scots Fusiliers occupied the ridge parallel to and to the south of the railway; three companies of Welsh Fusiliers entrenched themselves so as to command the approaches from the north; the transport animals were placed in security; a company was entrenched close to the Mooi River to ensure a supply of water; and the station was temporarily converted into a hospital. Scarcely had all this been done when

very early on the

21st came the attack. A party

**Frederikstad invested
and bombarded.**



THE ARMY CLOTHING DEPARTMENT: THE IRONING ROOM
The irons are heated by gas flames within them, and are hung on moveable arms so that their weight does not fall on the wrists of the ironers.

of Boers 300 strong rode up the opposite bank of the Mooi River in full sight of the British outposts, as though disdaining concealment, and took up a position whence they opened a heavy rifle fire on

the garrison. At the same time firing began from a number of houses on the farther bank of the river, occupied by Boer women, who had not been molested, as they professed that their husbands were in St. Helena or Ceylon. Three Boer field guns and one "Pom-Pom" joined in the attack and bombarded the British camp all day. No assault, however, was delivered. The Boer fire did great harm to the British transport animals, killing six oxen and wounding fifteen more.

Next day the Boers maintained a heavy fire. The British, in serious straits for ammunition, did not waste a shot. For the rifles there was no further supply than what the men had in their pouches, and the guns had only a small reserve. Reinforcements had been called for, and Lord Roberts had already issued orders that the 1st Essex Regiment with 550 mounted men was to go to Barton's aid; at the same time he had directed General Charles Knox to hurry from Heilbron, take command of Le Gallais' and De Lisle's men and the Colonial Division, and at once cross the Vaal with the object of attacking De Wet. The Boers were fast drawing their cordon closer and closer around Frederikstad; no runners were allowed to pass their lines; though they left the telegraph wires standing, it was only to tap and tamper with the messages. On the 23rd their "Pom-Pom" suddenly opened on the camp from a hill on the British side of the Mooi River. It was, however, speedily put out of action by a fine shot from the 4.7, which damaged the Boer weapon and wounded a man. On the 24th the Boers worked closer in, and caused great annoyance to the men watering the horses and transport animals of the brigade by a "sniping" fire.



CAPTAIN W. L. D. BAILLIE,
Killed at Frederikstad.

On the 25th the enemy, emboldened by the comparative silence of the British guns and rifles, and no doubt believing that General Barton's ammunition was exhausted, made an attack. They directed a heavy long-range fire upon the British positions from all sides, under cover of which small parties pushed along the railway embankment and river, and crossed the latter to the neighbourhood of the railway station, which, as we have seen, had been converted into a hospital. From the embankment they fired with effect upon the Scots Fusiliers, nor could the shells of the British "Pom-Poms" and the shrapnel of our field guns dislodge them. As they were becoming very dangerous, 200 men of the Fusiliers and the Imperial Light Horse were ordered to drive them back. Led by Captain Baillie the British gallantly advanced under a heavy fire, and at once began to suffer, Baillie and half-a-dozen men being knocked over. On this General Barton directed the suspension of the attack, and brought the men

back. In the course of the morning the Essex Regiment, half the Dublin Fusiliers, and Strathcona's Horse arrived with a convoy, but unluckily they had no supply of small-arm ammunition with them, and only a few rounds for the guns, so that Barton's position was not greatly improved. There was still no sign of Knox, and, tired of waiting for him, and of being



HOW WATER IS CARRIED FOR TROOPS IN THE FIELD.

perpetually sniped during the wait. Barton determined to attack in real earnest. Accordingly he ordered two companies of the Scots Fusiliers, three of the Welsh Fusiliers, and two squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse to advance against the enemy and use the bayonet. "Inspired by the same enthusiasm that led them to victory across the shell-swept slopes of Hlangwane and Pieter's Hill," says the *Standard* correspondent, "they drove home their attack, and faced the deadly fire of

Boers put to rout.

the enemy to within 80 yards of his concealed position, when a stubborn handful of Boers threw up their arms and ran for dear life in scared disorder, hotly pursued by the Welsh Fusiliers. Some of the men in advance charged home with the bayonet. The pursuit was followed up by the company of Scots Fusiliers, operating on the flank, under command of Captain Dick, who dropped severely wounded, but cheered on his men. Close to him fell Lieutenant Elliott, dangerously wounded; and the command now passed to Lieutenant Osborn, who ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge, the Boers fleeing before him in wild terror towards the river. One squadron of Imperial Light Horse charged up from behind, but did not succeed in heading them off. The General, who directed the operations from the advanced positions of the three guns, ordered Major D. C. Carter, commanding the 78th Battery, to concentrate his three guns and the 4.7 gun on the retreating enemy." The other British guns joined in, pouring shrapnel upon the flying foe. The Boers broke in great disorder,

*A. C. Ball.]*

CHARGE OF THE SCOTS FUSILIERS AT FREDERIKSTAD.

and were being pursued by the British, when, hearing the roar and whistle of the shrapnel overhead, the infantry halted, and watched the result of the artillery fire. The British shells, bursting over the enemy, cut them down; the "Pom-Poms" played upon them with a continuous and infernal uproar. In the midst of the turmoil of exploding shrapnel, the few survivors of the Boers mounted and rode away, leaving on the ground 24 dead and 30 wounded. Twenty-six prisoners were taken, of whom three were afterwards tried and shot for having fired upon our men after raising the white flag. Another Boer, who fell wounded, while lying on the ground deliberately shot Lieutenant Field, and was for this crime bayoneted on the spot. The British casualties were severe, amounting to 13 killed and 25 wounded. It was found that the houses on the river, which had been left standing because they had for their inmates Boer women, had been converted by the enemy into small forts. The women had disappeared; presumably they had rejoined their husbands with the Boer commandos.

Barton ascertained that De Wet had fallen back towards the south-west, in the direction of the Reitzburg Drifts. Follow the guerilla he could not; he had not enough mounted men, and, moreover,



(Photo by Lambton, Bath.)

MAJOR KENNETH LEAN,
Who led the advance from Bothaville (p. 180).

Third occupation of Potchefstroom.

he was still faced by the Transvaal commandos, which would have cut up his repairing-parties and convoys had he gone south. Accordingly he signalled news of De Wet's movements to Knox, and himself marched along the railway to Potchefstroom, which place he once more occupied. It was the third time that Potchefstroom had been captured by the British; on this occasion the town was garrisoned permanently, and three months' supplies were left in it.

From Frederikstad De Wet had headed south, seeking to recross the Vaal. But he found that Knox was waiting for him at the first point where he tried to cross—De Wet's Drift—and not caring to risk a battle with that officer, he hurried eastwards along the north bank of the Vaal

towards Rensburg Drift. Knox hotly pursued, sending Le Gallais' mounted men with two Horse Artillery guns of U Battery to Vredefort, so as to head off the Boers in case they attempted to retire to the south-east, while he himself followed the course of the Vaal. At

Rensburg Drift De Wet and Knox came into collision on October 27. The Boers, unfortunately, were too sharp to be surrounded. Under cover of a heavy fire, as darkness fell, they managed to elude both Le Gallais and Knox, but only at the cost of abandoning two guns and eight waggons. A ninth waggon, containing ammunition, was struck by a shell from U Battery and exploded. Nine prisoners were taken from the enemy, while the Boers are said to have left seven bodies on the field. The night of the 27th was so fearful, a furious rainstorm raging, that further pursuit with tired troops was out of the question. The British had to rest content with their captures, amongst which was one of the guns of U Battery lost at Koorn Spruit, and now retaken largely by the efforts of the very same battery.

Recovery of a gun captured at Koorn Spruit.



PRESIDENT STEYN'S CHILDREN.

The photograph was taken by a lieutenant of the 4th Derbyshires when a prisoner with De Wet. After Prinsloo's surrender, Mrs. Steyn and children, who were among the prisoners, were taken under Col. Brookfield's care from Fouriesburg to Bloemfontein.

After crossing the Vaal, De Wet's forces would appear to have retired to the south-west towards Rhee-bokfontein, near Bothaville. Knox now determined to make a fresh effort to capture them. Three columns started from two different points with orders to converge on Rhee-bokfontein. Le Gallais, followed by Knox marched from Honing Spruit; De Lisle, with the Australians and Cape Colonials from

Kopjes, but after covering a short distance the Colonials parted company from his column, and struck out north-eastwards, with the object of intercepting De Wet should he attempt to retreat along the south bank of the Vaal. Le Gallais, marching all the night of November 2 in a terrible downpour, was close to Rheebockfontein by the morning of the 3rd. He

Columns converge on Rheebockfontein.

made all his dispositions for an attack, only to find at the last moment that the wily De Wet had disappeared. An empty camp, with the usual litter of meat tins, worn-out horses, and discarded blankets, was all that remained to reward his efforts. But on the veldt were tracks running south-westwards towards Bothaville and the Vaal. These he decided to follow, and Knox, informed of his purpose, hurried after him with De Lisle's Australians and some other mounted infantry to reinforce him. At mid-day of the 5th Le Gallais was at Doornbult, with Knox ten miles to his rear. He placed his waggons in laager, and, with two guns of U Battery and 200 mounted men, rode towards Bothaville to reconnoitre. The place was in ruins, having been destroyed by one of the many British punitive expeditions; to the south of it flowed the River Valsch, which is crossed by a good

drift near the Bothaville town. Approaching it by Le Gallais, reconnoitred

from the north, it was soon clear that the nemy was there in some force. From a kopje to the south of Bothaville two Boer field guns and a "Pom-Pom" opened fire, and were at once engaged by the British 12-pounders. The skirmish only ended with nightfall, and in it the British held their ground with a loss of five men wounded.



[Photo by Mayall.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL PHILIP WALTER JULES LE GALLAIS.


Born 1861 in Jersey; educated in Germany; joined 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars, from the Jersey Militia, as Second Lieutenant, 1881; Captain, 1888; Major, 1897; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 1898; A.D.C. to Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, 1891-3; employed with Egyptian army, 1896-1900, accompanying Lord Kitchener in the Nile Expeditions of 1897-8; appointed to special service in South Africa, January, 1900. When the Mounted Infantry Division was formed at Bloemfontein Le Gallais was appointed Assistant-Adjutant-General to General Ian Hamilton, whom he accompanied to Pretoria and Heidelberg. After the division was broken up he was given command of a mounted infantry flying column operating against De Wet. He was a brilliant, popular officer, and a keen sportsman.

The baggage was brought up to the north bank of the river after dark and parked in the square of Bothaville among the blackened ruins of the houses, while detachments of mounted infantry were pushed forward to the south, crossing the drift and occupying the kopjes beyond it, which had been held during the day by the Boers. Very early on the morning of the 6th Le Gallais once more advanced. The 5th Mounted Infantry under Major Lean led the way, followed by the 8th Mounted Infantry under Colonel Ross. Then came the 5th, 17th, and 18th companies of Yeomanry with three of the U Battery guns; the 7th Mounted Infantry and one gun remained behind, holding Bothaville and guarding the drift while the baggage crossed. The country before the British troops was free from drifts and kopjes, and there were no signs of the enemy. Nevertheless Major Lean and his men moved with the utmost caution.

Suddenly, as they advanced, they came right upon a small party of the enemy lying asleep on the ground, with their horses tethered about them.

Major Lean surprises the Boer laager.

In a moment the party was secured and disarmed—this, too, before they could give the alarm. They were one of De Wet's pickets. Riding further forward, Major Lean saw what was to the British troops a glorious sight. Around three houses and a pig-stye lay the enemy's laager, men, horses, guns, and waggons all crowded together in a small space. The mounted infantry extended along the summit of a gentle undulation, which fell away towards the Boer camp. Without an instant's delay Lean sent back a message to Le Gallais, dismounted his troops, and opened magazine fire upon the slumbering foe at a range



PLAN OF THE POSITIONS AT BOTHAVILLE.

of only 300 yards. In a moment the Boer camp broke into life. Steyn and De Wet leaped ignominiously into a Cape cart and drove off, leaving their followers to escape as best they could. All the burghers who could get to their horses made off, seeing the leaders in full flight. Only those whose horses were out of reach stood their ground, and replied to the hail of bullets from the British rifles as best they could.

The British seized a farmhouse just at the summit of the elevation overlooking the Boer laager. To the west of this, and not far from it, was a dam, and, close by, a pig-stye enclosed by a high stone wall; to the south of it was a large garden, a hundred yards square, which was also enclosed by a strong and high stone wall, offering excellent cover; to the south of this garden again was another, similarly enclosed, but of smaller size. At the north-eastern corner of the large garden was a second dam, and beyond it a white house. When the Boers recovered from their first alarm they climbed into the walled gardens and into the pig-stye; at the same time they seized the white house and manned the banks which enclosed the two dams. From these positions they returned a very heavy fire; there were at least 200 of them, whereas the British as yet numbered only sixty all told. Gradually, however, reinforcements arrived. The 8th Mounted Infantry seized a farm and kraal on the British left, while two guns of U Battery pushed up on the British right to within 400 yards of the enemy. There, notwithstanding a hail of bullets from the Boer sharpshooters, the gunners coolly unlimbered, opened fire, and continued in action for some hours, while their smoking guns grew white with the splashes of lead. On their right

Steyn and De Wet escape.

Positions of the opposing forces.

flank a party of forty Yeomanry took post to cover them. By far the most dangerous and annoying fire came from the pig-stye, inside which lay three Boers, who shot with the most deadly effect at a range not exceeding 100 yards. All the efforts of the British infantry could not silence these three; it was only when one of the guns planted a shell inside the stye that its occupants were blown to pieces and an effectual stop put to the annoyance which they caused.

Meantime Le Gallais rode up to the farmhouse in the centre of the British position, whence he could gain a good view of the fight. In the farm itself were ten of the Oxford Light Infantry;



F. J. Waugh.]

ESCAPE OF STEYN AND DE WET.

fourteen men were in the kraal on the left, while on the right were forty of the East Kents and Worcesters. Already the troops had suffered considerably. Captain Colvile had been wounded and Captain Engelbach killed. Le Gallais entered the farm and made a careful examination of the Boer dispositions. He saw that the enemy were recovering from their first panic, and that even those who had bolted were returning to the field. They were developing a dangerous counter-attack upon the two British flanks. With his diminutive force he stood in a most critical situation. Indeed, from being the assailant he had

**Boers' concentrated
attack on the
farmhouse.**

become the assailed. As he went to the window a shower of broken glass and the whiz of bullets proclaimed the fact that the Boers saw him and were directing their fire upon him. Without a moment's delay he ordered his staff officer, Major Hickie, to ride back, instruct the heliograph to call up General Knox to his aid with all possible speed, collect the British baggage to the south of the drift, and order every available man into the fighting line. The 7th Mounted Infantry were accordingly brought up to the right, where they helped to take the pressure off the Yeomanry; the third gun of U Battery was sent to the left, where it did splendid work, putting a shrapnel into the white house, and silencing the troublesome fire of a small party of Boers. Even so matters continued very critical. The enemy's strength was growing from moment to moment, and they had even managed to bring one of their guns into action though in a position where it had little command, and could do but insignificant damage.



G. Soper.]

THE BATTLE OF BOTHAVILLE: WOUNDED MEN FILLING THE MAGAZINES FOR THEIR UNWOUNDED COMRADES (p. 185).

When Hickie returned to the farmhouse to report, terrible was the scene that met his eyes. Outside it lay fourteen horses riddled with bullets; inside, the rooms were swept continuously by a tempest of splinters of wood, glass, brick, and lead, that told of the tremendous fire which was being concentrated upon it; the thud of the Boer bullets on the walls never ceased; and only the handful of Oxfordshires fired furtively from the windows, at which to show oneself boldly was death. To one of the windows went Colonel Ross, leaving the door to the rear of the house open. This door was exactly opposite the window, and made a clear passage through the house, giving the enemy a perfect view of the British officer. He fell in a moment with his jaw and a part of his throat shot away. Four privates picked him up and strove to carry him to the sheltered side of the house, and as they stooped in the clear light of the passage, the Boers saw them and poured bullets upon them at point-blank range. Yet the four, with the magnificent and stolid courage of the British soldier, flinched not for one moment. The trampling of their feet, the groans of the desperately-wounded man, and the pattering crescendo of the falling bullets drew Le Gallais' attention in another room. He came out into the fatal passage

**Death of Colonels Ross
and Le Gallais.**



E. Prater.]

DEATH OF LIEUT.-COLONEL LE GALLAIS.

to see what was the matter. The moment he appeared he was struck by a bullet in the region of the heart and mortally wounded. This was the sight that met Major Hickie's eyes. Already the mists of death were gathering about Le Gallais. As he lay dying the ruling passion of the soldier—the devotion which is stronger than death—asserted itself. He spoke constantly of the Boer guns

and of the need of clinging to them at all costs. Never did a thought of self cross that noble mind. Even in the hour of physical extremity victory and his country held the first place in his heart.

It was now near 8 a.m., and still reinforcements did not arrive. The fourth and last gun of U Battery was placed in the firing line; all through this engagement the Horse Artillerymen fought with that superb coolness and courage which in every action of the war they invariably displayed, and for which they won glorious pre-eminence, even where there were many brave. They proved, indeed, on this occasion that on favourable ground guns can hold their own, even at close quarters, against adversaries armed with magazine-rifles, provided am-



[Photo by Shawcross, Guildford.]

LIEUT. F. A. MAXWELL, V.C., D.S.O., Of the Indian Staff Corps, attached to Roberts' Light Horse, won the Victoria Cross on March 31, 1900, at Koorn Spruit, where, with three other officers not belonging to Q Battery, R.H.A., he showed conspicuous bravery in saving the guns of that battery. He went out five times, and helped to bring in two guns and three limbers. Several of the guns were finally recovered under circumstances detailed on pp. 142 and 185.

Portraits of others who obtained the V.C. for gallantry at Koorn Spruit will be found on page 567, Vol. II., of "With the Flag to Pretoria."



[Photo by Knight, Aldershot.]

MAJOR H. N. SCHOFIELD, R.A.

The story of the recovery of two of Colonel Long's guns is told on pp. 142 and 185. Major Schofield was one of the officers who gallantly tried to rescue them at Colenso. On the ground that he was simply acting under orders he was recommended by Sir R. Buller for a D.S.O. instead of a V.C. This decision was confirmed by the War Office, in spite of Mr. St. John Brodrick's decision that a V.C. could be gained for deeds performed under orders.

Portraits of those who gained the V.C. at Colenso will be found on p. 99, Vol. I.

munition does not run short. It was the converse of what had happened at Colenso, and raises the doubt whether after all there was not method in the seeming madness of that gallant but unfortunate officer, Colonel Long. Major Taylor, of the Horse Artillery, had now taken over command, being the next officer in point of seniority when Ross and Le Gallais were wounded. He pushed out two companies of the 7th Mounted Infantry to his left flank, and though so much inferior in force, actually ventured to attempt a flanking movement against the flank attack of the Boers, realising probably that the safest course in so desperate a position lay in putting on the boldest face. But everywhere his line was in difficulties. "For five hours," says Reuter's correspondent, from whose vivid account we have drawn many of our details, "the gallant men forming our front held their own against an overwhelming fire. Man after man was shot, killed or wounded, but the others continued



[Photo by Davies Bros.]

GUN COMPANY OF IMPERIAL YEOMANRY (DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE'S OWN).

firing calmly and steadily. The wounded men in several cases filled the magazines for their comrades still fighting, and handed up the full rifles to them. It wanted courage of a very high order to hold the position. Not only were 200 Boers firing with terrible rapidity at short ranges, but 800 were threatening to cut the British off. The men, however, with bull-dog tenacity would not yield and never flinched. As one of them said afterwards, 'We could see their guns, and we weren't going to lose them.'"

The Boers on the right made an attempt to close, but were repulsed by the Yeomanry. Just at this point—it being now after 8—the men in the firing line heard the roar of the rifles swelling. This time it was not reinforcements for the Boers. The troops of General Knox's and Colonel De Lisle's commands were at last beginning to appear on the scene, and were entering the combat. The hours of tension and uncertainty were over. The British flanks rapidly gained ground, pushing the Boers back till the fighting line ran round the

**Timely arrival of Knox
and De Lisle.**



Lieut. Abadie.

Gen. Sir A. Hunter.

Col. Le Gallais.

Capt. Balfour.

Major King.

GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD HUNTER AND STAFF.

Taken before the battle of Bothaville.

enemy's laager in the shape of a crescent. A deadly enfilading fire was brought to bear upon the stone enclosure, which was still full of Boers. The spirits of the British rose as unit after unit entered the battle, and a brilliant success became assured. About 9 a.m. a "Pom-Pom" was brought into action against the enclosure and shelled it heavily. Then a terrific magazine-fire was

concentrated upon it, in preparation for an infantry assault. But at this juncture the Boers inside it realised at last that the game was up. The white flag showed at 10.30, yet the British, remembering the enemy's many treacherous devices, took good care not to leave their cover.

Boers surrender.

The order was shouted to the burghers, as the roar of rifles and cannon ceased, to lay down their arms and come out, unless they would be further shelled. At once the Boers climbed over the walls and sulkily made their surrender. In all six guns and 100 prisoners were taken by the British. The guns were one 15-pounder of the weapons lost at Colenso, one 12-pounder lost by Q Battery at Koorn Spruit, three Krupp 15-pounders, and one "Pom-Pom." In addition a Maxim and thirteen waggon-loads of ammunition and supplies were among the British trophies. The enemy left 25 dead and wounded on the field. One of their dead was a Boer doctor with rifle in hand and bandolier half emptied, but with the Red Cross on his arm, showing how little reliance could be placed upon the enemy's good faith, and how for the basest purposes they misused the most sacred emblems. Steyn's secretary, De Villiers, was wounded and captured. The flying remnant of the Boers was pursued for many miles towards the south-east, but the great bulk of the fugitives eluded capture by the expedient of scattering in small bodies.

Great as the success was—and it still remains by far the greatest success achieved by British troops against De Wet—it was dearly purchased. Three officers, including Le Gallais, and eight men were killed; thirty-three officers and men were wounded. But Le Gallais was a host in himself. He

British losses.

breathed his last with the words on his lips, "Tell my mother that I die happy, as we got the guns." He had made his mark in the Sudan campaign, and had risen like a rocket till he stood, in the estimation of all those who knew him, in the very front rank of cavalry leaders. "Le Gallais," says "A Subaltern" in his *Letters to his Wife*, "was a very fascinating man; his head was beautifully modelled, his eyes dark and sad, his voice soft and gentle as a woman's. There was a subtle suggestion of something foreign about him, to which his name lent colour. He was one of the most modest and retiring of men, and those who had never seen him play polo or lead cavalry into action would hardly have suspected his nature of its profundities of self-reliant strength."

Small successes on both sides.

During the middle of October Generals Hunter and Bruce Hamilton were busy carrying out punitive expeditions in the north of the Orange River Colony. They marched from Kroonstad to Bothaville, which place was destroyed as a punishment for the enemy's conduct in directing from the houses a sniping fire upon the British. At the same time General Settle with a strong column moved from Bloemhof in the Transvaal to Hoopstad in the west of the Colony, but not without some sharp skirmishing on the way. It was intended that he should co-operate with Hunter, and

with Hunter crush a force of 1,600

Boers reported to be between Hoopstad and Bothaville. Marching eastwards on the night of October 19, his camp was attacked at Elizabeth's Rust, but the Boers were driven off with a loss to the British of only 16 men. On the 21st Settle's advance guard met the cavalry of Hunter's command. No Boers had been discovered, yet two days later, on the way back to Hoopstad, a force of 650 Boers suddenly attacked the baggage of the column. It was in charge of the Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape Police, who were hotly engaged, and only with the utmost difficulty repelled the enemy. The British loss was comparatively heavy; two Maxims and several waggons were lost, while 7 men were killed, 12 wounded, and 17 missing. In all directions the enemy were active, small bands of guerillas hanging upon the British flanks and rear, but refusing to be brought to a general engagement. They were in a desperate frame of mind, and asserted that neither they nor De Wet would ever lay down their arms "so long as there was a single sheep left in the Colony." From Bothaville Hunter returned to Kroonstad, denuding the country of supplies on his march, and turned his attention to the Ventersburg district. Here the



(Photo by Elliott & Fry.)

MAJOR HANWELL, R.A.

Killed near Ventersburg, October 30, 1900.



[Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.]

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. H. SETTLE AND HIS TWO AIDES-DE-CAMP.

Major-General Sir Henry Hamilton Settle, K.C.B., D.S.O., R.E., was born in 1847; entered Royal Engineers, 1867; Captain, 1879; Major, 1885; Lieut.-Colonel, 1888; Colonel, 1893; served with the Nile Expedition, 1884-5, as D.A.A. and Q.M.G.; in the operations at Suakin, 1888, in those of 1889, and in the Sudan, 1891; Inspector-General, Egyptian Police, 1892-4; Assistant Inspector-General of Fortifications, Headquarters of Army, 1895-9; Colonel on Staff, Malta, 1899; Colonel on Staff, South Africa, 1899-1900; Inspector-General, Lines of Communication, with local rank of Brigadier-General, South Africa, 1900; and afterwards in command of columns in the disturbed districts.

Boers were giving great trouble. A commando, which was variously estimated at from 1,600 to 150 men, with guns, was in the neighbourhood, and persistently cut the railway. On October 28, early in the morning, they surrounded the volunteer company of the Berkshires, 90 men strong, which was garrisoning Geneva Siding. They attacked at daybreak, and are said to have captured the volunteers asleep, either in their trenches or in some huts near the line. As no official report has been published, it is impossible to say what is the truth; the officers of the company, however, are stated to have been placed under arrest. At the same time the Boers fired upon the mail train from Capetown at Holfontein, compelled it to halt, ordered the passengers out, looted the mails and stores, burnt all that they could not carry off, and were proceeding to destroy the carriages, when an armoured train, under Captain Nanton, came up from Ventersburg Road, and at the same time a detachment of cavalry arrived from the north. The enemy thereupon abandoned the prisoners and decamped. On the 29th



Captain De Bertodano
(District Commissioner of Kroonstad).

General De Wet.

Lieut. Teddy.

Commandant Du Priez.

Commandant Prinsloo.

Commandant Nel.

A FRUITLESS CONFERENCE.

Captain De Bertodano, District Commissioner of Kroonstad, was sent by Lord Roberts to interview De Wet and his companions with a view to obtaining their submission. Needless to say, the errand was without result.

Generals Hunter and Bruce Hamilton reached Ventersburg Road with a large force of infantry and mounted men, and made immediate preparation to surround a farm near Ventersburg, where the Boers were stated to have a laager. This operation was carried out during the night of the 29th-30th, but without any great result. At daybreak the troops were in position, when an untoward incident happened. Two guns of the 39th Battery had halted close under a kopje, which had already been reconnoitred by the Camerons and the Berkshire Yeomanry and pronounced unoccupied, when suddenly from the summit of the kopje a hidden force of Boers opened fire at quite short range. A number of horses and oxen were stampeded; Major Hanwell, of the 39th Battery, was killed on the spot; of the two guns one jammed, and from the other only four shots could be discharged. But at the critical moment the Sussex Regiment boldly charged the kopje and the Boers took to flight. In this affair the 3rd (Militia) East Kent greatly distinguished themselves. No large haul of prisoners was made, but after the fighting Ventersburg

was destroyed, the country denuded, and some 50 or 60 burghers arrested and sent into Kroonstad.

In the north-eastern corner of the Colony sporadic fighting still continued, and General Rundle's hands were kept very full. The Boers had re-occupied Fouriesburg and Ficksburg, places whose lot it seemed was to be perpetually changing hands. On October 12 Rundle left Vrede, which place he garrisoned, and marched to Reitz, stripping the country on his way. He then proceeded to retake Bethlehem, and managed to arrange an interview with Commandant Prinsloo—a relative of the Prinsloo captured in August in this very neighbourhood—hoping to persuade him of the uselessness of further resistance. He explained the situation to the Boer general; told him of Mr. Kruger's flight to Delagoa Bay; and put before him the irrevocable determination of the British Government to abolish Boer independence. But Prinsloo was not ready to be persuaded.

**Rundle's movements
in the north-east.**

A strong garrison was left in Bethlehem, and on October 26 Rundle marched out towards Harrismith. A short distance outside Bethlehem the enemy were encountered, holding a position which intersected the road. They had no guns, but they were not easily dislodged. Towards evening the Yeomanry, supported by two companies

**Skirmishes between
Bethlehem and
Harrismith.**

of Grenadier Guards, turned the right Boer flank, then the rest of the Grenadiers stormed the main position in the centre. The total British loss was 3 killed and 17 wounded; the Boer loss was unknown. Rundle, after further skirmishing, and, as punishment for an act of treachery, burning the farm of Matthias Wessels, brother-in-law of General Botha, reached Harrismith on the 30th; thence he despatched mobile columns to scour the country.



[Photo by Bassano.]

HIS HIGHNESS MAJOR PRINCE
CHRISTIAN VICTOR OF SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Born in 1867, at Windsor Castle, eldest son of their Royal Highnesses Prince and Princess Christian; educated at Wellington College, and Magdalen College, Oxford. He received a commission in the King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1888; Captain, 1896; Brevet Major, 1896. Served in the Ashanti Campaign as A.D.C. to Sir Francis Scott, 1895-6; Staff Officer in the Sudan Expedition, 1898; was present at the battles of Atbara and Khartoum; on special service in South Africa, 1899; extra A.D.C. to Lord Roberts, 1900. An enthusiastic soldier, he went through many hardships during the South African War, and succumbed to enteric and malarial fever, October 29, 1900. He was buried at Pretoria, according to his own wish.



[Photo by Wolff.]

FUNERAL OF PRINCE CHRISTIAN VICTOR AT PRETORIA, November 1, 1900: THE CORTEGE PASSING THE EX-PRESIDENT'S HOUSE.



W. B. Wollen, R.I.]

[After a photo.

KEEPING THEMSELVES IN TRAINING.

While encamped at Pienaar's River the Australian Bushmen amused themselves with hurdle-races and other athletic sports.

CHAPTER X.

EVENTS IN THE TRANSVAAL DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

Efforts to clear the Lichtenburg district—Pursuit of Boer convoys—Settle's field of operations—Clearing the Rustenburg country—Paget's successes to the north-east of Pretoria—Erasmus obtains an armistice—Boers active near Zeerust—Diminution of the army—Grievances of the Colonial troops—Friction with Rhodesian and Cape Volunteers—Return of the City Imperial Volunteers and other troops—Steinecker's Horse and Baden-Powell's Police—Lethargic recruiting—Deficiencies of the army—Hardships endured by the troops—Lack of correct information—Boers attack railways and convoys—French's march to Heidelberg—Hans Botha captures a train—Laagers seized in the Lydenburg district—Smith-Dorrien near Van Wyk's Vlei—Methuen operates in the Rustenburg district—Futile attempt to negotiate with Botha—Annexation ceremony at Pretoria—Plots at Johannesburg—Patrol of Compton's Horse entrapped—Shooting of Kaffirs—Attacks on Johannesburg-Natal Railway—Action near Rhenoster Kop—The enemy disappear in the darkness—No improvement in the general situation—Lord Roberts returns home—Succeeded by Lord Kitchener.



IN the Western Transvaal the last incident which we recorded was the relief of Eland's River and the march, at the end of August, of Lord Methuen to Mafeking, whither Carrington had also retired from Zeerust. Both columns rested and received remounts, and Carrington was ordered north to Rhodesia, where his presence was required, his place in command of Mafeking and the neighbouring district being taken by General C. W. H. Douglas. Methuen was directed, when ready to move, to clear the country round Zeerust, and then to march to Schweizer Reneke, where was stationed a small British garrison which had been continuously besieged for many weeks. Douglas was to co-operate with him and to clear the Lichtenburg country, leaving a strong garrison in Mafeking. On September 7 both columns were prepared to recommence operations, and next day Methuen, with his men freshly equipped and remounted, marched eastwards. He had under his orders the 3rd, 5th, and

Efforts to clear the Lichtenburg district.

10th Yeomanry battalions, brigaded under Lord Chesham, the Munster Fusilier Mounted Infantry, 1st Loyal North Lancashires, half the 2nd Northamptons, 4th Field Battery and two "Pom-Poms." Skirmishing began with the enemy's snipers almost from the moment when the column left Mafeking. Halting for the night at Grootfontein, a large Boer convoy was made out proceeding towards Molopo

Oog, where the Lichtenburg commando, under Commandant Vermaas, was reported by spies to be encamped. No attack was made upon it, as Lord Methuen was afraid that its capture would scare



F. Dadd.]

AN OATH OF VENGEANCE.

[After a sketch by a trooper.]

"There was a most impressive scene," writes a Colonial trooper, "at the burial of Lieutenant White, near Lichtenburg. He was treacherously shot at Manana, four miles east of Lichtenburg, while going to answer the white flag displayed by the Boers. He was the pet of the Bushmen's Corps. We all loved him and will avenge him. At the funeral his comrades replaced their hats on their heads, and joined hands together and swore most solemnly never again to recognize the white flag." The figure at the head of the grave with hat in hand is the Sergeant-Major, a giant among giants—for all the others stand over 6 feet high.

away the Boers. He had arranged with General Douglas, who had under his orders 900 Bushmen, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, the other half of the 2nd Northhamptons, the 88th Field Battery, two

howitzers and two "Pom-Poms," for a joint attack upon the Boer camp, in which Lord Erroll with a small mounted force was to participate. Douglas was to come in from the west, Erroll from the south-south west, and Methuen from the south-west.



[Photo by Ball.]

MAJOR-GENERAL C. W. H. DOUGLAS.

Born, 1830; joined the 92nd Foot, 1869; Captain, Gordon Highlanders, 1880; Major, 1881; Lieut.-Colonel, 1895; Colonel, 1898. Served in the Afghan War with the 92nd Highlanders, 1878-80, accompanying Lord Roberts in his march to Candahar. He was present with the Gordon Highlanders at the battle of Majuba in the Boer War of 1881; served in the Sudan Campaign, 1884-5; D.A.A. and Q.M.G., Egypt, 1885; Brigade-Major, Aldershot, 1893-5; D.A.A.G., Aldershot, 1895-8; A.A.G., Aldershot, 1898-9; A.D.C. to Queen Victoria, 1898; to King Edward VII., 1901; Chief Staff Officer, 1st Division South African Field Force, 1899; and in command of the 9th Infantry Brigade with the Kimberley Relief Force, with the rank of Major-General. He was present at Magersfontein.

ammunition, thrown from the retreating waggons to lighten them. Here and there were broken-down or abandoned waggons, with their exhausted teams lying on the ground, and gazing with their big eyes at the eager Yeomanry as if they wondered what it was all about. At 3 p.m., however, the pursuit had to be abandoned because of the sheer weariness of the pursuers, and though the success was a considerable one, it was by no means so great as might have been expected. Out of 80 waggons, which are believed to have formed the convoy, 22 were captured, in addition to 30 prisoners, two heliographs, a large quantity of ammunition, and numbers of oxen and sheep. The British casualties were only 13 wounded.

From Molopo Oog Lord Erroll marched to Ottoshoop, while Methuen turned southwards towards Schweizer Reneke, and Douglas moved towards Lichtenburg. Douglas was attacked on the 11th, but repulsed the enemy and made large captures of supplies from them. On the 12th he attacked them and took 39 prisoners, 10 waggons, and many sheep and oxen. Methuen on the 19th was at Jakskraal, north of Schweizer Reneke, when he learnt that a Boer convoy was in his neighbourhood. He at once pursued it and came up with it,

Early on September 9, Methuen led his men towards the Boer camp, the 3rd Yeomanry in skirmishing order forming the advance-guard. Heavy firing was soon heard in front, which told that Douglas was already in

Pursuit of Boer convoys.

action; a few minutes later spasmodic shots were fired from a clump of trees on the right. The enemy, however, were rapidly pushed back. Presently, in a valley away to the British front, a long cloud of red dust was seen rapidly moving towards Lichtenburg. It was the Boer convoy retiring, so that Lord Erroll had evidently not been able to cut the enemy's line of retreat. The 3rd and 10th Yeomanry with the "Pom-Poms" were at once warmly engaged with the Boer rearguard, who did their very best to delay the British pursuit, while the drivers of the waggons with frantic eagerness plied their whips upon their teams, and strove to urge the lumbering oxen forward. Volleys from the British rifles and shells from the "Pom-Poms," however, did their work. The Yeomanry were beautifully handled, advancing in alternate sections, one section always covering with its fire the movement of the others. The enemy were kept on the run; minute by minute the British pursuers drew closer to the convoy, until after about four miles' chase an abandoned waggon was found. Onwards from this point the ground was covered with supplies and



[Photo by Ball.]

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. H. SETTLE, K.C.B., D.S.O., R.E.
(See biographical note on p. 186.)

capturing a 15-pounder gun, which proved to be one of the weapons lost at Colenso, 28 prisoners, 26 waggons, 12,000 sheep and cattle, and a quantity of ammunition. On the next day he reached Rietpan, and there made further seizures of cattle and sheep. While he was at this place General Settle, with a strong column from Vryburg, succeeded in reaching Schweizer Reneke, on the 22nd, and threw into the place a large quantity of supplies. This force of General Settle's was henceforward occupied in making periodical visits to the various British garrisons in the south-west Transvaal and the north-west Orange River Colony. From the enormous number of waggons with which it had to move, it was christened by the irreverent soldiers, "Settle's Imperial Circus." Nowhere did it encounter serious opposition, yet it was perpetually "sniped" by the Boers, who hung about it, watching its movements, and ready to attack it or its convoys upon a favourable opportunity. Bloemhof, Christiana, and Schweizer Reneke were the places upon which General Settle had to keep his eye, while at the same time guaranteeing the safety of

Settle's field of operations.



[Photo by Russell & Sons.]

THE RETURN OF THE HOUSEHOLD TROOPS: HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA REVIEWING THE COMPOSITE REGIMENT.
AT WINDSOR, November 29, 1900. (See page 194.)

Kimberley and the line of communication as far south as the Orange River Bridge. The garrisons of the towns held by the British in this quarter had all the tedium, with none of the excitement, of a siege. The enemy never attacked or bombarded, but they were always ready to cut up weak detachments and capture individuals who ventured outside the British lines.

As Lord Methuen's column was no longer needed in the extreme south-west, orders were issued for it to march back towards the Rustenburg district. On its way thither two engagements were fought with the Boer Commandant Lemmer, who, with 500 men and two guns, had taken up a position to the west of Klerksdorp. He was driven back, and a loss of 7 killed, besides 14 men taken prisoners, was inflicted upon him, at a cost to the British of only 2 killed and 3 wounded. Other columns, under Generals Clements, Cunningham, and Broadwood, and Colonel Bradley, were also directed upon the Rustenburg district, to thoroughly clear that perturbed region. This they did, Broadwood reaching Rustenburg on September 26. The town was garrisoned and the country round denuded of supplies. In the operations in this quarter 29 waggons and large quantities of supplies and ammunition were captured.

Clearing the Rustenburg country.

To the north-east of Pretoria, at the end of September, General Paget was busy with Commandant Erasmus, whose camp was surprised by the British troops during the night of September 23, while the Boers were making an unsuccessful attack upon the British post at Eland's River, on the Delagoa Bay Railway. Paget captured 12 prisoners and a great number of cattle; at the same time, Plumer's Bushmen, operating against the same force, made further captures of cattle and took 11 prisoners. On the 27th Erasmus' commando attacked Pienaar's River Station on the Pietersburg line, but was beaten off, though under

Paget's successes to the north-east of Pretoria.



J. J. Cameron.]

KING EDWARD VII. PRESENTING A COLOUR TO STRATHCONA'S HORSE.

After the presentation of medals to the officers and men of Strathcona's Horse on February 15, 1901 (see p. 195), the King handed to Lieut.-Colonel Steele a new colour for the regiment, remarking, "It was the intention of my late mother to present this colour. Guard it in her name and in mine." Lieut.-Colonel Steele was thanked and complimented on the services rendered by his regiment in South Africa. He had previously distinguished himself as the leader of "Steele's Scouts" in suppressing Riel's rebellion in Canada. Beside the King stood the Duke of Connaught, Earl Roberts, and Sir Evelyn Wood. Queen Alexandra, the Duchess of Connaught, the Princess Louise (Duchess of Argyll), the Duke of Cambridge, and Prince Charles of Denmark were also present.

cover of the thick bush the Boers were able to get to close quarters. The British loss was quite insignificant. As the result of these affairs, and of the British successes in the east, Erasmus requested a five days' armistice, ostensibly to enable him to ascertain whether Botha's army had been routed and Mr. Kruger driven over the Portuguese border. The armistice

was conceded, but, needless to state, no surrender followed. Probably his real object was to confer with Botha and concert measures with that general.

In the Western Transvaal the Zeerust and Rustenburg districts

Boers active near Zeerust.

continued to be disturbed by small

bands of Boers who scattered whenever attacked, and were there-upon described in the despatches as "completely dispersed." They always, however, reassembled as soon as the British columns had passed. For a short time in June it had seemed as if this country had been pacified. What had led to the outbreak of guerilla warfare there, had been the incapacity of the British to protect those who submitted, and the unsatisfactory manner in which the disarmament of the farmers had been carried out in the first instance. The state of things which still existed in this quarter is concisely described by one of the Yeomanry in a letter home. Though his

letter was dated "Ottoshoop, September 26," it fairly depicts the conditions elsewhere and at a later date. He wrote: "Day follows day, and still the situation continues practically the same. Convoys are escorted to and from Mafeking, patrols go out and are sniped at, or not, according to the amount of energy Brother Boer feels capable of. Pickets are posted and relieved. . . . Our friend the enemy remains sullenly on the kopjes." Indeed, the Boers were active in every direction and seemed more formidable than ever.

Further to the south "Settle's Imperial Circus" was for ever marching and countermarching. Now it would be called upon to relieve some beleaguered post in the Transvaal or Orange River Colony; now it would have to clear guerilla bands from the great trunk railway. The neighbourhood of Vryburg, Kimberley, Enslin, and Belmont, was infested with small bands of Boers, who appeared only to cut the railway and then vanished into space.

Meantime the British headquarters were face to face with the most serious problems. How serious those problems were does not seem to

have been clearly understood, even at Pretoria, since it has been stated by responsible British authorities at home that no demand for further reinforcements

came from the front. The army had for weeks been steadily shrinking in numbers owing to losses in action and from disease, which were no longer being made good by reinforcements. No strong drafts had gone out from England since June. For some reason or other, it was decided to send home the composite regiment of Household Cavalry and the A Horse



ABEL ERASMUS AND VILJOEN.

From a photograph taken during the armistice referred to on p. 193.



THE FIRST CANADIAN V.C.

Sergeant A. H. L. Richardson, of Strathcona's Horse, won this distinction on July 5, 1900, at Wolve Spruit, near Standerton, when thirty-eight of his regiment were engaging eighty of the enemy. After the order to retire had been given, Sergeant Richardson rode back under a heavy fire to pick up a wounded trooper whose horse had been shot, and rode with the man to a place of safety. Sergeant Richardson is a native of Liverpool, and being the first Canadian to win the V.C., has been presented by his fellow Canadians with a gift of £3,000.

Diminution of the army.

Artillery Battery, and this though they had not been in South Africa from the outset, and had no legitimate right to priority of return, and though mounted men were everywhere needed. Nor was this all. By the terms of their enlistment, in the autumn

and winter
Grievances of the of 1900,
Colonial troops.

the greater part of the Cape Colonial troops were entitled to their discharge, as also were Strathcona's Horse, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, the Canadian Regiment, three batteries of Canadian Artillery, and the first of the New Zealand, Australian, and Tasmanian contingents. In all, these forces may have reached 10,000 admirable and efficient soldiers, by far the greater part mounted. Some of these Colonial contingents could make the proud boast that never

a man in their ranks had surrendered to the enemy. Among the Cape Colonials there had been great friction and soreness, which, it must be confessed, was due in some degree to the action of our military authorities. "Man," said a mortally wounded Colonial to an officer who bent over him, "you are brave as a lion, but not fit to lead a regiment of ducks." And though there were hundreds of Imperial officers who managed to keep on the best of terms with the Colonial soldier, this story illustrates a feeling which indubitably existed in the South African Army. Others of the South Africans were indignant at the manner in which appointments in the Transvaal were being given, not to those who had fought for the British cause, but to men who had remained in the Boer States throughout the war.



[Photo by Gregory.]

THE HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY AND CANADIANS DISEMBARKING AT SOUTHAMPTON FROM THE SS. "HAWARDEN CASTLE" on November 29, 1900.



[Photo by Russell & Sons.]

THE KING DISTRIBUTING MEDALS TO STRATHCONA'S HORSE ON THE TERRACE OF BUCKINGHAM PALACE, February 15, 1901.

This was the first presentation of the new war-medals, which bear on the obverse the effigy of Queen Victoria, and on the reverse Britannia crowning her soldiers. The men were drawn up on the lawn, and after the presentation of the medals and colour (p. 193), were inspected and thanked by the King.

Nor was their discontent lessened by reports that the refugees, who had not fought, but had skulked at Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, were to be allowed to go back, while they, who had displayed



THE LORD MAYOR BIDDING FAREWELL TO THE CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS ON THEIR DEPARTURE FROM SOUTHAMPTON, January 13, 1900.

patriotism, and borne the burden and heat of the day, were to be kept in the field. Amongst other causes, the discreditable treatment of certain regiments by the British Government cannot be overlooked. The volunteers of the Rhodesian Field Force, for example, had been raised in Rhodesia, just before the outbreak of the war, with the promise of a pay of ten shillings a day. But while they were serving with Colonel

Plumer their pay had been arbitrarily cut down to five shillings, of course through no act or fault of that officer. And this Field Force, which had suffered cruelly, and distinguished itself in a remarkable degree—a portion of it fought with glory at Eland's

Friction with Rhodesian and Cape Volunteers.

River—had received no recognition and no thanks for its meritorious achievements. The intolerable delays which, under our British system, occur in such cases distinctly detract from military efficiency. *Bis dat qui cito dat*, and honours are most appreciated when promptly conferred.

The trouble which was brewing came to a head at Heilbron. Here were stationed the Kaffrarian Rifles and the Border Horse, under Colonel Cumming. Their time expired on October 17; on October 1 they intimated that they would not serve beyond that date. Colonel Cumming replied that he would do his best to get them their discharge. The 17th, however, arrived, and no Imperial troops came to take their place. Then the Colonel called them together; told them that he was daily expecting reliefs; and asked them to stay where they were on the condition that they should not be asked to leave camp, except to go



CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS AT CAPETOWN.

The citizens of Capetown gave the "Lord Mayor's Own" a most effusive welcome. They were received at the railway station by the Mayor, who addressed them on the platform, and, as will be seen, the houses on the route of march were decorated with flags, and vast crowds thronged the streets.

home. That very night a patrol was ordered to prepare to go out at daybreak. On this the men refused to stir, and sent word to Colonel Cumming reminding him of his promise. After some remonstrances, however, they agreed to serve on till the 31st. But the British authorities had determined to make an example, and the Kaffrarian Rifles and the Border Horse were ordered to Kopjes Station as disgraced regiments, there detained a fortnight, and then sent home. There were one or two other incidents of a much less serious nature in other corps.

Besides the Regulars and the Colonials whose time had expired, the City Imperial Volunteers and a few of the Volunteer Companies, whose time was not yet up, were sent home. They could naturally be better

spared
Return of the
City Imperial
Volunteers
and other
troops.

than the
mounted
men; yet
at a mo-
ment when British
garrisons were being
attacked in all di-
rections, their with-
drawal was certainly
a questionable act of
policy. Moreover, it
tended to produce
great discontent
among the Yeomanry
and the other Volun-
teers. Why, these
asked, should parti-
cular corps thus be
favoured? If all had
stayed this feeling
would not have
arisen. When it did
arise, it seriously
affected the efficiency
of the army. Of
course, it need not be
said that the City
Imperial Volunteers
were in no way to
blame for this un-
timely return of
theirs. They had
rendered the most
sterling service, and
proved themselves a
splendid body of men,
intelligent, well dis-
ciplined, and brave.
On October 2 they
were passed in review
by Lord Roberts, who
made them a short



CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS AT ST. PAUL'S.

Immediately before leaving London, and again on their return from South Africa, the City Imperial Volunteers attended special services at St. Paul's Cathedral. (See the note on p. 198.)

speech, in which he said: "You are going home in advance of the other troops, because I feel that some consideration is due to those of you who have given up professions, situations, and employments to take your place in the ranks of Her Majesty's Army; and that some consideration is due also to the employers, who, through motives of patriotism, are keeping your places open until you return. . . . You have proved your worth, and now you return to your homes to receive the well-merited applause of your fellow-countrymen." Not less emphatic was the praise of General Smith-Dorrien, under whom a detachment of the City Imperial Volunteer Mounted Infantry had served. "This little band," he telegraphed, "have done, to my mind, the finest mounted infantry work I have seen in this campaign." On the 7th the regiment embarked at Capetown and passes out of our story. Yet its success in the field is not without interest in its bearing upon the military problem which confronts



[Photo by Cheal, Reigate.]

LONDON'S WELCOME TO THE RETURNING CITY IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS.

It was natural that the capital city should take a special interest in the regiment she had herself enrolled and equipped. On Monday, October 29, 1900, London welcomed her volunteers on their arrival from South Africa. It had been arranged that the men should march from Paddington to attend a service at St. Paul's, proceed to a reception by the Lord Mayor and Corporation at the Guildhall, and afterwards banquet in the grounds of the Honourable Artillery Company. So overwhelming, however, were the crowds along the line of route that the procession was twice interrupted. The Lord Mayor, unable to reach Temple Bar to receive the men at the City boundaries, awaited them on the steps of the Cathedral. Their arrival was delayed for two hours, and serious accidents occurred. In the illustration the procession is shown passing along that portion of the Strand near St. Clement's Church which had just been widened. The irregularity of the line of troops guarding the way testifies to the pressure of the crowd; up Ludgate Hill the men could only pass in single file.

Great Britain. It proved that, without an extravagant amount of barrack-square drill and training, men can be rapidly prepared for the exigencies of irregular war. At the same time, the City Imperial Volunteers were not an ordinary Volunteer unit; they had been carefully selected from all the regiments of the metropolis, and because they did so well it by no means follows that any ordinary volunteer battalion would prove as efficient.

A few weeks later the Royal Irish Volunteers, Gloucesters, Yorkshires, and Hampshires left for England, while a number of Australians, whose time was up, also departed. Before they quitted

Pretoria Lord Kitchener addressed them, complimenting them upon the magnificent spirit which they had displayed. "We are sorry to lose you," he concluded, "but we are very glad that we are now able to allow you to go, though there is still much work to be done in the field, before we have completed the task we have undertaken in this country."

In some degree to replace the troops thus lost, recruiting in Cape Colony and Natal was resumed; a body of mounted infantry, known henceforth as Steinecker's Horse, was raised for service in the Eastern Transvaal; and attempts were made to provide a strong force of Mounted Police for the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the command of General

**Steinecker's Horse and
Baden-Powell's Police.**

Baden-Powell. At first, recruits offered themselves willingly, but then changes were made in the scale of pay which produced no small amount of ill-feeling. Moreover, the Colonial Governments offered strong objection to the Australians and New Zealanders, who were among the pick of the British Army in physique, daring, and intelligence, being enrolled in the new force, as they considered that, if this were allowed, some of their best citizens would be perma-

nently lost. In England there

Lethargic recruiting. was no want of applicants for places



A DUMMY GUN NEAR VRYBURG.

One of not a few devices for drawing the enemy's fire where it could do no harm.



ONE OF THE FORTS ERECTED NEAR VRYBURG FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RAILWAY.

It is a regrettable fact that in country which has long been ours it has been found necessary to build earthworks and man them for the protection of the lines of railway, not against burghers from the Orange River Colony or the Transvaal, but against Colonists who have long lived under British rule.

was neither energy nor foresight, though it was growing day by day more manifest that large reinforcements were required. With the supply of remounts it was as bad as with the supply of men. The purchase of mules and horses had been stopped, with the inevitable consequence that the mobility of the British mounted arms, never remarkable, grew less and less.

Practically what happened was that the army for two months, from mid-October, 1900, to the middle of December, was left incapable of a vigorous offensive, and that the Boers were given a breathing time when they most needed it. Large though the army in South Africa appeared upon paper, it was yet in reality much too small for its task.

**Deficiencies of the
army.**

Its efficient strength at the beginning of November, deducting the sick and the various corps which had been disbanded or which were on their way home, probably did not

in the Police, but the authorities did not hurry themselves in the slightest degree, and by the beginning of December not more than 200 men were ready for service. Indeed, a fatal languor appeared to have seized upon those at home responsible for the preparation of reinforcements. There

exceed 150,000 combatants. Even this figure may be considerably above the mark. With this force Cape Colony, the Orange River Colony, and the southern half of the Transvaal had to be garrisoned; the lines of railway, which reached a length of about 4,000 miles, had to be guarded throughout their length; for, it need scarcely be said, Cape Colony and Natal contained many Boer sympathisers, who would at any moment have been ready to destroy an ungarrisoned bridge or culvert; and mobile columns had to be provided. Though many important places, such as Ficksburg, Fouriesburg, Ladybrand, and Thaba N'chu, had been evacuated and left to the enemy, the work of guarding the railways and throwing supplies into the garrisons that still remained tasked the army to the utmost. Off the railways, which for want of men were only weakly held, small British posts were dotted up and down an area as large as that of France and Germany. The garrisons of these posts lived in a perpetual state of mild siege. Now and then a relief force would fight its way through the snipers with a great train of waggons, and, when supplies for some months had been transferred to the garrison stores, retire. The dreariness of the work both for the relief columns, which were perpetually on the move, and for the garrisons, who had to be always on the watch, may be easily



[Photo by J. Bowers, Pretoria.]

A GROUP OF FAMOUS WAR CORRESPONDENTS.

First row (from left to right): William Dinwiddie, *Harper's Weekly*; Alister Campbell, *Laffan's Agency*; J. B. Atkins, *Manchester Guardian*; Douglas Story, *Daily Mail*; G. H. Seull, *New York Commercial Advertiser*; R. C. Booth, *Pearson's War News*; R. M. B. Paxton, *The Sphere*; Major Pollock, *The Times*.

Second row: Basil Gotto, *Daily Express*; Winston Churchill, *Morning Post*; F. W. Walker, *Daily Express*; M. H. Donohoe, *Daily Chronicle*; H. J. Wigham, *Daily Mail*.

Third row: W. B. Wollen, R.I., *The Sphere*; J. O. Knight, *Times and Herald*, Chicago; Ernest Prater, *The Sphere*.

pictured. The endurance of constant hardships and the daily round of bad food badly cooked had begun to lower the vitality of every soldier. Outwardly the men might look fit; inwardly they were one and all depressed and disheartened. In no other war waged by our race have the symptoms of that strange disease known as homesickness been so manifest and so injurious. Under Wellington, British soldiers fought for year after year, though perhaps without suffering the same peculiar and continual discomfort; yet in the memoirs of the time we do not find that, from highest to lowest rank, every man, in the expressive vernacular of the private, was "fed up" with campaigning. It is, however, a symptom which has been noticed in most modern armies—in the German levies of 1870-1, in the Confederates and Northerners during the later stages of the American Civil War, and in the hosts of Napoleon. The common idea that a force grows in efficiency with each week of war is absolutely incorrect.

Hardships endured by the troops.

Men may become "veterans," but veterans too often are bodies without spirit or energy, limp, weary, and discontented, knowing the peril of battle and the misery of the bivouac, and mainly anxious to return home safely with the glory which at the outset they have acquired. To the raw and unseasoned belong the ardour for the combat, the desire to be under fire, the enthusiasm which makes light of daily trials and discomforts. Hence the vast importance of maintaining a steady flow of new blood to an army long in the field.

That flow of new blood was not steadily maintained, and the results will be seen in the period of the war upon which our history is now entering, and in which the Boers resume the offensive with some success. Here, as through all the later months of the war, there is the utmost difficulty in ascertaining what really happened. The official telegrams, never too full, and too often marked by a tendency to exaggerate small British

Lack of correct
information.



Frank Craig.]

[After a sketch by H. Lea.

RESPECTED EVEN BY ENEMIES: AN INCIDENT OF A BOER RAID IN NATAL.

A correspondent in Natal writes: "We loyalists in South Africa love the Princess of Wales (now Queen Alexandra) like you at home; but it is astonishing to find that the Boers too have a real respect for her. During the invasion, when our houses were being raided and wrecked, a curious instance of their respect for the Princess occurred. The Boers had been engaged in breaking up the furniture in a raided house, and had, with great delight, smashed and trampled upon the portraits of Rhodes and Chamberlain, but the portrait of the Princess was left untouched."

successes and minimise serious reverses, become more brief, more fragmentary than ever. Important events, the aspect of which is not wholly agreeable, are sometimes passed over altogether. No detailed despatches dealing with those of later date have been published. Of independent information coming from other than military sources there was little. Most of the correspondents had left South Africa; upon those who remained a military censorship of the strictest nature was imposed.

Meantime, in the Central and Eastern Transvaal attacks on the railways and upon convoys continued with monotonous frequency. On October 1 a number of waggons on the way to Vryheid under the escort of sixty of the Natal Volunteers and Middlesex regiment were attacked at De Jager's Drift over the Buffalo River by a much larger force of Boers. The scouts failed to detect the enemy,

and the British found themselves surrounded. Unfortunately, a Hotchkiss gun with the convoy jammed at the critical moment; after an hour's resistance the escort surrendered with seven men wounded. The

**Boers attack railways
and convoys.**

waggons were plundered and destroyed and the gun carried off. The Boers are said to have lost nineteen killed and wounded, but there is some reason to think this estimate—it can be nothing else—exaggerated. Some weeks later, on October 26, the Boers reappeared in the same locality. A party of them under a Russian adventurer, one Captain Leboswonsky, rode up to Waschbank station, on the line between Ladysmith and Glencoe, captured a goods train, seized a dozen remounts, wounded a plate-layer, and burnt the station.

Nearer to Ladysmith British pickets and outposts were occasionally sniped by isolated Boers.

On the Delagoa Bay line the enemy continued their persistent attacks upon trains. The affair at Pan, on October 1, when they derailed a train containing Coldstream Guards and prisoners, has already been recorded. On October 5 they derailed another train, also containing Coldstreams, near Balmoral, by exploding a mine under the line. Fortunately, however,



[Photo by Knight.]

MAJOR EDWARD DOUGLAS
BROWN, V.C.,

Of the 14th Hussars, won the Cross for the rescue of three comrades under a heavy fire at 400 yards at Geluk on October 13, 1900. He took Sergeant Hersey, who had lost his horse, behind him on his own mount; afterwards he assisted Lieut. Browne to mount his horse, which was frightened by the firing; and he carried Lance-Corporal Trumpeter Leigh, who was wounded, out of action.

no one was injured. On the 7th, a culvert was destroyed at Brugspruit, a little to the east of Balmoral; on the 9th there was a serious accident at Kaapmuiden, probably caused by Boers tampering with the line. A train containing a section of the 66th Battery left the rails at the deviation crossing the Kaap River, with the result that three men were killed and sixteen injured, while forty horses were either killed on the spot or received such injuries that they had to be destroyed.

General French, who had returned from Barberton to Machadodorp, was ordered in October to march south towards Heidelberg. He had under his orders for this purpose three mounted brigades under Generals Gordon, Mahon, and Dickson, with half the Suffolk Regiment and three Horse Artillery batteries. Mahon left Machadodorp on the 12th, and the other troops next day. The line of march was through Carolina, Ermelo, and Bethel, in country comparatively thickly populated. At Geluk Mahon was hotly engaged with a force of Boers 1,100 strong, supported by four guns. He was closely pressed and was in some difficulty, when fortunately the rest of General French's force came to his assistance and drove back the enemy. Throughout the march the Boers hung round the British flanks and rear,

**French's march to
Heidelberg.**



[J. H. Thornely.]

MAJOR BROWN, 14TH HUSSARS, HOLDING LIEUT. BROWNE'S HORSE UNDER HEAVY FIRE.
One of the acts for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

and caused no small amount of trouble. Many of them wore British uniforms, and in their ranks, according to General French's official reports, armed Kaffirs were seen, while on more than one occasion the Boers killed the British wounded, a practice of which, to do them justice, they were rarely guilty. On the 14th Carolina was occupied and a Boer convoy captured. Near Ermelo the enemy became more active than ever, "at times," according to Lord Roberts' despatch, "attacking the column from all sides." On the 20th Bethel was reached, and six days later the column entered Heidelberg with sixty prisoners captured on the march and a great quantity of cattle, forage, and ammunition. The British losses during the operations were considerable, amounting to seventeen killed and seventy-four wounded, while one man was missing, and at least one ammunition waggon, laden with 12-pounder shells, was captured by the enemy, a fact which the official reports did not notice. Probably the Boers suffered even more severely, as on many occasions the cavalry got to close quarters with them. Still the mere act of marching through a large track of territory does not imply its permanent pacification or the subjugation of its inhabitants, and the enemy in this quarter of the field continued to give just as much trouble as before. A certain amount of supplies had indeed been carried off, but these they could very well spare, since, notwithstanding reports that the commandos were "disorganised," "demoralised," and "starving," the country east of Ermelo and Amersfoort, which had not as yet been visited by the British troops, afforded them abundance of corn and cattle.

In the neighbourhood of Heidelberg there was a minor disaster on the railway on October 8. Parties of the enemy had



F. J. Waugh.]

[After a sketch on the spot.

THE WRECKING OF AN ARMoured TRAIN NEAR VLAKFONTEIN.

been seen on the hills near Vlakfontein, and, to ascertain what they were doing, the incident of the armoured train at Chieveley was repeated. A detachment of the Rifle Brigade, with a few engineers, proceeded along the line towards Vlakfontein. The Boers, who were under Hans Botha, were in strong force, ambushed on both sides of the railway. They allowed the train to pass Vlakfontein, but then a party came down and blew up two culverts behind it, cutting it off from support, while a second party tore up the rails in front of it and opened a tremendous fire on its occupants. The men in the train made a gallant resistance, but they were fairly caught in a trap, and were ultimately compelled to surrender with a loss of two killed and seven wounded. Inside Heidelberg were a number of Boer sympathisers, who gave regular information to the enemy of all that was happening, which may, perhaps, account for this unsatisfactory affair.

**Hans Botha captures
a train.**

In the Lydenburg district, General F. W. Kitchener, on the night of October 25, made a forced march to Krugerspost, where the enemy were collecting in some force. He captured their laager, but



BREVET-COLONEL J. SPENS, C.B., A.D.C.,

Of the 85th Shropshire Light Infantry. Acting Brigadier of the 19th Brigade. Colonel Spens is the champion army racquet player. He stands in the centre; on his right is Captain Ogilvie, Royal Canadian Rifles, D.A.A.G. and on his left Captain Weldon, Chief Staff Officer.

only took
Laagers seized in the
Lydenburg district. four prison-
ers. A few

days later he made another night march and captured Schoeman's laager in the Steenkampsberg. He followed the retreating Boers and took a second laager, which had been occupied by Schalk Burger's commando, but here again, unfortunately, he was not able to make any large haul of prisoners. The enemy left five dead on the field; they were pursued for miles by the cavalry and mounted infantry, and many of them were cut down in panic-stricken flight. The British loss was insignificant. As towards the end of October the Boers had once more become very troublesome on the Delagoa Bay Railway, General Smith-Dorrien, who was in command at Belfast, determined to attack their camp at Van Wyk's Vlei. On the afternoon of November 1, in torrents of cold rain, he moved out from

Belfast in two columns; one, under Colonel Spens, was composed of the Shropshires, half the 84th

Smith-Dorrien near
Van Wyk's Vlei.

Battery, 5th Lancers, and Canadian Mounted Infantry, and received orders to march by Leeuwkloof to Van Wyk's Vlei, taking the Boers on the flank; the other, under the General himself, composed of the 1st Gordons and Canadian Mounted Rifles, with the rest of the 84th Battery, two "Pom-Poms," and a 5-inch gun, proceeded by way of Bergendal, so as to take the enemy in front. When the Boer camp was near at hand, a halt was ordered till daybreak; with dawn the troops advanced. But the enemy fell back to the hills. At noon of the 2nd, as there was no hope of achieving any serious result, the column retired. The enemy at once pressed upon it, actually closing with the Gordons, and might have cut up that battalion but for Colonel Lessard of the Canadians, who sent back his Colt gun to the Scotsmen's assistance. In the fighting Lieutenant Chalmers, of the 2nd Canadian Mounted Infantry, distinguished himself by an act of peculiar gallantry. His senior officer, Major Sanders, fell seriously wounded and was left behind. Chalmers



IN THE CAMP OF THE GORDONS: ARRIVAL OF MAIL-BAGS.



MOONLIGHT CHARGE OF THE 19TH HUSSARS NEAR STEENKAMPSBERG (p. 204).

J. H. Thormöy.

rode back to him and brought him off, but himself paid for his bravery with his life. The British loss was two killed, fourteen wounded, and one missing. On the 6th, Smith-Dorrien again moved out of Belfast with the object of destroying several farms from which the British had been fired at, or in which the Boers were accustomed to take shelter. This was achieved, but not without sharp fighting. The Boers took up a strong position along a rocky ridge, on the further bank of the Komati River, from which they were only dislodged by a wide turning movement, carried out by the 1st Suffolks and Canadian Dragoons. The Shropshire Regiment much distinguished itself, and it had by far the greater proportion of casualties in its ranks. "The men deserve the greatest praise for the magnificent



PREPARING TO GIVE THE ENEMY A WARM RECEPTION: GORDON HIGHLANDERS TURNING OUT IN THE EARLY MORNING.

way in which they behaved during the day—cool, unflinching, daring to a degree," says a correspondent with General Smith-Dorrien's force. "Some of the companies had crept up to within 200 yards of the Boers' position, where they fired off all their ammunition; but though constant attempts were made by carriers to replenish the expenditure, they failed to get anywhere near for the fearful fire directed on the parties. Courageous stretcher-bearers moved out also to bring in the



H. B. LEMMER,
Commandant of Potchefstroom.

wounded, but met with similar treatment, one of the bearers at least being wounded." In all six men were killed and twenty wounded. On the following day, Smith-Dorrien pushed eastwards and was at once engaged. The enemy had been strongly reinforced, and attacked with great vigour and decision. They first of all attempted to seize the position which they had held on the previous day, and a desperate race took place between them and the Canadian Dragoons, with a section of the 84th Battery, in which the Canadians won. Colonel Lessard, and the Canadian Artillery under Lieutenant Morrison, were ordered to cover the rear of the British column, while the 5th Lancers seized the high ground near Van Wyk's Vlei. The fighting was severe, 200 Boers boldly charging the Canadian Dragoons and coming to close quarters with them before they could be driven back, while at the same time threatening the British flanks. Not till nightfall was the fight over. The British loss was small, fourteen killed and wounded; while the Boers are known to have suffered severely from the British artillery fire, which was admirably directed. Three commandants, Prinsloo, Fourie, and Grobler, were either



LIEUT. A. C. DOXAT, V.C.

Lieut. A. C. Doxat (3rd Imperial Yeomanry) on October 20, 1900, was engaged in reconnoitring the position held by the Boers on a ridge of kopjes near Zeerust. When the British approached within 300 yards of the position, they were met by a heavy fire, and in retiring left one of their number behind. Lieut. Doxat galloped back and rescued the man, who had lost his horse. He was the first Yeoman and the first member of the Stock Exchange to win the Victoria Cross.

killed or wounded. The enemy on this occasion behaved with great kindness and humanity to some of the British wounded who fell into their hands. They captured sixteen of the Canadian Dragoons, whose horses had been stampeded or shot. The younger Boers were for killing their prisoners, but, to their credit, the commandants intervened and saved them. In the end they were well treated, and were released after the battle.

In the Western Transvaal, during the earlier part of October, Lord Methuen was busy in the Rustenburg and Zeerust country,

which he cleared of a large number of wag-

**Methuen operates
in the Rustenburg
district.**

gons and of a great quantity of cattle and produce. De la Rey watched his movements, but would not allow himself to be drawn into an action. On October 16, however, Methuen's mounted men detected Lemmer with a small commando passing across the British front, and at once attacked. The Boers, taken by surprise, fled without offering serious resistance. One of their guns had a narrow escape, two of its mules being killed by a fine shot from a British battery, but the bush was thick and the gunners succeeded in withdrawing their weapon by hand. Ten of the enemy were found dead; the British suffered no loss. Next day the British advance continued, amid perpetual sniping, through thick bush. At noon the British camp was shelled by the enemy at long range, four men and several horses being killed. Finally, after some unsuccessful efforts, the 4th Battery placed a shell right on the Boer gun and silenced it for good. In the afternoon Zeerust was reoccupied and was henceforth permanently held by a British garrison. On the 20th the Northumberlands and a wing of the North Lancshires, with the mounted troops and artillery, moved out to dislodge the Boers from a strong position which they had occupied at Botha's Farm, some miles to the north of Zeerust. The enemy had protected their position with wire entanglements concealed in deep corn, but after four hours of bombarding and sniping they were compelled to retire. The British casualties were fourteen. On the 24th there was more fighting, this time at Kaffir Kraal to the south of Zeerust, where Methuen

THREE CANADIAN V.C.'S.



[Photo by Moss, Halifax, N.S.]

LIEUT. E. J. HOLLAND, V.C.

LIEUT. R. E. W. TURNER, V.C.

Major-General Smith-Dorrien writes in high terms of the behaviour of the whole Canadian rearguard under Colonel Lessard. To three of them the Victoria Cross has been awarded. Lieut. Z. C. Cockburn, Royal Canadian Dragoons, with two others won the Victoria Cross on November 7, 1900, in the action between Witkloof and Lilliefontein on the Komati River. He was wounded and sacrificed many of his men in keeping off the Boers while the guns were being saved. Every man of his party was either killed, wounded, or captured. Lieut. R. E. W. Turner, had already been twice wounded, when he dismounted and fought at close quarters. Lieut. E. J. Holland had charge of a Colt gun in the rearguard action. He continued firing until the enemy were close up to him, and the gun became clogged with a bullet. Then he detached the red-hot gun from its carriage, and galloped away with it under his arm.



LIEUT. Z. C. COCKBURN, V.C.

and Douglas attacked Lemmer, inflicted upon him a loss of twenty-nine killed or wounded and twenty-five prisoners, and captured twenty-five waggons and large quantities of cattle. Yet no disabling blow could be dealt the Boers; this series of small skirmishes, in which they had on the whole considerably the worst, was not of a nature to break their resolution, compel their surrender, and lead to the pacification of the country. Notwithstanding all the marching to and fro of British columns, this region continued to be disturbed and could not be considered conquered.

Further to the east General Paget vainly endeavoured to come to handgrips with the small commandos in the neighbourhood of Pretoria. Under directions from headquarters he also attempted to open negotiations with General Botha—which Botha we are not told, though
Futile attempt to negotiate with Botha. probably it was the famous Commandant-General. Botha received the British emissaries with politeness, but absolutely declined to abandon the Boer cause. Steyn and Viljoen were with him and were equally obstinate. Steyn, indeed, refused to listen to the



[Photo by Wolff.]

REVIEW IN CHURCH SQUARE, PRETORIA: ONE OF THE "COW GUNS" OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY MARCHING PAST

British proposals. On November 1, Paget and Plumer hurried in the direction of Magato Nek, hearing reports that Steyn, Botha, and Viljoen intended to move to the south and join De Wet. Apparently this movement was unsuccessful, as the Boers at once fell back to the north, though Steyn got through the British lines and joined the Free State guerillas. In co-operation with Paget, Methuen and Douglas marched to Lichtenburg, surprising Commandant Vermaas on the way, and capturing from him thirty prisoners. Douglas pushed on in advance and entered Ventersdorp. Thus the weary peregrinations of the British troops continued with the maximum of effort and the minimum of result. Ventersdorp was abandoned a few days later, and Douglas moved to Klerksdorp, in combination with General Barton, who marched to the same place from Potchefstroom. A few prisoners and some cattle were taken, but again the Boers could not be brought to battle. About the middle of November one of the periodical reliefs of besieged Schweizer Reneke was carried out by a force detached from Settle's command, after constant skirmishing with a Boer commando, 700 strong. Large quantities of stock and cattle were removed by this British force on its return to Vryburg.

On October 25 took place the ceremony of proclaiming the annexation of the Transvaal to the dominions of the Queen. The Royal Standard was hoisted in the great square to a salute of twenty-one guns, while the Grenadier Guards presented arms. The proclamation was read by the Governor; the troops cheered for Her Majesty; and the Victoria Cross was presented to Majors



[Photo by Lafayette.]

LIEUT. J. NORWOOD, V.C.

On October 30, 1899, Lieut. Norwood, when retiring his patrol near Ladysmith, galloped back through heavy fire, dismounted, and rescued a fallen trooper, whom he placed on his back, while leading his horse with one hand. For this deed he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

(Portraits of the other recipients mentioned on this page are given in "With the Flag to Pretoria," Vol. I., p. 99, and Vol. II., pp. iv, 567, 608, and 695.)

hidden in St. Mary's Church, in the seats which were occupied by Lord Roberts and his staff, and was to be exploded during service. Thus at one stroke the heads of all the military departments would be removed, and the British army paralysed. It was further intended to get rid of Sir Alfred Milner in much the same way. Bombs, the detective learnt, had already been prepared by a foreign chemist in the employment of one of the mining companies. The murder of Lord Roberts was planned for November 18, but on the 15th the police struck, not caring to risk a catastrophe by waiting and attempting to catch the criminals in the act of placing the infernal machine. Eleven of the ringleaders were arrested and lodged in one of the forts. Unhappily no bombs and no infernal machines could be discovered, but the police had excellent reason to think that these deadly implements had been concealed on a farm a few miles out, round which the Boers were hovering in force. No further punishment than deportation from the country was inflicted upon the prisoners. Well might the British in the town shake their heads and point out that these continual plots—this was the fourth one of a serious nature—showed the danger of leniency and of allowing a large hostile element to remain on the Rand, when all the time the loyal British refugees were

Phipps-Hornby and Babbie, Captains Congreve and Fitzclarence, Lieutenant Norwood, Corporal McKay, and Gunner Lodge. Then the garrison marched past, most of the colonies and countries under the British flag being represented.

Annexation ceremony at Pretoria.

Among the detachments present was one from the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the regiment which nineteen years before had been in garrison in Pretoria when the quasi-independence of the Transvaal was restored by Mr. Gladstone. This imposing ceremony was witnessed by the chiefs of Basutoland, who were present with Sir Godfrey Lagden.

In November Lord Roberts moved to Johannesburg, and while he was there another and, if possible, more dangerous plot was devised against his person. It was engineered by Italian, French, and German desperadoes who, with the usual

Plots at Johannesburg.

British tenderness, had been permitted to remain in the town. The conspirators were anarchists, and not, it would seem, Boers. The means to be employed were dynamite and bombs. The police obtained information that something serious was brewing, but they were not permitted to act vigorously and arrest the suspects till they had definite and tangible evidence. At last a detective, carrying his life in his hands, concealed himself in the room where the conspirators met, and learnt the whole abominable plan. An infernal machine was to be



[Photo by Lieut. A. L. Langman.]

LORD ROBERTS LEAVING PRETORIA AFTER THE FUNERAL OF PRINCE CHRISTIAN VICTOR.

no infernal machines could be discovered, but the police had excellent reason to think that these deadly implements had been concealed on a farm a few miles out, round which the Boers were hovering in force. No further punishment than deportation from the country was inflicted upon the prisoners. Well might the British in the town shake their heads and point out that these continual plots—this was the fourth one of a serious nature—showed the danger of leniency and of allowing a large hostile element to remain on the Rand, when all the time the loyal British refugees were

not permitted to return. It was urged that the British workers, or a proportion of them, should be allowed to come back, on the condition that they rendered military service when required, in return for rations from the British commissariat, and that the foreigners ought to be informed that they must make their own arrangements for supplies. But this scheme was not adopted until the advent of Lord Kitchener to the command-in-chief, and even then not in its entirety.

On the night of November 1 a regrettable incident, which well illustrates Boer methods, occurred at Klipfontein, near Johannesburg. A patrol of seven men of Compton's Horse on police duty entered

**Patrol of Compton's
Horse entrapped.**

a farm and obtained some food. Five of the seven then went to sleep while the others sat in a room writing letters to their wives. There were no blinds or curtains to the windows, and the room was brightly lighted, so that everything inside it was clearly visible to the skulking assassins without. Suddenly a whistle was heard, several rifles appeared at one of the windows, and a shower of bullets riddled the two unfortunate letter writers. The other five lay prone on the floor; several Boers covered them with their rifles, others entered and disarmed them, sending them back next day stripped of their equipment and belongings.



(Photo by H. W. Nicholls, Johannesburg.)

BRITISH TROOPS LEAVING ST. MARY'S CHURCH, JOHANNESBURG.

St. Mary's was the church in which Lord Roberts and his Staff were to have been assassinated (p. 209).

Another feature of the war about this date was the wholesale shooting by the Boers of Kaffir drivers and servants with the British forces, the aim, of course, being to 'establish a reign of terror and thus deter natives from aiding the British in any way. At Commando Nek, not content with the mere killing of eight natives, the Boers piled the bodies in a heap and flung a dead dog upon them.

Shooting of Kaffirs.

On the Johannesburg-Natal Railway line the enemy continued to give trouble. In this quarter Colonel Bewicke-Copley made some large captures of cattle in early November. The line was

**Attacks on Johannes-
burg-Natal Railway.**

cut near Greylingstad on or about November 13, and attacks were made on British outposts at Vlaklaagte, Platrand, Vaal, and Waterval. On the 14th a convoy, while entering Vryheid, was attacked, but the enemy were repelled, mainly by the good practice of the 67th Battery. On the 26th Bewicke-Copley attacked a party of 150 Boers near Greylingstad and drove them from their position, but failed to capture them. The same day the

Boers attacked Brakpan, a station on the Johannesburg and Springs Railway, but were beaten off by a small detachment of seventeen regulars aided by the town guard. A Boer field-cornet and two burghers were left dead on the field. To aid in clearing this district Bruce Hamilton's Brigade was moved north from the Orange River Colony, towards the end of November. It removed the Boer women from the farms, as they were a constant source of danger, laying traps for British patrols, and giving information of British movements to the enemy. On the 25th the brigade attacked a Boer laager near Springs, but the result was, as usual, insignificant. Large captures of cattle, however, were made. About the same time Colonel Colville with a mobile column attempted to clear the Standerton district. On December 1 he attacked Hans Botha near Vlakfontein without achieving any material success, and on the same day, a few miles to the east, another indecisive skirmish occurred with a party of the enemy who had raided a farm and driven off thirty-five head



A. C. Ball.]

THE KILLING OF TWO MEN OF COMPTON'S HORSE WHILE WRITING LETTERS HOME.

of cattle. The British captured seven waggons but no Boers. Another skirmish of much the same nature happened on the 4th when the British attempted to bring in the family of a farmer named Meyer from a farm seven miles to the east of Standerton, but found that the Boers had been beforehand with them. On the 2nd the garrison of Utrecht fought an action with two hundred Boers who had seized a position near the town and from it caused general annoyance.

On the Delagoa Bay Railway there was still constant interference with the line. An outpost of the East Kent Regiment south of Balmoral was surprised on November 19, and eleven men were killed or wounded, while thirty-one were made prisoners. As the enemy were in some force between Balmoral and Pretoria, Generals Paget and Plumer once more tried conclusions with them. Plumer moved northward from Wagon Drift and came in contact, on the 28th, with 500 of the Boers, who, as usual, promptly retired before any serious loss could be inflicted upon them. Paget, meanwhile, advanced some twenty miles north-

Action near Rhenoster
Kop.

eastwards, from Bronkhorst Spruit, to a point three miles south of Rhenoster Kop. At daybreak of the 29th he led his troops forward against a strong position held by Viljoen and Erasmus. This position was a crescent-shaped ridge, no less than seven miles in length; on the east it rested upon Rhenoster Kop, while on either flank the ground was broken and difficult. To assist the Boer defence there were numerous small kopjes to the rear and front of the main ridge, each capable of affording admirable cover to a small force. Altogether the position was excellently chosen. The enemy's strength was placed at about 4,000 men, with several guns, including a howitzer, two Krupp field-pieces, and one "Pom-Pom." In numbers the British were distinctly inferior, as the total of combatants under General Paget's orders was only 2,500, but they had the advantage in artillery. The troops present were the West Riding Regiment, half the Munster Fusiliers, the



[Photo by the Biograph Co.]

MAJOR D. T. LAING,
Commandant of Lord
Roberts' Bodyguard.



[Photo by the Biograph Co.]

LORD ROBERTS' BODYGUARD.

One of the acts by which Lord Roberts endeared himself to the South African Colonials, and did much to reduce the friction between them and the military authorities, was the selection from their ranks of his personal bodyguard.



COL. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, C.B.,
Military Secretary to Lord Roberts; afterwards Inspector-General
of Irish Constabulary.

Victorian, Tasmanian, and South Australian Bushmen, the New Zealanders, the 7th and 38th Batteries, and two naval 12-pounders. The action opened on the left, where a detachment of 150 Queenslanders seized an eminence only 800 yards from the Boer position. Here, however, they were furiously

attacked and had great difficulty in holding their ground, until reinforcements in the shape of a hundred Victorians with two guns of the 38th Battery arrived. To the right of them another detachment of New Zealanders, supported by Australian Bushmen, crept forward and were received in much the same way. The British guns and "Pom-Poms" could do little against the rifle-fire of the well-concealed enemy. One of the 7th Battery guns, indeed, after pushing in to within a thousand yards of the Boer position, came under so heavy a fire that ammunition could not be brought up to it except by the gunners crawling laboriously forward with each round that was used. The men working the gun were unable to face the enemy erect, and had to lie down between the shots, but they fired

the gun none the less until the rifling wore out and the weapon virtually became a smooth-bore, and this though, in the words of a correspondent, "it rained bullets and shells about them." It now became certain that the only hope of success lay in an assault by the infantry. Towards noon the West Riding Regiment and half the Munster Fusiliers were ordered forward, the West Ridings on the left and Munsters on the right, covered by the fire of two naval 12-pounders and the 38th Battery. The Boers responded by a flank attack upon the West Riding Regiment. All eyes in the British force were now turned to the east, from which quarter General Lyttelton was expected to appear and out-flank the Boer left, but he did not come. The position of the West Riding men grew critical. They fought their way by short, sharp rushes to within 300 yards of the Boers, but they could get no further, though they were gallantly supported by the New Zealanders and Munster Fusiliers. "As



Frank Dadd, R.I.]

[After a sketch by Lieut. H. Collinson Morley.

WITH THE QUEENSLAND IMPERIAL BUSHMEN AT RHENOSTER KOP, November 29, 1900.

the afternoon wore on," says an eye-witness, "it was seen that the assault could not be delivered home. Two more battalions might have done it, but not less than two. As it was, at 300 yards only from the goal the Regulars stuck; at 450 yards the New Zealanders could hardly, without decimation, move a yard further. So, throughout the waning summer afternoon, the dogged British lay there, indisposed to yield an inch, cursing their inability to charge. The heat was intense, and thirst had to be slaked. Water-bottles were handed along, a volunteer got hold of a number, made a run for it—twenty yards or so—lay down, made another rush, and thus got over the ridge. Returning he had again to run the gauntlet." At this juncture Colonel Lloyd of the West Riding Regiment stood up to use his field-glasses, and exposed himself to the hail of Boer bullets. In an instant three shots struck him in both breasts and in the side, inflicting wounds from which he died almost immediately. No help could be given to him or the other wounded, though the surgeons exposed themselves in heroic attempts to bring up the ambulances. The Boers, whenever they saw

the ambulances move, turned their "Pom-Poms" upon them, perhaps taking them for ammunition waggons, notwithstanding the Red-Cross flag.

As the Boer position could not be carried, the only alternative was for the British troops to cling to the ground which they had won, till night fell, and rush the position in the darkness. The



[Photo by H. W. Barnett.]

COLONEL LLOYD,
West Riding Regiment. Killed at
Rhenoster Kop.

**The enemy disappear
in the darkness.**

enemy's counter-attack was repulsed, and the situation somewhat improved, but the firing only ceased late in the evening. Before the intended assault could be delivered, however, the enemy had gone. They had divined the British plan of action and had trekked during the night, leaving General Paget with a Pyrrhic victory. The British losses in this unsatisfactory affair were serious. Besides Colonel Lloyd, sixteen men were killed; eighty-five officers and men were wounded. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles lost five officers out of six, and had four men killed and thirty-eight wounded; among the wounded were Lieutenant Challis of the Army Medical Corps, and Captain Godfrey of the New Zealand Medical Service, hit while attending wounded men under a heavy fire.

These weary, desultory, and unsatisfactory skirmishes could effect no change in the situation, which at the close of November was still

**No improvement in
the general situation.**

much the same in all respects as it had been in August or October, with the added disadvantage that the whole of the Orange River Colony was now in a

perturbed condition. In the interval the British had captured some

prisoners—how many it is difficult to say, since precise returns are wanting—and a few guns. But they still exercised little authority away from the lines of railway; they had not subjugated the country; they had not really pacified the east or west, or north or south; the enemy were close to Pretoria itself in some force, and even drove off cattle from Johannesburg. It was all about as disconcerting as anything could be. The Boers, too, perfectly informed of the weakness of the British Army, were making arrangements for the resumption of the offensive on a serious scale.

Lord Roberts' services being required at home in the office of Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, he issued his farewell orders to the troops on November 29. "The service which the South African force has performed," he wrote, "is, I venture to think, unique in the annals of war, inasmuch

**Lord Roberts returns
home.**

as it
has
been

absolutely incessant for a whole year, in some cases for more than a year. There has been no rest, no days off to recruit, no going into winter quarters as in other campaigns which have extended over a long period. For months together, in fierce heat, in biting cold, in pouring rain, you, my comrades, have marched



FILLING WATER-CARTS AT BRONKHORST SPRUIT.

The photograph shows the mill and the drift.

and fought without halt, and bivouacked without shelter from the elements. You frequently have had to continue marching with your clothes in rags and your boots without soles, time being of such consequence that it was impossible for you to remain long enough in one place to refit. When not engaged in actual battle, you have been continually shot at from behind kopjes, by invisible enemies to whom every inch of the country was familiar, and who from the peculiar nature of the country

were able to inflict severe punishment while perfectly safe themselves . . . You have endured the sufferings inevitable in war to sick and wounded men far from the base, without a murmur, and even with cheerfulness. You have, in fact, acted up to the highest standard of patriotism, and by your conspicuous kindness and humanity towards your enemies, your forbearance and good behaviour in the towns occupied by you, you have caused the Army of Great Britain to be as greatly respected as it must henceforward be greatly feared in South Africa . . . And now farewell."

That same day, Lord Roberts handed over the command to Lord Kitchener. Shortly afterwards he left for Durban, halting *en route* at Ladysmith and Colenso, where he visited the grave of his



[Photo by Gregory.]

BACK TO THE WAR: CONVALESCENTS OF THE ROYAL LANCASTER REGIMENT WOUNDED AT SPION KOP RETURNING TO THE FRONT, November 26, 1900.

son. The value of the work that he had accomplished in his eleven months of command can hardly be overestimated. He reached the front when our armies were so shaken in morale by continual defeats that they almost despaired of victory. In a few weeks he relieved Kimberley and Ladysmith, captured Cronje with a large Boer force, and occupied Bloemfontein. Up to this point he did his work without check or mishap, and, so doing, put new life into the British Army and nation. At and after Bloemfontein his success was not so uniform and invariable. Yet the march to Pretoria was a brilliant achievement, marked by extreme daring. The gold mines of the Rand, on which the economic future of South Africa depended, were saved by this vigorous dash, but, though the capital was occupied by the British, the people of the Transvaal declined to submit or to accept our rule as inevitable. It was now that Lord Roberts found his communications assailed by the guerilla warfare of De Wet, an adversary whom not all the skill of the British Field-Marshal could overcome. Gradually, during October and November, the horizon clouded, as we have seen, not from any fault of the Commander-in-Chief's, but because of the inherent difficulty of the task and the inadequacy of the army. If there were errors, these were due to Lord Roberts' kindness of heart, or perhaps even more to the British aversion from stern and forcible measures. The monstrous record of white-flag

**Succeeded by Lord
Kitchener.**

incidents, breaches of parole, and murders of natives, show how little British lenity was appreciated. Lord Roberts appears during the later months of the war to have in some degree misjudged the temper of his opponents. He thought that they would recognise the mischievousness of prolonging their resistance, when the British forces had marched to Komati Poort and occupied every strategic point in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. As he believed that he had only to show patience before the enemy submitted, the Boers were not very vigorously pressed during the closing weeks of his command. When he sailed from South Africa in December the situation was again gloomy, though it was in no sense to be compared with the state of things existing when he arrived early in 1900.



LORD ROBERTS' RECEPTION AT THE RAILWAY STATION, DURBAN.
By his side is the Mayor of Durban, who is leading the cheering.

CHAPTER XI.

DE WET'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO INVADE CAPE COLONY.

British troops guard the Orange—De Wet moves south from Lindley—Major Massy surrenders Dewetsdorp—Relief columns chase De Wet—Experiences of a captured British officer—Attempt to press the Boers northwards—De Wet doubles over the Caledon—Harsh treatment of British prisoners—De Wet fords Amsterdam Drift—Boer method of transport—Raiding farms—De Wet chased from Helvetia towards Reddersburg—Haasbroek breaks through the cordon—De Wet escapes through Springhaan Nek—Boers supreme in the south-east of the colony—De Wet's tactics—He is pushed towards Reitz—Colonel Laing ambushed—Surrender of Lord Kitchener's bodyguard—Attacks on the Western Railway—Operations in the south-west—Haasbroek active south of Bloemfontein—Bruce Hamilton in the north-east—Rundle skirmishes in the Bethlehem district—Instances of Boer savagery.

IN the Orange River Colony matters did not improve during November, notwithstanding the severe handling which De Wet had received at Bothaville. How the great guerilla managed to repair his losses in guns and material we do not exactly know, but since after every engagement in which he



Photographed at Government House, Cape Town, December, 1900.

LORD ROBERTS AND SIR ALFRED (NOW LORD) MILNER WITH THEIR PERSONAL STAFFS.

The names from left to right are—Back row: Lieut. Hereward Wake, A.D.C. to Lord Roberts; Colonel Murray; Lord Kerry, A.D.C. to Lord Roberts; Captain Henley, A.D.C. to Sir A. Milner; Colonel Cowan, Military Secretary to Lord Roberts; Captain H. Wilson; Lord Stanley, Private Secretary to Lord Roberts; Colonel Sir H. S. Rawlinson, Assistant-Adjutant-General; Lieut. Chester-Master, A.D.C. to Sir A. Milner; Lieut. Cowan, Naval A.D.C. to Lord Roberts; Lord Herbert Scott, A.D.C. to Lord Roberts.

Front row: Colonel Hanbury-Williams, Military Secretary to Sir A. Milner; Sir A. Milner; Lord Roberts; General Ian Hamilton.

had not the best of matters he headed in the direction of Lindley and remained there for some days, it is conjectured with some plausibility that he had a store of guns and ammunition buried or concealed near that place. Little definite information could be obtained as to his whereabouts. He was now reported near Lindley, and now again west of Kroonstad, in the country from which he had been driven after Bothaville. But as it was known that at an early date he intended to attempt the invasion of Cape Colony, troops

British troops guard
the Orange.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE DE WET'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO INVADE CAPE COLONY.

The dotted line shows the route followed by De Wet.

were hurried south to watch the fords of the Orange. Westwards from Bethulie the Guards Brigade was stationed, while General Macdonald's Highlanders held the drifts in the neighbourhood of Aliwal North, aided by some of the battalions of General Hart's Brigade. Meanwhile Bruce Hamilton beat up the Lindley country, but found that the bird had once more flown. There was no De Wet to be found, though parties of the enemy hung about the British column, sniping its flanks, and were repaid for their kind attentions by the burning of the farms which they used as their bases of supply and sleeping places.

De Wet, in fact, with over 2,000 men had left the Lindley country, and was already hurrying south. On November 20 a Kroonstad report placed him in the neighbourhood of Dewetsdorp. To his rear, at Thaba N'chu, a second commando, under Prinsloo, 500 strong, was reported. The British outposts near Thaba N'chu were attacked on the 16th, and it was clear that the enemy had artillery. Movements in the direction of Wepener were also observed. Dewetsdorp was occupied by a small British garrison consisting of two guns of the 68th Battery, one company of the Highland Light Infantry, three companies of the 2nd Gloucesters, a company of Royal Irish, and a few Orange River Colony Police, the whole totalling about 500 men, under Major Massy. The garrison was well entrenched on a commanding position near the town, and seemingly no anxiety as to its safety was felt at headquarters. There was, however,

**De Wet moves south
from Lindley.**



F. J. Waugh.

THE DEFENCE OF DEWETSDORP: WORKING A 15-POUNDER SINGLE-HANDED.

one very serious defect in the position. Water could not easily be obtained, and the supply of it could without much difficulty be cut off by the enemy. On November 17 the Boers first appeared near the place, and on the morning of the 18th they opened fire with a field gun from the east, at the same time directing a hail of bullets from long range upon the point held by the Highlanders, which was the key to the position. News of the attack, it would seem, was not at once despatched to the neighbouring British commanders; at any rate no attempt to send relief was made for nearly a week. On the 19th and 20th the Boers maintained their rifle and artillery fire, their sharpshooters steadily pushing nearer and nearer in, and reinforcements were called up by them from all the neighbouring commandos. On the 20th they succeeded in cutting off the water-supply and thereafter the garrison suffered terribly from thirst, as water had to be fetched from some distance under a heavy fire. The dangerous work was undertaken by volunteers, but sufficient could not be procured in this way to do more than moisten the parched throats of the defenders. On the night of the 22nd the Highlanders' position became untenable. The Boers had pushed in to close quarters; they even

attempted to rush the post as the Scotsmen were retiring. But their assault was foiled by the presence of mind of the ten privates covering the retreat, who shouted loudly to each other the order to fix bayonets, and the withdrawal was effected in good order. With daylight the situation of the garrison was desperate. The men were under a cross fire, without water; of the two field guns one had become unserviceable, and such a hail of bullets was directed upon the other that it could only be served with extreme difficulty. Sixteen out of eighteen gunners were killed or wounded at it; for some time a devoted sergeant-farrier worked it single-handed. What added to the suffering of all was that the 23rd was exceptionally hot—the hottest day of the siege. There was no sign of any relief force. East and west, and north and south, no cloud of dust broke the surface of the veldt. At 5.30 p.m. Major Massy decided that further resistance was impossible and hoisted the white flag.

**Major Massy surrenders
Dewetsdorp.**



H. Dixon.]

A HURRIED "INSPAN."

No official report of the affair has as yet been issued, and we are left in complete darkness as to the reasons why a position was selected for defence in which the most important factor, the water supply, was so uncertain. Nor are we told how it was that the 15-pounder field guns were not disabled before they were handed over to De Wet, to be used a few days later against British troops. These things are mysteries, and unsatisfactory mysteries. For the rest, the British casualties were heavy: 15 officers and men were killed and 42 wounded, a percentage of a little under 12 on a strength of 500. De Wet and Steyn congratulated the garrison on the defence, and, if reports can be trusted, Steyn acknowledged that the Boer loss in killed was heavier than the British loss in wounded. These stories may or may not be true, but they were small consolation for the loss of an important post and of two guns. The British are said to have buried some of their ammunition before surrendering.

Apparently no movement to relieve Dewetsdorp had been made before November 25, when a column 1,400 strong left Edenburg for that purpose; but as it was much too weak to deal with 2,000 or 3,000 Boers, it was, perhaps, just as well that it did not arrive in time. On the march

it was reinforced by General Charles Knox with 750 men. Dewetsdorp was entered on the 26th, and found empty of all but the sick and wounded. De Wet seemed to have vanished into space.

**Relief columns chase
De Wet.**

Knox divided his force into three sections and went in chase. Colonels Barker and Herbert from

the east attempted to overtake the guerilla, hurrying towards Vaalbank, while Colonel Pilcher with the third column, ten miles to the west of Dewetsdorp, moved in advance of them to the same place in the hope of blocking the Boer advance south. The drifts over the Orange River were held in some force by the British. It looked as though De Wet had run his neck into a noose, and, if only the British columns had possessed a high degree of mobility and had been able to march as fast as the enemy, his capture ought to have been assured. Of the methods by which he extricated himself from this apparently desperate position, we fortunately have some account from one of the captured British officers, whose experiences were published in *The Times*. They go to show that if there were points in which the Boers were our superiors, there were others in which it was far from desirable that we should copy them.

"De Wet," says this witness, "is a short thick-set man with a dark beard. He was riding, at the date of the capture of Dewetsdorp, a white horse, and was wearing a dark tail coat and a square-topped 'bowler.' His only arm was a revolver. His men stripped and looted the prisoners, compelling them to hand over their great-coats,



[Photo by Heath, Plymouth.]

MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES E. KNOX.

(A biographical note appeared on p. 398, Vol. I., of "With the Flag to Pretoria.")

In command of the 13th Brigade of the Sixth Division, he took part in the pursuit of Cronje along the Modder River, and in his subsequent defeat at Paardeberg. During that battle General Knox was wounded. He afterwards operated in the Kroonstad district during the summer months of 1900, and engaged in the early pursuit of De Wet. In October he took command of Le Gallais' and De Lisle's men and the Colonial Division in the second pursuit of De Wet across the Vaal. He completed the defeat of the Boers at Bothaville, and checked De Wet's advance into Cape Colony, as related in this chapter.

under the threat of using actual violence. 'Put your great-coat on my horse,' said a Boer to the officer, and when he hesitated and objected, added, 'If you don't I will lay you flat with my rifle.'

**Experiences of a
captured British
officer.**

The prisoners on the night of the 23rd were marched off some six miles to a farm which had once belonged to De Wet, where there was a huge Boer laager. They were driven into a filthy cattle kraal, inches deep in mud and garbage, and there were left to make the best of matters. From here, next day, with only a cup of coffee and some bread, they were hurried to another laager at a farm known as Blessbokfontein, where was a natural basin in which a large force could lie completely screened from observation. Here the prisoners were compelled to drink from water rendered muddy and foul by the Boer mules and horses, which they were not allowed to drive away even for a moment. On the 26th the Boers marched to Vaalbank—apparently that one of the three Vaalbanks near Dewetsdorp which is between Dewetsdorp and Helvetia. Now it happened, as we have already seen, that three of the British columns—Barker's, Herbert's, and Pilcher's—were also under orders to march to Vaalbank. De Wet was carefully watching Barker and Herbert, but, as luck had it, he was unaware of the existence or location of Pilcher's column. Consequently, at 8.30 a.m. of the 27th, Pilcher's advance guard suddenly came upon the Boer laager. "De Wet and Steyn," says the British officer already quoted, "were breakfasting in a farm near by, when a heavy fire was opened on the laager, and several bullets came whizzing over our heads. We had not yet started, and the order 'inspan' was given. The rapidity with which it was carried out was remarkable, as indeed was the way the Boers got their guns into action and lined all the ridges in the immediate vicinity of the laager. We wretched prisoners were marched off hurriedly, but, of course, with a hope that we should that day be rescued, so we plodded on fairly cheerfully. With the exception of a short halt, we marched till 2 a.m. the next day—nearly eighteen hours—and this began to tell horribly upon the men, who were getting weak, especially twenty wounded men we had with us, some still having more than one bullet in them."



THE WRECKED RAILWAY-BRIDGE AT BETHULIE, AND THE TEMPORARY TIMBER STRUCTURE OVER WHICH TRAFFIC IS NOW CONDUCTED.

By carrying but little baggage, by moving at night, by each burgher taking with him at least one, and often two or three led horses, a practice which, after all these months of war and futile pursuit, the conservative British had not copied from their alert enemy, De Wet was able to out-distance pursuit. At Vaalbank there was nothing more than a two hours' rearguard action, in which the solitary British capture was a couple of waggons. Some hundreds of led horses are said to have been stampeded in the enemy's camp, but it does not appear that they were secured by the British. De Wet's line of retreat was in the direction of Bethulie. As it was a matter of enormous importance to keep him out of Cape Colony, where it was feared that his presence would give the signal for sporadic insurrections, if not for a

**Attempts to press the
Boers northwards.**

general rebellion, of the disloyal Dutch, Knox urged his subordinates to use every effort to get to the south of the guerrillas. By hard marching in bad weather Colonels Pilcher, Barker, and Herbert succeeded in placing themselves between the enemy and the Orange River. On the 28th the British columns were twelve miles north of Bethulie, and there once more they came into touch with the Boers.

On December 2, after beating up the country between the railway and the Caledon, De Wet's main force was located by Colonel Herbert at Sterkspruit. A large convoy of waggons, with many hundreds of Boers, was seen moving from the direction of Willoughby towards Odendaal Drift on the Orange River. At this moment Knox and Barker were endeavouring to obtain supplies in Bethulie, which had been barricaded and put in a state of defence. Yet, though his waggons were empty, Knox, without a moment's delay, hurried off Barker to Herbert's aid, and also sent him Colonel Williams with another small column, just arrived, consisting of the 1st Mounted Infantry and four guns of the 85th Battery. As a further and very welcome reinforcement, Strathcona's Horse were despatched to the scene of action. Fighting began along a front of fifteen miles from Sterkspruit to Willoughby, Williams on the right, Herbert in the centre, and Barker on the left. The British captured seven prisoners and succeeded in heading the Boer convoy away from the south-east to the north-east. As darkness fell the enemy seemed to be retreating towards Bushman's Kop, a hill full of caves, near Smithfield, where it was conjectured the Boers meant to deposit their supplies. At daylight, in a deluge of rain, Knox marched direct upon the stronghold, with Pilcher and Herbert upon his flanks. He had covered some miles, when he learnt to his exceeding chagrin that De Wet during the night had doubled back, passed clean round the British right, and was now on the Cape Colony side of the pursuers, heading for the Caledon fords. This was unpleasant news, but in a vast open country such as the Orange River Colony, where the obstacles to movements off the roads are few and insignificant, it was a contingency with which the British




A. C. Ball.]

commanders had always to reckon, and which not infrequently, as on this occasion, frustrated their best plans.

The British columns wheeled about and followed the elusive Boers, bivouacking on the night of the 3rd at Carmel Farm, midway between Smithfield and Bethulie, where, they learnt, De Wet had encamped the previous night. The troops suffered severely in their bivouac; the rain, which had fallen continuously all the day, still descended in sheets, and, to add to the general discomfort, a bitterly cold wind blew. There were no tents with the columns, which were marching light; in some cases there were even no blankets. At day-break the chase was resumed. De Wet had well utilised the start which he had obtained by doubling back. At 4 p.m. of the 3rd he started on a march which continued without intermission for twenty-seven hours, the longest halt being one of an hour, and pushed on to the River Caledon, which he forded at 7 p.m. of the 4th. Says the British officer already quoted: "It is almost impossible to make anyone appreciate the appalling times we had; it rained the whole of the twenty-seven hours; we

**De Wet doubles over
the Caledon.**



RUDYARD KIPLING'S ALLEGORICAL VIEW OF THE CHASE OF DE WET.

The unwieldy engine—bound by antiquated ordinance not to travel above a walking-pace, and heralded by the time-honoured red flag warning everyone of its approach—seeking in vain to overtake, under such conditions, the flying horseman in the distance, aptly typifies the methods by which the British attempted to catch the Boer general.

were all drenched to the skin by day and by night; we had no food whatever and no sleep; and at the end De Wet himself ordered the men to wade the Caledon River, which had swollen tremendously.

**Harsh treatment of
British prisoners.**

Our commanding officer protested against this, but without avail, and our men had to strip and wade across, carrying their clothes on their heads, the water being up to some of the men's armpits—one poor fellow lost his clothes, and had to continue his journey wrapped up in a blanket. De Wet then said the officers must strip, too, but afterwards he sent horses, on which we were able to swim across. Towards the end of this unique march the 'caporal' in charge of our escort said the general had ordered the men who lagged behind to be sjamboked, and if it had not been for the officers marching behind the men, it would have been done systematically; there were a few instances of it, and one man near me had a piece of flesh cut right out of his cheek. The Boers then tried to get us officers to ride on a waggon, but we saw through their cunning, as it was obvious that they were trying to get us away in order to hustle and thrash our men along, and we declined.

"Well, by this time both officers and men were getting depressed, footsore, weary, and half-starved, and with a feeling that after the extraordinary distance we had travelled the British columns must have

lost touch with us. The way the men were treated during this march was simply monstrous; the Boers rode their horses into them, prodded them with the butts of their rifles, and, if they got a chance away from an officer, used the sjambok freely." Such are the noble-hearted foemen for whom our British Pro-Boers reserve all their sympathy and affection. Reading this story, one is led to wonder whether, if reprisals had been resorted to when the enemy first took to ill-using prisoners, they would have persisted in the practice. On the 5th De Wet was on the Orange River at Odendaalstroom with 3,000 men under Commandants Fourie, Haasbroek, Truiter, Philip Botha, and De Villiers. He had been joined by many of the bywoners, or poor whites, in the country through which he had passed; the farmers, however, all of whom had taken the oath and made their submission to Lord Roberts, did not come forward freely, though they aided him with information and supplies. In fact, their attitude towards him was one of secret annoyance at his coming, because he brought the British columns in his wake. His intention was to burn and destroy the farms and property of loyal British subjects in Cape Colony, to beat up recruits, and, if possible, to bring about a great rising. He reckoned much upon the magic of his name. On the 5th the non-commissioned officers and men among the British prisoners were released, the officers only being detained. The men were so exhausted with hard marching and want of food that they could not have gone further.



Allan Stewart.]

[After a photo.

HOW THE 9TH LANCERS SAVED THEIR HORSES BY MARCHING DISMOUNTED.

De Wet was now in the triangle which is enclosed by the Caledon and Orange Rivers and the Basuto frontier, but to round him up was still no easy matter. The line of the Caledon alone, shutting in this triangle on the north-west, is eighty-five miles long, and could only be guarded effectually by a large force. It was, however, a factor in favour of the British that the torrential rains had swelled the Rivers Caledon and Orange till they could be crossed only with the greatest difficulty. The Caledon was particularly treacherous and

difficult, since it rose and fell many feet in a single hour, but never, after such rains, flowed lower than four feet.

The British must have been very close to De Wet on the 4th, as they captured a waggon with 35,000 rounds of ammunition, some dynamite, and twenty rifles upon it, driving off the men in charge of it with a few shots and taking one of them prisoner. A 9-pounder Krupp gun was discovered concealed by Karreepoort Drift over the Caledon. It was placed among some trees, and seemed to have been left for the purpose of protecting the drift, as there was ammunition at hand and the sights and breech mechanism were intact. The drift itself was now inspected, and proved to be exceptionally difficult. "It is certainly the most formidable drift which I have seen in South Africa," says Reuter's correspondent. "On the south side the track ran straight up at an angle of 25°, the mud being a foot deep, and it looked impossible to drag anything up it. General Knox's position was a difficult one. The river was running deep . . . If we began to cross, the river might rise when only



MR. STEYN AT ZASTRON.

The photograph represents the gathering of the Zastron commando at the commencement of the war. Mr. Steyn, with his little son, stands near the flag. In December, 1900, he was again in this district with De Wet and Fourie, but his family were now prisoners in the hands of the British. Zastron is some 30 miles east of Rouxville.

a small portion of the force had got over. De Wet's exact position was unknown. He might be waiting for an opportunity to turn and attack us while crossing."

Colonels Pilcher and Herbert were despatched to make for Odendaal Drift by way of Bethulie Bridge, while Knox, with Barker and Williams, determined to cross at Karreepoort. Williams guaranteed that he would get the men and guns over, and early on the 5th the crossing began. It was awkward work, as above and below the ford were deep holes, yet the 1st Mounted Infantry, 9th Lancers, and all the guns with their ammunition waggons were moved safely across. After them came the ambulances and water-carts. Extra teams had to be hitched on for the ascent of the opposite bank, so that the process was a slow and tedious one. There were no losses in men or animals; one man, who was washed away, was gallantly rescued. But at four in the afternoon, when only two supply waggons had crossed, and when Strathcona's Horse were still on the north bank, the river suddenly rose and speedily became impassable. Nothing more could be attempted till it fell. The situation was this: that two-thirds of the force was on the south side, without baggage or provisions, while on the north side was the other third, with all the baggage. Had De Wet been at hand, he might



John Charlton 1901

M.P.E. 15

J. Charlton.]

ARTILLERY FORDING THE CALEDON AT KARREEPOORT DRIFT.

have brought off a great coup; but he was at Odendaalstroom exchanging shots with the Guards who held the drift, and unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge a Cape Police outpost from an entrenched position to the north of the Orange River.

Knox passed a very trying night with his troops on the south bank of the Caledon, as the rain again came down in sheets and the men were without any sort of comfort. But they were in high spirits at their achievement, and elated with the hope of catching De Wet. Strathcona's Horse were ordered to make the passage, if it proved feasible, at dawn of the 6th, and this they accomplished; but the river was too high for the waggons, and these were sent to Smithfield, under escort of the Yeomanry. Knox determined to march light and to draw on the country for his supplies. With

his staff he set a fine example. There were no waggons packed with luxuries for his headquarters; he had only what he could carry on his own horse. That day the British reached Odendaalstroom, and were delighted to see the Union Jack still flying over the fort at the drift, which was held by the Guards. De Wet was reported to have gone eastwards, towards Aliwal North, and thither Knox followed him. But as a matter of fact the Boer leader had doubled back once more, towards the Caledon, not caring to thrust his neck



DESTRUCTION OF A BOER HOMESTEAD.

The first photograph represents the eviction of the family, and the second the destruction of the house by fire. Dynamite is sometimes used instead. Of all the duties which our soldiers are called upon to discharge, probably this of the wrecking of homes is the most painful. Yet the treacherous sniping under cover of the white flag, which does not seem to be dishonourable in the eyes of the Boers, can only be stopped by such drastic methods.

any further into the British noose, and extremely disconcerted by the sustained vigour of Knox's pursuit. Nearing Rouxville, he thought of an attack upon that place, but abandoned the idea because of the proximity of his pursuers. It was held only by a small garrison of Highland Light Infantry, and might well have fallen, had not De Wet feared the consequences of even a few hours' delay.



De Wet fords
Amsterdam Drift.

On this northward retreat, says our British officer, De Wet trekked night and day, the longest halt for some days being about three hours. He reached the Caledon at Commissie Bridge on December 7; to his chagrin and surprise he found the British there, holding it, and he did not dare to try to force a passage. Hurrying up the river, he discovered that a difficult ford, known as Amsterdam Drift, was unguarded, and plunged into the water. The river was flowing high, and covered the maxims and guns on their passage, yet he managed to get his force over without more serious loss than a few carts. Meanwhile Knox had reached Kroomdraai Farm to the north-east of Aliwal North, only a few hours behind De Wet, on the afternoon of the 6th, and had hurried forward to Commissie Bridge, where he crossed the Caledon. He gained heavily upon De Wet by making use of the bridge; but, unfortunately, want of supplies compelled him to wait a day, till his waggons could be replenished from Bethulie,

and thus handicapped him. On the 8th De Wet was at Smithfield, apparently endeavouring to edge off to the west and get clear of the forces which, he knew, were waiting for him athwart the favourite Boer line of retreat from Ladybrand to Thaba N'chu. Knox, however, anticipated this manœuvre, and, accelerating his march, moved rather more to the west so as to force the enemy back in the direction of Thaba N'chu. At the same time a fresh column under Colonel White was brought up to Reddersburg, to drive him off in case he struck north-westwards, towards the railway. For British and Boers alike the going was very bad. The constant rains had softened the surface of the veldt and left the tracks deep in mud. Behind De Wet's column the roads were covered with dying or worn-out horses and oxen.

That De Wet was able to keep ahead of the numerous British forces now in pursuit, in spite of all his doublings and twistings and turnings, is somewhat surprising. The explanation is given

by the
Boer method of transport. British officer

who was an enforced witness of his manœuvres. "In the first instance," he says, "the Boers, as a rule, only half load their waggons; and a great part of their transport consists of Cape carts, of which they had hundreds. Again, the burghers do all their own driving; they have two native boys attached to each wagon, but these do not do the driving, and are only used at the halt to look after the mules and

Count Pecci (Nephew of the Pope), Colonel Camillo Ricchiardi di Alba (Piedmont), Captain Max Schiffs, Commanding the Engineers Section, Count Villeneuve de la Colette, Commanding the Dutch Squadron.



Major Joseph di Termini Imerese (Sicily).

Baron von Goldek, Commanding the Hungarian Squadron.

Lieutenant Simon, of the Hungarian Squadron.

[Photo by Zanutto.]

OFFICERS OF THE FOREIGN LEGION, AT TRIESTE, ON THEIR RETURN FROM SERVICE WITH THE BOERS.

inspan and outspan when there is no immediate hurry. In the case of a surprise or sudden start the Boers even do this part themselves. There is no doubt the Boers are masters of the art of driving a wagon and getting both mules and oxen along. It is true that during the trek they had only two ox waggons, but the way their oxen were made to keep up with the mule transport was extraordinary; these poor animals were flogged along, and when one became exhausted he was taken out and left on the veldt, another being there to take his place. They drove a herd of about a dozen oxen in reserve to put into the ox waggons. I have every reason to be thankful that the Boers did take their ox waggons, since to it I owe my escape from their hands, as I shall afterwards show."

Whenever they came to a farm they turned their horses upon the standing corn, which the British had been so accommodating as to leave for them; stripped the place of forage and eatables, and commandeered every male above fourteen. They carried spare rifles with them, with which to arm these recruits. In short, they behaved to their own people far worse than did the British, whom all the time they and their fervent supporters in England

Raiding farms.

were furiously denouncing for imaginary inhumanity. As a matter of fact the conversation of De Wet's men afforded absolute demonstration of the necessity of denuding the country and removing the Boer women and children from the farms. Several of the burghers complained that it was very hard to come back to life on commando, after a month's leave with their wives and families on the farms! They were furious at the destruction of these farms, but they did not seem to grasp the fact that it was the inevitable result of their guerilla tactics. The feeling of the burghers to De Wet was by no means cordial. He had the hardness and sternness which are, perhaps, required by the great soldier, but his severities did not make him loved. Still, according to the officer already quoted, his influence with his men was great and they obeyed him readily, liking the way in which he was prolonging the

war, and tricking the English. Among the commandos the best men were the Free State burghers; the worst the riff-raff of foreign mercenaries. There were many men who talked English and seemed English by nationality, to whom we may hope that the shortest of shrifts will be granted if they ever fall into our hands.

On the 9th De Wet was at Helvetia, midway between Smithfield and Dewetsdorp, when suddenly, about 7 a.m., to his great surprise a British force came upon him and opened on his column with a 15-pounder and

De Wet chased from Helvetia towards Reddersburg.

a "Pom-Pom." The Boers hurried off to the north-east, pressing their teams to the utmost and making no effort to return the fire. The British prisoners had the unpleasant experience of being shelled by British guns; the shrapnel and "Pom-Pom" shells fell right and left among the carts, but strange to say did little damage. Here and there an animal was lit; there were, however, reserves of mules and horses from which the losses could readily be replaced. The British fire caused great confusion, and in the turmoil four of the British officers, who were prisoners, managed to escape. They bolted to a walled enclosure and hid there, but to their horror the British artillery proceeded to turn its fire upon their hiding place, probably supposing that the Boers were lining the stone wall. Fortunately, the shrapnel hit no one, and a few minutes later the refugees were safe with Barker's and White's pursuing columns, some 3,000 yards behind the Boers.



[Photo by Mayall.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL A. W. THORNEYCROFT, C.B.

(A biographical note appears on p. 284, Vol. I., of "With the Flag to Pretoria.")

Colonel Thorneycroft served under Sir Redvers Buller in the campaign which resulted in the relief of Ladysmith. He proceeded with the Natal Army in command of his regiment over the passes of the Drakensberg into the Transvaal, and joined the main Army of Lord Roberts. After Sir Redvers Buller's return to England and the redistribution of the Natal Army, Colonel Thorneycroft joined in the operations against De Wet in command of a mobile column in the Orange River Colony.


of Reddersburg, where on December 11, the British arrived about noon, to learn that De Wet was

Haasbroek breaks through the cordon.

some hours ahead. He had gained considerably by trekking all night—a frequent practice of his when he was in difficulties. But by hard marching Knox once more got to the west of him and pressed him back in the direction of Thaba N'chu.

During the 12th he was greatly reinforced by Haasbroek's commando, which must have brought his strength up to 3,000 men or more. On this same day White seized a position on the Dewetsdorp and Thaba N'chu road, while Knox was still to the rear of De Wet, who was now at Geluk, close to Dewetsdorp, so that there were British forces on either side of the Boers, and their capture seemed almost certain. De Wet started to entrench himself, and it appeared as though he meant to stand a

siege. It was a trick he had tried before—successfully—against Lord Kitchener, in August. From this dangerous position the guerilla leader trekked all the night of the 12-13th, and turned sharply to the east, heading for Springhaan Nek, fifteen miles to the east of Thaba N'chu. Springhaan Nek is a broad defile four miles in width. Its entrance was defended by two small fortified posts, which were held by the British, while Colonel Thorneycroft, with a mobile column, composed of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, some other mounted troops, and a detachment of artillery, was watching the pass from the heights to the east of it. To veil his real intentions, De Wet directed Haasbroek to make a feint upon Vic-



[Photo by Captain C. L. Andersson, S.A.L.H.]

RECRUITS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN LIGHT HORSE DETRAINING AT BLOEMFONTEIN ON THEIR WAY TO JOIN IN THE CHASE OF DE WET, December, 1900.



[Photo by Captain C. L. Andersson, S.A.L.H.]

CAPTAIN A. SOLLY-FLOOD (Adj.) AND CAPTAIN G. ALLSOP, South African Light Horse.

toria Nek, a pass further to the west. Colonel White, observing Haasbroek's movement, apparently mistook the feint for the real attack, and gave chase. He gained rapidly upon the Boers, and at nightfall came up with them. But the results were insignificant. The carts, transport, and guns were all with De Wet, and Haasbroek's men merely scattered in twos and threes, and thus escaped in the falling darkness. There was some attempt at pursuit; the Welsh Yeomanry galloped into their midst and emptied their rifles among the flying Boers, while one of the British ammunition waggons dashed right into them, the drivers making free use of their revolvers. These incidents did not, however, compensate for the passage of Haasbroek through the British cordon. Further to the east De Wet was just as successful. When he neared Springhaan Nek, he put his horses to the gallop, Steyn and Fouché leading, and himself bringing up the rear. In this wise he dashed in open order through the pass, under the very noses of the amazed British, receiving the fire of Colonel

Thorneycroft's artillery, but otherwise sustaining surprisingly little damage. The British failed to attack him with energy in this critical operation. Had they delayed him for only a brief half-hour, Knox would have been given time to come in upon his rear, and probably nothing could have saved him. Knox was but four miles behind, pushing his men to the utmost, and calling upon them to make

every endeavour to close with the enemy they had so long and so gallantly pursued. The heliographs twinkling from the north showed that there was no mistake this time as to where the enemy really were. But once more the British efforts were in vain. The only fruit of so much toil and so much weary marching was to add to



AUSTRALIAN SHEEP FOR FOOD FOR THE BRITISH ARMY.

This photograph represents the pens of the Sydney Meat Preserving Company. The remaining pictures on this opening show the processes by which the sheep are converted into food for the army in South Africa.

De Wet's prestige. Someone blundered—who, we are not told—and the Boers got through. Thorneycroft's force, however, succeeded in cutting off De Wet's extreme rearguard, and between them the South African Light Horse and Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry captured one 15-pounder, of the guns taken from the British at Dewetsdorp, one "Pom-Pom," several waggons, some mules and horses, and twenty-two waggons. But the great bulk of De Wet's force, with most of his transport, got away. Moving rapidly to the north, they effected a junction with Prinsloo, who had hurried down from Ficksburg to co-operate with De Wet, and who had required a good deal of watching by Colonel Thorneycroft.

The whole of the Boer force did not pass north. On his raid through the Rouxville district,



THE CUTTING-UP ROOM

In which the carcasses are stripped and cut up ready for the boners. The floor is of open battens, giving good ventilation and allowing the fat, skins, and waste portions to pass on to conveyors which travel underneath. The skins are dressed, the fat made into tallow, and the whole of the refuse is converted into manure, some of which goes to grow rice in Japan, and some to raise sugar in Mauritius. Over a million sheep are dealt with at these works annually, and they employ 600 hands, and consume 35 tons of coal and 50,000 gallons of water daily.

De Wet appears to have sent strong detachments to all the villages that

Boers supreme in the south-east of the Colony.

were not garrisoned by the British, to hoist the flag of the Free State



THE BONING ROOM.

and to stir up the burghers to revolt. One of these detachments on December 13 encountered a number of recruits of the 2nd Brabant's Horse, and inflicted upon them a very serious check.

The captain in command was badly wounded, 3 men were killed, 17 others wounded, and 107 taken prisoners. The prisoners had to be immediately released, as the enemy had no means of securing them or feeding them. No detailed information of this humiliating affair has ever been published, but it seems to have been the result of allowing raw and untrained men to come into contact with a veteran enemy. Henceforth, the south-east of the Orange River Colony, which had been pacified once in March and a second time in October, was more disturbed than ever. The British garrisons were one by one withdrawn, and the region was left to the enemy, to whom by reason of its fertility



PRESERVING MEAT FOR THE USE OF THE ARMY: THE STAMPING ROOM.

In this room the tops and bottoms of the tins are stamped out, and the bodies of the tins cut out by slitting machines, ready for soldering together.

it was of the utmost value. Other Boer detachments slipped south round the British left, during the chase of De Wet, with the intention of entering Cape Colony, while our energy was directed elsewhere. Their movements will be treated in a later chapter.


From Thaba N'chu De Wet

passed north to his old hunting ground in the region between Senekal and Lindley. The pursuit of him was continued as far as Senekal, and there was somewhat relaxed, but he was not, as on previous occasions, allowed a respite of weeks, to rest and recruit his force for a fresh move. No doubt the exhaustion of the British troops and the want of more mounted men were reasons why



THE PRESERVING ROOM.

Here the meat, in the tins, is subjected to a heat sufficient to sterilize it and to drive out all the air. The tins are then sealed, so that the meat is preserved in vacuo.



THE FILLING AND STUFFING ROOM.

Here the meat is placed in the tins and rammed tight.

such breathing-time had been given him. Yet the effect of any intermission of aggressive operations by the British was greatly to prolong the war. Could De Wet have been continually harried and pressed, week in, week out, he might well have been run to earth. But what actually happened was

this: He would take the offensive, making some bold foray or capturing some British post; half-a-dozen columns were then detailed to give chase; after a week or a fortnight's pursuit he was enclosed in a cordon; then he broke through the cordon; and finally, he would retreat to Lindley,

De Wet's tactics.

Senekal, or Vrede, and there remain some weeks, more or less unmolested, resting his horses and giving furlough to his men. In justice to the British mounted troops it must be remembered that, being comparatively few in number, they were wanted in all directions, and were kept almost continuously at work. Many of them had covered 4,000 miles of veldt between March and November, 1900; few had done less than 2,500 miles. Ten days' rest in that whole period was all that two of the regular mounted infantry battalions had been granted. "With them," says one of



E. Prater.]

THE CAPTURE OF THE BODYGUARD: LIEUT. BATESON'S DARING RIDE.

Reuter's correspondents, "a short day is twenty miles, and a fair average about twenty-five. They march every day at any time from 4 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. They call a six o'clock start 'a European morning.' They carry no tents, have none of the luxuries of big infantry columns, seldom get into camp till late in the afternoon, and, to add to their discomforts, as one of the men exclaimed the other day, 'We've followed the rainy season from the Vaal to the Orange.'"

However, on this occasion, Knox, with Barker's, Pilcher's, and White's columns, kept fairly close to De Wet. They swept the Ladybrand district clear of Boers, and compelled De Wet to release at Senekal a large number of burghers whom he was carrying round

He is pushed towards Reitz.

with his force and compelling to fight. These ex-prisoners were allowed to go to their farms when they fell into Knox's hands. Five waggon-loads of supplies and about 6,000 rounds of ammunition were also captured by the British. At the end of December, De Wet, after one or two attempts to make his way south, was pushed back to the north-east, in the direction of Reitz. Colonel White, still close on his tracks, determined to follow him up to Reitz

and occupy that place. On January 3, 1901, accordingly, he ordered Colonel Laing, commanding Lord Kitchener's Bodyguard, a force of picked Colonial mounted infantry attached to his column, to take 150 men and reconnoitre the approaches to Reitz. The detachment rode off and was promptly ambushed by the enemy.

What happened was this: Small parties of Boers were seen on the British right and left as Colonel Laing neared Reitz, but they were a long way off and they seemed to retire hurriedly on catching sight of the

**Colonel Laing
ambushed.**

British. The Colonel, who was an old soldier and had risen from the ranks, was an extremely brave and impetuous man. He hurried forward, and was leading his men up a valley in close order—column of troops—with a few scouts out, when suddenly shots were heard on the right. Two scouts came galloping in with information, but before they could impart it one was tumbled off his horse by the enemy's fire—shot dead with an expanding bullet through the head—and the horse of the other fell. The fire evidently came from close quarters. Laing seized the situation, but too late. He had barely time to order the leading squadron to wheel at a trot, when from a kopje only 600 yards away came a perfect tempest of bullets. Laing was wounded, and several of the saddles of the Bodyguard were emptied. An attempt was made to deploy to the left and deliver a counter-attack, but now from that quarter also came a terrible fire. The enemy were clearly in great strength, and there was nothing for it but retreat. Colonel White was known to be only four miles to the rear, and if the Bodyguard fell back towards his force he

would be certain to lend it a helping hand. But the moment the British tried to retire they found that the enemy had swiftly moved round to their rear and had cut them off. Their only alternatives were to surrender then and there or to fight on, in the hope of White coming up. The Bodyguard determined on the latter course. They dashed to a donga near at hand, with the bullets claiming their victims each instant, dismounted, and did their best to return the enemy's fire.

So hopeless was the situation that some now suggested surrender. But the braver hearts would have none of it, though

**Surrender of Lord
Kitchener's Bodyguard.**

at this moment Colonel Laing was shot dead with a Martini bullet through his heart. The Boers, seeing how few were their enemies, began to press closer and closer on them, pouring in all the time a deadly fire. Yet the men of the Bodyguard did not flinch. The officers took the rifles of the dead, and used them with effect. At this juncture Lieutenant Bateson did a supremely brave deed. The only chance for the British was to obtain aid from Colonel White. Bateson suddenly mounted, dashed out through the midst of the Boers, and made his way to the British column, with news of the plight in which he had left the Bodyguard. White at once despatched all his available artillery and mounted men to repair the disaster. Unhappily, the relief force arrived too late. They were just in time to see the Boers removing their prisoners, but they had at least the satisfaction of shelling them and inflicting some loss upon them. It appeared that the Boers had crawled to within thirty yards of the donga, in overwhelming force, upon which some of the Bodyguard had



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL D. TYRIE LAING,

Who was killed near Reitz, commanded the Commander-in-Chief's Bodyguard, which was composed of picked Colonials. He enlisted in a Highland regiment, but left Scotland to settle in South Africa, where he soon afterwards took part in the Matabele War. Only a short time before his death he had been promoted from the rank of Major.



[Photo by Sinclair, Gibraltar.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL W. L. WHITE, R.A.

Entered the Artillery in 1876; Captain, 1885; Major, 1893; served in the Sudan, 1885; went to South Africa on special service, 1899; commanded a flying column in the Orange River and Cape Colonies in 1900, and now (June, 1901) commands Zand River Camp.

surrendered. The others, refusing to obey the order to cease fire, had continued their resistance until the Boers threatened that they would kill the prisoners unless this stubborn remnant laid down its arms. On this the whole force surrendered, with a loss of 18 killed, including Colonel Laing, 28 wounded, and about 100 taken prisoners.

While these operations against De Wet were in progress, the enemy had not been inactive in other quarters of the Orange River Colony. Early in November a small detachment of Orange River Colony Police was surrounded, while out patrolling near Petrusburg in the west of the Colony. They held their ground for some hours, until their ammunition was exhausted, and then surrendered, but were released after being stripped of their rifles and equipment. A few days later a convoy of two waggons which left Warrenton, a station on

**Attacks on the
Western Railway.**

the railway some distance north of Kimberley, for Christiana, was attacked by the Boers and captured. The detachment in charge of it numbered only eighteen men, and was unable to offer any effective resistance. Emboldened by the complete impunity which attended their operations, the enemy now destroyed four miles of railway south of Kimberley, and on the 15th attempted to blow up two culverts at Brussels, near Vryburg, but were driven off by an armoured train. On the 23rd they fired upon a passenger train at Border Siding without, however, doing any damage. They also showed themselves at Phokwani, a station a little to the north of Border Siding, and on the 24th attacked a police post near that place and compelled the police to retire to Taungs. On December 10 they appeared at Riverton Road, carried off all the stores they could load into their waggons, drenched the remnant with paraffin and set it on fire, cut the telegraph, broke the line, and only retired when an armoured train appeared upon the scene. Besides these attacks, which were reported at the time, it is certain that there were others which never found their way into print, so that the main line of communication between Orange River Station and Mafeking was daily menaced.



[Photo by Captain C. L. Andersson, S.A.L.H.]

BOER PRISONERS AT BLOEMFONTEIN ABOUT TO ENTRAIN FOR CAPETOWN, Christmas Day, 1900.

The Boer commandos operating in the west of the Colony showed themselves at Abraham's Kraal, close to Driefontein, on November 13, where a skirmish was fought with a detachment of Yeomanry. On the 19th they were driven from Aasvogel Kopje by Colonel White, after a brisk exchange of fire. On the 27th they were at Bultfontein, where White again engaged them. He drove them in flight, pursuing them for some distance, but could not inflict any very serious loss upon them, though he killed and wounded half a dozen of them. Several of the enemy were observed to be clothed in khaki—a growing practice of theirs at

**Operations in the
south-west.**

this time, and one which added considerably to the difficulty of the task before the British troops. They numbered about 400 and had no guns; they were understood to be under the orders of Haasbroek and Nel. On the 28th they attacked Boshof, but were beaten off, and the same fate attended a second attempt on the following day. On the same day General Settle came into collision with a quite independent force, about 500 strong, under Herzog, at Luckhoff, in the extreme south-western corner of the Colony. Again no decisive success could be secured. On the advance of the British the enemy seized a strong position from which, after five hours' fighting, they were ejected with trivial loss. Herzog had previously, on November 16, attacked a police post of 100 men under Captain Tucker, at Strydom's Dam, near Bloemfontein. A picket of ten men under Sergeant Hamilton and the main camp were assailed at one and the same time. Of the picket nine were killed or captured, but the assault upon the camp was repelled, and some loss was inflicted upon the Boers. Small detachments from Herzog's force were at the close of November along the north bank of the Orange River, from the neighbourhood of Colesberg bridge to Zand Drift, near Petrusburg, apparently reconnoitring in view of an invasion of Cape Colony. On November 27



STORES OF THE TWENTIETH DIVISION (UNDER LORD METHUEN) AT BOSHOF.
The Dutch Church in the background.



PIPERS OF THE 4TH SCOTTISH RIFLES AT BOSHOF.

they suddenly approached the camp of the Grenadier Guards at Zand Drift, and fired into it, killing one man and wounding two others. It is probable that some of these small bodies actually crossed the Orange about this time, though they did not make their presence felt on the south side of the river for some days.

Haasbroek's commando, besides causing trouble at Bultfontein, was active south of Bloemfontein, repeatedly attacking the railway, and from time to time lending a hand to De Wet and Prinsloo, who were operating further to the east. Edenburg was the scene of almost continuous skirmishing, and the railway and telegraph lines were repeatedly broken near that place. Thus on November 14 the railway was cut, and there was a small fight between a British mobile column and the enemy just outside the village, with insignificant results. The line was promptly cleared and repaired. On the night of the 21st a patrol of police had a brush with Haasbroek's men to the south of Bloemfontein and narrowly escaped capture.

**Haasbroek active
south of Bloemfontein.**

In the north-east of the Colony there was no intermission in the guerilla warfare, though the enemy were there not quite so active as in the south. Bruce Hamilton, after working across the

north of the Colony, marched from Kroonstad on November 10, with Lindley and Heilbron as his destination. He captured a few Boers on this march and denuded the country, but as the enemy had just made a haul of 3,000 sheep and cattle from the British near Harrismith, they were not reduced to starvation. The prisoners reported that the Boer commandos never used the roads, but travelled along the mountain paths; they derided the slowness of the British movements; and they told some extraordinary stories, probably with the object of currying favour with their captors, as to the reports spread by De Wet. According to them De Wet had announced that on December 10 all the British were going home, that Botha had driven the enemy from the Transvaal, that the Volunteers and Yeomanry refused any longer to fight, that General Buller had gone to England because he, with 7,000 men, had been taken prisoner and released upon parole, and that Lord Roberts had died of wounds at Heilbron. They added the

Bruce Hamilton in the north-east.



Chas. M. Sheldon.

BOERS LOOTING A STORE IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

invariable refrain that the Boers were sick of the war and would surrender but for De Wet and Steyn. This rubbish appears to have been swallowed, since it was telegraphed home. But it may be doubted whether the majority of the enemy were not perfectly informed as to the truth, and if there had been any real desire on the part of the commandos to surrender, more deserters would have come into the British lines. From Heilbron, Bruce Hamilton marched to the Vaal and entered the Transvaal, after some skirmishing with scattered parties of the enemy near Wolvehoek.

General Rundle, in the Harrismith, Vrede, and Bethlehem districts, fought several small skirmishes with the enemy during November. On the 10th the Boers made a determined attack on the British troops at Reitz, but were repulsed; on the previous day they assailed a British

Rundle skirmishes in the Bethlehem district.

patrol near Vrede. On the 23rd General Campbell, while marching from Harrismith to Bethlehem, found the Boers in a strong position athwart his road at Tiger Kloof. He at once attacked, when the Scots Guards delivered a dashing assault upon the Boer centre and drove it in, with a total loss of only five. But the country did not settle down, probably because no severe punishment was inflicted upon these small bodies of guerillas infesting it, and in early December the Boers became more aggressive. On the 12th of that month they delivered

simultaneous night attacks upon Bethlehem and Vrede, but were in each case repulsed. Their loss is placed in British reports at twenty-four killed and wounded.

We have repeatedly noticed the growing savagery of the Boers in this period, and the tendency, which is always manifested in guerilla warfare, towards acts which can scarcely be described in any other way than as murderous atrocities.

Instances of Boer savagery.

One of the worst examples was the murder of a British Afrikaner officer, Lieutenant Neumeyer, who was on his way to Bloemfontein to join the Orange River Colony Police. He was proceeding north with a surrendered burgher in a Cape cart, when near Rouxville a party of Boers fired upon him. Neumeyer directed the burgher to run for his life, and himself went forward and surrendered to the enemy; they led him to a donga and murdered him there. When last seen, he was standing erect, facing them like a true and gallant soldier. The criminals must have struck him, as the traces of a heavy blow were found upon his face. They shot him twice and left him dead. His body was found on November 23, hidden in the donga. Seven of the murderers were afterwards captured, but it is doubtful if they were shot. Another incident occurred near Kroonstad, where a patrol of De Lisle's Colonials met what was apparently another British patrol, as all the men wore British uniforms and carried Lee-Netfords. This strange patrol suddenly opened fire, killing a sergeant and wounding two men. Such treachery deserved stern punishment, for, though in war you may assume the enemy's uniform, you do so with the distinct understanding that if captured you may be shot. But our happy-go-lucky "lenient" methods permitted the Boers to abuse our clemency. It was quite bad enough to concede belligerent rights to an enemy who wore no distinguishing mark; the situation became intolerable when the enemy positively adopted a dress which was the British uniform.



MAJOR-GENERAL B. B. D. CAMPBELL, C.B., M.V.O.

Born 1845; joined the Scots Guards, 1864; Captain, 1866; Lieut-Colonel, 1876; Colonel, 1886; Major-General, 1898. Served with the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in the Egyptian War of 1882. In command of the 16th Brigade, South Africa Field Force, January, 1900.



HARRISMITH.

[Photo by Caney.]

Harrismith lies at an elevation of 5,250 feet above the sea level, 250 miles from Durban, and 210 from Bloemfontein. It is in the Orange River Colony, close to the Natal border. The normal population is just under 1,000. Harrismith is a considerable commercial centre, and much trade is done with the Orange River Colony, and even with Basutoland. The altitude of the town makes it peculiarly healthy, and it is much frequented by those suffering from pulmonary complaints. About three miles away are some wonderful Bushman paintings on the walls of a cave. The town was named after Sir Harry Smith.



[Sketched from life by Mortimer Menpes.]

LORD MILNER OF ST. JAMES'S AND OF CAPETOWN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

Born in 1854 in Wurtemberg, son of Charles Milner, M.D., professor at Tübingen, and of a daughter of Major-General Ready, Governor of the Isle of Man. He was educated in Germany, at King's College, London, and under Jowett at Balliol College, Oxford, where he had a brilliant career. He was called to the Bar, 1881, and was afterwards for some time associated with the editorial staff of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, under the editorship of Mr. John Morley, and, for a brief period, of Mr. Stead. He was Private Secretary to Mr. Goschen, 1887-9, and through his influence was sent to Egypt in 1889 as Under-Secretary of Finance. In 1892 he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, and in 1897 High Commissioner of South Africa. On December 13, 1900, he was made Governor of the Transvaal and of Orange River Colony. On May 24, 1901, on his arrival in England, the King conferred on him the title of "Baron Milner of St. James's in the County of London, and of Capetown in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope." It is to him that the country looks for the permanent settlement of affairs in South Africa.

CHAPTER XII.

NOOITGEDACHT AND EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL IN DECEMBER.

De la Rey in the Magaliesberg—Clements moves to oppose him at Nooitgedacht—Disposition of the British troops—Boer plan of attack—Beyers rushes the pickets—Furious onslaught of the Boers—Death of Colonel Legge—Clements takes command—Perilous position of the Staff and guns—Beyers attacks the troops on the heights—Clements' desperate position—Retiring the guns of P Battery—Disorder in the camps—Impedimenta abandoned in retreat—Courageous gunners—Boers loot the British camps—Clements retires to Rietfontein—Disaster to the Northumberlanders—French ordered to clear the Magaliesberg—Clements' advance—Failure to pacify the Rustenburg country—Methuen denudes the Zeerust district—Enemy active around Johannesburg—Destruction of mining gear—Guarding the Rand—British neutrals—Lax defences of Johannesburg—High price of necessities—Colonial criticism—Want of adaptiveness of the British generals—Parliamentary election—Despatch of reinforcements.



TOWARDS the close of November a strong Boer force under De la Rey, which had its hunting ground in the country between the Magaliesberg Range and the Johannesburg-Klerksdorp Railway, began to show great activity.

De la Rey in the Magaliesberg.

While detachments from it under Lemmer and Doulthwaite faced General Hart in the Gatsrand and hung round the west of Pretoria, the main body, estimated at about a thousand men, with two field-guns and a "Pom-Pom," watched General Clements. On November 25 Clements marched towards Reitfontein, which lies on the northern side of the Magaliesberg, and came into contact with this force. According to the official telegram, which in the light of after-events must



THE ATTACK ON THE CONVOY AT BUFFELSPORT (p. 242).

A. C. Ball.]

be taken with a very large pinch of salt, he "completely dispersed" it. At the same time, as the Boer loss by British accounts was only six killed, it is obvious that the blow was not of a very serious nature. Having effected this "dispersal," Clements returned to Krugersdorp with a quantity of cattle and a number of refugees whom he had removed from the country traversed by his troops.

Only a week later De la Rey had reassembled his scattered burghers and was again merrily at work. On December 3, 500 of his command suddenly attacked a convoy which was proceeding from Pretoria to Rustenburg, under the escort of 300 men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, Yorkshire Light Infantry, and West Yorkshire

Regiment, with two guns of the 75th Battery. The affair occurred at Buffelspoort to the north of the Magaliesberg. The troops with the convoy fought splendidly to save it, but the enemy captured and destroyed the lead-



TWO VIEWS OF THE PRISON AT WATERVAL,
NEAR PRETORIA.

Commonly called "The Birdcage." Prepared by the Boers for the reception of British prisoners, and afterwards used by the British for Boer prisoners.

ing waggons. The last half of the convoy was protected by the fine conduct of the gunners with the two guns. They poured case-shot in upon the enemy, killing several of them, only fifty yards from the guns. The noise of the firing was heard at Rustenburg and Commando Nek, from both of which points assistance was sent, while General Broadwood's Cavalry Brigade, then clearing the country to the north of the Magaliesberg was also directed to hasten to the aid of the convoy. But the Boers were satisfied with half a loaf and hurriedly retired, taking with them a few prisoners. They had in addition killed fifteen and wounded twenty-three of the British troops.

On December 1 General Clements had been ordered by Lord Kitchener to move out from Krugersdorp and advance up the Hekpoort valley to the Magaliesberg. In this valley and on the



[Photo by Underwood & Underwood.]

INTERIOR OF "MUD HALL," THE LAST PRISON OCCUPIED BY BRITISH
OFFICERS AT PRETORIA.

southern slopes of the Magaliesberg, De la Rey's men had their laagers and rallying points. Clements accordingly marched to Nooitgedacht, immediately to the south of the range, on or about December 10. He did not come into collision with De la Rey's force; the Boers avoided battle and remained near Hekpoort, facing him with about a thousand men. He himself did not feel strong enough to attack them in a formidable position with his total of only about 1,200 combatants. Before leaving Krugersdorp he had protested that his column was insufficient for the work before it, and events showed that his protest was fully justified. What added to his uneasiness was a vague warning that a second Boer force was to be expected from the north. This force, under Commandant Beyers, was about 1,500 or 2,000 strong, and had been for some time at Warmbaths. Beyers and De la Rey had arranged between them for a sudden concentration and attack upon the British column. To reach De la Rey, however, Beyers would have to run the gauntlet of Broadwood's Cavalry Brigade, which was supposed to be scouring the country north of the Magaliesberg. It is probable that General Clements looked to this brigade—and not without reason—to intercept any Boer force coming from the north.

The British troops were divided into three sections, two encamped in the valley under the berg and the other on the mountains. The main camp lay just under the ridge of the Magaliesberg, at a point where a gully runs up the frowning precipices. In this camp were the transport waggons, a 4.7-in. gun, two sections of the 8th Battery, and two companies of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers. To the west of it was a second camp, in which were the Imperial Yeomanry (20th, 22nd, 26th, and 27th Companies), Kitchener's Horse, Ceylon Mounted Infantry, 2nd Mounted Infantry, and P Horse Artillery Battery. Yet further away to the west, four companies of the

Clements moves to oppose him at Nooitgedacht.



Sydney P. Hall.

ONLY A PAWN.

[After a sketch by Lionel James.]

The body of a Colonial trooper, who had been wounded in a reconnaissance and left on the field, was found as here depicted. He was a chess-player, and was carrying in his haversack a miniature set of chessmen. He had placed a pawn on his empty water-bottle to represent his own appreciation of his part in the great game of war.

Disposition of the British troops.

the west of it was a second camp, in which were the Imperial Yeomanry (20th, 22nd, 26th, and 27th Companies), Kitchener's Horse, Ceylon Mounted Infantry, 2nd Mounted Infantry, and P Horse Artillery Battery. Yet further away to the west, four companies of the

Yorkshire Light Infantry were entrenched, protecting the British left. On the summit of the ridge,



[Photo by Mayall.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NORTON LEGGE, D.S.O.,

Lieut.-Colonel of the 20th Hussars, fought in the Egyptian and Sudan campaigns, 1885-6; in the Dongola Expedition, under Lord Kitchener, in 1896 (in command of four squadrons of Egyptian cavalry); and in the operations of 1898, including the battle of Khartoum. When Lord Kitchener was appointed Chief of the Staff in South Africa, Colonel Legge—at that time D.A.A.G. to the Inspector-General of Cavalry in India—left for Capetown, and in eleven days organised Kitchener's Horse. After commanding this regiment, he had charge of a corps of mounted infantry in Ridley's Brigade, and later on of the 6th Corps (with local rank of Brigadier-General) in General Clements' Division. In this command he met his death at Nooitgedacht.

intended, though Beyers, with complete success, evaded General Broadwood, and on the evening of December 12 was in touch with De la Rey.

That evening no sign of the proximity of


Beyers rushes a large Boer force was visible to the menaced British column. Clements was still quietly waiting for the reinforcements which did not come from Pretoria. De la Rey in the neighbourhood of Hekpoort seemed perfectly quiet. And so the night came down. Under cover of it Beyers made his dispositions. The burghers who were to attack the camp crawled

upon the sharp knobs which rose on either side of the gully, were posted four companies of Northumberlands, with pickets out in all directions. The mountain chain, which descended precipitously towards the British camp, on the south, was flat on the summit for some distance and then fell slowly away to the north. The level tableland on the summit and the northern slopes were covered with countless boulders, affording just the kind of cover of which the Boers knew so well how to avail themselves. Yet the British position was, on the whole, about as good a one as could have been found. The Northumberlands on the crest of the ridge, it was thought, would be able to prevent any dangerous attack from the north. The troops in the valley, far below, would be able to meet any assailant coming from the south. The real drawback was that the men on the crest were remote from help and could not be quickly supported.

The Boer plan was for Beyers with one detachment to attack the British camps in the valley from the west, and when Clements' attention was thoroughly engaged,

Boer plan of attack.

to throw the other and larger detachment upon the Northumberlands, holding the mountain ridge, from the north. De la Rey was to come up from Hekpoort, dismount his men and take the British in the rear. Had this plan been carried out in its entirety the British force must have been annihilated. But fortunately events did not go quite as the Boers had



[Based on a sketch made on the spot.]

SKETCH-MAP OF THE NOOITGEDACHT POSITION.

through the thick bush, as near as they could get to the camp without causing a general alarm. The enemy on the ridge above took cover stealthily behind the rocks and boulders, round the outposts of the Northumberland. The alarm came first from the bush near the British western camp in the valley. Here the Boers actually rushed the pickets and closed in upon the supports, which happened to be strong. As the British soldiers saw figures in khaki, wearing "smasher" hats, crawling through the bush not eighty yards away, they challenged. It was now 4 a.m. of December 13, and the day had not yet broken, so that the light was dim. This aided the Boers in no small degree,

Furious onslaught of the Boers.

since in the uncertain light they were for an instant taken by the British for Colonials, an error which may have saved the burghers many casualties. But, then, as the mysterious figures crept forward, soldier after soldier in the supports opened fire. A furious fusillade broke the stillness of early day, arousing the slumbering men in the camps and upon the ridge to battle. The troops poured out to aid the supports and a fierce fight began in the bush. Two guns of P Battery were quickly upon the scene. The gunners drove them into the bush and served them with case, at quite close quarters with the enemy. Colonel Legge, who commanded the Mounted Infantry, dashed into the battle, half-dressed. Though



[From a sketch by Colonel Watson, R.F.A.]

THE SCENE OF THE NOOITGEDACHT DISASTER.

he had lost not a moment, he was only just in time to save a picket of thirty men, which had been enveloped and cut off by the Boers. The thirty fought like heroes, yet most of them went down in a minute or two, under a murderous fire at short range. Legge pushed out his men in extended formation to their aid, but the Boers could not be seen, and their bullets seemed to come from every bush. At this juncture Legge himself fell dead, shot while gallantly directing the counter-attack. He was struck by three bullets.

Death of Colonel Legge.

The battle raged furiously in the bush as the sun rose in the sky. General Clements arrived and took command. The Boers, however, no longer displayed the dash and vigour which had marked their attack at the outset. They were under a severe fire from a small British detachment, high up on the precipices in the middle of the gully, and though they

Clements takes command.

sent some of their skirmishers to press up the steep slopes, these skirmishers after considerable fighting were dislodged by the British mounted infantry. Then, at last, the Boers apparently gave way. They ran in all directions to the bush, and under its cover hurried to the point where they had left their horses, a mile away. The British imagined that they had been dealing with

De la Rey's men, and supposed that the attack was over. Clements signalled by heliograph to the Northumberlanders on the heights, to know if they were safe. They answered promptly that they had not been attacked. Thereupon the rest of the British force returned to camp, leaving only the two guns of P Battery and their escort of mounted infantry in the bush on the side of the mountain.



SERGEANT DONALD FARMER, V.C.

Sergeant Farmer, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, is twenty-three years of age, and is the first of his regiment to receive the V.C. He fought at the Atbara and at Khartoum, and was present at the affair at Fashoda. During the attack on General Clements' camp at Nootgedacht, on December 13, 1900, a small detachment of the Cameron Highlanders went to assist a picket, when some Boers, concealed by trees, suddenly opened fire on them at close range, killing or wounding three-fourths of their number. Lieut. Sandilands was lying wounded, shot through the liver and through both shoulders, when Sergeant Farmer carried him to a comparatively safe place; he then returned to the firing line, and removed bandoliers of cartridges from the dead and wounded for distribution among those still able to fire. After getting Lieut. Sandilands conveyed to the ambulance, he again returned to the fighting line, and was eventually taken prisoner.

on the crest, and whether there was any sign of De la Rey. But this explanation was not known to the British, who supposed that they had been fighting De la Rey all the time. The Horse Artillery guns and a "Pom-Pom" at once opened fire upon the watchers. And then a few shots were heard far away on the summit of the mountain. Boers could be seen in some numbers crawling along the edge of the crest, and the guns at once began to play upon them. At this moment the firing on the mountain top swelled up into a terrific roar, and it became clear that the Northumberlanders were seriously menaced. Their heliograph flashed down the news that the Boers were coming on in great strength, and called for reinforcements. At once 100 of the Yeomanry and a company of Yorkshire Light Infantry were directed to hurry up the gully—an hour's hard climb from the camp to the posts of the Northumberlanders above.

Beyers' men on the summit had drawn close in, while the Northumberlanders were intent upon the fight raging below, and, choosing the most opportune moment, had made a most determined attempt to rush the British detachments on each side of the gully. The rocks gave them admirable cover; they were in force at least four to one; and they came on with the utmost courage, yelling defiance. The Northumberlanders to the west of the gully

At this instant a heavy fire suddenly burst from the bush near the guns. It seems that a small force of about fifty Boers had been cut off from the main body and had lain hid, till they saw the bulk of the British withdrawing. They then emptied their magazines into the men round the guns and into General Clements' staff, who were standing near. Every single officer on the staff, except the general and Captain Carr, was shot down. The Boers, however, quickly paid the penalty. Vigorously attacked by the British mounted infantry, they were killed or captured almost to a man, only very few making good their escape. In this renewal of the fight Sergeant Read, of the mounted infantry, particularly distinguished himself, and would have been recommended for promotion, on account of his gallantry, had he not been shot through the heart. Civil Surgeon Engelbach, too, covered himself with honours. Tending the wounded under a terrific fire, he was shot through the hand. He had just remarked that he was now handicapped in his work, when, while dressing his own wound, he was struck a second time, by a bullet in the forehead, and killed on the spot.

This second fierce fight was over. But the British could see that the Boers who had escaped were standing some distance away to the west, gazing, now intently at the summit of the mountain, and now in the direction of Hekpoort. They were looking, it need scarcely be said, to see what had happened to the main attack upon the Northumberlanders

Beyers attacks the troops on the heights.



[Photo by Kelley, Newton Abbot.]

CIVIL-SURGEON ENGELBACH.

Killed while succouring the wounded at Nootgedacht.

made a brave resistance, but were speedily overpowered. To the watchers below it seemed that only about ten minutes passed before the Boers had carried the western height, driving the British before them to the edge of the precipice. There the Northumberlands had to choose between surrender and throwing themselves into the abyss below. The detachment to the east of the gully suffered the same fate. They, too, were overwhelmed, though they fought to the last and many of them refused to surrender. The signalman with the heliograph, after flashing a last sad message that all was lost,



F. J. Waugh.]

THE DISASTER AT NOOITGEDACHT: THE END OF A BRAVE SIGNALLER.

refused to give in to the Boers, and was forced over the cliff. The sight was a horrible one for those below. As the enemy crowded to the crest of the heights, the turn came for the reinforcements of Yeomanry and Yorkshires to suffer punishment. The Yeomen had just reached the foot of the precipice and were in difficulties in the thick brushwood and huge boulders. From above the Boers were able to shoot them down with complete impunity. Under the withering fire which was directed upon them, they had to choose between surrender and being shot down like dogs. They stubbornly held out for some minutes, but then they too raised the white flag. Thus utter disaster had befallen

General Clements, and in less than two hours from the first shot, nearly half his force was placed *hors de combat*.

Even this was not the worst. The Boers from the heights began to direct an infernal fire upon the British camps below, causing the utmost confusion, and had De la Rey appeared upon the scene the remainder of the British must have been captured. But, luckily for Clements, De la Rey had made the mistake of dismounting his men too far from the scene of action, so that he was not able to come up in time to deal the *coup de grâce* by a sudden attack from the south. As it was, Clements' position was utterly untenable. The Boers opened fire upon the confused mass of men, waggons, and transport animals below with two "Pom-Poms" and a heavy gun, while the burghers who had delivered the first assault upon Colonel Legge's Mounted Infantry again began to push forward, threatening the section of P Battery which had remained in the bush upon the British left. The officer in command of the battery had received orders at the very outset to stay where he was as long as he possibly could, and shell the

Clements' desperate position.



THE 2ND BATTALION NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS WHO FOUGHT AT NOOITGEDACHT.
From a photograph taken when they were embarking for South Africa.

slopes of the berg. So critical, however, was his situation under the hail of bullets from the heights above, that he took upon himself the responsibility of sending back one of the two guns. Hardly had he done this, when the commander of the mounted infantry escort with the remaining gun reported that he had only six men left, and that the Boers in considerable numbers were working through the bush and had already got in between the gun and the nearest camp. There was nothing for it but to limber up and retire, unless the gun was to be lost. With no small difficulty, owing to the steepness of the slope and the fire of the enemy, the team was brought up and the gun driven desperately, straight down the abrupt slope, to the valley below, whence it reached the camp by a detour. The battery lost one officer and fifteen men—a high percentage, since it had entered the fight shorthanded.

Retiring the guns of P Battery.

Meantime in the two British camps at the foot of the mountains there was a scene of great disorder, though not among the soldiers. Drivers and Kaffirs in frantic haste strove to inspan the terrified mules and oxen, under a shower of bullets and shells. "The fighting men, however," says the *Standard* correspondent "stood firm, and it was then that the guns did magnificent work. The cliffs and the flanks were swept by a never-ceasing shower of shrapnel and lyddite. The order for the transport to

clear from the main camp had already been given, and with much shouting and confusion in the feverish hurry, the supply waggons were got away one by one. They were all run out at a trot, and crashed over ground that, in ordinary conditions, would have been deemed impossible. The very oxen seemed to be imbued with the idea that there was danger everywhere. All the while the camps were being swept by a hail of

**Disorder in the
camps.**

The Field Hospital, camped between the bivouacs, was in no better case. The flag of the New South Wales Army Medical Corps section brought no protection to the wounded, perhaps owing rather to the occurrence of the cross-fire than to deliberate intention. The drivers had bolted with the waggons—they were never seen again—and Captain Green and five men were left on the open veldt with the wounded. The bullets were so thick that stretchers were splintered, and wounded men hit again as they lay. Eighty per cent. of the bullets, it is said, were expanding, and they spluttered and exploded as they hit the rocks. After much trouble, under this heavy fire, the wounded were removed to the back of a Kaffir kraal, farther away."

In this turmoil the retreat began, the guns and mounted

Impedimenta abandoned in retreat.

infantry covering the withdrawal of the transport. But the fire from above rose in volume, and the Boer skirmishers, advancing through the bush on the British left, pressed closer and closer in, so that the situation each moment grew more critical. General Clements saw that it was impossible to remove all the baggage; if the attempt to do so were longer continued what must result was the capture of his

whole force. He gave orders that the tents in his camp, his own waggon, and most of the officers' kit were to be abandoned. From the mounted infantry camp nothing had been removed; even some of the ammunition had to be left behind. The mules of two ammunition waggons were put out of action by the Boer fire, and the waggons were allowed to fall into the enemy's hands. No less than 400 of the horses in the mounted infantry camp could not be removed; a few were killed by the shells and bullets, but the great majority, with the saddles and equipment upon them, were captured by De la Rey and Beyers, while all the men's kit was lost. Twenty waggons, which were unable to negotiate the passage of a small stream between the camps, were also abandoned. There



Lancelot Speed.

A GUN OVERTURNED ON A HILL-SIDE.

[After a photograph.]

It was under much such conditions as these that the guns were got down the hill at Nooitgedacht.

was but one crossing-place for wheeled vehicles, and under a heavy fire it could only be negotiated with the extremest difficulty. The smallest drift will delay a column indefinitely, and, as it was, the attempt to pass these waggons over all but enabled the Boers to capture the British guns. The gunners, under Clements' personal direction, had behaved with their usual splendid bravery, and it

Courageous gunners. was their courage alone that in all probability averted a fearful disaster. When the time came for them to retire one by one, the Boers pushed forward boldly and rained bullets upon them. The 4.7 weapon had the narrowest escape. Its ponderous weight rendered rapid movement out of the question; of its thirty-two oxen only eight were left alive, and it was finally got away by rigging ropes and dragging it off by hand power. The last to go were the Mounted Infantry and the four companies of the Yorkshires. The whole force, now sadly diminished and mustering not more than 600 combatants, took up a new position some two miles away, on Yeomanry Hill, whence the guns re-opened fire. The remaining transport was collected and parked behind the hill, in readiness for a further retreat.

To retire further in the face of so overwhelming and mobile an enemy was,

Boers loot the British camps. however, impossible for the moment.

Combined, De la Rey's and Beyers' commandos outnumbered the British by at least five to one. Had they resolutely attacked and followed up their success of the early morning, against disheartened men they must have achieved the soldier's true end in war—the annihilation of their adversaries. The inferior discipline and the propensity of their forces to plunder at the slightest provocation, stood them in evil stead at this juncture. Instead of assailing Clements with all their strength, the burghers took to looting the abandoned British camps. Notwithstanding a sharp fire of shrapnel from the British Artillery, they could be seen going through the tents and waggons, and when they had obtained all they wanted and could carry off, setting them alight. With no little rage

the British troops witnessed the destruction of their effects. Now and again the showers of shrapnel would drive the Boers from the camps, but they came back until their work was done. Once they threatened the little force on Yeomanry Hill, opening fire upon it with two guns and a "Pom-Pom," but after firing a dozen rounds from each gun, they withdrew their artillery. General Clements watched

Clements retires to Rietfontein.

them vigilantly and made continual demonstrations, as if he intended to resume the offensive; perhaps they supposed that he knew of the approach of reinforcements.

At all events, when, about 4 p.m., he once more fell back, they did not molest him. He retired up the valley, and, marching all night, reached Rietfontein in safety at daybreak.

No clear account of what had happened to the Northumberlands on the summit of the berg has ever been published, and we are left to glean some vague details of their capture from the tales of



Allan Stewart.

CASTING SHELLS AT THE ROYAL ARSENAL, WOOLWICH, FOR THE BIG GUNS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

one or two fugitives and the observations of those with Clements' force in the valley below. It is stated that their outposts had been doubled for two days, in expectation of such an attack as actually occurred. Beyers with 1,000 to 2,000 burghers appears to have overpowered these outposts, his men creeping up to them in the early dawn, under cover of the huge stones with which the ridge was strewn. Then, just as the attack below was being pressed, adopting the tactics which had won success at Spion Kop, the Boers began to direct a hail of bullets upon the British infantry, while their picked men stole forward from stone to stone, and drew ever closer. It does not appear that the British detachments were in any way entrenched; there is no mention of schanzes; yet, if no steps had been taken to fortify the position, this was a very grave omission and would go far to explain the disaster. The Northumberlands saw that they were being attacked by overwhelming numbers, and must have realised that there was no possibility of reinforcements speedily reaching them from Clements' column in the valley far below.

**Disaster to the
Northumberlands.**



F. J. Waugh.]

BOERS LOOTING THE BRITISH CAMP AT NOOITGEDACHT UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.

They fought, then, with morale depressed by the consciousness of their inferiority. Steadily the accuracy of the Boer fire increased; more and more closely the Boer skirmishers pressed upon them. The British troops are said to have used their rifles coolly and to have caused the enemy heavy loss before the end came. It is reported that their ammunition was exhausted when they hoisted the white flag, though this does not accord with the brevity of the combat, as noted by the appalled spectators below. Some at the last refused to surrender, but they cannot have been numerous or the casualty list would have been even heavier than it was. Yet the figures testify to fighting of the severest nature, and to a resistance the determination of which in some degree redeemed the greatness of the disaster.

In the British forces on the summit and in the valley the killed numbered 66, the wounded 187, of whom 14 died of their wounds, and the missing and prisoners 346. The prisoners and missing

were mainly Northumberlands and Yeomanry. The killed among the Northumberlands appear to have been about 20, while the wounded were 2 officers and 68 men. Among those who fell on this unlucky day the most distinguished was Major Legge. Like the gallant Le Gallais he was a young officer who had already won renown as a leader of mounted infantry, commanding the 6th Corps of that arm when it was organised at Bloemfontein. The losses of the Boers, according to the reports which reached the British Intelligence Department, were even greater than those of General Clements' column. Their killed are said to have numbered 123, and their wounded to have reached a total of some hundreds; but it is possible that these figures are somewhat exaggerated. Among the Boer wounded was a son of General Joubert. With Lord Kitchener's permission, he was brought into Pretoria and nursed by his family. Of the prisoners taken by the Boers 315 were released and sent into Rustenburg a day or two after the battle.

The enemy deserve great credit for the manner in which they planned and carried out their attack. Their concentration was rapidly and cleverly effected; they skilfully eluded and deceived General Broadwood; and their assault was delivered with great vigour. But for De la Rey's mistake and for the burghers' propensity to plunder, they might have gained an even greater success than was in fact achieved. Still, as it was, they obtained large supplies, a great number of horses, numerous rifles and a good quantity of ammunition, though they failed to capture Clements' guns, which were, no doubt, one of their chief objectives.

As the presence of this powerful and victorious force in the Magaliesberg, at no great distance

from Pretoria, was a serious matter, and as there was some risk of a fresh attack upon

Clements, Lord Kitchener took prompt steps to reinforce his subordinate. General Alderson, with 750 men and J Horse Artillery Battery, was despatched at once to join him at Rietfontein, and these troops were followed by the 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. At the same time the 4th Cavalry Brigade and an infantry battalion were moved to Krugersdorp, to hold back De la Rey



A BRITISH INFANTRYMAN IN MARCHING ORDER.

and Beyers, in case they attempted to head south, while Broadwood with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade hurried to Rustenburg, where an attack was apprehended. Reinforcements were also sent to the British post at Olifant's Nek. A day or two later it was learnt that the Boer force had again divided, one part of it, presumably De la Rey's command, going south, and the other west. With the object of driving both forces away and once more clearing the Magaliesberg, General French was placed in charge of the operations, and given command of all the British troops in the region. His force consisted of Paget's and Clements' columns, with Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Dickson's 4th Cavalry Brigade, Gordon's 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and the garrisons of Krugersdorp, Rustenburg, Olifant's Nek and Commando Nek. Gordon joined Clements and the two engaged the Boers on December 19 close to Nooitgedacht.

The Boers held a position stretching across the Hekpoort Valley, from Nooitgedacht Nek, which was on their extreme left. At 4 a.m. the fighting began, when Colonel Cookson, with 300 Mounted Infantry and four guns of U Horse Artillery Battery, seized Yeomanry Hill, the point to which Clements' men had first retreated in the action of December 13. Two hours later a body of Boers

made for the hill, seemingly unaware that the British had occupied it. They were received with a heavy fire, which drove them back in great haste. On this a Boer gun opened from the Magaliesberg upon the British, and, as its position could not for some time be located, caused considerable annoyance. Cookson was reinforced by half the Inniskillings, while Clements directed Alderson with the 11th Mounted Infantry, the Canadian Scouts, and the "cow-gun" to attack the enemy's right. A turning movement compelled the Boers to fall back, and a general advance was ordered by Clements. The heavy rains, however, had made the ground so difficult that the transport could not move at any pace. The British force halted for the night near Boschfontein.

Next morning Clements continued his advance. Alderson on

the British
Clements' advance. left was

speedily engaged with the enemy. He brought into action 500 Mounted Infantry, the 8th Field Battery, and four Canadian Colt guns. The enemy were at least 700 strong; they were steadily forced back to Naauwpoort, but there they made a determined stand in a strong position. They held the broken ground beyond a small stream, which, after the rains, was in full flood. The 14th Mounted Infantry were directed to capture a kopje on their left, and, attempting to do so, came under a heavy fire from the Boer rifles and from two 12-pounders which the enemy had in action. Gordon, who was threatening the Boer right, could not make much progress, and, failing help from him, Alderson did not consider himself strong enough to attack with vigour. Accordingly he returned to camp, and rested content with shelling the enemy at long range. The British casualties on the 19th were 2 killed and 14 wounded; several Boer dead were buried by our men, and on one body—that of an old burgher—no less than nine passes were found, signed by as many British officers. In the fighting of the 20th the British loss was six wounded or missing.

On the 21st the enemy showed a disposition to retreat south-westwards, and were heavily shelled and pressed by Gordon, who followed them with a force of mounted men in the direction of Potchefstroom. At the same time Clements marched through Olifant's Nek, and camped to the north of that pass on December 23. There he was joined by Paget with the troops from Haman's Kraal on the Pretoria-Pietersburg line, and, with Paget, he set to work to pacify, for about the fifth time, the Rustenburg



[Photo by Wyrall, Aldershot.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. R. P. GORDON.

Born 1860, son of Lieut.-General Sir B. L. Gordon; educated at Wellington College. Joined the 15th Hussars, 1879; served in the Afghan War, 1880; in the Boer War, 1881, as Adjutant, 15th Hussars; in the Bechuanaland Expedition, 1884-5, as Adjutant, Methuen's Horse; in the Burmese War, 1887; on the West coast of Africa, 1892 and 1895. Captain, 1888; Major, 1895; Lieut.-Colonel, 1897; local Brigadier-General, in command of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, South African Field Force, February 1900. Engaged in the advance from Modder River to the relief of Kimberley, in the capture of Cronje, in the operations of April in the Orange River Colony, and later along the Delagoa Bay Railway.

district. Broadwood had been withdrawn from Rustenburg to the south of the Magaliesberg, to aid General French in sweeping the country to the east of a line drawn from Olifant's Nek to Klerksdorp.

Failure to pacify the Rustenburg country.


Finally it was reported that the Magaliesberg and the region to the north and south of it were clear of the enemy, but Beyers had only slipped round General French's right flank, and once more appeared to the south of the Witwatersberg, in close proximity to Pretoria. Moreover, no sooner had the British columns returned from the Rustenburg country than it was again infested with small bands of snipers, who harried convoys and menaced detached posts. The British operations in this quarter were, in fact, a complete failure, because the Boers would never stand and fight a decisive action, and because no means had yet been devised of compelling them to fight. The defeat at Nooitgedacht had not been retrieved, and no severe blow had

been dealt the guerillas.

In the Zeerust district, further to the west, Lord Methuen continued to denude the country.

Methuen denudes the Zeerust district.

On a march from Ottoshoop to Zeerust he captured 1,200 sheep and cattle. On December 14 he attacked the Boer commandant Lemmer's laager near Zeerust and captured it, taking five prisoners, several waggons and carts,



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

THE FIRST HOUSE BUILT AT JOHANNESBURG.

15,000 rounds of ammunition, and 3,500 sheep and cattle. Two Boers were killed. The paucity of prisoners was not altogether satisfactory. Near Zeerust the enemy continued to give constant trouble, and on December 18 two waggons with their teams were captured by the Boers only two miles from the place. The

British, even at this date, could not be said to exercise any effective control outside the area commanded by their guns.

Dislodged from the Magaliesberg, Beyers' men caused no small amount of annoyance near Johannesburg. On December 18 a small party of them attacked a British post at Zuurfontein, on the railway between Johannesburg and Pretoria. They were beaten off without

Enemy active around Johannesburg.

any loss to our troops, but their audacity was somewhat disquieting. Zuurfontein lies only twelve miles from Johannesburg, and close to the Rand. Here, if anywhere, we should have expected the British troops to have been able to make headway against the guerilla bands, but never had the neighbourhood of Johannesburg been more insecure than it was in this December. Growing in boldness the enemy, on December 26, appeared at Benoni, near Boksburg, an important mining town on the Rand close to Johannesburg. Benoni was garrisoned by 17 of the Johannesburg Police, who held their own in spite of the fact that the enemy brought



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

COMMISSIONER STREET, JOHANNESBURG, AT THE PRESENT TIME.



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

GENERAL VIEW OF THE RAND
FROM THE HEAD-GEAR OF THE
GELDENHUIS MINE.

a "Pom-Pom" to bear upon them. On the same day the enemy succeeded in doing considerable damage

Destruction of mining gear.

to the New Kleinfontein Mine, burning the battery of stamps, and wrecking the machinery and chimney, and to the Chimes Mine. These were cases of sheer purposeless destruction. There was no military object to gain by injuring the mines,

which were not even the property of purely British companies. It was an act of brigandage, and could not be defended upon any ground, except that it was in revenge for the burning of farms by the British. But farms, except in very few instances, were not destroyed by the British for other than military reasons; nor was it a fair act of retaliation to wreck property, a great part of which belonged to French and German shareholders. These shareholders, by their clamour against the war, had, one would have supposed, secured the sympathy of the burghers. The incidents afforded fresh evidence of the savage and lawless propensities which the Boers too frequently displayed in the later period of the war.

The Rand, with all its valuable mines and countless millions sunk in machinery, stamps, and shafts, was extremely difficult to guard with a limited force. It is aptly described by Lord Milner

Guarding the Rand.

as "all length and no breadth," stretching as it does from Springs to the east of Johannesburg to Krugersdorp and Bank for some fifty miles. A Town Guard of British subjects was organised in early December and christened "The Rand Rifles." It was recruited from the British who had come to Johannesburg in the wake of the army, from the residents who had been in the place throughout the war, and from the refugees, a certain number of whom were allowed to return on condition that they rendered military service whenever and wherever required. Some difficulties were raised by certain of the British residents, who alleged that they

British neutrals.

had taken an oath of neutrality to the Boer government, which they could not break without doing violence to their consciences. These consciences could not have been very tender or susceptible, as their owners without question had supplied with goods the enemies of their country during the war, and had rendered them all kinds of indirect assistance. There was, however, good reason for exempting them, as, had they been compelled to render service, the Boers would have protested that their own perfidious violation of the parole, which they had given, and of the oath of neutrality, which they so regularly took only to break, was fully justified. Then, too, there was the very unpleasant possibility that the enemy might by some piece of good luck succeed in rushing Johannesburg—and the gold-mining city was, as we shall see, far from secure—when they would doubtless have massacred those who had followed their own teaching. The wisest course would have been to request these British neutrals with the strenuous consciences to withdraw from South Africa till the war was over. As it was, nothing was done to them. The enemy were always prepared

to go to all lengths; the British, with their humanitarian ideas of war, shrank from any act of severity, and thus necessarily prolonged the struggle. But then the Boers had no anti-patriot party in their ranks.

To prevent the Boers and their sympathisers from passing freely in and out of the town, a wire fence was constructed round it at the cost of £210 a mile. The contract for this fence aroused some comment, as shortly before the war a British firm had constructed for the Boer government a similar fence at a cost of only £55 a mile. At the same time the wise measure was taken of requisitioning the cycles and horses of all foreigners

**Lax defences of
Johannesburg.**

and Dutchmen resident in Johannesburg. They were paid a reasonable price, and thus they were deprived of the means of rapid locomotion, so that they could not gallop out and give information to the snipers and guerillas who hung round the town. Yet it is painful to have to state that, notwithstanding these measures, which appeared admirable on paper, it was still possible for strangers to pass in and out. "A civilian of my acquaintance," writes a correspondent, "took it into his head to see how far he could get out of the town without being challenged; so, taking his bicycle, he rode away in the direction of Pretoria. He rode for many miles; he saw in the distance various pickets, but nobody seemed to pay the slightest attention to him. Then he got tired and returned. Thinking that, perhaps, it was beneath the dignity of a British picket to notice a single individual, he repeated the experiment in a different way. He collected half-a-dozen friends, and




THE FIRST PARADE OF THE RAND RIFLES.

[From a photograph.]

they dressed themselves up in the Boer fashion, and rode out together in the same direction. Precisely the same thing happened. They rode for miles and returned at leisure without having once been challenged, and this notwithstanding the fence." The best plans and regulations are useless unless they are carried out with strict attention and intelligence, and this is always difficult to ensure.

The want of care in such matters of detail resulted in mortifying incidents, news of which only after long intervals reached the home public. On January 1, 1901, a party of Boers suddenly descended upon a farm ten miles out from the town, and carried off some thousands of cattle which had been removed by the various British columns from the denuded areas. On the 5th news was received that a Boer raid was intended upon the remount station in the Bezuidenhout Valley, just outside Johannesburg. The station was carelessly guarded, but steps were at once taken to reinforce the men on duty there, and the Boers presumably heard of this, as they made no move. On the 12th, however, a party of them visited the remount depôt at Braamfontein and carried off 512 horses, which had been at great trouble collected and brought up to the front, and which were urgently required by the Army. The place was in charge of one officer and one man, who, of course, could make no resistance. It would



BOERS RAIDING THE REMOUNT DEPÔT AT BRAAMFONTEIN.

J. H. Thornely.]



THE REMOUNT DEPÔT AT BEZUIDENHOUT'S FARM, NEAR JOHANNESBURG.

The farm has been commandeered, as its owners are Boers out on commando. Here Colonel Birkbeck, Chief Remount Officer of the South African Field Force, established a large central remount depôt. The park-like country around the farm is well suited for this purpose, the large trees affording shelter for sick horses and farriers at work. About 4,000 horses can be accommodated; they are fed and sheltered from rain under corrugated iron roof sheds, which, with water-troughs kept constantly full, appear in the above illustration. Four British officers manage the establishment, which includes two veterinary surgeons and a staff of native assistants.

be interesting to know who was the subordinate responsible for leaving these remounts unguarded. The officer stationed at Braamfontein had more than once represented that raids by the Boers were to be feared, but no attention had been paid to his warnings. "It is one thing," says a Johannesburg correspondent, "to seize the horses; it is quite another, apparently, to take ordinary precautions and prevent the Boers getting them back again. From all sides we hear of raids on remount stations and cattle posts inadequately guarded; and while we capture, no doubt, large numbers of horses and stock, little difficulty is placed in the way of the Boers in getting their own again." Thus the captures of stock were rendered fruitless; all that happened was that we took charge of the animals until the enemy wanted them, when the burghers came and quietly helped themselves.



COLONEL C. J. MACKENZIE, C.B.,
Military Governor of Johannesburg.

Born 1861. Joined Seaforth Highlanders; Captain, 1889; Major, 1899. Served in Egyptian War, 1882; with the Burmese Expedition, 1885-7, and in 1887-9 as Embarkation Officer at Mandalay, Transport Officer at Myingyan, and afterwards in command of a company of Mounted Infantry; with the Hazara Expedition, 1888, as Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders; A.D.C. to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 1890-92; served with Waziristan Field Force under Sir William Lockhart, 1894-5, as D.A.A.G., 2nd Brigade; in Sudan Campaign, 1898, with the 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, under Sir Herbert Kitchener; in the South African War, 1899-1900, as D.A.A.G., and later as temporary Director of Military Intelligence. In May, 1900, appointed Military Governor of Johannesburg with local rank of Colonel.

In Johannesburg itself military rule gave rise to many complaints. People did not reflect that in war the methods of the soldiers must always be rough and ready, or that the incessant attacks upon the lines of communication must necessarily render supplies scarce and prices very high. They grumbled that the cost of all necessities had risen enormously beyond what had been the case in the days of Boer misgovernment. Flour, for instance, had been 17s. a bag before the war; it was now 29s. Rice cost 3½d. a pound in mid-1899; in December, 1900, it cost 5d. A tariff of prices had been published shortly after the occupation of the town, limiting the charges of all private dealers and shop-owners. But this tariff the Government itself disregarded. The want of method, which was at times so evident in the operations in the field, was here manifested in administration. The prolongation of the war, ascribed by many of the Johannesburgers who had served in the British ranks to the spirit of routine and red tape quite as much as to the policy of conciliation, caused great bitterness. Criticism

of the British officer, often intemperate and unjust, but in some cases not levelled at him without substantial reason, was general. Colonials, it was said, unfettered by red tape, would have speedily dealt with the guerilla bands. They knew how to wage war whole-heartedly, added the critics, and were not for ever thinking of what the

High prices of necessaries.

Colonial criticism.

Pro-Boers would say of them. South Africans knew that the natives made excellent scouts; the British officer too often treated the natives with contempt or refused to give any credit to their reports. It was added that the British Army showed a reluctance to listen to local warning and advice. The Colonial soldiers, whether South African or Australian, New Zealander or Canadian, were the most outspoken of all in this kind of talk. The Yeomanry, however, were not far behind. The fact was overlooked that more than once Colonials had fallen into ambushes, and that the best of the Colonial Corps owed much of their success to the disparaged British officer.

This spirit of dissatisfaction and criticism on the one hand, and of not unintelligible irritation on the other, boded ill for the future. The Colonials might have remembered that discipline in all armies in the time of peace tends to produce a spirit of self-sufficiency and routine, and the British was no exception to the rule. They should, too, have laid to heart the devoted bravery of the officer and the great personal sacrifices which he was daily making in a cause that was in large measure theirs. That there were some eye-glassed imbeciles of supercilious manners, was no reason for condemning all who held British commissions. And the offenders in the British Army on their part might have shown more tact in their handling of the Colonial, remembering that he often was a man of high intelligence, that he was always a stranger to class-distinction, that the habit of obedience was not ingrained in him, and that he regarded fighting, and not drill, as his business. They should have borne steadily in mind, and avoided at all costs, the example of General Braddock, "whose domineering temper and the insolent superiority which he affected, as an Englishman over Americans and as a regular officer over Colonials," tended in no small degree to estrange the people of the American Colonies. Yet while there were many failures, there were also men who, like Thorneycroft, Rimington, and De Lisle, were followed with enthusiasm, and who showed what bravery, tact, and judgment could do with the splendid material placed at their disposal.

Speaking of the American success in the War of Independence, Sir Henry Maine drops the fruitful remark that "next to their stubborn valour, the chief secret of the [American] colonists' success was the incapacity of the English generals, trained in the stiff Prussian system, . . . to adapt themselves to new conditions of war." This want of adaptiveness at the front was marked in the Boer war, and, combined with the tardy and irregular despatch of reinforcements from home, it tended greatly to prolong the struggle.



F. de Haenen.]

[After a photograph by M. Bennett.]

ON GUARD AT ROBINSON'S BANK CORNER, JOHANNESBURG.

There was no real reason, except routine, why picked British troops and Colonials should not have been rendered just as mobile as the burghers, or why, in the British as in the Boer ranks, power to place the best officers in the most responsible positions should not have been given to the Commander-in-Chief.

In late December the state of things in South Africa had become so disquieting that at last it was decided to forward reinforcements from home. The General Election in the United Kingdom,

**Parliamentary
election.**

which began in October and ended in November, had been fought mainly upon the question whether the war was right or wrong. By an enormous majority the nation pronounced that it was right. The Ministry had gone to the country 399 strong; they returned 402, that is (as has already been pointed out in the note on p. 170) with a party majority of 134. But actually the majority in favour of the war was increased by the fact that a considerable number of the Liberals were Imperialists, who on all questions relating

to South Africa could be counted upon to support Lord Salisbury. The total number of such Liberal Imperialists cannot be stated exactly, but was certainly over 50. So that in a House of Commons 670 strong, the war was supported by a majority of 452.




[Photo by Jerrard.]

ARCHIBALD PHILIP PRIMROSE, K.G., K.T., P.C., J.P., LL.D., F.R.S., F.S.A., 5TH EARL OF ROSEBERY.

Born 1847, son of Archibald, Lord Dalmeny, and grandson of the 4th Earl, whom he succeeded in 1868; Under-Secretary for Home Department, 1881-3; Lord Privy Seal and First Commissioner of Works, 1885; Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1886 and 1892-4; first Chairman of London County Council, 1889-90 and 1892; Prime Minister and Lord President of the Council, 1894-5. At the beginning of the war Lord Rosebery stirred the hearts of most of his countrymen, and disappointed some of his quondam followers, by a bold and patriotic declaration of his intention to support the policy of the Government. He has since more than once levelled the most damaging criticisms against them, but these criticisms have been especially directed against their supineness and lack of vigour and foresight.

Scharnhorst or Von Roon, though he lacked the knowledge and iron will that are the first requisites of a great military organiser, and though in his Army scheme he repeated the old fault of grasping at the shadow and not at the substance, was in every way an improvement upon his predecessor. His influence was at once felt in the despatch of further mounted troops, who, as each week went on, were more and more wanted at the front.

Again and again Lord Lansdowne had been warned that more men might, and probably would be wanted. As far back as February 15, 1900, Lord Rosebery in a sagacious and patriotic speech had urged the Government to prepare more than the 50,000 men then under orders for the front. He



[Photo by the Stereoscopic Co.]

HENRY CHARLES KEITH PETTY-FITZMAURICE, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D., 5TH MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

Born 1845, descended from Strongbow, Earl of Pembroke; succeeded his father in 1866, and his mother, eldest daughter of the Comte de Flahault (one of Napoleon's officers) and Baroness Keith and Nairne, in 1895; Lord of the Treasury, 1869-72; Under-Secretary for War, 1872-4; Under-Secretary for India, 1880; Governor-General of Canada, 1883-8; Governor-General of India, 1888-93; Secretary for War, 1895-1900; succeeded Lord Salisbury in the Foreign Office, 1900.

Particularly noticeable was the rejection by the constituencies of politicians who had opposed the war or espoused the Boer cause. North-east Manchester rejected Mr. Birrell; Cockermouth, Sir Wilfrid Lawson; Shoreditch, Professor Stuart; Caithness, Dr. Clark, whose votes fell from 1,828 in 1895 to a paltry 673. Consequent upon the Election were certain changes in the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne was removed from the War Office, but, to the stupefaction of the country, was made Foreign Minister. He was succeeded by a much more energetic administrator, Mr. Brodrick.

The new War Minister, though very far removed from a

had received as his answer the usual optimistic assurances. The forces in process of organisation, said Lord Lansdowne, were quite sufficient. So it was with no surprise that the discovery was made in

Despatch of reinforcements.

December 1900 that there were available only 520 Mounted Infantry at home. Many of these were Militia; moreover, in absolute defiance of the lessons so painfully learnt in South Africa, they had not been trained to act together under

the officer who was to lead them in the field, but had been scattered in companies. Their strength was raised to 800; two cavalry regiments, the 1st and 3rd Dragoon Guards, were placed under orders for embarkation, drafts were prepared for the other regular units at the front, appeals were made to the Australian Colonies and New Zealand for further contingents, and it was decided to recruit the South African Constabulary up to 10,000. Another Militia battalion, the 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers, volunteered for service in the Mediterranean, thus setting free regulars for the front. The despatch of remounts was also resumed on the largest possible scale.

The total of men to be added to the British forces in South Africa by these arrangements was about 14,000, since Australia and New Zealand responded heartily to the new call. But with the invasion of Cape Colony, which will be narrated in the following chapters, the area of hostilities had widened and the claims upon the Army indefinitely increased. In mid-January it was decided to enlist 5,000 more men for the Imperial Yeomanry and to call for further volunteers. The number of Yeomanry to be raised was fixed at 5,000, and the pay offered was five shillings a day. But soon it was determined—and wisely determined—to make a great increase in the total of Yeomanry, and finally these figures represented

the number of men despatched to the front during the earlier months of 1901: Yeomanry, 16,733; Volunteers, 5,805; while, instead of 10,000 South African Constabulary being raised at home, only 5,180 were sent out from the United Kingdom. To the total of 27,000 Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Constabulary, must be added 3,000 more men from Australia and New Zealand, and the 4,000 Regulars and Colonials who formed the December reinforcements. Thus about 34,000 fresh men were sent out to the war. On the other hand it was understood that the Volunteers and Yeomanry who had gone out in 1900 should be withdrawn, as soon as the arrival of the new troops rendered it possible, while for several of the earlier Colonial contingents the period of service had expired. The actual increase in force was reduced by these various deductions to about 10,000 men. But as, at the same time, all the regular units in the army were raised by drafts to a figure considerably above their establishment, the striking power of the force at Lord Kitchener's disposal was greatly augmented. It was not, however, until the end of April, 1901, that all these troops became available, and the interval before they entered into line was one of great anxiety.



R. Simkin.]

UNIFORMS OF THE NEW IRISH REGIMENT OF FOOT GUARDS.

By the following Army Order, dated April 5, 1900, a new regiment, the Irish Guards, was raised to commemorate the valour of the Irish in South Africa: "Her Majesty the Queen (Queen Victoria), having deemed it desirable to commemorate the bravery shown by the Irish regiments in the recent operations in South Africa, has been graciously pleased to command that an Irish regiment of Foot Guards be formed. This regiment will be designated the Irish Guards." To form a nucleus of the regiment the Foot Guards in London were drawn on, 200 Irishmen being contributed by the 1st Grenadiers. Their Colonel-in-Chief is the King, their Colonel, Earl Roberts, and their Lieut.-Colonel, Major R. J. Cooper, who served with the Grenadiers in South Africa. Other officers are the Earl of Kerry, Lord Oxmantown, Lord Settrington, Lord Herbert Scott, and the Earl of Kingston. The uniform is scarlet with blue facings; its distinctive features are a shamrock in silver embroidery at each end of the collar, the star of the order of St. Patrick on the shoulder-strap, a plume of St. Patrick's blue at the side of the bearskin, a field-cap with soft projecting brim piped with green and with a green band, and the arrangement of the buttons on the tunic in groups of four, four, and two. The depot of the regiment is at Caterham.



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

A MAIL-CART LEAVING JOHANNESBURG POST OFFICE.

Where the railway does not run communication is still maintained by means of the somewhat cumbrous vehicles of which this is a good example.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY.

Traitorous Dutch of Cape Colony—The Bond—Seditious press incites to rebellion—Tales invented by Boers on parole—Congress of Bond representatives—Violent anti-British speeches—Delegation to Sir A. Milner—Boer plan of invasion—Geography of the north-west district—The Karroo—Its advantages for guerilla warfare—Delay in requisitioning Cape horses—Kritzinger crosses the Orange—He moves to Knapdaar—The commando divides—Re-unites in the Zuurberg—Herzog and Brand move toward Colesberg—Philipstown and Petrusville receive the Boers coldly—British troops hurried to De Aar—Attack on the railway at Houtkraal—Britstown seized—Capetown isolated—Middle district under martial law—Formation of Town Guards—Appeal to arms—Organisation of the Colonial Defence Force—Boer commandos in the Vryburg and Carnarvon districts—Progress of the latter towards the Atlantic—Capetown prepared for defence—Herzog and Brand centred at Calvinia—Disaffection spreading—Invasion of the south-west fails—Cruelty to coloured loyalists—Herzog's occupation of Calvinia—De Wet the Boer hero.



THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR MEDAL.

EVER since the revival of the war in October, the Boers had meditated a second invasion of Cape Colony. At the outbreak of the war, it will be remembered, they had entered the Colony and made themselves masters for a time of the districts of Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Herschel, and Barkly East, whence they had been compelled to retire in February and March, 1900, by Lord Roberts' march upon Bloemfontein. Though somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 Afrikaners of the Colony had joined their ranks during this invasion, they had not been supported, as they had hoped and expected, by a general rising of their race. On their retreat a number of the

inhabitants of the Colony who had been guilty of treasonable practices were arrested and brought to

GOVERNORS OF SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIES.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

THE HON. SIR W. J. HELY-HUTCHINSON, G.C.M.G.

Second son of the 4th Earl of Donoughmore. Born in Dublin, 1849; educated at Cheam, Harrow, and Cambridge; called to the Bar; accompanied Sir Hercules Robinson to Fiji as Special Attaché, 1874; Private Secretary to Sir Hercules Robinson for Fiji Affairs, 1874; Private Secretary for New South Wales Affairs, 1875; Colonial Secretary of Barbadoes, 1877; Chief Secretary to Government of Malta, 1883; Lieutenant-Governor of Malta, 1884; Governor of Windward Islands, 1889; Governor of Natal, 1893, and carried out the incorporation of the Trans-Pongolo Territories with Natal; Special Commissioner for Amatongaland, 1895; Governor of Cape Colony, January, 1901.


this enterprise. The utter inability of the British to catch the Boers had been demonstrated day after day for months. At the worst the burghers were always sure of their retreat, unless, indeed, the British suddenly developed an originality and a power of adaptiveness which they had lacked throughout the war.

To pave the way for the invasion, a campaign of sedition began in Cape Colony. The agents

of treasonable practices were arrested and brought to trial. The punishments inflicted, however, were of such a nature as to provoke derision rather than to inspire terror. Treason, in fact, was rendered safe and even profitable. It may be wise to exercise great clemency after a war, but while hostilities are actually proceeding, there is grave danger that clemency will be taken by the enemy for weakness. It was so in this case. The

Traitorous Dutch of Cape Colony.


Dutch of Cape Colony, seeing that they could rebel with impunity, made fresh overtures and offers to the Boer leaders in the field. They promised numerous recruits, if not a general rising; they suggested that an invading force would be able to exact reprisals from the British loyalists for the burning of Boer farms in the conquered territories; while there were evident military advantages in widening the area of disturbance as much as possible. If the Boers could establish themselves in Central Cape Colony, they could threaten the three trunk lines of railway running up to the Orange, and at every turn break the communications of Lord Kitchener's Army. Nor would there be any serious risk to the commandos in



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

BREVET-COLONEL SIR H. E. MCCALLUM, K.C.M.G., A.D.C., R.E.

Entered Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, 1869; Superintendent of Telegraphy, Southern District; Secretary to Sir W. Jervois, Governor of the Straits Settlements; Superintendent Engineer, Admiralty Works, Hong Kong, 1877; attached to Office of Inspector of Works, Royal Arsenal, 1879-80; Deputy Colonial Engineer, Straits Settlements, 1880; Colonial Engineer and Surveyor-General, Straits Settlements, 1884; Member of the Executive and Legislative Councils; President of Singapore Municipality, 1881-6; appointed to construct new fortifications of Singapore, 1885; commanded Singapore Volunteer Artillery, 1888; Special Commissioner in Pahang during disturbances, 1891; Governor of Lagos, 1897; Governor of Newfoundland, 1898; Governor of Natal, 1901.



[From "The African Review."]

MAJOR HAMILTON JOHN GOOLD-ADAMS, C.B., C.M.G.

Born 1858. Joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1878; Captain, 1885; commanded a troop of Bechuanaland Border Police, 1885, and a force against the Matabele, 1893; Major, 1895; Resident Commissioner for Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1897; Lieut.-Governor, Orange River Colony, January, 1901.

were ready to hand. The Afrikaner Bond, a Cape political organisation, was for all practical purposes a Boer association. Its speakers delivered inflammatory addresses; its organs, *Ons Land* and the

The Bond.

South African News, rose to unprecedented achievements of mendacity, and in this carnival of falsehood the disloyal at the Cape received yeoman's service from the pro-Boer press in Great Britain, which stuck at nothing, which paraded every disparaging report concerning the British Army as gospel truth, and the statements of which were caught up, reproduced and swallowed with avidity by the credulous Dutch. See, it was said, what stories these English themselves tell about their soldiers and generals! The existence of a faction in England which, out of sheer spite towards and hatred for the Colonial Minister, persistently encouraged the enemy, had no small indirect influence in the prolongation of the war. At home its utterances were appraised at their true value; abroad and in South Africa they worked incalculable harm.

Seditious press incites rebellion.

Ons Land and the *South African News*, the latter, it is sad to have to state, edited by an English journalist, spread horrible stories of atrocities perpetrated by the British troops. Farms, as we know, had been burnt to the number of over 600, but, except in a very few cases, under the greatest provocation. Moreover, as the Boers wished to gain all the advantages of a guerilla war, they ought to have been prepared to accept the disadvantages. The firebrands of the Bond should have remembered that war must inevitably bring great suffering to even the non-combatants,

and that where life can be taken, in obedience to mili-

tary dictates, no sane man would hold property sacred. Tales of plunder, murder, and outrages on women were daily retailed by the incendiary Bond publications. Yet there is ample evidence to prove that these stories were impudent concoctions or gross exaggerations. In any army there will always be some black sheep, but the testimony of impartial foreign observers is conclusive. The Foreign Attachés, the Swiss Consul in Pretoria, and a dozen others rendered the highest tribute to the conduct of the British soldier. Our men paid for everything they took: as much as £33,000, for example, was disbursed at Johannesburg in one week, for Boer produce commandeered, and, it is added by Lord Graham, who served in the Army Service Corps, that quite 50 per cent. of the money found its way to the coffers of the South African Republic, for the further purchase of munitions of war.

Some of the most valuable material for this campaign of slander and calumny was furnished by Mr. W. T. Stead, an Englishman, who has been without any exaggeration described as "the friend of every country but his own." He issued a document entitled, "What is now being done in South Africa," which is described by a Chaplain who made the entire campaign in the Boer territories as "simply a tissue of base calumnies and vile falsehoods against British officers and men. Even where a grain of truth occurs here and there, it is so perverted and exaggerated as to be a real falsehood."



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MR. MERRIMAN.

The Hon. John Xavier Merriman was born in 1841 at Street, Gloucestershire. His father was Bishop of Grahamstown, Cape Colony, and there young Merriman went as a boy. In 1869 he entered politics, and joined the Molteno Ministry in 1875. He occupied various posts, including those of Commissioner of Crown Lands, Treasurer-General, &c. He tried gold-mining, and acted for a short time for Mr. J. B. Robinson, at Langlaagte Estate, near Johannesburg. He was a member of the Cape Committee on the Jameson Raid, and is a prominent member of the Afrikaner Bond.



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MR. SAUER.

Mr. J. W. Sauer has distinguished himself consistently as an anti-British agitator, both in and out of the Cape Parliament, to which he was elected in 1874. He was Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Scanlen Ministry of 1884, and Colonial Secretary in Mr. Rhodes' first Cabinet of 1890. It is said that he refused a K.C.M.G. in 1893. A member of the Afrikaner Bond, he came to England with Mr. Merriman in 1901 in the futile hope of stirring up the working men against the Government in the interests of the Boers. Their visit appears to have convinced them that they have not much to hope for from the pro-Boer party here.

Mr. A. J. Balfour (First Lord of the Treasury).	Mr. Joseph Chamberlain (Secretary for the Colonies).	Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (Chancellor of the Exchequer).	Mr. C. T. Ritchie (Secretary for the Home Department).	The Earl of Selborne (First Lord of the Admiralty).	Lord Balfour of Burleigh (Secretary for Scotland).	Lord Ashbourne (Lord Chancellor of Ireland).	The Marquis of Londonderry (Postmaster-General).	Mr. Walter Long (President of the Local Government Board).	Mr. A. Akers-Douglas (First Commissioner of Works).	Lord James of Hereford (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster).	Mr. R. W. Hanbury (President of the Board of Agriculture).
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S. Begg]	The Marquis of Salisbury (Prime Minister and Lord Privy Seal).	The Duke of Devonshire (Lord President of the Council).	The Earl of Halsbury (Lord Chancellor).	Earl Cadogan (Lord Lieutenant of Ireland).	The Marquis of Lansdowne (Secretary for Foreign Affairs).	Mr. W. St. J. E. Brodrick (Secretary for War).	Lord George Hamilton (Secretary for India).	Mr. G. W. Balfour (President of the Board of Trade).
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THE WAR MINISTRY.
The Cabinet as reconstructed after the Elections of October–November, 1900.

Such documents were spread broadcast through the Colony, while other tales of the same kind were invented by the Boer prisoners whom, with their truly remarkable insouciance, the British authorities turned loose on parole. A good example of these fictions is given by Mr. Edgar Wallace. "It was about an officer and seven men and a Boer woman who would not tell where ammunition was stored. First the British set fire to the curtains of her bed, then they set fire to the curtains of her room, then, having locked her in her bedroom, they placed dynamite at the four corners of the house and blew the poor woman and her children to destruction. Then there were other stories, mostly horrible. Always the same characters moved in them—the brutal English soldiery and the defenceless women and children." The effect of this kind of stuff upon ignorant minds can be imagined. Even the educated Dutch accepted it as gospel truth. Week by week the same stories were published, always with editorial notes asking how much longer God would allow the devoted burghers to be crushed beneath the iron heel of the savage oppressor.

In late November and early December observers noted signs of a general fermentation among the Dutch, such a fermentation as often precedes great events. So many sparks had been flung into the powder-magazine that it seemed as though an explosion must follow. The speeches of the Bond partisans grew more and more furious and inflam-

Julian Ralph. Perceval Landon.



H. A. Gwynne.

Rudyard Kipling.

(From "War's Brighter Side," by Julian Ralph.)

THE EDITORS OF TOMMY'S NEWSPAPER.

On his entry into Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts suppressed the Boer newspaper, *The Friend of the Free State*, paid an indemnity for the use of the plant, and utilised the latter for publishing a paper for soldiers called *The Friend*. Mr. Kipling was appointed editor. Such an incident is unique in the history of journalism and of warfare. Twenty-seven numbers of four pages each were issued during the month of editorship. Notices were in both English and Taal. On April 16 the paper was made over to the proprietor of the *Johannesburg Star*. To commemorate its issue, those connected with *The Friend*—Lord Roberts (editor-in-chief), Mr. Kipling (associate editor), Lord Stanley (censor and contributor), Messrs. P. Landon, H. A. Gwynne, F. W. Buxton, and Julian Ralph, united themselves in a social order, "The Friendlies," adopting as their motto, "Inter praelia prelum"—"in the midst of war the printing press."



A. Barraud.]

A VIEW IN WORCESTER, CAPE COLONY.

[After a photograph.

Worcester is a hotbed of anti-British sentiment. The population of 5,400 is largely Dutch, and the farmers in the neighbourhood, who are stockbreeders and agriculturists, are almost entirely Dutch. Large vineyards are under cultivation in the immediate vicinity, and quite two-thirds of all the ox-wagons used throughout South Africa for transport are made in the Worcester district. The anti-British sentiment is of long standing, and is fostered by the Afrikaner Bondsmen who have farms in the district.

matory. Mr. Merriman, Mr. Sauer, and Dr. Te Water vied with one another in stirring up the Dutch. The assemblage of a Congress of

Congress of Bond representatives.

Bond representatives at the village of Worcester, fixed for December 6, was expected to prove the signal for an outbreak. Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Kitchener, however, were closely watching the disloyal. A few days before the meeting of the Congress, four hundred Australians, on their way home from the front, detained and encamped at Worcester. The Bond thereupon retaliated by making furious demands for the recall of Sir Alfred Milner.

On December 6 the Congress assembled. Some 2,000 Afrikaners of the Colony were present at it. Speeches of great violence were delivered. Mr. Cronwright Schreiner sapiently declared that "the war was being waged and thousands of English soldiers were being sacrificed, that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes might cover up their spoor, and that an international gang of capitalists might reign at Pretoria. Their plot was equally directed against the men and women of Cape Colony." England, he asserted, conveniently forgetting the ultimatum of the Boer Government and the invasion of British territory by the burghers, had forced the war upon the Transvaal, and she was carrying it on with a barbarism and inhumanity that surprised the civilised world. He told tales of the shooting of Boer women by British troops, and declared that Sir Alfred Milner was "the curse of South Africa." Dr. Reynecke followed with more stories of atrocities. Boer women had been herded and driven about by Kaffirs, and crushed

**Violent anti-British
speeches.**



Enoch Ward, R.B.A.]

A TRIAL FOR TREASON AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

[After a photograph.]

to death while applying for bread at Johannesburg. He read extracts from the English pro-Boer journals to prove the truth of these silly falsehoods. The Rev. Dr. Pienaar, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, bade the delegates in meaning accents "do what their hand found to do." Finally resolutions were moved and carried, demanding the immediate termination of the war, and requiring the concession to the Boer republics of that independence, which one of them, at least—the Transvaal—had never possessed. There was not one word of censure on the enemies who had so wantonly plunged South Africa into war by attacking British territory. With fine irony, the reporter concludes his account of this meeting with the words, "the National Anthem was not sung at the close." Throughout, though the speakers protested their wish to keep within Constitutional limits, the intention to sail as closely to the wind as possible was obvious. The speeches were admirably calculated to exasperate Dutch feeling and to stir up sedition.



CRADOCK.

[Photo by McKenzie, Cra-lock.]

On the eve of the Congress Mr. De Jong, the editor of the *Worcester Advertiser*, a journal which had outdone its competitors in the campaign of mendacity, and which had, among other stories, published one to the effect that the British troops had taken a baby from a Boer mother and battered it to death, was arrested. He had previously attacked the Australian troops with such bitterness and untruthfulness, that his house had to be guarded against their indignant attempts at retaliation. Immediately after the Congress a number of delegates waited upon Sir Alfred Milner with the resolutions

adopted. Replying to them in a firm and

Delegation to Sir A. Milner.

temperate speech, the

High Commissioner complained of "the tone of

aggressive exaggeration which characterised the allusions to the conduct of the war. The war, gentlemen," he continued, "has its horrors—every war has. These horrors increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy, thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial troops. But having regard to the conditions, it is one of the most humane wars that has ever been waged in history." He assured the delegates that Great Britain's decision was inflexible and unalterable, and that on her part there could be no going back.

By the original Boer plan, which is now known in detail, De Wet was at this very juncture, on December 6, when excitement had reached high-water mark, and when Dutch speakers and the Dutch press had produced a feeling of the bitterest



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

THE VALLEY OF DESOLATION AT GRAAFF REINET.

exasperation, to have crossed the Orange River with 4,000 men and six guns, close to Aliwal North. He was then to have marched direct upon Cradock and Graaff Reinet, two centres of Dutch disaffection. Two smaller commandos, totalling between them 2,000 men, and under the orders of Kritzing and Herzog, were to have moved in the same direction by way of Bethulie and Zand Drift. Had such a general movement occurred at this critical moment, had De Wet at the head of a

FAUNA OF NORTH-WEST CAPE COLONY.



THE SPRINGBOK.

differs much from the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. It is even drier, more barren, and water is scarcer. The north-west of Cape Colony, including the districts which lie west of the great railway to Kimberley, is a vast waste, over which many


Geography of the north-west district.

generations of man have passed without bettering its soil or improving its habitability. Only in the brief period of heavy rains is its melancholy surface broken with verdure. Then it is clothed with tall grass, in which flourish flowers of surprising brilliancy. When the rains are over the scorching sun burns the grass once more to the dreary brown hue which it wears most of the year. In old times the Bushmen had wandered over it; now it was populated by a few families of Trek-Boers, a nomadic people, without settled homes or well-built farms, living mainly in waggons and tents. They were cunning hunters, good shots, and splendid horsemen, but by nature idle and unenterprising. Here in the remote desert fastnesses were still to be found vast herds of springbok, the koodoo, an occasional gemsbok with spear-like horns, flocks of ostriches, and even a rare lion and leopard. The country was almost unexplored; the British maps of it were for the most part drawn mainly from imagination. Only the Boers had accurate maps, showing every route and every watering-place,

large force made his way into the very heart of the Colony, the consequences might well have been disastrous. But the extreme activity of General Knox and his subordinates, and the efficient manner in which the drifts from Aliwal North to Bethulie were guarded, proved fatal to the plan. The principal actor, De Wet, was, as we have seen, forced away from the Orange River. Finding that he had been checkmated, De Wet sent orders to Kritzing and Herzog to make independently for Graaff Reinet, though he knew that their forces were too weak to cause serious trouble. Even so they could not reach the Colony

till some days after the Congress, when much of the excitement had died down, and when even the Dutch treason-mongers had begun to ask themselves whether they had not gone just a trifle too far. In fact the psychological moment had been missed, and it did not recur.

The country which the Boers were now about to enter



THE KOODOO.



THE GEMSBOK

thus evincing the care and forethought with which they had made their preparations for war. In this north-west corner the only civilised settlement of any size is Ookiep in Namaqualand, a village



[Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.]

IN AN OSTRICH FARM: A FINE DISPLAY OF PLUMES.

of 2,000 inhabitants, with rich copper mines, connected with Port Nolloth and the sea by a narrow-gauge railway. One or two oases are found in this forbidding desert. One

of the most curious is Vogel Vlei Vloer, a shallow lake, "on the shores of which," writes Mr. Bryden, "are to be observed myriads of wild duck, geese, and other water-fowl, as well as herons, egrets, all sorts of wading birds, flamingoes, and pelicans." To the east of this is the Groet Vloer, another lake fed by the Zak, which is dry except after the rains. The valley of the Zak is remarkable for its fertility, and in it three crops can in favourable years be garnered within twelve months. But this is the only inviting spot to civilised man in a land remote and all but unknown—a land, however, which the art of man may yet render capable of supporting a fair population.

Eastwards of this country lies a better-watered region, immediately to the south of

the Orange River. It is a high plateau, supporting large numbers of sheep and goats; but nevertheless its appearance is arid and repellent. South of it again lies the Great Karroo, enclosed by the

The Karroo.

Nieuwveld and Sneeuwberg Mountains on the north, and the Zwarteberg to the south. This is the very heart of the Colony; "it is," in Professor Bryce's words, "tolerably level, excessively dry, with no such thing as a running stream over its huge expanse of 300 miles long and half as much wide; nor, indeed, any moisture, save in a few places shallow pools, which almost disappear in the dry season . . . It is virtually a desert, bearing no herbage (except for a week or two after a rainstorm) and no trees, though there are plenty of prickly shrubs and small bushes." The Great Karroo is traversed by the two trunk lines of railway, from Capetown to De Aar and Kimberley, and from Port Elizabeth to Colesberg, Bloemfontein, and Pretoria.

The advantages which this country offered for a guerilla war are obvious. Its sandy tracks and waterless deserts could only be traversed with extreme difficulty by strong bodies of organised troops,



[Photo by J. W. Goldsbrough, Port Elizabeth.]

THE REMOUNT DEPARTMENT AT PORT ELIZABETH.

During three months of 1900, when Lord Roberts was advancing upon Pretoria, this department passed as many as 25,000 horses to the front.

who knew exactly where and in what quantity water was to be found. The mountains which shut it in afforded admirable hiding-places for small bands of guerillas. The sympathy of the few Dutch inhabitants, scattered over its vast surface, would always be with the invaders rather than with the British. Ensconced here, in the very centre of the Colony, diminutive commandos would be able to gather in recruits, to obtain remounts and food, and from time to time to descend upon the railways and break the British communications.

Its advantages for guerilla warfare.

With their capacity of rapid movement, the burghers could always withdraw from any district when, from the presence of British troops, it became too hot to hold them. They could not be enclosed in a cordon, for the simple reason that the distances were too vast. They could not be ejected by systematic devastation, because the country was in name British and outwardly loyal. The difficulties which had faced our generals in the Boer territories were thus multiplied when the war was transferred to Cape Colony, though there still remained one means, and one means only, of overcoming them—to render our troops as mobile as the Boer commandos. On this every effort should have been centred, but here the want of remounts came in with the most disastrous results. It is impossible to reckon the cost in millions to the British nation of the unreasonable and injudicious economy and the apathy at home which led to the stinting of funds for horses.

Delay in requisitioning Cape horses.

It does seem, however, that more might have been done with the horses upon the spot. In Cape Colony were large numbers of ponies and horses, acclimatised to South African conditions. These might have been requisitioned at an earlier date than that at which they were actually taken. Possibly what prevented such a measure was the fear that it might be misunderstood and misrepresented by the Dutch, and also the great difficulty of carrying it into execution. To collect the horses scattered over a vast area, where the British agents



LANDING REINFORCEMENTS AT PORT ELIZABETH.

Landing is effected by means of baskets or slings swung overboard as here shown.

had not the sympathy of the farmers, would not have been a simple task. Moreover, such action would have been seized upon by the agitators in the Colony and the Pro-Boers at home as another "outrage." These considerations may have led Lord Kitchener and Sir Alfred Milner to postpone the measure till the actual appearance of the enemy in the Colony rendered it imperatively necessary. But then the horses had to be broken in, and there was considerable delay before they were available.

Throughout October and November small bodies of Boers had been moving southwards in the Orange River Colony, so that December opened with scattered bands of the enemy everywhere in

**Kritzinger crosses
the Orange.**

close proximity to the frontier of Cape Colony proper. On Sunday, December 16, the first organised body of the enemy passed the Orange River. This was Kritzinger's commando, which, 700 strong, crossed at Rhenoster Hoek Drift, a few miles west of Odendaal. The Orange River had fallen after the heavy freshets, due to the torrential downpours which were encountered during the chase of De Wet by Knox, and was easily fordable. Kritzinger appears to have been with De Wet in the neighbourhood of Rouxville, to have conferred at leisure with the guerilla leader, and then, while the attention of the British troops was centred upon the most daring and capable of their enemies, to have marched quietly south. What



[Photo by Knight, Aldershot.]

MILITIAMEN AS MOUNTED INFANTRY.

The photograph represents the 5th (Militia) Battalion of the Manchester Regiment in training as Mounted Infantry.

had become of the troops who had been holding Odendaal Drift we are not told. Possibly they had been withdrawn to support Knox. A picket of Cape Police watching Rhenoster Hoek was captured with the loss of one man wounded. From Rhenoster Hoek Drift, Kritzinger hurried towards Brandspruit and Burghersdorp. He was followed without delay by Major Neylan of the Cape Police with fifty of that force, and every effort was made to head him off. As he neared Burghersdorp, the Mounted Guard of that place moved out to bar his progress. It was numerically weak and very inferior as a fighting force to a commando of seasoned burghers, but Kritzinger did not attack it.

**He moves to
Knapdaar.**

His patrols exchanged a few shots with it, but his main body at once turned westward and rode towards Knapdaar. There was some insignificant skirmishing. At night the commando crossed the Burghersdorp-Bethulie Railway, without damaging the line, near Knapdaar, and bivouacked. As yet no injury had been done to property, and non-combatants had not been molested. At Knapdaar the commando appears to have divided.

**The commando
divides.**

One section hurried to the village of Venterstad, half-way between Knapdaar and Norvals Pont, and there, on the morning of December 18, surrounded a detachment of twenty Cape Police. The police were entrenched on a kopje outside the village, but after only a few shots had been fired they surrendered. It has been said that their ammunition was exhausted, but of this there is no proof whatever, and it appears to have been a mere guess, to explain the incident. Meanwhile the stores in Venterstad were despoiled of

goods. All clothing and provisions were removed, and one shopkeeper lost goods to the amount of £300, for which no payment, even in "Orange Free State" paper, was made. The telegraph wires were cut, and soon after 2 p.m. the enemy vanished as suddenly as they had appeared, and a British force poured into the town.

The other detachment of Kritzinger's commando seems to have made direct for the Zuurberg, a mountain range which runs east and west, from Naauwpoort to Stormberg. They may have intended to make a dash upon the town of Steynsburg, or upon that important railway centre, Rosmead Junction, both of which places lie immediately to the south of the range. If so, when they discovered that these points had been already occupied by British troops, who were quite ready for their coming,



A. C. Ball.]

THE ATTACK ON HAMELFONTEIN FARM.

A British outpost of twenty Yeomanry and nine Grenadier Guards, commanded by Lieut. Fletcher, was surprised by Boers on December 17, 1900, and bravely held for eleven hours until the enemy retired.

they judged it better to abstain from attack. The two detachments re-united in the Zuurberg, the men from Venterstad effecting their junction with the main body, and there remained for some days, presumably awaiting reinforcements from the Orange River Colony. But as the Orange River had again risen after the heavy rains the reinforcements did not come, and there was a pause of some days' duration in the operations, during which the British made efforts to surround the invaders.

Re-unites in the Zuurberg.

While Kritzinger was marching on the Zuurberg, another body of Boers had crossed the Orange River on December 17, at Zand Drift, mid-way between Norvals Pont and Orange River Station.

Herzog and Brand move toward Colesberg.

They were about 1,200 strong, under the leadership of Herzog and George Brand. In their ranks were included most of the guerillas who had for weeks infested the neighbourhood of Kimberley and who, on the night of December 10-11, had raided the station of Riverton Road. At first they moved in the direction of Colesberg, apparently

with the intention of joining Kritzinger in the Zuurberg, but troops were hurried south by Lord Kitchener, and arrived in time to prevent any attack upon Colesberg. On the night of the 17th the trenches were manned; next morning a mobile column 500 strong, composed of artillery, cavalry, Yeomanry and Colonials, under Major Shute, marched out in the direction of Philipstown, where the Boers were reported and where firing had been heard. It turned out that the firing had been due to a Boer attack upon a British outpost at Hamelfontein farm. The outpost was composed of 20 Yeomanry and 9 Grenadier Guards, under the command of Lieutenant Fletcher, a famous Oxford oarsman. The attack was a surprise one; the men were actually cleaning their accoutrements when a volley was suddenly fired at them. But Fletcher was not a man to surrender in a hurry, and he was well backed by his soldiers. Rough defences had been constructed, and behind these the British were able to defy the Boers for eleven hours, eventually beating them off. The British had 2 killed and 7 wounded—severe casualties for so small a force. The Boers retired leaving behind them two wounded men.

The Boers occupied Philipstown for a few hours and captured a British officer there, who rode into the place quite unaware that the enemy had crossed the Orange River. They sent out patrols in all

Philipstown and Petrusville receive the Boers coldly.

directions collecting forage, food, and horses from the farms, but to their great disappointment only six recruits joined them. They had counted more or less upon a rising *en masse*. At Petrusville, which was temporarily occupied by one of their detachments, they had even less luck, as there no recruits joined them. In fact the Dutch farmers showed some irritation at their coming, and did not receive them with any of the enthusiasm which the Worcester treason-mongers had led them to expect. Herzog's and Brand's troops were by all accounts a very tatterdemalion crew, looking

more like brigands than soldiers, and this may have contributed to the coolness of their welcome. Moreover, the Boer commando was weak in numbers and in guns. The invaders cut the telegraphs, and then, as British troops were fast concentrating to the east, retired on a wide front towards the west. In this direction lay the important railway junction

British troops hurried to De Aar.

and depôt of De Aar, which had been entrenched and held by a small garrison in the opening weeks of the war. Hither General Settle had been despatched from the Kimberley country with all the troops that could be spared, while column after column from the north, under Colonels Sir Charles Parsons, Thorneycroft, Byng, Williams, and De Lisle, was moved by train to Naauwpoort Junction, and thence directed westwards and south-westwards to deal with the invaders. But the enemy made no attempt upon De Aar. They had orders not to risk engagements with con-



(Photo by Hills & Saunders.)

LIEUT. FLETCHER,

The Oxford oarsman who held Hamelfontein.

The Commanding
Officer
Sir
I herewith
beg to ask you to
surrender within 5 min-
utes. I think enough
blood has been spilt
so be reasonable and
surrender
Yours Truly
Leo Barkers
Command

Photo by Lafayette.

DEMAND FOR SURRENDER

Addressed by Commandant Brand to Major de Burgh, 61st (2nd Dublin) Yeomanry.

considerable bodies of troops; they were to employ guerilla tactics and to cause annoyance, not to attempt to deal deadly blows. They struck the De Aar-Kimberley Railway at Houtkraal, a station

a few miles to the north of De Aar. They fired on a goods train from Capetown, and attempted to tear up the rails in front of it, but the drivers—there were two engines on the train—gallantly ran through their midst and escaped uninjured, though the leading engine was dented with bullets. Then the raiders broke the line, cut the telegraph, and, when the British troops appeared upon the scene, precipitately retired in the direction of Britstown. They were pursued by the British mounted forces, but in the pursuit one of those minor mishaps, so frequent in the war, occurred. A detachment of Yeomanry lost touch of the main British column, and was ambuscaded and captured. The incident served to illustrate the enemy's skill in guerilla war, and the danger of permitting small bodies of men, unsupported, to come into touch with so resourceful and daring an enemy. The prisoners could not be long detained without interfering with the mobility of the raiders; they were stripped of their equipment, rifles, and horses, and then set at liberty.

On December 22 the Boers simultaneously occupied Britstown seized.

Strydenburg and Britstown, villages 45 miles apart. The advance-guard, about 50 strong, rode into Britstown, arrested the magistrate, ransacked the public offices and Police barracks, destroyed all official documents upon which they could lay their hands, and requisitioned from the stores £700 worth of goods. Next day a larger force, 600 strong, under Brand and Herzog, arrived, and encamped on a ridge outside the town. They complained bitterly of the attitude of the Dutch, whose horses, sheep, and rifles they declared their intention of commandeering, since these Afrikaners had left them in the lurch at the outbreak of the war, and now again were failing to rally to their flag. They did a great deal of damage, and sjamboked some of the loyal farmers who had the courage to complain of their proceedings. In spite of their protests that they never wantonly destroyed private property, they fell upon the farm of Dr. Smartt, the Commissioner of Public Works, at



F. J. Waugh]

THE DESTRUCTION OF DR. SMARTT'S FARM AND THE TURNING LOOSE OF HIS OSTRICHES.

THEY complained bitterly of the attitude of the Dutch, whose horses, sheep, and rifles they declared their intention of commandeering, since these Afrikaners had left them in the lurch at the outbreak of the war, and now again were failing to rally to their flag. They did a great deal of damage, and sjamboked some of the loyal farmers who had the courage to complain of their proceedings. In spite of their protests that they never wantonly destroyed private property, they fell upon the farm of Dr. Smartt, the Commissioner of Public Works, at

Houwater, trampled to the earth 500 acres of ripe wheat, burnt his wool stores and granaries, cut his ostrich fences and turned his ostriches loose. On the 24th they hurriedly retired. When, some hours later, the head of a British column under Thorneycroft entered the town, this sudden departure was explained. They were not regretted, even by Boer sympathisers, as their behaviour had been that of mere brigands. They headed west and south-west.

Already the invasion, though the number of men engaged in it was



AN OASIS IN THE KARROO.

Capetown isolated. contemptible, was causing something like general consternation in Cape Colony. A culvert twelve miles to the south of De Aar was destroyed, and railway communication with Capetown was broken, while no ordinary traffic was allowed on December 24 north of Victoria West. Victoria West lies 80 miles south-west of De Aar and 150 from the Orange River, so it may be seen what inconvenient results this raid was producing. Never, even in the first weeks of the war, when the British were awaiting the arrival of General Buller's army, had the area of disturbance extended so far to the south. In all directions the telegraphs were down; no one knew what exactly was happening, where the enemy were, or what was their strength. The most alarming feature of the whole situation was the evident incapacity of the British troops to get at the enemy. What was the use of 250,000 men—on paper—who could none of them catch the guerillas? Wild reports set afloat by Boer sympathisers exaggerated the invaders' successes; the Colony had been kept in such ignorance

of military events, that even the loyal scarcely knew what to believe or what to think. On December 20 martial law had been extended by a proclamation of Sir Alfred Milner's to the districts of Britstown, Victoria West, Richmond, Hanover, Murraysburg, Graaff Reinet, Aberdeen, Middelburg, Steynsburg, Tarka, and Molteno, covering the whole centre of the Colony. In the threatened districts business-houses took alarm; as far south as Ceres, only 65 miles from Capetown itself, banks closed and shopkeepers hurriedly removed all the property that they could. The panic, however, soon abated, when it was seen that, if the British troops gained no successes against the invaders, the invaders accomplished little against the British.



DR. SMARTT.

The Hon. Dr. Smartt is Commissioner of Public Works in Sir Gordon Sprigg's Cabinet. He held the same office in the Cabinet of 1896, and has for many years taken a leading part in the affairs of Cape Colony, acting as a foil to Mr. Sauer.



MAJOR NEYLAN.

Major J. N. Neylan, Cape Mounted Police, held Molteno for four months, with the Boer lines about twelve miles away. The retention of the place was of great importance, for had it yielded to the Free Staters, the disaffected would have joined the Boers. On March 10, 1900, Major Neylan succeeded in saving Bethulie Bridge from destruction, and thus kept open communication with Lord Roberts. In December he was operating against Kritzinger in the Burgersdorp district.

In many of the threatened towns the organisation of Town Guards proceeded rapidly. On December 27 Beaufort West and Carnarvon were added to the districts under martial law; on the 31st Sir Alfred Milner ventured upon a daring measure—

Formation of Town Guards.

Appeal to arms.

daring it must be called in view of the half-hearted conduct of the British Government and of the criticism with which the stroke was greeted by many moderate men at home. This was nothing more or less than a general appeal to the loyal to arm and organise, made by the Colonial Premier, Sir Gordon Sprigg. The risk, of course, lay in



[Photo by Bassano.]

RIGHT HON. SIR GORDON SPRIGG, K.C.M.G. (1886), P.C. (1892), D.C.L. (Oxon).

Born 1830, son of the Rev. James Sprigg, M.A., Ipswich. Owing to ill health he settled in Cape Colony in 1858, and for eleven years worked as a journalist. Entered the Colonial Parliament as representative of East London, 1869; Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary, 1873-1881; Treasurer, 1881-6; Prime Minister, 1886; resigned office, 1890, and was succeeded by Mr. Rhodes; again Treasurer, 1893, and Prime Minister, 1896; resigned the Premiership, 1898, and resumed office in 1900. He is a staunch Imperialist.


asures are necessary." Payment was to be made at the rate of five shillings a day, and officers below the rank of major were, as far as possible, to be elected — a concession to the democratic prejudices

of the Colonial. In command of this force was to be that able and distinguished Colonial officer, General Brabant, while Colonel Girouard, the brilliant Canadian, who had made so great a name in charge of the Egyptian and South African military railways, was to superintend the organisation of the new levies at Capetown.

The response to this appeal was gratifying in the extreme, and this though Cape Colony had already placed thousands of men in the field. "Every house from Seapoint to Simonstown sent its recruits, and the big business firms came *en bloc*," says Mr. Wallace, speaking of Capetown. "There were Somebody and Co.'s two companies, and Emporium Limited's half battalion, and full companies from almost every association in town, whether Caledonian or Licensed Victuallers. There were Scottish companies and Irish companies and a Jewish company. There were Rand

the possibility that the Dutch malcontents might be stimulated by such a step to open rebellion. In any case the appeal was certain to draw a sharp line between the sheep and the goats—the loyal and the disloyal—and as the goats were unfortunately all too numerous, it might reveal to them their strength. On the other hand it had this great advantage, which the prescient eye of Sir Alfred Milner discerned. It would accustom the loyalists to the bearing of arms, and in the long-run bestow upon them military aptitudes, the want of which in them had led the Dutch to despise them. For the moment it could not affect the position; these raw levies could not without grave risk be allowed to come into contact with the Boers, who had acquired by fifteen months' warfare in the field all the arts of the soldier. But it would react in the long run upon the political situation in Cape Colony.

The new force to be raised was called the Colonial Defence Force, and it was to be utilised, as the call to arms stated, "for the sole and exclusive purpose of repelling the present invasion, guarding railways and other lines of communication, and maintaining order and tranquillity in districts in which such mea-



[Photo by Lekegian, Cairo.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR E. PERCY C. GIROUARD, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.

Lieut.-Colonel Girouard was born in 1867 at Montreal, and is of French-Canadian descent. He studied engineering in one of the Canadian technological schools, and was first employed on the Canadian Pacific Railway. He came to England and joined the Royal Engineers in 1888, and from 1890 to 1895 was Railway Traffic Manager at Woolwich Arsenal; Captain, 1899; Brevet-Major, 1899; Lieut.-Colonel, 1899. His remarkable ability brought him under the notice of Lord Kitchener, who when in command in Egypt sent for the Canadian and placed him on his staff as Major. He constructed the railway up the Nile Valley, and on the outbreak of the war was summoned to South Africa, where he has done remarkable work as Director of Railways.

millionaires and Capetown merchants; there were doctors and lawyers; town councillors, and quite a brigade of civil servants. Sir Gordon Sprigg has no reason to be otherwise than gratified with the manner in which Capetown has answered his appeal for men to repel the invaders, and Capetown's answer can be taken as typical of all the other loyal towns."

Practically all the able-bodied loyalists, as was Sir Alfred Milner's and Sir Gordon Sprigg's purpose, took up arms. Yet when the cream had been skimmed off by so many previous levies, it could not be expected that the quality of the new force should be as high as had been that of the earlier Colonial regiments, such as the incomparable Imperial Light Horse and Thorneycroft's admirable Mounted Infantry. But it was intended to use this levy *en masse* rather for defensive than for offensive work: the latter would fall to the Imperial troops and the earlier-raised Colonial units



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY BY HERZOG AND BRAND.

under Lord Kitchener's immediate orders. Some difficulties arose with regard to the supply of rifles. The Capetown Defence Force had to be temporarily armed with Martinis, for there was no reserve of Lee-Metfords in South Africa. There was also a want of ammunition and equipment.

To return now to the progress of the invaders. After a brief pause they began to press south, both in the west and in the centre of the Colony. Herzog and Brand's commandos, after leaving Britstown, sent a patrol to Vosburg and destroyed the telegraphic instruments there, while another detachment was directed towards Prieska, probably to open up communications with a large commando of Boers who had been seen some days previously passing to the south of Vryburg, with the apparent intention of marching by Kuruman and Griquatown

Boer commandos in the Vryburg and Carnarvon districts.



CHURCH SERVICE AT MATJESFONTEIN

Matjesfontein is a little village and wayside station on the main Capetown line, 195 miles from the Capital. It is 2,970 feet above the sea, and the climate is particularly dry and healthy, especially for those suffering from pulmonary complaints. The place belongs to Mr J. D. Logan, a Scotchman, often called the "Laird o' Matjesfontein." He is the refreshment contractor of the Cape railways, and from mere bare veldt he has made the spot a veritable sanatorium. Olive Schreiner lived there at one time.



(Photo by Peters, Capetown.)

GENERAL BRABANT REVIEWING THE TOWN GUARD OF CAPE TOWN, January 12, 1901.
The Town Guard numbered about 4,000 men, comprising horse and foot, artillery and cyclists.

towards Cape Colony. On its way to Kuruman this commando captured a British convoy of 26 waggons, laden with clothing, tobacco, provisions, and forage, only 30 miles from Kuruman. The convoy was guarded by 25 police, who were taken prisoners without offering any resistance. At Geluk, near Vryburg, the enemy seized a large store, confiscating all the goods in it. Yet a third detachment of the invaders marched upon Carnarvon, followed by Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, who endeavoured, all unsuccessfully, to overtake it. A mobile column, under Sir Charles Parsons, was railed, under Lord Kitchener's orders, from De Aar to Victoria West, whence it marched towards Carnarvon, with the object of intercepting the Boers. The enemy, however, moved too fast to be caught; on December 30 they were near Carnarvon, but did not occupy that place, and when the advance-guard of the British column appeared on the scene, they hurriedly resumed their southward march. The Carnarvon district had been extremely disloyal all through the war, and, though, according to the British official statements, few recruits joined the enemy there, it would seem that Brand and Herzog did pick up a good many sympathisers. They certainly obtained fresh horses, for the district had not been systematically denuded.



J. Nash, R.I.]

THE WRECK OF H.M.S. "SYBILLE."

[After a sketch by a British officer.]

H.M.S. *Sybille* was lying at anchor in Lambert's Bay when, on the night of January 15, 1901, she was compelled by stress of weather to put to sea. Captain Williams and about fifty of the crew were on duty on shore at the time. The weather moderating, the cruiser steamed back into the bay, but was carried out of her course and struck on a reef, when she became a total wreck. Capt. Williams proceeded to her assistance in a tug, and by means of an endless rope the whole of the crew were saved. The drawing shows the tug and the cutter of H.M.S. *Tartar*, which also came to the *Sybille's* assistance.

From Carnarvon the enemy moved almost due south towards Fraserburg and cut the telegraph. They left behind them many horses on the line of march, but as they could everywhere obtain fresh remounts that did not matter. We are not told whether the British columns were permitted to requisition horses from the farms as they passed, but the odds are that they were not. On January 2 the Boers were reported to have left the Victoria West and Fraserburg road, striking much more to the west towards Williston. News now came in which indicated that this commando or a part of it meant to make for the Atlantic coast, where in one of the many deserted bays, it was said, a foreign ship was to land arms, supplies, and reinforcements. Steps were at once taken to guard against such a contingency. The cruiser *Sybille* was sent to Lambert's Bay, which was the most likely spot to be selected by the enemy, to maintain a rigorous watch. Here, unfortunately, she was driven ashore in a violent gale on the night of January 15, and became a total wreck.

The continued progress of the invaders caused a renewal of the alarm. Even at Capetown, in spite of all official assurances, the preparations made showed clearly that the military authorities

thought a *coup de main* upon the capital of the Colony far from impossible. Naval guns were mounted on the Devil's Peak; entrenchments were thrown up across the Cape Peninsula; the prisoners at Capetown and Simon's Bay were placed on board ship; a naval brigade was landed; every available soldier was rushed north by rail, and all important points were carefully watched by sentries with loaded rifles. Never had Capetown had so close an acquaintance with war as in this week with which the new year opened. There was even talk of a plot hatched by a number of Dutch malcontents to assemble secretly in the mountains near Nordhoek, on False Bay, and then to attempt either a rush upon the Imperial dockyard at Simonstown, or the destruction of the Capetown Waterworks on Table Mountain. A gunboat was promptly detached to watch Nordhoek; but this wild plot ended in smoke.

What, perhaps, caused most uneasiness was the meagreness of news about the invaders, showing that the British troops had completely lost touch of them. On January 7 Herzog and Brand were

**Capetown prepared
for defence.**



F. Dadd, R.I.]

TIRED OFFICERS INDULGING IN A LITTLE "NAP."

[After a photograph by a British officer.

at Calvinia, 70 miles in a direct line to the west of Williston. Thence they seem to have despatched small detachments in all directions. One pushed on to Van Rhy's Dorp, a bare thirty-two miles from the Atlantic and directly on the road to Lambert's Bay. This detachment was thought to intend a dash upon Piquetberg and Malmesbury, places at no great distance from Capetown, and the news of its advance led many loyalists to remove from these menaced towns into Capetown. Units of the new defence force were hurried north to the Piquetberg, and to the Hex River Pass to guard the approaches to the south-western provinces of the Colony. At the same time efforts were made to denude the country of horses and transport. But in many quarters the Dutch farmers offered quiet opposition, and it was discovered that after the Worcester Conference a large number of horses had been sent north by Boer sympathisers and placed in the line of the invaders' advance. A second Boer detachment advanced to within four miles of Sutherland, and presently occupied the town itself in force. Matjesfontein, to the south of Sutherland, a station on the railway, was garrisoned and prepared to resist an attack. In quick succession,

**Herzog and Brand
centred at Calvinia.**



GROUP OF BENGAL LANCERS, TAKEN AT THE REMOUNT DEPÔT, KROONSTAD.

The Indian troops would have been only too glad to fight for the British, had not the Boer report, that natives were allowed to take active part in the war, been untrue.

last months of office as War Minister. The wildest stories circulated everywhere. Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey were said to be all coming to swell the invasion, and it was added that Botha and De Wet had sworn not to shave their beards till they entered Capetown. The extraordinary audacity of the invaders was, indeed, staggering. They paid not the slightest attention to the British troops, rode round them, scattered, plundered, and reassembled, with the completest impunity. That they were aided everywhere by the disloyal is evident. The farmers of Clanwilliam, indeed, when the British military authorities attempted to requisition their horses at a fair price, flatly declined to sell, and challenged the British troops to come and take them away. To what extent recruits joined the invaders is uncertain. But it was clear that the commandos were growing in numbers. The disloyal Dutch, however, waited prudently for some brilliant success before undisguisedly alighting from the fence on which they had sat so long. It is true that the treason trials had shown that assisting the enemy was regarded as a comparatively venial offence, but the Dutch have always been a slow-moving people, and whatever the tie of race, in Cape Colony they had no real ground of complaint against the British Government.

Meantime in the west the British troops followed steadily in Herzog's and Brand's tracks. Bethune, Thorneycroft, and De Lisle took part in the pursuit, but rarely caught sight of the enemy. Other columns under Colenbrander, a Colonial officer commanding "Kitchener's Fighting Scouts," and Lieutenant-Colonel Henniker, strove to head the Boers back, starting from Matjesfontein. As Kritzinger from the midlands was working down towards the south-west, these commanders were ordered at all costs to prevent him from forming a junction with Herzog and Brand. This object was achieved. At last the western invaders seem to have taken alarm at the formidable forces mustering in their front and rear. A line drawn from Sutherland to Clanwilliam approximately represents the high-water mark of the invasion in the west. Along this line the enemy remained for some days, and then the tide slowly began to ebb. The Boers from Sutherland began to retire in the direction of Calvinia, and on January 9 Sutherland was occupied by the British troops. A few days later Clanwilliam was seized and secured by the Colonial Defence Force. The line of the Roggeveld Mountains was next occupied, and the passes strongly held. Worcester,

Invasion of the south-west fails.

district after district was added to those already under martial law — Calvinia, Clanwilliam, Worcester, Malmesbury, Tulbagh, Piquetberg, Paarl, and Stellenbosch all being proclaimed. "It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of the situation, and more troops are most urgently needed" said a telegram from Capetown on January 7. Such were the results of the policy of withholding reinforcements, pursued by Lord Lansdowne in his

Disaffection spreading.



COLONEL COLENBRANDER.

Johann W. Colenbrander was born in Pinetown, Natal, in 1861, of Dutch extraction. He is a great hunter of big game. He was interpreter to the Matabele Envoys to England in 1889. He did much to help Cecil Rhodes to conquer and colonise Rhodesia, being an old friend of Lobengula. Under the Chartered Co. he has held many important appointments, and has interested himself in gold mining.

Ceres, and other centres of Dutch disaffection were also garrisoned, and the people required to surrender their rifles; while Mr. Malan, the editor of the seditious journal *Ous Land*, was arrested, and his paper and the equally treasonable *South African News* forbidden within the area under martial law.

A certain amount of discouragement was shown by the raiders at the failure of their attempt to provoke a rising *en masse*. If reports can be believed, Herzog declared that he was sick of the war, and foresaw its certain end, but was determined to fight on. He behaved in many instances with great cruelty to coloured loyalists, upon whom he vented his rage at what he considered the treachery of the Dutch in disappointing him. At Calvinia, with his consent, if not by his orders, a Kaffir named Esau was severely flogged for the sole crime of loyalty. Esau, according to the report of the Civil Commissioner and Magistrate at Calvinia, Mr. Dreyer, "was called up before F. van der Merwe, Landdrost, and was informed by the Landdrost that he would receive 25 lashes with a cat for having spoken against the Boers and for having attempted to warn the natives. The unfortunate man was then taken by Van der Merwe and tied to a gum-tree within sight of the public, and the so-called Landdrost proceeded to lash him with a cat upon the bare back. Esau fainted as he received

Cruelty to coloured loyalists.



[Photo by Underwood & Underwood.]

THEY MISS MRS. ATKINS.

The soldier campaigning has to wash his own clothes when and where he can. These men are carrying on the operation under conditions of comparative luxury.



EXPECTING A VISIT FROM THE INVADERS.
Sighting a machine gun.

the seventeenth lash. He was then untied, and fell to the ground weak and exhausted, where, it is said, he received some kicks." Finally, when the British were advancing, some weeks later, the Boers are stated to have shot him in cold blood. It will be interesting to see whether, when the war is over, the British Government takes the trouble to avenge upon the criminals the murder of one whose only crime was loyalty.

Mr. Dreyer gives other and interesting particulars of the Boer occupation of Calvinia. All the public money and im-

portant official records were removed before the enemy's arrival, greatly to their indignation. For this crime they threatened to punish the magistrate, but, of course, could not carry out so preposterous

Herzog's occupation of Calvinia.

a menace. Proclamations were posted up ordering the surrender of all arms and ammunition, and denouncing severe penalties against anyone who concealed such useful articles. Promises were made that private property would be respected, but as the invaders had looted the farms and stores on their line of march, no one attached the slightest weight to these assurances. The shopkeepers closed their shops in fear and trembling. On January 10 they were summoned before Herzog and informed that if they did not re-open them a severe punishment would be inflicted. The result was that their shops were looted of men's clothing, tinned food, and groceries "to an alarming extent." Many civilians were deprived of

their horses, field-glasses, and other property, and on the 12th all the officials, two coloured policemen, and several natives were imprisoned. Forage and horses were collected from the neighbouring farms. On the 16th the enemy departed towards the west and south-west—200 men under Theunissen, 150 under the Chief Commandant Herzog and Nieuwoudt, 200 under Brand, and 85 under Pretorius, a total of 635 men. Yet these 635 men had been permitted to remain eight days unmolested in a town in the very centre of Cape Colony. The commando appears to have concentrated at Van Rhyn's Dorp, where it was doubtless joined by the other detachments which it had sent out beating up recruits. The British columns to the south of it, under De Lisle, Scobell, and Colenbrander, prepared to force it northward over the border of the Colony. But they were much hampered by the hostility of the Dutch. "They are sullen towards us," says a correspondent with one of the British columns, "they never offer us any hospitality, and they charge excessive prices for everything they can be persuaded to sell us. They tell us to our faces that they do not want to see us, and hope they will never see us again. They show no gratitude to the men who have come to keep back the invaders. On the contrary, there are scowls on every face, and a disposition to do nothing for us beyond what they are obliged to do by martial law. De Wet is their hero. They are never tired of talking of him, and they boast of his deeds before us, referring to the capture of the Derbyshires, the burning of trains, and the surrender of Dewetsdorp with pride and pleasure. They even do not hesitate to rally our troops on their inability to catch 'the flying Dutchman,' and they have apparently long ago come to the conclusion that the fame of Napoleon or Wellington must pale before that of De Wet." And here, on the eve of the general advance in the west, from which little proceeded but disappointment, we must turn to the doings of the enemy in the midland districts of Cape Colony.



AMBULANCE MEN ATTENDING A MAN WHO HAS FALLEN OUT THROUGH FATIGUE.



A. Barraud.]

BURGERSDORP.

[After a photograph.



[Photo by Vander Weyde.

SIR CHARLES WELBY,
M.P.

[Photo by Elliott & Fry.

MR. WILLIAM MATHER,
M.P.

[Photo by E. Stead.

MR. GEORGE GIBB.

[Photo by Elliott & Fry.

SIR G. S. CLARKE.

[Photo by Winlow & Grove.

MR. E. W. BECKETT,
M.P.

[Photo by Elliott & Fry.

MR. CLINTON DAWKINS.

REFORMING THE WAR OFFICE: THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY.

Mr. Brodrick, in assuming office as Secretary of State for War, appointed a committee to examine into the methods of business at the War Office to investigate the system of contract and audit, and to consider the feasibility of more decentralisation, greater rapidity in the despatch of business, and the diminution of red tape. Lord Roberts, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had the following expert business men to assist him:—Sir Charles Welby, M.P. for Newark, who has been Private Secretary to two War Secretaries; Mr. William Mather, M.P. for N.E. Lancashire, partner in the Salford Ironworks; Mr. George Gibb, originally a solicitor, an authority on wages, and General Manager of the N.E. Railway; Sir G. S. Clarke, formerly of the Royal Engineers, and serving in Egypt, superintendent of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich; Mr. E. W. Beckett, M.P. for Whitby, partner in the banking firm of Beckett, Leeds, heir to Lord Grimthorpe; Mr. Clinton Dawkins, formerly of the India Office, and Financial Member on the Council of the Governor-General of India, member of the firm of J. S. Morgan & Co.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROGRESS OF THE INVASION.

Kritzinger begins to move—Major Burrows deceived by khaki hats—Colonel Grenfell engages Kritzinger at Plaisterheuvell—Train looted and burnt near Sherborne—Boers advance to Middelburg and Richmond—Organisation of Kritzinger's commando—British powerless to stop the advance—Unreliable reports of Kritzinger's route—Skirmish near Murraysburg—Stoffel Myburgh's commando crosses and recrosses the Orange—Cruel treatment of wounded yeomen—Kritzinger at Uniondale—Colonel Haig bars the Zwarteberg passes—The invaders turned back—Midland districts raided—Skirmish near Port Elizabeth—Attempt to hem in the western invaders—De Lisle climbs the Roggeveld by night—Story of the murder of Esau—Bethune and Colenbrander reach Calvinia—De Lisle enters Williston—Ookiep fortified—Boers saved by De Wet's movement—Proclamation against treason.




**Kritzinger begins
to move.**

E left Kritzinger with 700 or 800 men waiting in the Zuurburg for reinforcements, while the British were massing troops to the north and south of the range, and preparing for a vigorous campaign to eject the invaders. When the Orange River subsided small parties of Boers crossed between Norvals Pont and Aliwal North, moving by twos and threes, so as to elude observation, and hurried south to the rendezvous appointed by Kritzinger. Late in December Kritzinger's

men began to show more activity. On the 23rd a patrol of Burghersdorp local troops and Imperial Cavalry, under Major Burrows, 120 strong, learnt that 500 of the enemy were in laager half-way between Burghersdorp and Venterstad, and started at once. They rode up to the laager, where the men were bivouacking, and opened

**Major Burrows
deceived by
khaki hats.** results

might have been obtained, but unluckily the Boers wore khaki-coloured hats, and were mistaken by one of the British officers for Brabant's Horse. Thereupon the British were ordered to cease fire and wait. They did so,



THE AERIAL RAILWAY CAR ON NORVALS PONT BRIDGE.

After the destruction of Norvals Pont Bridge by the Boers, an aerial railway was slung across the gap, pending the erection of a temporary bridge.

with the result that the supposed Brabant's Horse saddled up and swarmed out to attack the patrol. There was an exchange of fire at long range; several of the British horses were knocked over; and then Major Burrows thought it best to retreat, as he was greatly outnumbered. He lost a couple of men, one wounded and another missing. That night the Boers crawled up to Albert Junction, the next station to the north of Burghersdorp, and in their usual manner sniped the sentries, wounding a Guardsman in the leg. It was the practice of the Duke of Wellington and of the French Generals in the Napoleonic wars to discountenance such attacks upon sentries and outposts as unproductive of any military result and unnecessarily cruel. A similar tolerance was shown by the North and South in the American Civil War. But the Boers had no scruples; their miserable tactics of sniping, plundering, and evading battle spared no life, however insignificant.

On December 24 Colonel Grenfell, who had been in pursuit of Kritzinger all this time, at last came into contact with the enemy at Plaisterheuvcl. The strength of the two forces was about equal, but the British made no strenuous attempt to deal a severe blow. There was a long-range bombardment of the Boer position, during which the 17th Lancers attempted to turn the Boer flank, and suffered a loss of 8 men, among whom was Lord Frederick Blackwood, severely wounded. The British troops engaged were the 17th Lancers,

Brabant's Horse, Cape Mounted Rifles, Cape Police, and Royal Artillery with 15-pounder and "Pom-Poms." There was no evidence that the enemy lost heavily, though the local press expressed a naïve surprise at the expenditure of so much shrapnel with such little result. Kritzinger after this brush, which must be



THE WRECKING OF A TRAIN NEAR SHERBORNE.

[From a photo by a British officer.]

regarded as one of our many lost opportunities, retired into the mountains from which he had come. He abandoned his Maxims and carts, according to the official report, presumably finding that they impeded his movements. And this done, he put his men in motion for the south of the Colony, though columns under Colonels Williams and Shute lay across his path.

On December 29 the important railway centre of Rosmead Junction, where four lines of railway meet, running generally north and south and east and west, was alarmed by news of the arrival of a Boer commando in the neighbourhood. A force of Colonial troops, known as the Prince of Wales' Light Horse, had been detailed to garrison the junction. It at once retired to a fort, 800 yards from the station, where it prepared for all eventualities. The Boers, however, did not attack. They moved round to the north of the town, and took up a position on the railway from Rosmead to Naauwpoort. They held up the train from Bloemfontein to Port Elizabeth on the 30th, near Sherborne. The train was made up of thirty trucks, but some

Train looted and burnt near Sherborne.

carriages were attached, in which were 40 passengers, mostly women and children, and 60 men of the Prince Alfred's Guards, returning home. The enemy, about 200 strong, succeeded in damaging and stopping the engine by a lucky shot. A shower of bullets pierced the carriages, and many of the women and children had narrow escapes, though fortunately none of them were hurt. The troops with the train replied to the enemy's fire, but soon exhausted their ammunition, and were compelled to surrender with four wounded. The train was looted and burnt. The Boers started the engine at full speed down the incline towards Rosmead Junction, hoping that it would wreck the rolling stock standing in the station; but the scheme, though promising enough, did not work. Steam failed, and the locomotive came to a stop three miles from the junction. As the result of this incident traffic was suspended north of Rosmead, and south of that point could only be worked with great caution.



F. J. Waugh.]

DEGENERATE WARFARE: BOERS SNIPING A SENTRY.

Near Middelburg the Boers made their presence felt on December 30, and a day or two later small parties of them were in the neighbourhood of Richmond, which lies immediately to the south of De Aar, and at no great distance from the main line of railway from Capetown to Kimberley.

**Boers advance to
Middelburg and
Richmond.**

On December 31 a considerable force of British troops, under Colonel Williams, arrived at Rosmead. It consisted of detachments from the 1st Mounted Infantry, 5th and 9th Lancers, Nesbitt's Horse—a patrol of which the Boers cut off and captured—the South African Light Horse, 2nd Brabant's Horse, and Coldstream Guards. On January 1 about 1,500 men moved out and came into contact with the Boers on a range of kopjes at Grootvlei, to the west of Middelburg. The Boers could not have had more than 600 or 700 men, from the manner in which their forces had dispersed, and probably they had very much less. Yet the British delivered no vigorous attack. There was the usual long-range, indecisive fight. The British guns furiously bombarded the kopjes, but for all practical results they might have saved their ammunition. There is no evidence that a single Boer was killed, while the casualties to our troops

were four wounded. Thus a second opportunity of reading the invaders a sharp lesson was lost. A day or two later Colonel Grenfell effected a junction with Colonel Williams, to the south of Middelburg, but by that time the main body of the Boers had slipped through the British troops, and was in full cry for the south of the Colony.

The tactics of this commando are well described by Sergeant Arnott, of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, who was captured by the Boers.



A TYPICAL "DUTCH" FARM ON THE KARROO.

Built of rough sun-dried bricks, and roofed with corrugated iron. The photograph shows the farmer and his wife and family, his dog, his Cape cart and native servants—a representative Dutch household.

Organisa- The com-
tion of m a n d o
Kritzinger's was divid-
commando. ed into

four sections or squadrons, while a fifth was in process of formation from the ranks of the Colonial rebels who joined, and who numbered on January 1 exactly 30. The sections were again subdivided into messes, each of four men, under a corporal. Every burgher led one spare

horse, if not two. The kit, blankets, waterproofs, and cooking utensils of each mess were carried on a pack-horse. There were no carts, no waggons, and no guns. No food was carried by the men; they lived on the land. At the Dutch farms they expected, and they sometimes received, an eager welcome. The whites turned out, sang the Volkslied, and provided coffee, meat, and bread. Horses were exchanged, the worn and sore-backed mounts being replaced by sound animals from the farmer's stock. The Boer commandants paid for the exchange in requisition notes, full value for which, they calmly explained, would be obtained from the stupid British Government after the war. Evidence in various treason trials showed that this was their regular practice in collusion with the sellers of goods. Such is the reputation of the British Government for childish simplicity—a reputation which, we are bound



SOME OF THE INVADERS: A COMMANDO OF BOERS AND REBELS PHOTOGRAPHED NEAR RICHMOND, CAPE COLONY.



ATTACK ON A PATROL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LIGHT HORSE (see p. 292).

F.J. Waugh.]

to say, was fully upheld in the subsequent negotiations with Botha, when our military authorities appear to have been ready to make good with cash the Boer commandeering notes. The enemy had no reserves of ammunition; they used the Lee-Metford, and relied upon picking up British cartridges shaken out of our troops' awkward bandoliers and pouches. The invaders everywhere strove to enlist recruits, and many and comic were the scenes in this process. The well-to-do Dutch farmers almost invariably refused to go, alleging that if they had not been married men with wives and families, and

that if they had had nothing to lose, nothing would have given them greater pleasure than to join the raiders. But they were careful to impress upon their bywoners, or white servants, that these objections did not apply in their case. "It was no uncommon thing," observes Sergeant Arnott, "to hear a farmer say, 'If I were a poor man like you, and without a family, I would not hesitate a moment.'"

The invaders generally

marched by night, and were almost always accompanied by local farmers, who went unarmed, and who, when challenged by the British troops or police, had always a plausible excuse for themselves. In the neighbourhood of British forces, the whereabouts of which were generally known, the burghers slept by their horses, but when no troops were near, the horses were turned loose in some paddock. The recruits who joined were almost invariably of the bywoner class, who were quite ready to exchange a life of drudgery for one of brigandage, but of brigandage without any pains and

penalties. The tales telegraphed to the British press of the complete demoralisation and miserable condition of the men of Kritzinger's commando had no foundation in fact. The burghers were well fed and led a very safe and pleasant existence. An occasional interchange of fire at extreme ranges with the British troops simply added an exhilarating spice of danger, and as there were rarely more than one or two casualties in the Boer ranks, war was deprived of all its terrors.

It speedily became evident, to the amazement of all, that the British columns, however numerous they were, proved powerless to stop Kritzinger. Hampered by traditions and routine, encumbered with



[Photo by G. W. Wilson & Co.]

THE ENGLISH CHURCH AT GRAAFF REINET, AND SPANDAU KOP.



[Photo by G. W. Wilson & Co.]

GRAAFF REINET.

Graaff Reinet is, and always has been, a centre of Dutch (as opposed to British) colonists. Many members of the Afrikaner Bond reside in the neighbourhood, which is purely agricultural. The town is the oldest and largest in the Cape Midlands, with a population of 6,000. It contains a very fine Dutch church, built at a cost of nearly £20,000.

waggons and guns, without pack-horses or led horses, all that they could do was to follow the enemy at a respectable distance. Even now, after all the lessons of the war, ox-waggons were attached to our "mobile columns," reducing their speed to two or three miles an hour. And when fortune was favourable and the enemy were encountered, no attempt was made, as we have seen in two instances, to force on a decisive action. The British losses might have been heavy had the Boers been resolutely attacked, but, as things were, the lives saved in battle were lost by disease, while the war dragged on interminably and exerted an ever-increasing drain upon the resources of the mother-country.

British powerless to stop the advance.

The destination of Kritzinger was known to be, in the first instance, the Dutch stronghold of Graaff Reinet. At the end of the first week of January, with such expedition had he moved, that parties of his men were close to that place, while others were reported at Murraysburg, Hanover, Aberdeen, and as far to the south as Willowmore. Graaff Reinet was strongly held by the British, and for that reason was not attacked. Whether the enemy really were near all these places it is impossible even now to say. It was one of their

Unreliable reports of Kritzinger's route.



(From a photograph.)

A SOUTH AFRICAN "ROAD."

The difficulty of transport over roads such as this goes far to account for the failure of the British to overtake the Boer commandos.

methods to circulate deceptive reports.

The commanding officer of one British station in the Midlands in one week received no less than eight times precise information that commandos of from 500 to 1,000 men were at various places, and on every single occasion this information proved to be absolutely fictitious. Thus it would be a great mistake to assume that because the Boers were reported at a place, they were actually there. We have little or no trustworthy information as to the routes which they followed. Moving as they did by night, in small parties, and over unfrequented mountain tracks, they eluded the observation of the police and of the British patrols. Probably their object in making for Willowmore was to push on along the Groote Zwarteberg range to Matjesfontein, and there join hands with Herzog and Brand. Otherwise their movements would have been as purposeless as was supposed by some people in England at the time. But the history of the war shows that the Boers never acted without reason; that they rather followed a definite strategic plan, in which at this stage the chief aim was to cut the railway communications of the British Army in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

On January 11 the main body of Kritzinger's force would seem to have been near Murraysburg, as on that day a strong patrol of the South African Light Horse, numbering 50 men, suddenly came upon a body of from 700 to 1,000 Boers in the hills north of the town. The patrol was at once attacked, and beat a hasty retreat, but not without suffering some loss. Several men were killed or wounded, and a lieutenant and five men taken prisoners.


Skirmish near Murraysburg.

Those who got away gave information to the nearest British column, 600 strong, mostly Colonial troops, with four guns. The column arrived in the afternoon and skirmished till nightfall with the Boers, suffering in all, with the casualties to the patrol, a loss of 5 killed, 8 wounded, and 6 prisoners. The prisoners were detained a few hours in the Boer laager and then released. They reported that the enemy had lost from 60 to 70 men, which was probably an exaggeration.

While Kritzinger was moving south without let or hindrance

Stoffel Myburgh's commando crosses and recrosses the Orange.

British troops, another small commando had entered the Colony. It appears to have crossed the Orange River near Aliwal North, on or about December 29, and then to have moved in a leisurely manner south towards Dordrecht. For some days nothing more was heard of it. No doubt it marched by mountain paths at night, avoiding all British posts and towns. But on January 5 it was discovered in laager on the south-western edge of the Barkly East district. Its strength was only 100, and it was reported to be under the orders of "General" Stoffel Myburgh. A small British force of local troops at once assembled and moved out to attack this commando, which, according to apparently trustworthy reports, was composed mainly of Colonial rebels, who wished to sneak back to their homes. A native was sent into the Boer camp with a message demanding the enemy's surrender, but this had no result. The British then attacked, and there was another of the indecisive long-range encounters, in which the history of this period abounds. Much ammunition was fired off on either side, but surprisingly little damage was done. The British claim to have wounded two Boers in this farcical fight, which left matters precisely as they were. A few days later, however, Myburgh and



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE KRITZINGER'S INVASION OF THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF CAPE COLONY.

A few days later, however, Myburgh and

his men decamped, and recrossed the Orange River. It is difficult to say what was their real object; they are said only to have obtained two recruits.



[Photo by Barnett & Arnold.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL DOUGLAS HAIG.

Joined the 7th Hussars, 1885; Captain, 1891; Major, 1898; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 1900; A.A.G., South African Field Force, with rank of Colonel, 1901. Served in the Sudan Campaign under Sir H. Kitchener in 1898, and conducted the final cavalry reconnaissances before the battles of the Atbara and Omdurman. He has acted as General French's Chief Staff Officer in the South African War.

failure. There were no casualties in the British ranks. On the same day the Boers captured a native policeman near the town, and shot him in cold blood. They did a good deal of damage to the railway, tearing up the rails, burning the sleepers, and injuring culverts and bridges; they also looted several farms. After this the enemy moved off towards

Uniondale and Oudtshoorn. Uniondale lies barely 22 miles from the Southern Ocean, so that the Boers had now well-nigh accomplished their boast uttered at the outbreak of the

war — that they would bathe their horses in the sea. They had covered 300 miles of country in the space of a month, and had spread alarm through the whole centre of the Colony, from Queenstown on the east to the districts close to Capetown in the west. The moral effect of this incursion was, beyond doubt, considerable; it at

least demonstrated to the loyal Afrikanders their insecurity; but, beyond some interruption of traffic on the railways, there was little to show of the character of real achievement.

Cruel treatment of wounded Yeomen.

An incident of some little importance, as serving to illustrate the brutality of which the Boer guerillas were sometimes guilty, was reported from Herschel, a village near Aliwal North, about this date. Two unfortunate soldiers of the 30th Yeomanry Company were captured by the enemy at Vechtkop, near Zastron, in the Orange River Colony. There was a fracas, in which the Yeomen received severe wounds, as they averred, after they had surrendered. Without attending to their wounds, the Boers compelled them to march all day and far into the night, when one of the two fainted from pain and loss of blood. Thereupon they turned them adrift in the darkness, and this in mountainous country and upon a dangerous road. Finally, by the kindness of a loyal Dutchman they were brought into Herschel. Never, it need scarcely be said, were the enemy's wounded treated by our troops in this manner.

After eluding observation for some days, on January 18 Kritzinger, with about 400 men, appeared at Willowmore, and made a half-hearted attack upon that place. He encountered, however, a strong detachment of Australians, who were well seconded by the Town Guard, and his attack was a complete



SHOOTING A NATIVE.

[From a photograph.]

On January 19 Kritzinger's men were at Uniondale, where they split up into two bodies, moving towards Oudtshoorn by the north and south sides of the Kummanassie Mountains. Colonel Haig,



IN A FIX.

Only two horses left for three men; not an uncommon difficulty.

who had won great distinction as General

French's chief of the staff,

was now sent against them, and given control of the various columns under Colonels Byng, Williams, Grenfell, and Lowe, while the passes in the Zwarteberg, to the north of Oudtshoorn, were occupied, so as to prevent the enemy from breaking through and attacking the Capetown-Kimberley railway. Troops were poured into Oudtshoorn, and that important point was fully secured against a *coup de main*. The country here-

abouts is most difficult, the mountains reaching an elevation of 7,200 feet. For some days the enemy appear to have lingered in the mountains in a state of indecision, since their movements were not characterised by their usual celerity. But on January 25 and 26 Colonels Byng and Williams came into touch with them in the valley of the Olifant, and fought several insignificant skirmishes with them. They were hard pressed, and were compelled to abandon a number of horses and carts that they had commandeered and loaded with plunder. Evidently growing alarmed at the increasing number of British troops who were concentrating against them, and in some danger of being surrounded, they attempted to retire to the

The invaders turned north by Meiring's back.

Poort, but

found that pass guarded, and were compelled to retire. On this they headed east by the same tracks as those on which they had advanced, in two bodies, one marching by Avontuur, and the other by the north of the Kummanassie range. The former force cut the telegraph to Port Elizabeth, but did no other damage, and



SADDLING UP: A REFRACTORY MOUNT.

coming into contact with Colonel Gorrington, who commanded a mobile column, was driven into the Kouga Mountains, where for the moment it eluded pursuit. The second detachment appears to have marched north by cattle-paths unknown to the British troops, snapping up on its way a British patrol. Thus in the Midlands, as in the west, the tide of invasion was ebbing. Oudtshoorn represented here the high-water mark. But the raiders had not as yet any intention of retiring to the Orange. Though their further progress towards the west and the Capetown-Kimberley railway was blocked, a number of them turned at once towards Port Elizabeth, a place the importance of which to the Army and to the Colony was only second to that of Capetown, and hung in small parties round Uitenhage, a village only a few miles from Port Elizabeth, on the railway. Kritzinger on his part fell back towards Murraysburg and Graaff Reinet, and there his force divided again, one detachment, under

**Midland districts
raided.**

Scheepers, hovering round Graaff Reinet, while the other, under his personal command, moved towards Cradock. Ever since his first appearance in these districts the country to the north of them had been very unsettled. Small parties of Boers roamed at will over the mountains, and from time to time combined to attack British patrols and convoys, to plunder farms, and to intimidate loyalists. Steynsburg, Rosmead Junction, Aberdeen, Colesberg, Philipstown, and Aliwal North were all infested with these troublesome freebooters, whose methods were neither more nor less than those of brigands, and who, had they been faced by any other army than the British, would have been treated with the most relentless severity. These raiders captured a patrol of the Kaffrarian Rifles near Maraisburg on February 8.



[From a photograph taken at Van Rhy's Dorp.

HERZOG (in centre at back) AND HIS STAFF.



MYBURGH AND HIS COMMANDO.

[From a photograph taken at Van Rhy's Dorp.

On the 6th there was a skirmish at Klipplaat Junction, not far from Port Elizabeth, in which a mixed detachment

Skirmish near Port Elizabeth.

of 27 British troops carrying dispatches lost 2 killed, 5 wounded, and 20 taken prisoners. The detachment was surrounded by 400 Boers, who attacked in the boldest manner. Kritzinger himself was said by the British prisoners, when released, to have been in command; but the Boer generals were often represented by their men as being present, when they were really miles away. After this the enemy appear to have fallen back towards the north. Colonel Gorringer moved to Cradock, and from that centre attempted to clear the Eastern Midlands of Kritzinger and the most troublesome body of the enemy. At Cradock, too, he was well placed, in view of the probable



COMMANDANT KRITZINGER (seated) AND A SON OF GENERAL OLIVIER.

invasion of the Colony by De Wet, whose movements at the beginning of February were causing great uneasiness.

wards of the British troops began on January 23. The difficulties with which the British commanders had to struggle were indicated by a curious incident which happened just before this date. Three of the Cape Police, named Basson, Visser, and Cloete, were proved to have been guilty of opening British dispatches at Matjesfontein, and divulging their contents to the enemy. This crime, one of the most serious known to military law, was punished by the inadequate sentence of one year's imprisonment.

On January 29 De Lisle, reinforced by Bethune, left Clanwilliam, marching due east over the mountains towards Eland's Vlei, where Boer outposts had been reported. He crossed the Pakhuis Pass, and on the same day a patrol of four Gordon Highlanders was sent forward to reconnoitre. The reconnaissance was pushed too far; the Boers saw the patrol coming, and held their fire till the British were close to them, when they let go a volley, killing Lieutenant Clowes and wounding Captain Gordon and a man. On the 30th De Lisle deployed his men for an attack on the enemy's supposed position. On this the Boers at once retired. The body of the unfortunate Clowes was recovered, and buried during the advance. The British column now crossed a second mountain ridge, and descended



[Photo by H. W. Barnett.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL HENRY DE BEAUVOIR DE LISLE, D.S.O.

Was born in Dublin in 1864, son of the late Richard De Lisle, of Guernsey; educated in Jersey. Joined the 2nd Durham Light Infantry at Gibraltar, 1883; Captain, 1891. Served with the Sudan Frontier Field Force, 1885-6, with the Mounted Infantry; local Lieut.-Colonel in command of the 2nd Corps, 1st Brigade, Mounted Infantry, South Africa, January, 1900. He distinguished himself in the fighting around Colesberg, at Doornkop, and at Pretoria, where he turned the Boer southern position, and despatched a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the town. His column, because of its peculiar tactics—galloping to attack a position with men extended fifty paces apart—has acquired for it the name "galloping column." Colonel de Lisle is an expert polo player.

In the west also the invaders, towards the close of January, were in retreat. We left them at Van Rhyn's Dorp, not far from the sea-coast, about January 20, confronted by British mobile columns under De Lisle, Bethune, Scobell, and Colenbrander, all of whom were to the south of the Boer commandos, while Thorneycroft and Henniker were to the east of them, so placed that it was hoped they would be able to bar the retreat of the Boers. The general advance north-

Attempt to hem in the Western invaders.

by a steep and bad road into a river valley. The country through which it advanced was repellent in the extreme. "Thick brush of thorn-trees," says a correspondent, "covers the whole land, which is extremely mountainous. High precipices, crags and rocks are abundant, making it almost impossible to leave the road." On the steep descent no less than five of the waggons were overturned, though fortunately without damage either to the vehicles or their teams. From this valley yet another ridge had to be negotiated of even more formidable nature than the one already passed. Its difficulties were augmented by the fact that the road, which ran along the edge of a dizzy precipice, had in



A. C. Ball.]

DE LISLE'S MARCH TO ELAND'S VLEI: GETTING THE GUNS OVER A ROUGH PLACE.

places either fallen away or been destroyed by the Boers. The troopers fell to work with picks and spades, De Lisle himself setting the example by handling a pick. The guns were hauled up to the summit of the ridge during the night—the men working by the light of a brilliant moon. Then, after only a couple of hours' sleep, the yet harder task of hauling up the waggons began. Why a supposed mobile column operating in country of such mountainous nature should have been embarrassed with slow and cumbrous waggons does not appear. One does not cross difficult Swiss passes with long trains of wheeled vehicles. The whole day was spent in unloading the waggons, placing their contents

upon horses and mules, and then with double teams hauling up the waggons. At last early on February 2 the whole of the transport was on the mountain crest. But 36 hours or more, with hardly a moment for sleep, had been spent in covering a distance of a few miles. In that time the Boers, without any such encumbrances, must have obtained a start which rendered them absolutely secure.

On February 3 De Lisle reached Eland's Vlei. Before him rose the gloomy range of the Roggeveld, towering to a height of over 5,000 feet, and reported to be held in some force by the

De Lisle climbs the Roggeveld by night.

enemy. It was a more formidable obstacle than

anything he had yet encountered. For miles below it stretched an arid, waterless region. On the 4th he made a march of 40 miles, but found when he reached the watering place, which was the goal of that day's journey, that a dam had given way and that there was nothing but brown mud. On the night of the 5th a detachment of New South Wales Rifles and Irish Yeomanry, under Captain Bennett, succeeded in seizing by a detour a position commanding the pass over the Roggeveld, from Eland's Vlei to Calvinia, while De Lisle followed with the rest of his force along the road which zig-zagged up to the pass, so as to be able to give support. The ground covered in this night march was terrible. Several horses were dashed to pieces through slipping on the hazardous tracks and falling over the sheer precipices. One of the most sensational achievements was a climb accomplished by ten Australian troopers up a rock face, as steep and long as the famous eastern front of the Swiss Matterhorn. When day came it was found that the enemy had disappeared. Probably they had been alarmed by the movements of Bethune and Colenbrander, in country almost as bad, further to the west. On the summit of the pass, looking out upon a vast panorama of forbidding country—a chaos of mountains and



S. H. Vedder.]

CROSSING THE ROGGEVELD BY NIGHT.

deserts, in its lower tracts covered with thorn-bush—the column halted. It was ascertained from one or two farmers, who had been met on the way, that the enemy had already evacuated Calvinia. A commando under Brand and Pretorius, it was said, had passed through the village on the 5th. De Lisle sent forward a strong patrol to make certain whether the news was true, and then followed with all his force. The Boers had gone, leaving only a few stragglers, who dashed out of the place when they saw the British coming. The full story of Esau's murder was recounted by residents to the indignant troops. It was told how, when the Boers were retreating, their victim was dragged from

prison in a state of collapse, and placed on a horse, and how, a mile from the town, he was murdered, as treacherously as was Captain Elliot in the first Boer war. The Boers and their supporters in England pretend that this man, with his bowels lacerated and in a state of collapse, attempted to escape! Therefore, they say, he was shot. The fact remains that, after the Boers had killed him, they kicked the inanimate corpse in the most horrible manner, breaking many bones, and reducing the flesh to pulp. After this atrocity they flung the remains into a water-course. Another great-hearted act of these noble patriots was the destruction of the furniture and fittings of the English Church. They who wrecked and looted the Natal farms, filled the dwellings of British families with indescribable ordure, covered the walls with obscene inscriptions, wantonly damaged the mines, and wrecked what all civilised men, whatever their cult, consider sacred—the churches of God—had yet the effrontery to complain because 600 odd houses in Boer territories were destroyed for military reasons.

This romantic and adventurous march of De Lisle's column will give a good idea of what the other British columns had to accomplish. On February 7 Bethune's men entered Calvinia, accompanied by Colenbrander with Kitchen-er's Fighting Scouts, who had moved by



A. C. Ball.]

ESAU'S "ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE."

way of Van Rhyn's Dorp. Colenbrander's force had been organised on something like Boer principles, though it had not, like many of the Boer commandos, entirely discarded wheeled transport. Each man had one led horse, and the baggage was carried in Cape carts, which are far more mobile than the heavy and cumbrous ox-waggon. On his march Colenbrander had had some slight skirmishing with the enemy, who were attacked at Doornbridge and driven back. Their carts, spare ammunition, and a number of horses were captured. A few prisoners were taken, among them a man who had served with the British troops in the earlier period of the campaign. It would be interesting to know whether this traitor was let off with a few months' imprisonment.

Bethune and Colenbrander reach Calvinia.

On February 10, De Lisle entered Williston, after an extraordinary march through almost waterless country, in which he covered a distance of 72 miles in 48 hours—the record march, up to that point, of the war. The speed with which he moved may have been due in part to the excellence of the remounts supplied to his column from the Piquetberg district, but great credit for it must be ascribed to the troops and to their

De Lisle enters Williston.

indefatigable commander. At Williston it was ascertained that the Boers had behaved admirably, in complete contrast with their conduct at Calvinia. Here touch was obtained with a small British force

Ookiep fortified.

which had been operating from Ookiep in Namaqualand, with the object of preventing the Boers from damaging the copper-mines. Ookiep had been strongly entrenched and equipped with guns sent round by sea from Capetown, and a Town Guard and force of Mounted Scouts had been raised.

From Calvinia and Williston the Boers retreated to Van Wyk's Vlei, half-way between Williston and Prieska, leaving small parties near Carnarvon and larger ones on the Brak, which river was coming down in flood. Everything seemed to point to their easy

Boers saved by De Wet's movement.

The British were at last becoming mobile; there were numerous columns, admirably dispersed on all sides of the invaders; and a signal success, which would have been a fair reward for all these weeks of weary marching and suffering and privation, seemed within the reach of our hard-tasked army. But at this crisis the enemy were saved by a fresh act of daring on De Wet's part. The invasion of the Colony had been already attempted by him; now it was to be achieved, and, although the direct results were not great, his audacity and the alarm which he inspired undoubtedly extricated Herzog and Brand from the tight corner into which they had been driven.

The knowledge that considerable bodies of the enemy intended to enter the Colony had led to the issuing of a proclamation on February 1, denouncing the penalty of high treason against all

Proclamation against treason.


who should join the enemy, and threatening against them "the utmost penalty of the law"—a threat all the more necessary since in innumerable cases, some of which we have recorded, the disloyal had escaped with only a fine or a brief term of imprisonment. As loyalty was punished by the enemy with scourging, looting, and imprisonment, or even in some cases with death, the lukewarm naturally aided the Boers, to save their skins and their property. In short, however unwillingly, in Cape Colony as in the Boer territories, the policy of "thorough" had at last to be adopted, because leniency, after trial, had been found wanting. Fortunately at this moment of renewed danger, the first of the new reinforcements were beginning to arrive. In the week ending February 1, a thousand mounted infantry landed at Port Elizabeth. Thereafter for a couple of months, week after week, men poured in, and it was striking to see how this infusion of fresh blood, though as yet unavailable for operations in the field, reacted upon the morale of the army.



[I. Sheldon-Williams]

INDIAN COOLIES TAKING REMOUNTS TO STELLENBOSCH.

Stellenbosch is the base remount depot. The horses taken up there on landing in Africa are often quite untrained, and unbroken; they are the mere raw material out of which the cavalry or artillery horse is with much labour evolved.



From a Peer photograph

KRITZINGER'S COMMANDO IN CAPE COLONY: SADDLING UP PREPARATORY TO MOVING ON.



Drawn by H. M. Paget.

[From a sketch by Fred Leist.]

COLONIAL REINFORCEMENTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: THE RUSH OF APPLICANTS FOR ENROLMENT AT SYDNEY.

It had been announced in Sydney, in January, 1901, that 1,000 men would be enrolled to form a new contingent for South Africa. The response was overwhelming. The office at the Agricultural Society's grounds was besieged by men, who, as they were required to attend in uniform, represented nearly every regiment in the defence forces. So great was the crowd that the few police were powerless, and order was only restored after the arrival of a dozen mounted Lancers.

CHAPTER XV.

DE WET ENTERS CAPE COLONY.

De Wet recruits near Lindley—False humanitarianism of Pro-Boers—Second re-organisation of the Army—Brigades substituted for divisions—Disastrous results of centralised command—Fields of action assigned to each brigade—Ineffectual efforts to induce surrender—Peace committees set to work—Murder of a peace envoy—Piet De Wet's appeal to his brother—Christian De Wet escapes Knox in the Doornberg—Pilcher and Crewe chase him to the Tabaksberg—Crewe repulsed—Fresh combinations against De Wet—His plan of campaign—Defection of Fourie—Attempts to lay mines in the drifts—Capture of McAdam's party—De Wet advances to Hamelfontein—General Lyttelton's dispositions—The British columns too weak—Philipstown attacked—Skirmish at Colesberg—Plumer engages the enemy.



AFTER inflicting a severe defeat upon the Bodyguard, in the manner detailed in a previous chapter. De Wet remained for some days, seemingly unmolested, in the neighbourhood of Lindley. Why it was that he was allowed thus to rest and recruit his shattered force we do not know. "His movements," says Lord Kitchener's official despatch, summarising the history of our operations, "are somewhat difficult to follow, after the dispersion of his force in January into numerous small parties throughout the Lindley, Bethlehem, and Heilbron districts; but it appears certain that he not only permitted his commandos to dissolve for a time, many of his burghers going to their farms, but went to the neighbourhood of Vredefort to arrange for the collection of fresh supplies of horses, ammunition, and stores." In fact he proceeded precisely as if there had been no British Army in the Orange River Colony.


Knox and Boyes, of General Rundle's division, were in the north-eastern quarter of the Colony with strong brigades, while Lindley was held by a British garrison, which had been reinforced on the approach of De Wet by Bethune's Mounted Infantry and the Seaforth Highlanders. "Minor engagements," proceeds the despatch, "were now of frequent occurrence, in which we made a considerable

number of prisoners; but despite the energy and perseverance displayed by our troops, no definite results could be achieved, as the enemy, broken up into small bands, were dispersed over a very wide area." The absolute necessity of not only denuding the country but also of securing all male Boers, whether armed or unarmed, was thus demonstrated anew. But the Pro-Boers at home, anxious

**False humanitarianism
of Pro-Boers.**

to injure the Government and impede the Army, and caring little for the lives of the British soldiers, protested frantically against what they christened "ruthless barbarism," and the Government was weak enough to listen to them. The result was that the British generals were greatly hampered in their work, and could not turn the absence of De Wet from the field to profit, by destroying all means of sustenance in the country. It should be

added that about this time it had become an article of faith with the Pro-Boers to attack the capable and to praise the incapable among our generals. If an officer had been sent home for inefficiency, they covered him with fulsome praise. If a general showed signs of weakness, or had counselled a British garrison to surrender, he became a hero. Energetic and hard-working soldiers on the other hand were loaded with opprobrium.



G. Soper.]

A GALLANT DEED ON THE MARCH TO HOOPSTAD.

During the march of the 21st Brigade to Hoopstad the horses of the 39th Battery, alarmed by the firing of some shells, started off towards their former grazing ground. Veterinary Captain G. H. Farrell, with others, gave chase, and the Boers also were seen to be endeavouring to capture the horses. The pursuing gunners were unarmed, and Captain Farrell had only his Mauser pistol and ten rounds. With this weapon he succeeded in keeping the Boers at bay for a time, and prevented their rounding up the horses. His ten rounds exhausted, he endeavoured to escape, but his horse was shot under him and the Boers closed in. The foremost Boer was about to shoot him when another rode up and ordered the first to lower his rifle. Captain Farrell was taken prisoner, but managed to escape.

General Bruce Hamilton, for example, was nick-named, even within the precincts of the House of Commons, by an ill-mannered Welshman, "Brute Hamilton," and no one in the Government registered an indignant protest.

Thus factiousness, party spirit, and sham humanitarianism laid a cruel burden upon the dumb, uncomplaining officers and privates of the South African Army. These looked to their motherland, to the nation which they were serving, and for which they were so bravely and so cheerfully sacrificing everything, for sympathy, and they were rewarded with a torrent of vile abuse. With Collingwood they might have said, "What a life of privation ours is—what an abandonment of everything to our professional duty, and how little do the people of England know the sacrifices we make for them!" Yet they suffered in silence, though the spirit of any army must deteriorate when men find themselves denounced for doing their duty and when heroism is rewarded with ingratitude. Perhaps this cause, as much as any other, contributed to the apparent staleness of the men and the listlessness of the operations. Thus the Pro-Boers succeeded in prolonging the war, and by so doing greatly increased the sum-total of human suffering.

Without doubt one reason why De Wet's retainers were left comparatively unmolested lay in the fact that a complete re-organisation of the South African Army was about this date in progress. Under Lord Roberts a large number of towns and villages had been garrisoned, even when at some distance from the lines of railway. Thus, to mention a few examples, such places as Smithfield,

Rouxville, Jagersfontein, Christiana, and Hoopstad were held by British troops. These had to be kept supplied by means of convoys, which moved to their aid at stated intervals. But large convoys were naturally objects well worth attack by the Boers, who could collect considerable forces while they were slowly moving to their destination. It followed, therefore, that the convoys had to be given strong escorts, and in this way, as we have already seen, the energy of a large part of the British Army was absorbed. It was now determined to abandon all but the most important points, to remove the civilian population to refugee camps, and to concentrate and redistribute the Army. There was much to be said, at the time, for such a plan: but when given a thorough trial it proved a distinct failure. The loyal had to abandon the evacuated towns and villages; the prestige of Britain received another check; those of the Boers who still remained in arms took our withdrawal as a sign of weakness, and spread reports that our whole Army was going home and that war in the Far East had begun.

**Second re-organisation
of the Army.**



DIVINE SERVICE IN A BOER REFUGEE CAMP.

The commands in South Africa were at the same time completely redistributed. The old Divisions, numbered from the First to the Eleventh, with which the war in its more regular stages had been fought out, were abolished where they had not already ceased to exist. Forces so large as 10,000 men, operating together, were not required in this guerilla stage. Brigades were substituted, numbered from the First to the Thirty-eighth, in some cases composed of troops of all arms, with a proper proportion of mounted men, in other cases composed entirely of mounted men. In the re-organisation a kind of "general post" had to take place, for during months of continuous war units had been dislocated and scattered. "On our lines of communication," says *The Times* correspondent, "there were points where bunches of horse, foot, and artillery had been collected, while other and equally important points were inadequately guarded and open to sudden attack at any moment. Positions which might prove of considerable strategic value were totally unoccupied; and entire battalions had become isolated in other positions, in such a manner as to be rendered practically useless; sections, and in some cases whole batteries of artillery, held places

which there was not the smallest prospect of the Boers ever visiting, and other places which a few guns would have made perfectly safe were exposed to almost certain attack and very possible capture."

The causes of this disorganisation were unquestionably the want of a carefully trained staff, and the excessive centralisation of command which characterises the British army. No one ventured, without orders, to interfere with the distribution of troops, and headquarters had so many cares that it could not always issue the necessary orders. Subordinate officers in our service are expected and trained, not to think for themselves, but to obey. In all foreign armies a quite different system obtains. Officers there are free to depart from the instructions which they have received, if they think that the Commander-in-Chief's object will be thereby as-

ured. They act thus on their own responsibility, but in such conduct they are almost universally upheld. Again and again we have seen in the history of the war the disastrous results of the British method. De Wet, for instance, must have been crushed in August, 1900, at Reitzburg, had the British generals shown initiative and not obeyed orders, which were issued without knowledge of the precise circumstances; he might have been caught again a few days later at Olifant's Nek; he might, perhaps, have been captured in December at Springhaan's Nek; and, as we shall see shortly, he could



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

[Sketched from life.

"THIRD MAN": AN UNCOVETED DISTINCTION.

When a party of Mounted Infantry or Yeomanry goes into action one man of each four holds the horses of his companions—two with his right hand, one besides his own with his left hand, which explains why "No. 3" is the unfortunate man—and remains mounted himself, an excellent target for the enemy, while the rest of his sub-section seek cover. Among the Boers the horses are trained to stand still as soon as the reins are dropped over their heads; consequently all their men can fight instead of three out of four as with us.

not have escaped after his raid into Cape Colony, except through blind and mistaken obedience. It would be unjust to blame either Commander-in-Chief, the staff, or subordinate officers for this system. It had grown up in long years of peace and could not be easily discarded in war.

While the reorganisation was in progress, it was naturally difficult to carry on aggressive operations. The newly arranged brigades were allotted each one defined area, within which it was to move and fight. The plan is thus described by *The Times* correspondent: "Each brigade has its own ground to cover and will move in an arranged direction, clearing the ground as it goes until it reaches a point within the square belonging to the brigade of another group. If it is found advisable, the brigades will then retrace

Fields of action
assigned to each
brigade.

their steps, quartering the ground a second time, but the general movement will be inwards as well as forward, from north, south, east, and west simultaneously, so that, say, four groups of brigades could very easily be massed at any given point very quickly, if necessity arose for the concentration anywhere of an overwhelming force. It is apparent that the plan must, if carried out, as it will be, exactly

on the rules laid down, work out with mathematical precision. Each brigade will be able to keep in touch, through its outlying scouts and patrols, with the brigades to its right and left, front and rear. Moving steadily in a known direction, they must inevitably come in contact with the enemy very quickly, and, if the Boers, with their well-known luck and cleverness, are able to slip through the brigades of one group, they will only do so to find themselves in the midst of another, while the group behind them will return and close in on the enemy from the rear."

Depôts of supplies were so arranged as to be within a couple of days' journey from each brigade, no matter where it was, the idea being that thus the British forces would be always able to travel light, without the enormous trains of ox-waggons and carts, which had so hampered them in the earlier operations. All the mounted brigades were to have spare horses, and in many of the columns wheeled transport was absolutely abandoned. Yet though these arrangements seemed excellent on paper, it was speedily proved that they could not produce the desired result by themselves. They were an improvement—a marked improvement—upon the haphazard organisation of the past, but even now they did not render the British columns as mobile as were the commandos of the enemy. Till that object should be realised, rapid progress could not be achieved in bringing the war to a conclusion.



[Photo by Russell & Sons, Southsea.]

COLONEL J. STACPOLE, A.A.G., and CAPTAIN GRAHAM WHITE, R.N.,

The transport officers at Southampton, on whom the responsibility of the embarkation of the troops to South Africa has rested.

THE OFFICERS WHO TRANSPORTED THE GREATEST ARMY EVER SENT OVER SEAS.

Meantime, while the reorganisation was in progress, and before active operations could be resumed, the effect

Ineffectual efforts to induce surrender.

of further coaxing was tried upon the Boers. New and lenient proclamations were issued, inviting them to surrender, and promising all consideration to those who had fought fairly. But these proclamations failed to convince the enemy of anything except that the British were getting the worst of matters, and were anxious to make peace. The natural result was rather to stiffen them in their determination to persist; for if England was ready to concede so much, the burghers argued that by holding out a little longer, she might be induced to concede a good deal more. The men in the field were for the most part *bywoners* or poor whites, with little or nothing to lose. The substantial men had already made their submission or had been taken prisoners in the field. When peace came these *bywoners* were quite conscious that they would have to return to poverty and hard work, instead of living by plunder and requisition. The chiefs, Botha and De Wet, were equally aware that much of their power and importance would vanish. And thus, though Lord



SIR EDWARD CHICHESTER (in centre), NAVAL TRANSPORT OFFICER AT CAPE TOWN, AND HIS STAFF.

Kitchener himself, in an interview with a number of surrendered burghers at Pretoria, on December 21, 1900, assured the enemy that Britain had no wish to oppress the burghers, but that she would, on the contrary, give them a prominent share in the administration, his words fell upon deaf ears.

Peace committees were, however, formed at Pretoria, Kroonstad, and Bloemfontein among the surrendered burghers, with the object of inducing their countrymen to yield.

Peace committees set to work.

Upon them served such distinguished Boers as the brother of General Cronje, Piet De Wet, a brother of the famous Christian, Andries Wessels, a prominent Free Stater, who had fought with great distinction in the earlier period of the war, and General Vilonel. They set to work to distribute Lord Kitchener's proclamations among the rank and file of the Boers still in the field, from whom the leaders were believed to be withholding all information of this kind. To convince De Wet and Steyn was their first object, as these leaders had from the first set their face against any peace which did not give back independence to the Orange River Colony, and had, if a letter of the Kroonstad Peace Committee can be believed, twice prevented Mr. Kruger and the Transvaal Government from coming to terms. The attempt to overcome De Wet's reluctance to submit, unhappily led to the most tragical results, which must hereafter place that leader outside the pale of mercy, which dishonoured his name, and which showed him in the light of a cruel and implacable freebooter.

On December 28, under a flag of truce, two surrendered Boers left Kroonstad for the enemy's

lines. These two were Mr. J. J. Morgendaal, who

had taken the oath of allegiance

and had been appointed a magistrate, and Mr. Andries Wessels, ex-member of the Free State Volksraad. Their object was to explain to the Boers Lord Kitchener's terms. They drove to Paardekraal, not far from Kroonstad, and there met a board of Boer officers. After some deliberation this board ordered them at once to return to Kroonstad. They were on their way back,



A CRIMEAN VETERAN AT THE FRONT.

The veteran here depicted, whose name is Lane, served in the Crimean War and throughout the Zulu War. He was employed in the Ordnance Department at Dielfontein, Orange River Colony. By his side stands a trooper of Loch's Horse.



CORRESPONDENCE UNDER DIFFICULTIES: A TROOPER OF LOCH'S HORSE WRITING HOME.

when the enemy's Krygsraad apparently changed its mind and sent after them to arrest them, notwithstanding their flag of truce. They were taken to De Wet's laager, in the neighbourhood of Lindley,

and there were detained as prisoners some days. On January 9 scouts brought to De Wet the news that the British were approaching. The order was consequently given to inspan. At this moment, according to the evidence of a native with Morgendaal, and of a Boer who was confined with Morgendaal and Wessels, Morgendaal was washing his hands. The Free State commandant, Froneman, a man notorious for violence and brutality rather than for courage, came up to him and asked, "Why are you standing still and not inspanning?" With these words he began to lash Morgendaal across the face with his heavy rhinoceros-hide sjambok, each blow from which cut into the flesh. Morgendaal raised his hand—he was quite unarmed—to protect himself, and cried out, with his face streaming with blood, "General, why are you thrashing me when I am trying to carry out your orders?" This reply seemed to madden the miscreant, who shouted at his helpless victim, "I'll shoot you at once, you —."

De Wet stood a few yards away. He had so far permitted the atrocious ill-use of a man who had come to him under a flag of truce—an emblem sacred to every people above the level of the Chinese in civilisation—without raising his hand. A word from him would have saved Morgendaal. But he had no thought of mercy and no respect for the laws of civilised war. With the words "Shoot the —," he made himself a principal actor in the crime that was to be accomplished. Froneman unslung his rifle and then and there fired at Morgendaal at the closest range. Morgendaal fell mortally wounded, but not dead. On this Froneman rode twice round his quivering body, and then urged another burgher to fire a



THE KRUGER PEDESTAL AT PRETORIA.

About 1896 a gigantic statue of Paul Kruger, far larger than life size, was ordered from a Dutch sculptor, domiciled in Rome. It was never quite clear whether it was the Volksraad's present to Pretoria, or a tribute from the President to his own importance. Recent reports point to the statue being complete in Rome, but, for very good reasons, undeliverable. The pedestal was ready in Pretoria before the war. The late Mrs. Kruger with kindly forethought stipulated that the statue, which was to represent Kruger in his habit as he lived, frock-coat awry, and tall hat, should have the headgear made hollow, so that the rain water might collect in it for the little birds to drink.

second shot at him. This the burgher refused to do, replying, "You are such a coward; do it yourself!"

Whether or not a second

shot was fired is uncertain. If it was, the victim was still left alive, and finally Froneman ordered the native witness to "throw the — on the cart," and allowed him to be driven off to a neighbouring farm. There, on January 15, his wife found him dying. On the 19th he expired, after eleven days of terrible agony.

His blood cries to the British nation from the ground. There was no possible excuse for his murder, much less for the added torture. To flog a man before killing him is an act of such barbarity that civilised beings shudder at the very thought of it. The Chinese and Red Indians torture their prisoners before execution, but we do not expect such things from a people who profess



CHURCH STREET, PRETORIA.

[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

the religion of Christ, who read the Bible, and who pray to the Christian's God. The crime was something worse than murder; it was murder, coupled with treacherous violation of the white flag, and preliminary torture; it was murder of an envoy—of a person sacrosanct. Morgendaal had come openly, under the white flag, to the enemy; he had been illegally arrested; he had not even been tried by drum-head court-martial; and his bitterest enemies could allege no offence against him. It is characteristic of the depths of degradation to which the British Pro-Boers had sunk, that they associated themselves with De Wet in this crime, positively attempting to justify it. What, one of their organs asked, would Sir George White have done had Joubert sent a renegade Englishman into Ladysmith, under the white flag, with the object of persuading the garrison to surrender? The suggestion that the British general would have tortured and shot the envoy is almost as monstrous as the Boer crime. But it was neatly retorted by loyal organs of opinion in England that, on their own showing, the Pro-Boers in England deserved Morgendaal's treatment or something worse, since they were traitors, who could not plead the protection of the white flag.



F. J. Waugh.]

BOER TREATMENT OF PEACE ENVOYS: THE FLOGGING OF MORGENDAAL.

As for Andries Wessels, his fate remains uncertain to this hour. It is said that he was tried by a Boer court-martial and shot some days later, but definite evidence is wanting. No doubt the Boers of De Wet's command did all they could to wrap their black deeds in obscurity. But these crimes against the white flag and the persons of envoys showed the uselessness of treating with such men. Unhappily for England's fame not many days passed before the British were engaged in negotiations with Botha, and this though another peace envoy had been cruelly ill-used, if not murdered, by those under Botha's command. This was the more regrettable, since Botha had up to that date behaved in a uniformly straightforward and honourable manner, fighting fairly, and earning the respect and admiration even of his enemies.

One last appeal from Piet de Wet to his brother Christian was despatched on or about January 11. It showed how useless and how desperate was the struggle. "Dear Brother," it ran, "I hear that

you are so angry that you have decided to kill me, accusing me of high treason. May God not allow you the opportunity to shed more innocent blood! When I saw that we were beaten by the

**Piet De Wet's appeal
to his brother.**

British I wrote to the President and requested him to consider terms of peace, and rather to surrender than ruin the country and starve the people. I was afterwards with you for a month, and was then convinced that we had better lay down our arms, but I did my duty whenever we had an engagement. In the battle at Schietmakaar, with Prinsloo, I charged the guns, when I was shamefully left in the lurch by Froneman, who fled. At last, convinced that the struggle was hopeless, I left with my staff, surrendered, and was sent to Durban.

"The fact that you and Steyn were carrying on a guerilla warfare made me write to Lord Kitchener on December 11, requesting an opportunity to come to the Free State and persuade the men to lay down their arms, as no Free State Government then existed against which I could commit treason.

"Which is better for the Republics—to continue the struggle and run the risk of total ruin as a



IN THE WAKE OF DE WET: A HAUL OF PRISONERS.

nation, or to submit? Could we for a moment think of taking back the country if it were offered us, with thousands of people to be supported by a Government that has not a farthing and that has a debt of five or six millions, even if we received help from Europe? Do you think that any nation is so mad as to have thousands of men killed and spend millions of money,

and then to give us the Republics and the capital necessary to govern them? Put passionate feeling aside for a moment and use common sense, and you will then agree with me that the best thing for the people and the country is to give in, be loyal to the new Government, and try to get responsible government. As soon as the finances allow of its being done we shall govern the country virtually ourselves, have our children properly educated, and save the people as a nation. On the other hand, should the war continue a few months longer, the nation will become so poor, as a great portion already is, that they will be the working class in the country, and disappear as a nation in the future.

"I have heard that you and others accuse me of being paid by the English Government for what I am doing. I can only answer, there is a God. He will pass a righteous sentence. I have also heard that Lord Kitchener's offers and the attempts of myself and others are considered by you as signs of weakness on the part of the British. When you cornered 50 British soldiers in a kraal at Blaauwbank, when you did the same to 400 at Mostert's (Mosar's) Hoek, when you surrounded a small body of men at Rhenoster River, and under a flag of truce asked them to surrender willingly, was that weakness or a magnanimous

deed on your part? The British are convinced that they have conquered the land and its people, and consider the matter ended, and they only try to treat magnanimously those who are continuing the struggle, in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed.

"Believe me when I tell you that no troops are being sent back to England, but that thousands are still coming to South Africa. If you do not consider the Free State you are not sensible, and do not act sensibly. Are you blind? Can you not see that you are being deceived by the Transvaal generals and burghers? What are they doing? They do not fight a tenth part as much as we do. The Transvaal is not ruined to the same extent as the Free State. The Transvaal generals are inclined to submit, and are only waiting to see what you are going to do. The moment you surrender fall, or are captured they will surrender." The appeal was wasted. De Wet had made up his mind to continue the war to the last. He flogged the bearer, once more outraging the white flag, and sent him back. Thenceforth his misdeeds placed him among the outlaws, who could expect no mercy when the strong arm of England prevailed.

For some days after these terrible events little was heard of De Wet. It was known, however, that he had appointed

**Christian De Wet
escapes Knox on the
Doornberg.**

the Doornberg, a range of mountains north-east of Winburg, as the point of concentration for his forces. They were to assemble

on January 22, preparatory to a fresh invasion of Cape Colony. Lord Kitchener at once made dispositions to hamper this concentration, and, if possible, to capture the Boer forces. On January 23 De Wet had crossed the railway near Holfontein—seemingly on his way back from Vredefort, whither he must have gone some time between January 9 and 22—and had made for the Doornberg. Everything now depended upon the rapidity with which a blow could be struck at him. But, unfortunately, it was impossible to arrange for a general attack on the Doornberg before January 28. General Charles Knox on that day was to assail the Doornberg from Leeuwkop, lying directly to the south, in concert with General Bruce Hamilton, who was to attack the enemy from Kroonstad and the north. Once more, however, De Wet baffled the plans of the British, of which he must have had secret information. On January 27, with 2,300 men under Froneman, Haasbroek, and Fourie, two 15-pounders, and a "Pom-Pom," he broke up his laager and moved rapidly south. There was not by any means unanimity among his subordinate commanders. Fourie had shown some disposition to surrender, and now held more or less aloof with about 400 men, and was in consequence an object of extreme distrust to De Wet.



PIET DE WET.

De Wet, on leaving the Doornberg, headed south-west, and on his march picked up some further small reinforcements. He passed round or between the British columns, which were not as yet in a position to strike, and crossed the Winburg and Smaldeel Railway near Winburg, making for the Tabaksberg range, which lies directly to the north of Thaba N'chu, 30 miles from that place. Without a moment's delay the energetic General Charles Knox gave chase, starting columns under Colonels Pilcher and Crewe for the Tabaksberg, while Bruce Hamilton, equally indefatigable, marched his men through torrents of rain, over roads that were quagmires, to Winburg and Smaldeel, and there entrained them for Bloemfontein, with the object of getting to the south of De Wet and holding the Bloemfontein-Ladybrand line in force.

**Pilcher and Crewe
chase him to
the Tabaksberg.**

On the morning of January 29 Crewe's column, composed of South African Colonials, moving south-west, came in sight of the Tabaksberg, and heard heavy firing. Pilcher's column was known

to be moving parallel to Crewe, and it was at once concluded that this force was in action on the other, or western, side of the mountain, which is a low flat-topped kopje, shaped like a letter L turned upside down. Crewe, therefore, hurried his mounted men forward, and opened with two 15-pounders and a "Pom-Pom" upon the Boer position. He could see a number of Boers, apparently falling back towards the south and seeking shelter from the lyddite shells which were observed to be bursting on the heights and which could only come from the guns of a British column. The Kaffrarian Rifles from Crewe's force seized, without a moment's delay, a position on the eastern side of the Tabaksberg. The enemy moved to and fro irresolutely, generally towards the south and south-east. Instructions had been given to the column to head them off to the north, but as Crewe's force was already rather to the rear of them, this was out of the question. The column accordingly fell back two miles. It was much weaker than De Wet's command, for Crewe had under him only 700 men, while De Wet had at least 2,300, so that had the attack been pressed, without any certainty of Pilcher's co-operation, it must have ended disastrously. The exact whereabouts of Pilcher seem to have been unknown to Crewe. About 4 p.m. the column again began to advance, now working round the southern end of the Tabaksberg, and, as the British scouts neared the extreme southern end of the kopje, a force of 200 men was



E. Prater.]

RUSE BY WHICH THE BOERS CAPTURED A "POM-POM" ON THE TABAKSBERG.

seen, dismounted, with horses near at hand. At first they were taken for some of Pilcher's mounted infantry, but closer examination showed them to be Boers.

On this the British artillery came hurriedly into action and the Boers made off to the south-west. The British scouts hurried on to the southern arm of the Tabaksberg to press upon them. At this moment a number of Boers galloped across the British left front. A "Pom-Pom" dashed forward to the ridge to ply them with shells and, if possible, to prevent their escape. Unhappily the movement was only one more Boer ruse. When the "Pom-Pom" unlimbered, a terrific rifle fire was opened by



[After a sketch made on the spot by Lieut. C. Leigh.]

PURSUIT OF DE WET'S REARGUARD IN THE TABAKSBERG.

F. Dodd, R.I.]

enemies ambushed in all quarters; at the third shot the weapon jammed, while the Boers began to press the flanks and rear of the column. As they were in such superior force matters looked very grave. Skirmishing went on till darkness fell, the British failing to hold their own and being slowly forced back. With nightfall the British ammunition gave out, and there was nothing for it but retreat, which was the more necessary, as in the dusk the Boers were developing their flanking attacks. Though some gallant attempts were made to save the "Pom-Pom," that weapon was too far in advance to be withdrawn and had to be abandoned. All the way back to camp, where the waggons had been laagered, a severe rearguard action raged, but Crewe behaved with great courage and coolness, himself being among the very last to enter the camp. Entrenchments were at once constructed, but, after the British had regained their waggons, the Boers did not press their attack. Next day, however, when Crewe marched out to join General Knox, according to orders, he was again attacked and had to fight a rearguard action continuously for some miles, finally reaching Bloemfontein.

In this unsatisfactory affair there are some curious points. How was it that, so far as we know, Colonel Pilcher did not come to the assistance of Colonel Crewe? Was it here the case that the British officer waited for orders from some superior authority instead of acting on his own initiative, or was he kept off by feints of the enemy? Lord Kitchener's official despatch speaks of Pilcher's column having been engaged as well as Crewe's and a telegram puts his loss at

2 killed and 13 wounded, but the accounts of correspondents are silent as to what happened or what the nature of the fighting was. If Pilcher was out of supporting distance, evidently the very gravest risks were run in allowing Crewe's 700 men to engage over 2,000 Boers. As usual the enemy showed themselves superior to the British in tactical skill and used their numbers to considerable advantage. They captured a "Pom-Pom" with a quantity of ammunition, and inflicted a loss of 5 killed, 22 wounded and 10 missing upon the British column, thus demonstrating once more the danger which weak detachments run in the face of an active and resolute enemy.

On the night of January 30 De Wet succeeded in evading the pursuit of Knox, and passed out of touch with his scouts. Knox was greatly hampered by transport difficulties, as his carts and waggons could not keep up on the abominable roads, while Bruce Hamilton, though he made a fine forced march from Bloemfontein towards Thaba N'chu, arrived too late to bar the way to De Wet. Thus another combination had failed. The only resource now was to start afresh, further to the south, utilising the railway to get ahead of De Wet. The advantage which the possession of the railways at this stage of the war conferred upon the British is evident at every turn. Knox and Bruce Hamilton accordingly entrained their men at Bloemfontein and hurried south to Bethulie to guard the eastern half of the Cape frontier. As it was desirable also to reinforce the western half and centre of the British line, Generals Paget and Plumer were moved by railway from Balmoral and Brugspruit in the Transvaal, over the whole length of the Orange River Colony, to Naauwpoort, whither General Lyttelton was sent to take supreme command in the operations against De Wet. New columns were organised, in part with the troops just beginning to arrive from home, who were



GENERAL BRUCE HAMILTON

[From an oil painting]

full of dash and vigour, in part with the men brought down from the Transvaal. The Essex Regiment was placed at Norvals Pont, the Royal Fusiliers at Rosmead; while at Naauwpoort, in addition to Paget and Plumer's command, a brigade of cavalry was assembled and placed under Colonel Bethune's order. It was composed of the 1st Dragoon Guards, 3rd Dragoon Guards, and Prince of Wales's Light Horse, with G Battery of Horse Artillery. The 900 Mounted Infantry, who had just landed from England, formed another column, under Colonel Hickman with two field guns. To the east, in the Aliwal district, where that sterling soldier General Macdonald was in command, orders were issued to concentrate on the south bank of the Orange

**Fresh combinations
against De Wet.**

Captain McAndrew,
Intelligence Officer.

Captain Wyld,
Signalling Officer.

Lieut.-Colonel Waldron,
C.R.A.

Captain Stewart,
A.D.C.

Lieut. Balfour,
A.D.C.

Captain Stevens,
R.A. Staff.



Lieut.-Colonel Hon. C. Fortescue,
D.A.A.G.

Lieut.-Colonel C. McGrigor,
D.A.G.

Lieut.-General Hon. N. G.
Lyttelton.

Colonel S. H. Carter,
R.A.M.C.

Major Foster,
D.A.A.G.

GENERAL LYTTELTON AND STAFF

[Photo by A. Deale, Bloemfontein.]

River the mobile columns under Herbert and Hughes-Hallett, which had been clearing the Rouxville and Smithfield districts, and the garrisons of the small Orange River Colony villages. Thus from east to west some 20,000 troops were in readiness to meet De Wet when he came. Such a force, it might have been thought, would have been certain to effect his capture. But the length of frontier which had to be watched from east to west was great, amounting to 150 miles, without making any allowance for the river bends, and thus there were less than 200 men to each mile.

Meanwhile De Wet calmly continued on his way south, undisturbed by all these formidable preparations. Breaking through the Ladybrand-Bloemfontein line of posts with consummate ease, he moved to Dewetsdorp, and halted in that neighbourhood for two or three days, while he appointed

Field-Cornets and Landdrosts to the various villages, now evacuated by the British, in this quarter of the Orange River Colony, and made arrangements for the collection of great quantities of supplies

at Dewetsdorp. According to deserters who came in from his force, great discontent prevailed among his men. Small offences were severely punished, the men being tied to waggon-wheels and sjamboked. Food and ammunition were scarce, and fresh meat the only ration of the men. It is probable that these tales were exaggerations, but on some points, for instance the greater severity of the discipline, there is corroboration. On February 3 De Wet was reported south of Dewetsdorp; a day later he was north of Smithfield. Meanwhile his scouts had reconnoitred the eastern drifts over the Orange River, and reported them all to be strongly held. De Wet had originally intended to cross in this quarter, but without the slightest hesitation he abandoned the idea and turned towards the south-west, where he hoped to find the British less on the alert. His primary objective was De



THE CAPE PARLIAMENT HOUSES.

Situated in the centre of Capetown, these fine buildings, whose erection cost £220,000, have a very imposing appearance. From 1806 to 1835 the government of Cape Colony was vested in a Governor and executive officers appointed by the Crown: in 1835 a Legislative Council was added; in 1853 Representative Government was introduced, and in 1872 "Responsible Government," under which the Ministers, who are appointed by the Crown, and constitute, with the Governor as President, the "Executive Council," must be members of, and responsible to, the Colonial Parliament. The Legislative Council consists of 23 members elected for seven years by seven electoral districts, each of which sends three members to the Council, the additional two members representing respectively Griqualand West and British Bechuanaland. The House of Assembly consists of 95 paid members, elected by the town and country districts. The electorate is the same for both houses, but differently distributed, and the qualifications for a vote are: British nationality (by birth or naturalisation), the occupation of house property valued at £75, or the receipt of a salary of £50, and the ability to sign one's name. Elections are by ballot. Speeches in the Houses may be made in either English or Dutch, but the records are kept in English.



[J. Bell]

A SITTING OF THE CAPE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

Aar, where he was to join hands with Herzog, and once more essay an attack upon Capetown. The moment the Boers had completed their concentration near De Aar, Botha with 5,000 picked men was to push rapidly south through Zululand and Natal to Durban. At the same time the Boer commandos in the midlands of Cape Colony would renew their efforts to break the trunk-lines to Port Elizabeth and East London, and in the Eastern Transvaal the enemy would endeavour to seize a position astride the Delagoa Bay line. Thus the British Army was to have all its communications

attacked at the very moment when, as was hoped, terrible blows were being struck at the great bases of Capetown and Durban. The plan, however excellent on paper, made no allowance for the British Army, which, the Boers seem to have assumed, was going to sit quietly down and, without fighting, allow itself to be dislodged from the most vital positions. Its execution was altogether beyond the capacity of the Boers, who could not muster 20,000 men in arms, and who could not dream of success without desperate and bloody fighting, for which all through the war they had shown a singular aversion. It was therefore absurd—so absurd that, if one did not know the Tarascon character of the Boer Tartarins, one might doubt whether it was ever seriously entertained. Some months or weeks earlier there might have been a prospect of success, before the Cape Defence Force



[From a Boer photograph.]

DE WET CROSSING THE ORANGE RIVER.

had been organised, and before the reinforcements from England had begun to land. But in early February De Wet's invasion came too late and was predoomed to failure.

On February 4 the main part of De Wet's force began to cross the railway at Pompey Siding, where, on the morning of the 5th, a number of British transport waggons were damaged. An armoured train arrived while the Boers were busy with their work of destruction, and **Defection of Fourie.** shelled them, driving them away to the west. The ill-feeling with Fourie had come to a head, Fourie refusing to take any part in such a wild enterprise as the invasion of Cape Colony. Accordingly he was left with about 500 men near Rouxville. His presence in this quarter, however, indirectly proved of service to De Wet, as it rendered the Boer intentions uncertain. It could not be ascertained positively by the British which of the two forces meant to cross the Orange River; possibly both of them might have that object in view; and consequently it was not safe to denude the Aliwal district of troops. Still further reinforcements were brought up to the great strategic

quadrangle enclosed on the north by the Orange River, and on the other sides by the railways from Orange River Station to De Aar, De Aar to Naaupoort, and Naaupoort to Norvals Pont. On the 8th a reconnaissance in force by General Bruce Hamilton eastward from Bethulie, showed that the north bank of the Orange River was clear in that quarter. This was enough for Lord Kitchener, especially as during that day and the next information came in pointing to Zand Drift, near Philipstown, as the enemy's probable objective. General Charles Knox was at once ordered to put Bruce Hamilton, Pilcher, and Crewe in motion from Bethulie towards the west as rapidly as he could, while Lyttelton was directed to push his columns up towards Zand Drift.

De Wet was at Philippolis, close to Zand Drift, on the 8th. On his passage through the Fauresmith and Philippolis districts, of both of which the Boers were now in complete possession, with Boer landdrosts in the towns, he received considerable accessions of strength. At Philippolis he halted for two days to perfect his supply arrangements and to organise his commandos. He had with him at this point Mr. Steyn, his constant companion in his wanderings, Haasbroek, Cronje, Wessels of Harrismith, Theron, Pretorius, Koetze, Joubert, and other leaders of less note, with about 3,000 men, two field guns, a "Pom-Pom," and a Maxim. His transport consisted mainly of carts. The north bank of the

**Attempts to lay
mines in the drifts.**

Orange River was held from Norvals Pont to Zand Drift by his scouts and snipers, so that he could easily ascertain which fords were unguarded and which were most easily to be crossed. The British troops meanwhile were engaged in the attempt to lay mines in the drifts, Lieutenant H. McAdam, of the Prince of Wales's Light Horse, with



LIEUT. H. McADAM,
Prince of Wales's Light Horse.

In command of the detachment instructed to mine the drifts of the Orange River.

sixteen troopers and a supply of mines, being detailed for this purpose. But the river was so low that it was impossible to mine it with any effect. At Zand Drift a crossing could be effected anywhere for a distance of four miles, and a few mines distributed over that extent of river would have been useless. On the 10th McAdam was close to Glad Drift, or Leeuwfontein Drift, which lies a little to the west of Zand Drift. He had maintained good relations with the farmers, who



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

A QUIET SMOKE.

[Sketched from life.

To lie behind a boulder all day sniping at an invisible enemy is apt to become wearisome. Happy is the man in such a case whose supply of tobacco still holds out; and happy are they within reach of his toss when he has filled his own pipe.

were Dutch, but after their invariable fashion they were careful to give the "rooinek" no hint of what was coming. At 11.30 a.m. of the 10th his scouts sighted a large force of Boers crossing the river and coming towards his little detachment. Already a British outpost at Hamelfontein, under Major Bridges, had had to ride hard for Colesberg, burning several of its carts and abandoning some of its horses. The British scouts, white and native, had been outwitted by De Wet, and the invader had unceremoniously entered the front door, without his coming being announced.

McAdam and his small party were in an almost hopeless position. He wanted to get his cart with the mines to a place where he could at least hide the mines, as in the enemy's hands these might be

the cause
Capture of of much
McAdam's party. mischief.

Accordingly he hurried with the cart to a kopje and hid the dynamite charges, with the enemy fast drawing nearer. Then from the kopje he dashed for Zand Drift, as the Boers had worked to the south of him; but at the drift he was speedily brought to book. The Boers opened fire from the high ground above the drift with their "Pom-Poms" and rifles, and closed rapidly in. When they were only 30 yards away they called to him and his party to surrender, threatening that otherwise they would kill them all. The British surrendered; further resistance could scarcely be expected from such a small detachment in face of so formidable an enemy. They were stripped of their weapons, ammunition, field-glasses, water bottles, and a good deal of other property, and

were marched to the Boer laager, in which were 1,000 Boers with 2,500 horses. "The enemy's animals were in excellent condition," says Lieutenant McAdam, "sleek and fine. I never saw better draught oxen, and the horses were full of fire. But the mounts apparently did not relish the change from the veldt grass to the Karroo scrub, and soon fell away. They lost 1,000 of them within one week." In this laager, seemingly close to Zand Drift, the prisoners remained with the Boers during

De Wet advances to Hamelfontein.

the night of the 10th and morning and afternoon of the 11th. At 5 p.m. of that day the enemy moved to Hamelfontein, and there De Wet came in with another force, raising the total strength to 2,500. Near Hamelfontein the combined commandos halted for the night of the 11th-12th. They had thus been for three days unmolested



J. Finnemore, R.I., R.B.A.]

MCADAM'S DASH FOR ZAND DRIFT.

close to Zand Drift, a state of affairs which, in view of the numerous British columns operating against them, calls for some explanation.

The explanation, probably, is to be found in the deliberate purpose of General Lyttelton to lure

De Wet as far south as possible before closing in upon him. This would account for the fact that so important a point as

**General Lyttelton's
dispositions.**

Zand Drift was left unguarded, and that no attempt was made to attack the Boers while still close to the Orange River. Their position

was perfectly well known. Numerous patrols and scouts had sighted the enemy on the 10th and 11th. There must then have been studied design, and not mere slowness of movement, to explain the absence of the British columns on these critical days. When De Wet was well south upon the road to Calvinia, it seems to have been intended by the British general to close in upon him from the east and north. Near Colesberg was General Plumer with the first of a series of mobile columns; at De Aar was another under Colonels Crabbe and Henniker; at Richmond Road a third, of cavalry, under Colonel Bethune; at Fraserburg Road a fourth under Colonel Haig. All these points were on the railway, so that the dispositions could be speedily altered, if alteration were found necessary. At Victoria West, on the British left, was General Paget with a strong supporting force, ready to move wherever he might be wanted. On the extreme right, near Philippolis, were Knox and Bruce Hamilton, moving to the north of the Orange River, behind and in support of Plumer. From Kimberley a column marched south, to prevent any attempt to retire by way of Hopetown and Douglas. To the west a British force was ready at Prieska, while at Carnarvon was De Lisle, prepared to give a warm reception to the enemy, in the intervals of his pursuit of Herzog. But this necessarily diverted his attention from the commandos which had invaded the east of Cape Colony. It allowed Herzog to get away just when he was in a somewhat critical position.

The British arrangements were thus carefully thought out, and, had not the country been so vast and featureless, enabling the Boers to move anywhere, whether there were roads or not, might have succeeded. Possibly De Wet's three days' halt at Zand Drift was caused by indecision whether to proceed or not in the face of all these columns, of which he must have obtained information from the farmers. But if he hesitated for a moment, he soon made up his mind to face the risk of capture or annihilation. He had so often escaped from the tightest of tight corners, that he had some reason to think lightly of the danger from the British troops.

There was one serious defect in the British dispositions, which ultimately had no small share in foiling the plans for De Wet's capture. The columns were individually too

**The British columns
too weak.**

small to encounter with complete success so formidable a force as De Wet commanded. The Boer leader, we have seen, had under his orders from 2,500

to 3,000 men, inured by long months of war to the endurance of hardship, desperate, fanatical, and for the most part following with great devotion a leader whose prestige had steadily grown since



[Photo by Gregory.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL EYRE M. S. CRABBE, C.B.

Born in 1852; educated at Harrow. Joined the Grenadier Guards, 1871; Captain, 1883; Brevet Major, 1885; Major, 1890; Lieut.-Colonel, 1898. Served with the Auxiliary Transport in the Egyptian War of 1882; in the Nile Expedition of 1884-5 as Acting Quartermaster to the Guards' Camel Regiment, and was present at the actions at Abu Klea and El Gubat; served in the South African War, 1899-1901, with the Kimberley Relief Force, and was wounded in the engagement at Belmont, and more seriously (March 23, 1900) at Maas Farm, near the Modder.

March, 1900. Several of the British columns were not 2,000 strong; Plumer in particular, who was nearest to the enemy, and upon whom most of the hard work was certain to devolve, was dangerously weak. He could scarcely hope, without assistance from the other columns, to overwhelm De Wet's force, and in that vast country it was by no means certain that, if he was heavily engaged, other columns could arrive in time to extricate him. Colonel Crewe's fight at the Tabaksberg had shown the peril encountered by a small force which ventured to throw itself upon so mobile and resourceful an enemy. Plumer had under his orders, it is true, troops of very fine quality. The Queensland Mounted Infantry, who had months back won a splendid reputation at Eland's River, the Imperial Bushmen, and two squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, with some artillery, formed his command.

On February 12 the scouts of a Boer detachment 400 strong approached Philipstown, a village midway between Zand Drift and De Aar, "disloyal," as Mr. Wallace writes, "beyond salvation.

Philipstown attacked. Its inhabitants usually keep a holiday suit of clothes handy to don when the Boers ride through." It was held by nothing stronger than a Yeomanry patrol, which certainly ought, under the circumstances, to have retired. But instead of falling back, the officer in charge determined to stand his ground. He moved to the jail, put it into a state of defence, and lined

the walls, while he sent a message to another strong patrol of 60 Victorian troops, from Colonel Crabbe's column, midway between Philipstown and De Aar, calling upon him for help. The Boers, meanwhile, attacked the patrol in the jail, but half-heartedly, as there were reports in their ranks that Plumer with a strong force of "khakis" was fast coming up from the east; indeed, to corroborate these reports, the sound of firing could be heard



[From a photograph.]

A NARROW ESCAPE: A WOUNDED SCOUT WHO HAS HAD HIS HORSE SHOT UNDER HIM.

away in that quarter. They sent out a detachment of 150 men to occupy a position on the De Aar side and thus secure their flank from attack in that quarter. Here a strange incident happened. This party of Boers, on the east, was riding hard for a small eminence which commands the road from Philipstown to De Aar; at the very same moment, and unseen by them, the detachment of Victorians was galloping towards it from the west. The Australians arrived first, and instantly opened a heavy fire upon the Boers. The enemy brought up a gun and a "Pom-Pom," but they could not force the Australians back. A desultory skirmish continued all the day; with evening the rest of the Victorians and more troops of Colonel Crabbe's column arrived upon the scene, and the enemy fell back. The Boers succeeded in entering Philipstown, but they failed to carry the jail or to capture

the party of Yeomanry inside it. They lost a good deal of time to very little purpose. On this same day there was another skirmish, west of Colesberg. A detachment of 200 men from the Imperial Light Horse, South African Light Horse, and Nesbitt's

Horse, reconnoitring, was suddenly attacked by a much superior force of Boers—probably one of De Wet's flanking guards. Seeing the small numbers of the British, the enemy attempted to surround them, and our men had no small difficulty in repelling this attempt. Help, fortunately, was not long in coming. Plumer's column was already in rapid movement westwards, and as the spitting ring of Mausers began to encircle the irregulars, the Imperial Bushmen entered the fight. Close behind them came a "Pom-Pom," the bark of which was answered by the Boers with shrapnel from one of their 15-pounders. This gun was probably one of those taken from the British at Dewetsdorp. Seeing that reinforcements had arrived, the enemy fell back, closely followed by the British as long as daylight lasted.

On the 13th Plumer found himself close up to De Wet's force and at once attacked. The enemy held a wide front and brought their guns into action; inferior in strength, Plumer had to be careful in his management of the skirmish.

Plumer engages the enemy.

Slowly he made headway

and forced the Boers back; at nightfall they were in full retreat westwards. Some patrols were snapped up by De Wet on this day; a party of 20 Yeomanry under a lieutenant were captured; and two of Plumer's best scouts had a narrow escape. They approached a farm and were on the point of entering it when four Boers suddenly appeared and covered them with their rifles, shouting "Hands up!" One of the two was close to the door, and having no chance of escape, surrendered. The other made a bolt for liberty and amidst a shower of bullets got away. The prisoner was liberated on General Plumer's advance.



A. C. Ball.]

ESCAPE OF ONE OF PLUMER'S SCOUTS.

During the afternoon of the 13th the weather changed. It had been hot and dry: now the rain descended in sheets and cataracts, and the Orange River rose in heavy flood. On the one hand this prevented De Wet from regaining the Orange River Colony, but it also, on the other hand, prevented Knox and Bruce Hamilton, who were on the north bank, from crossing to Plumer's aid and taking part in the pursuit.



THE RACE FOR THE COMMAND OF THE PHILIPSTOWN ROAD: VICTORIA WINS!

I. Sheldon-Williams.]



E. J. Waugh.]

MAJOR BOGLE SMITH TACKLES DE WET AND HIS SJAMBOK.

CHAPTER XVI.

DE WET CHASED OUT OF CAPE COLONY.

Concentration against De Wet—His cruelty to prisoners—Plumer continues to engage him—De Wet escapes under cover of a storm—He cuts the railway near Houtkraal—Attack by armoured trains—Capture of carts and ammunition—De Wet obtains remounts—Bruce Hamilton and Henniker join in the chase—Boer force divides—De Wet enclosed in a triangle—Attempts to cross the Orange River—His camp captured—He re-crosses the railway at Kraankuil—A new cordon constituted—Paroled farmers assist in derailing a train—They are convicted and shot—A sniper killed—De Wet effects a junction with Herzog—Neglect of means of communication between British columns—Byng's mistaken obedience and De Wet's escape—De Wet re-crosses the Orange—Capture of a party of Boers—Failure of the invasion—Fresh dispositions—De Wet's march unopposed—He lays false trails—Bethune follows him to Fauresmith—The Boers scatter and close in again—Capture of cyclist scouts—Fortune favours De Wet.



DE WET'S line of march was at last determined clearly. There could be no more doubts at the British headquarters; the one object now was to bring every available man to bear against him. From far and near columns were hurried by rail towards De Aar, and the rattle and roar of the trains carrying up the troops from Kimberley, from Norvals Pont, from Aliwal, from Naauwpoort, and from the stations Capetown-way, resounded day and night over the barren Karroo. Thorneycroft, Bethune, Haig—

Concentration against
De Wet.

among the pick of the British brigade commanders in South Africa—were all borne swiftly to the support of the impetuous Plumer, with his skilled and capable lieutenants, Jeffreys and Craddock. Lyttelton, who directed the movements of the various units, and who had supreme command, moved to De Aar to be nearer to the troops. Prodigious efficiency had by this time been attained by the railway staff, and the feats performed with a single, narrow-gauge, badly-laid line were wonderful. The civilian and military staff worked day and night. "Men, horses, mules, cannon, waggons, and supplies were rapidly entrained, . . in the course of twenty-four hours, in one instance, 1,500 trucks

were moved off to various destinations." Now, it was thought, the Lord had delivered the enemy into the hands of the British, and every nerve was strained to capture the man who for eleven months



Chas. M. Sheldon.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL PLUMER, C.B., A.D.C.

After his long and arduous march from Buluwayo to the relief of Mafeking—a march which demonstrated his courage and persistence—Colonel Plumer was put in command of a mobile column, with rank of Brigadier-General. On July 21, 1900, with the Protectorate and Rhodesian Regiments, he arrived at Olifant's Nek, too late to prevent the escape of the Boers eastwards. Early in August, 1900, he was with General Carrington when Zecrust was evacuated, and on the 31st of that month defeated a party of the enemy near Pienaar's River. At Warmbaths he took over the command of Baden-Powell's column, and shortly afterwards retired to Pretoria. He was engaged in operations on the Delagoa Bay line until, in February, 1901, he joined Paget and moved south to assist in expelling the invaders from Cape Colony. See the note beneath his portrait on p. 48 of "With the Flag to Pretoria," Vol. I.

had baffled every British general and covered the reputation of the army with undeserved derision. Nor were the plain, humble regimental officers and privates less eager. To them the capture of

De Wet meant more than mere glory—which always goes to the general—it meant the end of the war and the limit of their sufferings and exile. There was a note of strenuousness about this brief campaign which we do not always find in other passages of the war.

It is sad to think that all this display of energy, all these efforts were to be in vain. On their side the Boers were not less eager and resolute, though, true to their traditional tactics, they ever refused to fight pitched battles. They, too, had a sense of injuries to avenge. They continually expressed to the prisoners their indignation at the removal of the women and children from the farms, though they were forced to own that if the women and children had been left on the farms, in the denuded



[Photo by J. W. Russell & Co.]

COL. OWEN, MAJOR BOGLE SMITH, AND OTHER OFFICERS OF THE 1ST DRAGOON GUARDS.

The names are as follow, reading from left to right: Top row, Lieuts. Holland, Reeves, Charlton, Adam, Capt. H. J. Williams, Lieuts. Denny and Gray, and Lieut. Brocklebank.
Middle row: Lieut. Rusbotham, Capt. Searight, Major Bogle Smith, Col. Owen, Cpts. Eastwood and E. A. Williams, Lieut. Turner.
Bottom row: Lieuts. Harris and Reuton.

country, they must have starved. They would not understand that a guerilla war such as they were waging must always bring the most terrible sufferings upon the non-combatants. They vented their

**His cruelty to
prisoners.**

rage by behaving with disgraceful severity to many of the prisoners, compelling them to march on foot while they rode, refusing them food, and robbing them of their greatcoats in the inclement weather. On the 14th there were even worse acts on their part. That day they snapped up another patrol, this time of the 1st Dragoon Guards, under Major S. B. Smith, while out scouting. "On, on, always on, they urged us through that never-ending day," says Lieutenant McAdam. "At 11 p.m. we begged again and again to see the commandant, or that a message might be carried to him, telling him officers and men—the prisoners—were broken down and unable to drag their weary limbs and aching bodies further. 'Only a little further,' was the cry, and so we struggled through until 1 a.m., Friday, when, unable to proceed, we threw ourselves upon the sodden, trampled ground, begging to see the commandant, and in a minute most of us were asleep. Within a quarter of an hour De Wet himself rode up. He was evidently in a towering rage, and roared, 'Whar's the officer?' 'Here I am,' said Major Bogle Smith, rising. De Wet rode at him, and began lashing him with the heavy rhino-hide sjambok he always carries. He managed to get in three or four blows, when the astonished Smith grabbed his arm, and nearly pulled him from his horse. Thereupon De Wet yelled, 'Whar's my pistol? Whar's my pistol?' Bogle Smith moved off in the dark, but De Wet, still in a fury, lashed out, hitting right and left, at the other officers and our soldiers, and the Boer escort joined in driving us along. I luckily kept out of his reach in the dark, and, running forward, escaped his notice. Such is the incident I saw

with my own eyes, and was mixed up in. I am sure if De Wet had possessed a pistol some of us would have been murdered. There is no doubt about its having been Christian De Wet. I saw him repeatedly in laager and upon the march. He is like his portraits, a saturnine man, with his beard streaked with grey, his age over fifty years. We were hurried on a mile more or less, and then halted to sleep."

For this cowardly assault there could be no justification. But the Boer leader, who was guilty of it, and also morally guilty of the murder of the peace-envoys, was one of those whose names were cheered by our British Anti-Patriots, when Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener were hissed, at the famous Queen's Hall meeting. The evidence of Lieutenant McAdam is not easily shaken, and it exactly accords with the incidents which occurred after Dewetsdorp, when the surrendered Gloucesters and Highlanders were sjamboked in the same way. Neither then nor on this occasion did the British army retaliate, though no other army in the world would have permitted comrades thus to be ill-used. It should be added that *The Times* special correspondent with the British troops questions whether it was De Wet who thus flogged prisoners, and thinks that, as the criminal is described as a "big,



A. C. Ball.]

[After a photograph.]

FUNERAL WITH MILITARY HONOURS OF A BOER PRISONER AT SIMONSTOWN.

Humanity, and even generosity, towards the living, and honourable burial for the dead, characterize the treatment of their prisoners by the British. In marked contrast is the cruelty practised towards the British prisoners by De Wet as detailed in this chapter.

burly man," he was the Harrismith Wessels. But McAdam was present, and *The Times* correspondent was not. There is no reason why any fair-minded person should impugn McAdam's testimony, of which *The Times* correspondent appears to have been ignorant, especially as, we have reason to know, Major Bogle Smith had no doubt that his assailant was De Wet. And even if De Wet was not the man who in this instance struck the dishonouring blow, such outrages occurred too frequently and too systematically in his commando for him to have been ignorant of them. He cannot in any case be acquitted of responsibility for them.

After an awful night, in which rain fell in torrents, the Boers found the veldt almost impassable, and had to stand till the ground dried. All the 14th fighting between Plumer and De Wet continued.

Plumer continues to engage him.

The sharpest brush in this action, which covered a front of many miles, was at Wolvehoek. So hard were the Boers pressed by the pursuers that they were compelled to abandon some carts and waggons, and dead and dying horses marked the track which they had followed beyond all possibility of mistake. During the day—in which 34 miles were covered by the British troops, though the going was as bad as bad could be and the surface of the veldt inches deep in slush—Major Vialls with the Australians stormed a very strong position on the east of Houtkraal. The Boer convoy, numbering about 100 waggons, could be seen making for Houtkraal Siding, on the railway between Kimberley and De Aar. While Craddock went forward on the left, and Jeffreys' Australians attacked in the centre, the 1st Dragoon Guards, under a heavy shell fire, and in face of great opposition, went forward on the right. Craddock's men were slow in storming the kopjes before them, and gave the enemy two hours' respite when respite was most needed. At last, towards evening, the main Boer laager came into view only three and a half miles away. Notwithstanding the numerical weakness of his force and the weariness of his troops after their hard marching and fighting, Plumer made preparations to storm it. His men were ready for any exertion if they could win the proud honour of killing or capturing De Wet. But just at this juncture fortune intervened to protect the Boers. As the troops were forming up for a bloody and desperate attack, one of those terrific storms, for which South Africa is famous, burst upon the combatants. "The sky, lurid as in a vision of the Apocalypse," says Madame Bron, describing one of these convulsions of Nature, "is swathed in inky clouds. The lightning, at first hurled down from heaven to earth in narrow, close-set lines, now spreads out into a sheet of flame, and turns the desert into one vast blaze. . . . What a hellish uproar! Hail and rain are falling in streams that change into moving walls of crystal and mighty diamonds as the light from the sky cuts through them." Before the storm came its usual premonitor, a hurricane swirling dense clouds of dust. When the storm had passed, and it was possible to see what lay before the British troops, De Wet was gone. Pursuit was attempted, but the tracks had become impossible. The veldt had become a vast shallow lake—a quaking quagmire. Nothing more could be done that night—darkness was already falling—and the column camped in the slush.

De Wet escapes under cover of a storm.



F. J. Waugh.]

A SOUTH AFRICAN HAIL STORM.

[After a sketch by H. Lea.

So violent are these storms that men are glad to obtain shelter of any kind, even that of their saddles, as here depicted.

Before the storm came its usual premonitor, a hurricane swirling dense clouds of dust. When the storm had passed, and it was possible to see what lay before the British troops, De Wet was gone. Pursuit was attempted, but the tracks had become impossible. The veldt had become a vast shallow lake—a quaking quagmire. Nothing more could be done that night—darkness was already falling—and the column camped in the slush.

On the night of the 14th De Wet with eighty men rode to the railway. He cut the line in two places, to the north and south of the point where he intended to cross, which lay midway

between Potfontein and Houtkraal. At 2.30 a.m. of the 15th, according to the British prisoners with his commandos, the Boers recommenced their march, which was now more like a disorderly retreat than the advance of a conquering army, though as a conquering army their leaders represented them. They trekked for some hours through swamps and quagmires, and about 5 a.m. were on the railway. There a halt was ordered to

**He cuts the railway
near Houtkraal.**

allow the convoy to get up. It had fallen far behind. Mules were exhausted and incapable of desperate exertion; oxen dropped; the prisoners wondered what had happened to the British troops. De Wet was on the alert. With 300 men he moved to a kopje to the south of the crossing place; as many more men hurried to a similar eminence some distance away to the north. Suddenly over the veldt from

**Attack by armoured
trains.**

the north came a black object with a roar and a thundering. It was the armoured train which patrolled the line from Orange River to De Aar, and its appearance caused blank dismay. Boer officers shouted to their men to make a dash for the other side of the line; cannon and "Pom-Pom" and Cape carts went furiously at a gallop towards the west, and at the same instant the train opened fire. Its first shell narrowly escaped four of the prisoners. The light was bad, but it would have gone very ill with the enemy had not another stroke of luck befallen them at this instant. The naval 12-pounder in the leading truck broke a bolt and was unable after a few shots to fire. Those shots, however, were enough. The Boers dashed to the south to get out of their way, when in that quarter also appeared a dark, puffing monster. It was Colonel Crabbe with an armoured train and a construction train from the south.

Crabbe's trains at once opened fire with two 15-pounders upon the enemy, with the result that the Boers, attacked both from the north and the south, fled in terrible confusion. This was a moment when a brigade of good cavalry could probably have put an end to De Wet's force. But it seems that the great opportunity was not fully used by the British columns. Crabbe may



R. Caton Woodville.

YEOMANRY ATTACKING DE WET'S REARGUARD AND TRANSPORT.

have been too weak. Plumer, we know, was too much hampered by the state of the veldt; and the means of communication between the two forces were probably defective. In any case by far the greater part of De Wet's force safely crossed the railway and made for Britstown and the west as fast as they could go. Their carts and waggons stuck in the mud and were abandoned when the extremity of the peril was realised. Only

Capture of carts and ammunition.


a few Cape carts, the ammunition waggons, and one or two of the guns were got away by supreme exertions. "I saw our armoured trains," says Lieutenant McAdam, "steam slowly nearer the kopjes, from which in turn the mounted Boers tried to bolt. For over half-an-hour the northern kopje was peppered, and most of the horses there were killed. Of the men, many managed to escape afoot . . . De Wet was furious about his oxen, and I saw him sjamboking two of his own Boers for not returning to get the waggons forward." In all, twenty carts or waggons were taken, most of them containing ammunition, of which in all 100,000 rounds were captured. Besides this no less than 6,000 rounds of "Pom-Pom" ammunition and several boxes of 15-pounder shells were among the captures, while twenty Boers, ragged and dirty and miserable, were made prisoners. One damaged Maxim was the only gun taken from the enemy.

So bad was the surface of the veldt that vigorous pursuit of the Boers was most difficult. "A truly awful march to the line—the softness of the veldt was inconceivable; I never thought the guns and horses could have got through," writes an officer with Colonel Jeffreys. But the Boers had now passed the line upon which we might have expected the British forces to bring them to


a standstill, and they had passed it because of the insufficient number of men available to guard the railway. From De Aar to Orange River, on a front of 70 miles, there were less than 2,000 British troops, which gives barely thirty men to each mile. It is, of course, possible that those in charge of the British strategy intended to let De Wet penetrate yet further into the Colony, but, if so, the 2,000 troops on the line were too many. Moreover, when once to the west of the railway, De Wet would have little difficulty in joining hands with Brand and Herzog, who were rapidly moving towards him, and would be in country which, through a grave oversight, had not been denuded of horses. Britstown and Philipstown had been carefully cleared by Major Parsons, the commandant at De Aar, acting with Lord Kitchener's consent. But the Hopetown commandant had done nothing beyond sending out a circular to the farmers directing them to bring in their horses. He

De Wet obtains remounts.

had taken no steps to give effect to this circular, and some farmers who actually brought their horses to Hopetown, were allowed or ordered to return with them to their farms. So that in this district De Wet could, and did, obtain remounts, and regain much of the mobility which he had lost during Plumer's tireless pursuit.



Lines of De Wet's Invasion English Miles 0 10 20 30 40 50
MAP OF DE WET'S MOVEMENTS IN CAPE COLONY.



J. Nash, R.I.

ARMoured TRAINS IN PURSUIT OF DE WET (see p. 329).

[After a sketch by Lieut. Campbell]

The British struck after him towards the west, and new columns were hurried up. Bruce Hamilton had now forded the Orange River at Zand Drift and was pressing forward with the 21st Brigade towards De Aar; Henniker, with three squadrons of the Victorian Imperial Regiment, two squadrons of the 17th Lancers, two companies of Coldstreams, and a section of M Horse Artillery Battery, was marching from Philipstown towards the sound of the firing. He promptly joined hands with Crabbe, and with a little over a thousand men, these two officers joined in the chase, across the veldt, where in Mr. Wallace's words, "the roads are only donkey tracks, and where waggons and carts wobble to and fro like barges in a heavy swell."

Bruce Hamilton and Henniker join in the chase.

Jeffreys, of Plumer's column, still led the van of the pursuers, but his horses were dropping out hour by hour, and his strength was steadily dwindling in consequence. On the morning of the 15th the British troops were close behind De Wet, so close that the Boers did not dare to make any long halt till Rietfontein was reached, when they off-saddled for four hours. The enemy's force had

Boer force divides. divided, the bet-

ter to elude pursuit, De Wet, Steyn, and about 1,500 men falling back in a north-westerly direction towards Strydenburg, while Froneman with rather over 1,000 went due westward. The British prisoners were left with Froneman, and as they were quite incapable of further marching—during the past few days McAdam and the men with him had been made to cover 150 miles

on foot—they were released at nightfall, and joined Crabbe and Henniker next day. Froneman in the night marched northwards, towards Strydenburg, keeping some ten miles to the west of the railway.

Deflected to the north, because the news had reached him that Britstown was occupied by the British—for Bethune's brigade of cavalry had marched out from Richmond Road on February 16 with Britstown as their destination—De Wet made further endeavours to work west. Plumer, tenacious and fearless as ever, still pressed him closely, though his men and horses were worn out by a week of tremendous effort, while Crabbe, Henniker, and Bruce Hamilton were also on the trail, the two first under Plumer's orders. Pienaar Pan was reached on the night of the 16th, Geluk's Poort on the 17th, at which place Commandant Bosman of Boshof, one of our most determined opponents, made his surrender. Here Jeffreys' men came upon the Boers as they were preparing breakfast, and drove



F. Dadt, R.I.

SEARCHING FOR WATER.

Water is usually to be found by digging in the dry water-courses. At times it has to be drilled for in the open and pumped up by machinery.

[After a photo by D. Grey, Kimberley.]

them in utter rout, until the complete failure of all supplies and the exhaustion of the horses compelled the British to halt. De Wet was always a couple of thousand yards ahead. Now and again a straggler from his column was snapped up; once or twice the British guns unlimbered and tried a shot at him, but there was no fighting. Still the British were so close at his heels that they entertained bright hopes of his capture, the more so as the heavy rains kept the Orange River in flood, and even the Brak, which is normally little more than a dry river bed, raged a swollen and formidable torrent. Once more, as in December, the guerilla leader was within a triangle shut in on

De Wet enclosed in
a triangle.

two sides by rivers. The course of the Brak on the south-west from De Aar to Prieska was a serious obstacle, while on the north he had the Orange River from Prieska to Orange River Station. The third side of the triangle was formed by the railway from De Aar to Orange River. But the distances in South Africa are vast, and, small though this triangle looks on the map, it covers an area of almost 4,000 square miles, or nearly the size of Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk. Suppose 3,000 well-mounted men turned loose in these counties, and about 10,000 others, less mobile and less well mounted, detailed to catch the raiders; suppose, further, a sparse population of less than 4,000 souls scattered over this area, and a total want of metalled road, railways, and means of communication, with wells only at great intervals and few streams of water, and we obtain some idea of the peculiar difficulties which confronted the British troops. They could not be certain of finding food; the water supply was often insufficient for large columns; while the sympathy of the population for the Boers was so strong that it was impossible to obtain accurate information of the enemy's doings.

On February 18 Bethune and Bruce Hamilton were at Britstown with their brigades, in close proximity to Brand's commando, which was moving towards De Wet's force, with the object of effecting a junction with him and supplying him with remounts. Of these a large number had been collected by the Boer patrols during the western invasion. Herzog with 1,500 horses was also close at hand at Vosburg, and, like Brand, was moving to aid De Wet. Knox was at Houtkraal; Plumer at Kraal Pan, short of supplies. The Brak, in heavy flood, parted the Boer forces, and gave the British a great opportunity of striking each section of the enemy separately. Bruce Hamilton's command was directed to move up the course of the Brak, keeping between the two main bodies of the enemy, and crossing, if possible, at Klip Drift. On the way its advance guard, composed of Rimington's Guides, came into collision with Brand's force, which was actually moving to seize Britstown. But the Boers had no intention of fighting an action, and, on detecting the strength of the British column, they hurriedly retired towards the south, and, by reason of their extreme mobility, were able to pass completely out of touch of our scouts. Bethune, who was with Bruce Hamilton when the enemy thus disappeared, decided to strike northward with his cavalry brigade in the direction of Strydenburg. Such a movement, in all probability, would have brought him right upon the heels of De Wet. But orders from a senior officer spoiled the plan. The brigade was kept to the rear, in the words of *The Times* correspondent, "marching uselessly up and down dusty roads, pursuing a phantom enemy," and this at the very moment when cavalry were most wanted to "round up" De Wet. It is to be regretted that Bethune did not disobey the orders



[Photo by Lafayette.]

COLONEL RIMINGTON.

Michael Frederic Rimington was born in 1858 at Penrith, and educated at Highgate, Oxford, and Sandhurst. Joined the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, then in Natal, 1881; served with Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren, 1884-5; Adjutant of his regiment, 1886; Captain, 1887; served in operations in Zululand, 1888; Staff-Captain, Remount Department, Ireland, 1897, until he left for South Africa on special service, July, 1899. On the outbreak of hostilities he enlisted from the loyal farmers of Natal, the Free State, and Cape Colony, his Imperial Corps of Guides, named Rimington's Tigers, partly from their activity, and partly from the wild cat's tail worn in their hats. Lieut.-Colonel, September, 1900; Colonel, South Africa, while commanding a column, May, 1901. His "Guides" have acted as a sort of Intelligence Corps, and have done valuable service.

given him and follow his own initiative, on the rule which governs operations in all Continental armies. Meanwhile, in fear that De Wet might attempt to cross the swollen Orange River at Hopetown, where there was a bridge, the Essex Regiment with two guns was sent to that point. The pursuit of Kritzingen was for the moment relaxed, and the columns under Colonels Byng, Lowe, and Williams, which had been chasing him, were brought up to Victoria West, whither also was directed a battalion of Highlanders from Aliwal North. These troops were added to the force at the disposal of Colonel Haig.



ORDERED HOME.

A group of convalescents at Wynberg hospital awaiting the hospital-train which shall carry them to Capetown on the way home.

On the 19th De Wet was upon the Orange River to the west of Hopetown, trying in vain to effect a crossing, though it is believed that a few Boers from his commando succeeded in swimming the stream. Henniker was still close up, from time to time using his guns upon the Boer rearguard. The rest of Plumer's brigade, exhausted by the very strenuousness of its pursuit, was compelled to remain behind and refit. As an example of the manner in which it had dwindled may be mentioned the fact that Colonel Jeffreys left Colesberg on the 11th with 589 men, 4 guns, 4 waggon, and a "Pom-Pom," and reached Zoutpan on the 19th with only 263 men, 2 guns, 1 waggon, and the "Pom-Pom." Captain Berry, however, and 50 men of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen, who belonged to Jeffreys' force, followed De Wet's tracks, and never lost sight of them. Unable to pass the Orange River, De Wet struck due west and attempted to pass the Brak, not far from Prieska, at the very apex of the triangle. Brand and Herzog seem to have succeeded in getting across the Brak, but higher up. At the Lower Klip Drift, which De Wet attempted, the Brak

STORMY WEATHER AT WYNBERG.

The photograph shows the effect of a windy night on some of the tents of the base hospital at Wynberg. Each tent is constructed to accommodate six patients.

The rains still continued, and the Orange River day after day flowed in tremendous flood. The drifts were all but impassable, and over sixteen feet of turbid water swirled down the river bed.



HOME AGAIN.

Interior of a hospital hut at Netley. The doctor making his round.

was impassable. Now was the moment for the British columns to close in upon the Boers, but unhappily the British movements were badly co-ordinated. "There was," in the words of Mr. Wallace, the *Daily Mail* correspondent with Henniker's column, "a total absence of any organised system of communication between the various columns." They wandered about, out of touch with each other and with the enemy, obeying orders from headquarters which only too commonly arrived after the circumstances to which these orders had reference had changed. Pilcher from Bruce Hamilton's column, Bruce Hamilton himself, Knox, and Bethune, who were all on the course of the Brak, would, Henniker's men hoped, strike De Wet on this westward detour, while Henniker guarded the base-line of the triangle. Unhappily various circumstances prevented these expectations from being fulfilled. Bruce Hamilton received information, probably spread by De Wet, that the Boers were moving towards Prieska, and hurried off in that direction. Meanwhile the crafty De Wet, hearing that Herzog and Brand's men were across the Brak and moving towards Hopetown, where they would be able to assist him in case he needed help, and to bring him what he most wanted, remounts, doubled sharply back to the east. In some manner or other he continued to dodge Colonel Henniker's small column, which the force at his disposal greatly outnumbered. He followed the Orange River from the point of its confluence with the Brak towards its confluence with the Vaal, searching for a practicable drift. Read's Drift, however, just below the confluence with the Vaal, was quite impassable. He next tried Marks' Drift, immediately to the south of Douglas, and there again had no better luck.

Henniker had taken a day's halt to rest his teams and mounts, trusting to Bruce Hamilton to settle with the Boers in case they crossed the Brak. Receiving information that De Wet was returning along the south bank of the Orange River, he hurried towards Kameel Drift, which lies above Marks' Drift. He had Crabbe with him, and was shortly reinforced by the indefatigable General Plumer, with Craddock's and Jeffreys' mounted columns. He had completed the refit of his force and was again moving in pursuit of the enemy. Wherever the British troops sent patrols they found traces of Boer handiwork, in commandeering receipts signed by Steyn and De Wet. On the evening of February 22, De Wet laagered his force at Kameel Drift, on the south bank of the Orange River. Plumer and Henniker received news of this, and with dawn of the 23rd marched out from Welgevonden, 22 miles away, where they had encamped



R. Caton Woodville.]

[From a sketch.

NATIVE ROAD-MENDERS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

for the night, to deliver an attack. Jeffreys, hearing that the Boers were crossing the Orange by a punt at Kalk Drift, rode towards that point, making a considerable detour, and thus for the moment falling out of the pursuit of De Wet. On his approach the enemy very hurriedly retired, but he did good work, heading them towards Hopetown, and capturing a number of prisoners and Mr. Steyn's own private cart. In all on this day he marched 40 miles, which was a splendid performance with indifferent horses in bad country. The rest of Plumer's force meanwhile clung to De Wet. At Pampoen's Pan the British advance guard came into contact with the enemy. The Boers held a strong position on a long ridge which ran generally east and west.

Crabbe's brigade led Plumer's force; it at once attacked and was well supported by Henniker's command. The Victorian Mounted Rifles were ordered to clear the ridge, and this they did in the finest style, under a heavy fire. At first it looked as if De Wet meant to make a stubborn fight. His "Pom-Pom" came into action, and was only silenced by the guns of M Battery and of one of the Australian batteries, while his marksmen held their ground resolutely. But when the Australians went forward with determination, the Boer rearguard, for such the force engaging Plumer was, broke in complete disorder, flinging away arms, ammunition, and equipment, and hurrying in the direction of Hopetown. Forty prisoners were captured, most of them in wretched plight and complaining bitterly of their sufferings. The pursuit continued all the afternoon. Towards evening the Boer camp came into sight at Disselfontein, and the two Boer guns could be seen near it. Without a moment's delay Captain Marker of the Coldstreams led a number of Victorians straight at the guns, and, finely supported by a detachment of Yeomanry and Imperial Light Horse, captured them both—a 15 pounder and a "Pom-Pom"—as night was coming down. So exhausted were the Victorians with the efforts of that day's fighting and pursuing that



[Photo by J. W. Russell & Co.]

COLONEL OWEN,

1st Dragoon Guards, who commanded a column in pursuit of De Wet, and captured De Wet's camp.

only three of them were behind Marker when he reached the guns. The Boers were so demoralised that they made no attempt at resistance. They bolted in craven fashion towards the Orange, where several of them are believed to have been drowned in attempts to cross.

Colonel Owen continued the pursuit and captured the camp, with cooking pots full and horses standing saddled. He had only a few hundred men, and the Boers were 1,200, if not more, but

His camp captured.

their only desire was to get away, and the better to evade pursuit, according to their usual tactics, they dispersed in all directions. De Wet and Steyn with the largest body, about 300 strong, retired to Doktor's Kraal, and there spent part of the night. If only other British columns had been within reach, it is difficult to suppose that they could have escaped. The better to facilitate their flight and to put the British off the track, stories were spread to the effect that they had already crossed the Orange in a boat near Hopetown. As a number of Boers had been seen in punts on the river the tale was plausible, though, as a matter of fact, the punts only contained demoralised burghers and not the great guerilla himself.

In the course of the night of the 23rd-24th the Boers resumed their retreat, but in very scattered order, and, working round to the south of Hopetown, to evade Major Paris, who was on the look out for them there with the Essex Regiment and some mounted men, struck eastwards for the railway. This column, by the way, opened a warm fire upon Plumer's men, mistaking them for the enemy. Fortunately there were no casualties. The veldt over which the enemy retired was littered with blankets and



THE WRECKING OF A TRAIN NEAR TAAIBOSCH (p. 339).

A. C. Ball.

plunder flung away, showing the precipitancy of their flight and the completeness of their demoralisation. At 2.30 a.m. of the 24th, the main body of fugitives crossed the line at Kraankuil, on their passage blowing up a culvert. The news was at once tele-



(Copyright 1900 by Underwood & Underwood.)

MR. GUY D. A. FLEETWOOD WILSON, C.B.,

Assistant Under-Secretary of State for War, was appointed Financial Adviser to Lord Kitchener, February 17, 1901, in response to his lordship's request for assistance in connection with the finances of the conquered territories.

parties of Boers were also moving from all quarters to join the guerilla leader, while, to the north of the Orange River, Field-Cornet Bosman, of Philippolis—who must not be confused with the surrendered Commandant Bosman, of Boshof—was making all preparations to lend a hand to De Wet and to supply him with transport, in place of the waggons lost, and with ammunition, in place of that abandoned or expended. This officer had collected a hundred of the Orange River Colony farmers, all men who had given their parole, and who were now treacherously in arms, and employed them in watching all the drifts from the northern bank, so that they would be able to give De Wet any information which he might require.

The burghers of one of the small parties of Boers now hastening to De Wet's aid had been guilty of a peculiarly dastardly outrage on the railway between Naauwpoort and De Aar, at Taaibosch. In this affair they were assisted by certain Dutch farmers of the locality. Under

Commandant Malan they had left Kritzinger's commando, and put up on the night of February 17 at Bad Farm, where they obtained refreshments and all manner of help. On the night of the 18th they proceeded to the railway near Taaibosch, and with spanners and crowbars, provided by the Dutch farmers, removed the bolts from one of the rails at a point where there was a sharp gradient descending through a cutting. On the banks of the cutting they took post and waited. One train, to their disgust, passed safely after the rail had been loosened; the next, however, laden with coal and railway material, left the line. As it approached they shouted to the

He re crosses the railway at Kraankuil.

graphed to General Lyttelton, who ordered Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry and the whole of Haig's

command to move north by rail to the neighbourhood of Orange River Station, and there join in the chase. At the same time he re-adjusted his dispositions, so as to give a cordon stretching in a wide curve from

A new cordon constituted.

Orange River Station to Norvals Pont. The columns which constituted it were to close steadily in,

converging on Zand Drift. As the Orange was still high, the capture of the bulk of De Wet's force, if not of De Wet himself, might yet be reasonably anticipated: But once more the want of carefully organised communications and of initiative in the leaders of certain of the columns was to bring the dispositions to naught.

Herzog and Brand were about one day behind De Wet, but were fast nearing him. On the morning of the 24th they were some distance to the south-west of Potfontein, at which station they crossed the railway at 3 a.m. of the morning of the 25th. Other small



COMMANDANT NIEUWOUDT.

Leader of the paroled burghers who acted as guides to the invading Boers in Cape Colony.

Paroled farmers assist in derailing a train.



BOER REFUGEE CAMP AT SPITZKOP, ORANGE RIVER COLONY.

driver to stop, which he refused to do, putting on all steam in the hope of running down the incline and getting away from them. On this they opened fire, and almost simultaneously the engine flew off the rails, buried itself in the bank, and the leading trucks in the train were telescoped. Four yeomen of the 29th Company of Imperial Yeomanry, and about a hundred natives, on their way to Kimberley, were upon the train. Two of the yeomen escaped unhurt, a third was killed on the spot, the fourth was pinned down under the wreckage with a bolt through his forearm, in horrible agony, and though with sublime fortitude he neither winced nor complained, he sustained such terrible injuries that he died some days afterwards. Of the natives one was killed and several others bruised or hurt. Notwithstanding the cries of the injured and the fact that no resistance was offered, the Boers, after the derailment of the train, fired into the wreckage, killing another native, wounding several more, and shooting the driver in the leg. Without rendering any assistance to the men in mortal pain, they drove the natives into a ballast hole and plundered them. It is satisfactory to learn that in their wild shooting, firing from either side of the line, they wounded two of their own number. They then proceeded to ransack the train, and were greatly chagrined to find that it contained nothing of any use to them. While thus engaged one of the armoured trains came up from De Aar and drove them off with a few shots.

A short time before the affair two native gangers reported to their foreman that the Boers were on the line, but, the foreman being a Dutchman, they were ordered to say nothing. Immediately after the attack eight arrests were made among the farmers of the district, and of the eight one at once turned King's evidence and denounced the others. Finally three men, J. P. Ninaber, S. Ninaber, and J. A. Nieuwoudt, were tried by a military court, found guilty of high treason and murder, by co-operating in the derailment of the train, and sentenced to death. Two others, H. and F. Nieuwoudt, were condemned to five years' penal servitude. The last two were not brought to trial. Execution of the sentence upon the men condemned to death took place at De Aar on March 19, when, at sundown, in presence of the whole garrison, the criminals were shot. They deserved and will receive no compassion, and though the Boers pretend that they were the innocent victims of a mistake, they confessed their guilt before execution. The cowardly and cruel firing into the train after its derailment, when no resistance of any kind was being offered, was in itself a crime, quite apart from the fact that the perpetrators of it pretended loyalty to the King.

**They are convicted
and shot.**

Another suggestive incident, which shows the value of such professions of loyalty, occurred on this same night of February 18, close to the same place. At an iron bridge, two miles from the scene of

the outrage, a picket of Coldstream Guards was stationed, and an elaborate barbed wire entanglement had been constructed to protect the picket. During the night men were heard stumbling about in

this entanglement. The picket at

A sniper killed.

once opened fire, and when morning came a farmer, who lived near the spot, was found with a bullet in his head. His wife stated that the enemy had arrived in the night and had commandeered him, but the truth probably was that he went of his own free will to enjoy the usually safe pastime of shooting "rooineks" and sniping sentries. For once the treacherous sniper met with his deserts.



COLESKOP.

Wet's force, now split up into some twenty or more small bodies, followed the course of the Orange River towards Zand Drift, still pressed by Henniker and Crabbe, who marched close up to the stream with Thorneycroft upon their right, Hickman closing in from Philipstown, and Byng moving up from Colesberg. In spite of all these pursuers, however, De Wet

De Wet effects a junction with Herzog.

was able to reach Petrusville, and near there effect a junction with Herzog, receiving from that leader a large number of sorely-needed remounts. There was no serious fighting, but from time to time within the four days the various British columns came into touch with parties of

Neglect of means of communication between British columns.

the enemy and exchanged shots with them. Unfortunately, as we have already noted, the want of intercommunication between the columns prevented these brushes from being turned to any good effect. It was of little use for one commander of

a column to come into touch with the Boers, if he could not call in the other columns upon the enemy's flanks and rear. Curiously enough, though the famous kopje known as

Coleskop, which had played a considerable part in the earlier period of the war, was in British hands, and offered an excellent means of maintaining the connection between the columns—covering, as the view from it did, a vast area of country—no use was made of it. A heliograph and a staff of signallers with a telegraph wire to Colesberg could have received information from and transmitted orders to the various British forces with consummate ease. But when Hickman struck the Boer rearguard to the north of Philipstown, though he tried for days to call up the signallers on Coleskop, naturally supposing that signallers would be stationed there, he failed to obtain any response. The same want of attention to small details, which had brought about the disaster of Spion Kop, on this occasion also wrecked the British plans. "There can be no doubt at all that had a signaller been stationed on Coleskop De Wet would have been caught," says Mr. Wallace. "From such an eminence—using Coleskop as the exchanging medium—columns would have been able to communicate one with the other, instead of being forced to resort to the laborious,



[Photo by S. Cribb.]

HOPE LONG DEFERRED.

"Police-Constable Jack," the derelict dog of Southampton Docks, was left behind by an officer going to the front at the beginning of the war, and has ever since been a most regular attendant on the quay on the return of every troopship. The dog was adopted by the dock police, and makes the rounds daily. Offers have been received from all parts of the country to give the dog a good home, but as the police decline to part with the faithful animal, several sums of money have been sent towards his keep, one admirer undertaking to make him a quarterly allowance until the return of his unknown master.

dangerous, and time-wasting method of sending messages through by despatch riders. To locate De Wet is simple enough: to place a cordon round him—that is, to put a force of men east, west, south, and north of him—is not so very difficult. To instruct these men or columns to leave camp at a certain date and move in a given direction is the easiest thing in the world; but once let these columns get thirty miles from their starting points without means of rapid communication one with the other, and you have set a dozen blindfolded mutes from the four sides of a square to catch a wide-awake man in the centre.” On such trifles does success or failure in war often hinge.

Thus once more luck served De Wet admirably. And now a second stroke of good fortune befell him. Just at this moment, when British columns were careering all round him, and when it might have been supposed that they could only succeed in missing him by a miracle, the Orange River began to fall. Now it would go down four feet and in a few hours rise again, but the tendency was for the water in the stream, at first capriciously, then steadily, to diminish. Inch by inch it fell, and hour by hour the moment approached when the drifts would again be practicable. The Boers, admirably informed of this, drew slowly nearer to Zand Drift. They obtained many fresh horses in the Petrusville district, which seemingly had not been denuded. Some of them, aided from the Orange River Colony side, managed to cross the river by swimming or making use of rafts and punts.

Those who remained to the south did their best to perplex the British columns, which, with all these scattered bands of Boers lying perdu in kloofs and dongas, plundering farms, and scouring the Orange River banks, never could feel quite certain whether the enemy was in front or behind. De Wet's repeated successes in slipping through British cordons might well excuse some doubt as to whether, after all, he had not made his way back to the west.

On February 27, the British lost their last opportunity of striking and destroying De Wet's force south of the Orange. On this day the various columns had fairly hemmed De Wet in. To the west



[John Charlton.]

THE EYES OF THE ARMY: SCOUTS AT WORK.

were Henniker, Crabbe, and Thorneycroft; to the south, Haig and Williams; to the east Colonel Byng with a flying column should have come right upon the enemy. Byng was not far to the west of Colesberg, and had thrown out pickets and patrols to the Seacow River. One of these patrols, five men strong, under Lieutenant Molyneux, actually came into touch with a large force of Boers, who rode along in the moonlight of the night of the 27th-28th, singing in chorus "Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer true." Two of the patrol were captured, and afterwards, when released, testified to the presence of De Wet with the force. The others under Molyneux got away and gave the alarm. Byng at once communicated the news to General Lyttelton, who was directing operations from the military centre of De Aar. No doubt he wished to assure the co-operation of the other British columns in the vicinity, knowing that if he attacked alone, De Wet would not be surrounded but

would simply slip between his enemies.



DOCTORING A SICK HORSE.

**Byng's mistaken
obedience and De
Wet's escape.**

Unhappily, either the message reached General Lyttelton in a mutilated and in-

correct form, or some mistake was made in transmitting the reply. For in answer to Colonel Byng's report that the enemy were close to him, to the west of him, came a command directing him to retire to the south-east. To the amazement of officers and men, who did not know of this order, Byng turned his back on the enemy and marched away from them to Colesberg. De Wet pushed hurriedly through the gap thus created, to Lilliefontein, close to the wreck of Colesberg road bridge, and began to cross the Orange.

That the order, however peremptory, should have been disobeyed by Byng is evident in the light of events. It could only have been issued under a misapprehension. Yet, once more, as in the British Army the spirit of resolute initiative in the subordinate commanders had not been encouraged in the past, it would be unjust to blame Colonel Byng for failing to disobey. The system, not the particular officer, was at fault. Still, had he pushed resolutely forward to where he knew the enemy were, and attacked

with determination, he might have lost heavily, but he would have inflicted severe punishment, if not complete disaster, upon De Wet. For on their hearing the sound of heavy firing it is impossible to suppose that the other British columns in the immediate vicinity would not have marched from all quarters to the scene of conflict, when they must have come in upon De Wet from every side. Instead, owing to this most unhappy order, the great object of the operations was missed at the very moment when it lay within the grasp of the British army. "Show me the general who has not made mistakes and you show me a man who has not made war," said a great soldier. But the recurrence of mistake after mistake, the loss of opportunity after opportunity, and the general want of initiative, are unmistakable evidence of serious defects in the organisation of command in the British army. "If the superior general," says one of the ablest Russian critics, examining the precisely similar

defects which characterised the command of the French army in the Franco-German war, "binds the hands of his subordinates and treats them like pawns in a game of chess, he must not be surprised if at the decisive moment he finds that he has before him blocks of wood and not intelligent men."

Byng was treated as a mere pawn, and the natural result followed.

On reaching Hamelfontein, Byng conferred with Colonel Haig, and decided about midday to move west again, towards the enemy. Whether fresh orders had been received we do not know, for on most points of detail in this period of the war we are in complete ignorance, even the precise day on which De Wet crossed the Orange River being uncertain. But Byng's action was futile; he had covered some ten miles along a bad, dusty track, and he had now the same distance to march back. Nothing more irritates and disheartens troops, or has a worse moral effect upon them, than evidence of indecision in their leaders, such as marching followed by counter-marching affords. As

the British column reached the camping-ground from which it had started in the morning, news came in that De Wet had made the fullest use of his opportunity. He had crossed the river at Lilliefontein, and regained the Orange River Colony.

The crossing, which seems to have taken place on February 28, was witnessed by Sergeant Harworth and nine men of Nesbitt's Horse, who were watching the river at this point. The stream



Allan Stewart.

HARD PRESSED.

De Wet succeeded in re-crossing the Orange River at Lilliefontein, February 28, 1901, under fire from Nesbitt's Horse. Five Cape carts, one waggon, and two ambulances were all that he saved of his transport.

hereabouts is very wide, and consequently shallower than elsewhere. About 1,500 of the enemy were made out. From under good cover the British patrol opened a heavy fire on the Boers,

**De Wet re-crosses
the Orange.**

which was not returned. The river was so high that many of the Boers were washed some distance down stream and had to swim their horses, yet they managed to get five Cape carts, two ambulance waggons, one horse waggon, and a Maxim across. They abandoned five carts and a good number of horses. So far as the patrol could make out, several of the burghers were either drowned or shot in the crossing, as a number of bodies could be seen lying upon the opposite bank. It seems certain that the entire command of De Wet did not succeed in making the passage. Numerous small bodies of Boers who had scattered from his column during the pursuit were left roaming the country in the Philipstown and Colesberg districts,

where they still caused no little trouble. One of these parties was "rounded up" a day or two before the crossing of the Seacow River, by Captain Dalliman, who had been detached with 15 of the Victorian Mounted In-



12-POUNDER KRUPP GUN CAPTURED FROM DE WET BY NEW SOUTH WALES MOUNTED RIFLES.

tantry from Colonel Henniker's column. Dalliman discovered 26 Boers and 7 native servants—the latter armed with rifles, though the Boers pretended that they never employed Kaffirs in the fighting-line—encamped with 50 horses. Unseen, he reconnoitred their position, and under

**Capture of a party
of Boers.**

cover of night succeeded in driving off their horses. He surrounded the sleepers, and might, at dawn, have killed them as they lay upon the veldt. But with that tenderness for the enemy which characterised all our operations, he ordered a volley to be fired over their heads, that they might wake and at least fight for their lives. They attempted to bolt for their horses, found the horses gone, and had to face the British fire without any chance of success. After half an hour's fighting Dalliman sent in a flag of truce, demanding their surrender with the threat that if they did not at once come in he would open on them with artillery. This, though quite justifiable, was a mere piece of "bluff," for he had no guns. The Boers thereupon surrendered, and, to their immense disgust, discovered that they had been completely fooled.

Whatever is said, and attempts were made at the time to minimise the incident, the escape of De Wet from Cape Colony cannot be considered creditable to the British Army. So large a force

**Failure of the
invasion.**

had been concentrated against him that the capture of the greater part of his commandos ought to have been assured. His prestige, which had suffered somewhat from the loss of his guns, was raised again by the manner in which he got away from quite the tightest corner in which he had so far been placed. Yet his invasion had been anything but a success. He had lost somewhere about 250 men, almost all his carts and waggons, and two guns. He had not succeeded in breaking through the British cordon to the south and west. His progress through the Colony had been that of a hunted fugitive, not of a victorious general. He had inflicted no serious damage upon the British other than the diversion of some thousands of troops from the Transvaal. So that on the whole the invasion of the Colony had ended in stalemate. The British had not been able to capture De Wet and achieve their great object, which was the destruction of the enemy and not the mere extrusion of them from the confines of Cape Colony. De Wet had not been able to work south or raise the standard of revolt in the heart of the Colony.

Fresh attempts were made to round up the enemy as soon as it was known that they were likely to cross the Orange River. But when the scene of the "slipper-hunt," as the British troops christened

Fresh dispositions. it, was transferred from Cape Colony to the Orange River Colony, certain advantages which the British possessed passed away. So long as De Wet was inside the quadrilateral, enclosed on three sides by the railways from Orange River to De Aar, De Aar to Naauwpoort, and Naauwpoort to Norvals-Pont, with the Orange River on the fourth side, the railways on the three sides gave great opportunities for strategic combinations. But in the Orange River Colony there was only the one trunk line running north to Bloemfontein and Pretoria, so that troops could not be flung upon De Wet from either flank or rear. Plumer, however, whose force had now refitted, was moved by train from Orange River Station to Springfontein. Knox, the old pursuer of De Wet,



Ernest Prater.]

GIVING THEM A CHANCE.

Dalliman's party firing over the heads of the sleeping enemy to awaken them.

was hurried by train to Colesberg. Bruce Hamilton, who had painfully wended his way over the barren Karroo from Britstown westwards and then again north-eastwards to Strydenburg, Potfontein, and the Orange River, was ordered to cross the river and enter the Orange River Colony. Bethune, with his fine cavalry brigade, which mistaken orders had withdrawn from the pursuit at the moment when its co-operation was most needed, marched to Orange River Station, crossed the river by the railway bridge, and moved along the north bank to Luckhoff. Unhappily, fine though his force was, composed for the most part of troops fresh from England, eager to gather laurels, and free from the weariness and reluctance to attack which marked the units long in the field, it was badly equipped. Its intelligence department was not such as was required for the work of sifting the misleading reports habitually spread by De Wet, and ascertaining the truth. Its transport was altogether unsatisfactory. In place of Cape-carts, or, better still, pack-transport, bullock-waggons hampered its movements. Finally, Thorneycroft and Haig were held ready to move against the guerilla leader from the south.

It was, perhaps, a pity that, while De Wet was in Cape Colony, no attempt had been made to secure such points north of the Orange as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, Luckhoff, and Philippolis, even at the cost of immobilising our army in the Orange River Colony. Had small columns of infantry been directed to hold these places, they could at least have prevented their use as bases by the Boers. In that case Field-Cornet Bosman would not have been able to collect supplies at Philippolis, and the Orange River drifts might have been watched and patrolled from the north as well as the south, thus rendering it much harder to effect a passage. The country also could have been denuded and reduced to a barren waste, across which not even De Wet would have found it easy to pass. On the principle of "hunting one hare at a time," we should have expected arrangements to have been made between General Lyttelton at De Aar and General Tucker at Bloemfontein to effect all these objects. But De Wet, when he crossed, found no columns ready to intercept his progress, and was able to move north with but little molestation. It is true that the pursuit of him was not abandoned, but the

**De Wet's march
unopposed.**



REINFORCEMENTS DISEMBARKING AT CAPETOWN.



UNLOADING AMMUNITION AT SOUTH ARM, CAPETOWN DOCKS.

pursuers were well away to his flanks, and, with their inferior mobility, had but little hope or chance of overtaking him. He halted for a day or two at Philippolis to re-elect Mr. Steyn as President of the "Free State," and then resumed his march.

The country through which he moved had been for some months in the hands of the Boers. Boer landdrosts directed the civil government in the towns and villages. "Thus," says *The Times* correspondent with Bethune's force, "when

the Cape Cavalry Brigade passed into the Orange River Colony, it was practically entering a hostile country. It is true that columns under Generals Settle and Clements, and stray reconnaissances, had pushed through the country, and had collected a certain amount of stock and removed a fraction of the male inhabitants, but the effect of these movements had been superficial, and had been no further reaching than what is accomplished by the average British column, which moves down a main road and examines the country as far as its flankers reach. There is to-day in these very districts, although four columns have just passed through them, sufficient local sympathy, horses, cattle, transport, and foodstuffs to keep a thousand combatants supplied for a year. It was not our business to clear the country, but it should be somebody's if the war is to be brought to an end by economic pressure."

At first it was thought that De Wet would follow the old, familiar line of retreat by Dewetsdorp and Thaba N'chu, the more so because Dewetsdorp had been temporarily proclaimed the capital of the

He lays false trails. "Orange Free State," and because the enemy had been left there for weeks unmolested, and were understood to have collected supplies there. Stories that this place was De Wet's immediate destination were carefully disseminated at his instigation. He took the utmost care to lay false trails, deliberately detaching men to make their surrender or to be captured, when they were instructed to give the most misleading information. Moreover he was careful, whenever he passed, to send the population into the hiding-places in the hills until the British columns were well out of the way. This added greatly to the difficulties of the British commanders. There was no one to interrogate or cross-examine except De Wet's emissaries, who had been instructed exactly what to say. The state of things resembled that of war at sea, where an enemy's fleet passes over the broad ocean leaving no track or indication of its movements behind it. Actually De Wet headed directly north, from Philippolis to Fauresmith, and thus succeeded in getting between the two British columns, under Plumer and Bethune, which should have closed upon him from the east and west.

Bethune's line of march was from Luckhoff, through Fauresmith to Jagersfontein Road, where he was to meet General Plumer's column. On nearing Luckhoff he had a skirmish with a small Boer commando, which promptly retired to the hills and left him in possession of the village. On March 3, at 4 p.m., he



BOERS ARMED WITH RIFLES AND UMBRELLAS.

Bethune follows him to Fauresmith. moved out of Luckhoff, intending to reach Fauresmith early in the morning. De Wet's force, though he did not know it, was directly in front of him, not far ahead, and was also marching to Fauresmith. Had he been able to carry out his intention, an encounter must have followed, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the greater part of De Wet's command would have been captured. But luck once more intervened to protect the Boers. As night came down a terrific storm burst over the veldt; the rain descended in veritable water-spouts; the surface of the tracks became a sea of slush and mud; the guns and waggons could scarcely move; and men and horses began to show signs of exhaustion. There was nothing for it but to halt and spend a miserable night in the midst of the lake of mud, until the ground had time to dry somewhat. In the morning the march was resumed, though the going was still extremely bad. Only five miles were covered, when a halt became necessary to permit of the column closing up. A squadron of Colonial troops, however, was sent forward under Captain Chittenden with orders to seize Fauresmith. Just after this detachment had moved off, a patrol on

the British left was caught by the Boers, and all but one man killed, wounded, or captured. The enemy were said to be in force, and as there was some possibility that they were the main Boer army, a careful reconnaissance had to be directed in this quarter. It was discovered that a farm on the British left was held by a party of twenty of Theron's Scouts. They retired hurriedly to the north, but Bethune did not pursue them, regarding them, probably, as only an insignificant detachment, so disposed as to cause him annoyance and put him off the scent. The heliograph, which had been accompanying the reconnaissance, was withdrawn, and the whole column marched upon Fauresmith, which lay directly in front.

Barely, however, had the heliograph been withdrawn when the troops on the left discovered that a strong force of the enemy, with waggons and transport, was moving along the Fauresmith and



George Soper.

BETHUNE'S DECOYS.

[After a sketch by Lionel James.]

Bethune's column left Petrusburg (see p. 350) at daybreak, but a party of 200 of the Prince of Wales's Light Horse was left behind in hiding. Every horse was picketed, and men were dressed as women to give the idea that the town had been evacuated. The little ruse resulted in the easy capture of Brand's advance guard.

Jacobsdal road, across the British left front. But without the indispensable heliograph the news could not be promptly transmitted to Colonel Bethune, and the British detachment on the left was too weak to cut up the Boers, failing the support of the rest of the column. It is one of the disadvantages of advancing upon a wide front—a practice to which resort was had for the purpose of gaining touch with the elusive De Wet—that it renders communication between the flanks and centre of the column, and the concentration of the column for attack, difficult. Almost at the same moment a message came back from Captain Chittenden that he had seized a position commanding Fauresmith, and that he was in action with the rearguard of a force which was moving north-west from Fauresmith. This rearguard, in fact, was a part of De Wet's command. De Wet had entered Fauresmith in the morning and kept all his attention fixed upon the British column under General



From a photograph taken in 1898.

PRESIDENT AND VOLKSRAAD OF THE LATE ORANGE FREE STATE.

The names are (from left to right)—Top row: J. Pongeleter, General Christian De Wet, P. van Wyk, P. Maree, Patrick McDonald, Piet De Wet, E. R. Grobler, J. P. Roux.
 Centre row: P. Reelers, N. G. Wessels, G. A. Coetzee, President Steyn, J. J. van Niekerk, D. J. van der Merwe, Commandant van der Merwe.
 Front row: Commandant S. Viljoen, C. H. Wessels (Chairman and Delegate in Europe), General J. B. Wessels, E. N. Grobler, Commandant B. C. Greyling.

Plumer, which had moved from Springfontein to Philippolis and Zuurfontein, and thence had pressed steadily after him, skirmishing with his rearguard at times. Jeffreys led the van, and on the 3rd captured a Boer field-cornet with notes and papers in his pockets which indicated that a general concentration had been ordered 20 miles east of the railway on the 6th, and at Dewetsdorp on the 9th. Probably these orders were intentionally misleading. Plumer's men had a smart skirmish with the Boers at Zuurfontein, the Imperial Light Horse being heavily fired at and driven back in momentary confusion. De Wet was quite unaware of the proximity of Bethune; at the first intimation of it, which he received from one of Theron's Scouts, he ordered a prompt retreat. Chittenden pushed after him into Fauresmith, but could not come up with him, and the main body of the column was not more fortunate. The guerilla leader rode with all possible speed for the bridge over the Riet on the Petrusburg and Fauresmith road. On the morning of the 5th Bethune's cavalry were on the Riet.

The Boers scatter and close in again.

But they discovered that the enemy had broken up into small detachments, and had swept the country clean of its inhabitants. De Wet, with only about fifty men, was reported to be heading north, having fixed a point of rendezvous for his scattered burghers.



CYCLIST SCOUTS (RHODESIAN VOLUNTEERS) OF PLUMER'S COLUMN

Under these circumstances it was difficult for the British to know what to do. It was perfectly possible that the Boers would allow the column to pass, and then close up again in its rear. Bethune advanced to within a short distance of Petrusburg, when the closing-in process seemed to have already begun. At any rate he had little bodies of the enemy on all sides of him, sniping his patrols, firing on his transport, and generally causing every kind of petty annoyance. Accordingly he halted to clear the country and confer with Plumer. When General Plumer came up, that officer decided to continue the pursuit of De Wet. Bethune remained to look after the small detachments, and for that purpose threw out patrols in all directions. All the Boer laagers in the vicinity were broken up, but, unfortunately, it was not possible to "bag" their inmates. A certain number of prisoners were taken; a few Boers surrendered; but the greater part of De Wet's force was able to elude capture. The enemy even succeeded in surrounding and compelling the surrender of a number of Imperial Bushmen and details whom Plumer had left in charge of a convoy. The prisoners, however, were liberated by Bethune. On March 6 a party of seventeen Colonial cyclist scouts was ambushed near Fauresmith. They were wheeling their cycles along the roads, which, what with mud and rocks, were almost impassable, when the enemy suddenly opened fire from a kopje. Others of the Boer force rode round the cyclists and got to their rear. Surrounded by a ring of Mausers, they held out for some time, and managed to kill one Boer and several of the enemy's horses. Then they surrendered, without themselves having suffered any loss. They were stripped of their cycles, arms, and equipment, and sent in on foot to Edenburg. This

Capture of cyclist scouts.

incident illustrates the helplessness of cyclist troops in unfavourable country and in bad weather. It may well be questioned whether scouting is the proper function of the cyclist in war.

Bethune marched back to Bloemfontein on March 11, while Plumer still continued the weary chase, some twenty hours behind his quarry. He reached Abraham's Kraal on the 7th, and there had to halt for supplies. Meantime reports came in that De Wet was not in front, but had gone to Dewetsdorp, and as these seemed to confirm the intelligence obtained earlier in the pursuit, it would not have been surprising had they been credited. Plumer, however, did not go back. He marched to Brandfort, with his transport played out, and there again refitted. De Wet, far ahead of him, was rejoined by Froneman and some of the detachments which had scattered; according to the best information he had now five guns—probably all dug up—and about 1,000 men with 20 ox-waggons. He had, moreover, the help of the weather. Rain fell in sheets throughout the early days of March,

greatly hampering the British pursuit. On the 11th De Wet was north of Brandfort, and, attempting to destroy the railway, was fired upon by an armoured train near Eensgevonden. On the 13th he was reported at Senekal, after which his movements for weeks remain uncertain. He seems to have sent his men on furlough to their farms, and himself to have retired



GREY COLLEGE, BLOEMFONTEIN.

Grey College is a handsome building presented by Sir George Grey for the education of boys. During the war it has been used as a hospital.

to one of the many mountain fastnesses in the Orange River Colony. About this time there were strange reports, to which, however, little attention can be paid, that his mind had become unhinged, as the result of the strain of continual flight. "Some prisoners who were recently taken," ran one of these reports, "declare that his conduct has become more arbitrary than ever, and that he confides his plans to no one. He has a small bodyguard of a few men who never leave him. He never sleeps in camp unless he is obliged, and tells no one where he intends to sleep for the night, consequently it is impossible for his orderlies to find him, or to receive orders." This story shows that De Wet did not entirely trust his men, but it does not prove that he was demented.

It is not a little curious to note the manner in which fortune favoured him all through this invasion and its resultant pursuit. On our side signals went wrong, orders were mistaken, small errors of judgment led to deplorable results, and the weather was uniformly hostile. Favouring him, the Orange River fell unexpectedly at a most critical moment, and suffered him to escape, just when his destruction seemed certain. Yet sooner or later this tide of luck must begin to ebb, and then we shall see whether De Wet is truly great or whether hitherto he has been merely fortunate. In any case it is clear, whether or not the Boers confess the fact, that his invasion of Cape Colony resulted in failure.

**Fortune favours
De Wet.**



STATUE OF PRESIDENT BRAND, BLOEMFONTEIN.

The bronze statue of Sir John Brand, G.C.M.G., President of the Orange Free State for a quarter of a century (1864-88), who may virtually be regarded as the Father of the State, is situated at the head of Maitland Street, in front of the Government buildings.



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

A FIELD-TELEGRAPH CART.

[After a photograph.

CHAPTER XVII.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL.

The Boer plan of campaign—The enemy's resources—Doings of the "Destruction Commando"—British position at Helvetia—The Boers attack the post on Gun Hill—They capture a 4·7 naval gun—The ammunition waggons saved—Prisoners placed so as to intercept fire—Helvetia re-occupied—Train wrecking—Utrecht and Vryheid attacked—Skirmish at Greylingstad—Captures by Steinecker's Horse—Brave stand of the Royal Irish at Belfast—Conference of Boer commanders—More train-wrecking—Narrow escape of Lord Kitchener.



The Boer plan of campaign.

FROM south to north, from west to east, the tide of war in South Africa ebbs and flows, and at first sight it is difficult to discover any common purpose in the series of disjointed operations on a vast field, into which the struggle had now resolved itself. But that there was common purpose and central direction on the part of the Boers has been proved by events. During the summer campaign of 1900-1901 the enemy aimed at cutting the communications of the British army, and thus paralysing it or destroying it. De Wet and the invaders of Cape Colony, it was hoped, would be able constantly to break the great trunk lines running to the sea-coast from the Orange River. There remained the lines to Delagoa Bay and through Natal. Against these also preparations were made for a concerted attack, while De la Rey and Beyers, hovering near Pretoria and Johannesburg, were ready to take advantage of any weakening of the British garrisons, which held these points none too securely.

With the progress of the war, the organisation of the Boer forces had greatly improved. Discipline was far more strictly enforced; proper grades of officers had been instituted, much after the British fashion, and it was easier, in consequence, to secure obedience. The men were now habituated to war, and had acquired great confidence in their leaders. The sluggish and incapable had been eliminated by capture, by surrender, or by the bullets of the British, and only the fiercest, the most fanatical, and the most resolute spirits remained under the *Vierkleur*. Yet great difficulties faced the Boer generals. Slowly but surely the supply of ammunition for their cannon was being exhausted, while gun after gun was captured from them by the British. Neither cannon nor cannon ammunition could be replaced. Of cartridges for their rifles they still had an immense supply; the Transvaal and Orange River Colony must, before the war, and during the earlier months of the struggle, have been covered with concealed depôts of ammunition.

The enemy's resources.

For supplies and remounts they could draw upon the districts which had not been visited by the British—the country round Pietersburg—where they had a printing press, mills to grind flour, and improvised workshops for the repair of damaged material of war—and the south-eastern portion of the Transvaal, on the borders of Swaziland. With information they were well supplied. From Portuguese territory letters were despatched by relays of mounted messengers, who crossed the Lebombo Range, and easily avoided the British posts in the Lydenburg district. From the north of the Transvaal to the south of the Orange River Colony, they had lines of heliograph stations, which could be used in sunny weather, and with which there was little interference by the British troops. Orders could thus be transmitted rapidly from Botha's headquarters to De Wet, or from De Wet's laagers to those of his subordinate commanders. The Boer secret service was excellent. The enemy could always obtain valuable information from their sympathisers in the towns and from the women, while little or nothing




[From a photograph by Dr. Fry.

PRISONERS IN PIETERSBURG GAOL, CHRISTMAS 1900.

This is a group of prisoners—some British, some Boers charged with treason—in Pietersburg Gaol. The names, reading from left to right, are: Top row—General Schoeman, J. Erasmus, A. C. Dixon, C. Benson, J. Van Reenen, E. C. Baines (who acted as despatch-rider at Retief's Nek, when Prinsloo was captured), Nieman. Lower row—Cipier van der Merwe, Captain Anderson, E. Cooper. Of these, C. van der Merwe was the Prison Inspector. The British were troopers of the 66th Yeomanry, captured at Warmbaths, September 3, 1900 (p. 97). It is worthy of mention that when they were brought before Commandant Coetzee, he chivalrously cautioned them against talking, remarking that he understood English. He took them to his own tent for supper, and gave them of the best he had. He was killed by a shell an hour afterwards. General Schoeman had fought against the British at Ladysmith and elsewhere, was charged by the Boers with treason, and confined at Barberton, and on the capture of that place was sent into Pretoria on parole. On October 1 he was sent with Captain Anderson with proclamations, under protection of a white flag; but, having lost the flag, both were captured and sent to Pietersburg. General Schoeman met his death at Pretoria, May 26, 1901, through the explosion of a lyddite shell which he believed to be empty, and into which he tossed a lighted match. The photograph was taken by Dr. Fry, also a prisoner, who was released, January 23, 1901, and smuggled out a letter from Trooper Baines concealed in a leg of mutton; the others were released on the entry of the British troops, April 8, 1901.

happened in Cape Colony of which they were not perfectly cognizant. They themselves have stated that their best intelligence often came from Capetown. Another means of finding out what the British were doing was afforded by the tapping of the telegraphs. It was noted by British observers in this period of the struggle that, though the Boers regularly cut the railways, they generally spared the telegraphs, which earlier in the war they had uniformly destroyed. The reason must have been that they found the telegraphs useful. All important messages, of course, were sent by the British in cipher, but no cipher is undiscoverable given time and ingenuity.

In mid-December it came to the ears of the British Intelligence Department that the enemy intended to attack the posts along the Delagoa Bay Railway. This line had been the scene of



TRANSVAAL POSTAGE STAMPS. [Stanley Gibbons collection.]

The first stamps made for the "South African Republic" were prepared in 1869 (1), and this type remained in use until July, 1877, when, upon the first British occupation, the stamps were overprinted "V.R.—TRANSVAAL" in two lines (2). In 1878 a permanent issue with the head of Queen Victoria replaced these provisional stamps (3). On the restoration of the South African Republic, the original types (1) were brought into use for a short time, but were superseded in 1885 by a new permanent type (4). This continued in use for ten years, and in 1895 was replaced by stamps of new design (5) which were in use when Lord Roberts entered Pretoria. The whole stock there was taken; the stamps were overprinted "V.R.I." and issued on June 18, 1900. In March, 1901, the one penny value (only) was overprinted "E.R.I." The permanent issue, with the head of H.M. the King, has not yet made its appearance. The only stamps made by the Boers since the war began (6) were produced by typography at Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal, which up to March of the present year had not been occupied by the British troops. Thither all that was left of the Boer administration had retired, and having exhausted their supplies, by way of raising a small revenue, issued the stamp here reproduced. On the seizure of this place the last printing machine in the possession of the Boers was taken, so that no further supply of the "South African Republic" stamps can be printed.


continual skirmishes and innumerable derailments of trains. Indeed, from Machadodorp to Pretoria wrecked engines and the traces of burned trucks and carriages could be seen every few miles. Especially

Doings of the "Destruction Commando."

active in this quarter was the so-called "Destruction Commando" under a Boer named Trichardt, and a deserter from the British army named Hinton, or Hindon. With about twenty followers these desperadoes lay in wait for trains, and never stuck at plunder and murder. They were guilty of innumerable cruelties and irregularities, so that they won an evil reputation, even among the Boers, and it is said, though probably without truth, that a price was placed upon their heads by the British headquarters. Their *modus operandi* was most ingenious. They scorned such commonplace devices as the removal of a rail, or the withdrawal of the bolts which held the rails down to the sleepers, or the loosening of a fish-plate or two. All these things could be



WRECKED TRAIN AT STANDERTON.



BURNT TRUCKS AT KOMATI POORT.

Including one used by the enemy as a gun emplacement.

detected by a vigilant eye, and it was their pride to lay traps of the presence of which there should be no sign whatever. A Martini was taken; the greater part of the barrel of the rifle was sawn off, and what remained was filled with detonating composition. The trigger-guard was removed, and the trigger placed under a rail, so that the deflection caused by the weight of the train would explode the detonator. Round the Martini lock were placed nitro-glycerine cans or

dynamite cartridges, and the mine, thus laid, was carefully covered up with ballast till it needed the most lynx-eyed of permanent-way gangers to detect its presence. To such a pitch of perfection had the train-wreckers attained that they were able so to adjust their contrivances that the

weight of the one or two empty trucks, which usually preceded the locomotive or armoured car on the military trains, should not be sufficient to cause an explosion. With complete impunity the Boer



ROYAL ENGINEERS (TELEGRAPH DIVISION) BUILDING A NEW LINE.

were two companies under Major Cotton. There were two detached posts, both defended by schanzes, at some little distance from the camp, to the east and west of it. One, facing Machadodorp, was held by a half-company under Lieutenant Wilkinson; the other, in the direction of Watervalboven, and to the east of the main camp, was held by 90 men with one 4·7-inch naval gun, manned by the Garrison Artillery, the Naval Brigade having been long since withdrawn from the field. From these three points the roads were commanded in all directions. The work of the garrison during November and early December had lain chiefly in the escorting of convoys going towards and coming from Lydenburg. The Machadodorp garrison would escort the convoy to Helvetia; from that point the Helvetia force had to see the waggons safely to Zwartkopjes, which was the next post to the north; the Zwartkopjes garrison in turn handed on the convoy to the troops at Lydenburg. The progress of these convoys, laden with stores, provisions, and ammunition, had for weeks been unmolested. The Boers seemed to be weak and were inactive in the neighbourhood of Helvetia; day after day the garrison had gone upon picket duty and come off again without incident—without even so much as seeing a Boer. Suddenly, in December, the troops learnt that Louis Botha himself, with a strong force, was in the neighbourhood, and that an attack might be expected at any moment. Precautions were at once taken. The men slept in their boots, with their rifles, loaded, at their sides, and accoutrements placed in regular order outside the tents. Thus, if the alarm was given, the troops could turn out, armed, without the loss of a moment, pick up

“Destruction Commando” could inflict upon the British soldiers and the British railway staff death and the most horrible tortures. Yet when our generals ventured upon the mildest form of reprisals for these outrages, the Boer sympathisers in England raised a howl. To kill Thomas Atkins by derailing trains was perfectly right in their eyes; to punish Brother Boer for so doing by burning his farm was an atrocity—an outrage.

On the road from Watervalboven to Lydenburg—the scene of fighting in

British position at
Helvetia.

September, 1900—is the little hamlet of Helvetia. This place, in December of that year, was held by a small detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and a force of artillery. The British main camp was situated upon rising ground in the midst of an immense upland plain. In this main camp



REELS OF TELEGRAPH CABLE READY FOR USE.

their belts and pouches, and file off to the positions which they had been detailed to occupy. It was thought that Christmas Day would be selected by the enemy for the attack, but that festival passed with the wonted quiet. The 26th of December, too, went by without incident. The night of the 27th closed in "with a darkness that," in the words of an eye-witness with the British force, "might almost have been felt." Soon the moon rose and shone with unusual brightness. Not a sound was heard; not a living thing stirred. The sentinels at their lonely posts, gazing eagerly out into the night, saw nothing. The warning had put them on the alert, and they kept their nervous, anxious vigil with all their senses strained to catch the sound of a footfall, the click of a Mauser-bolt, or the jar of a dropped rifle, in the heavy shadows which the fitful clouds threw over the veldt. They knew that they had to deal with a Red-Indian-like foe, and they were watchful accordingly. Dreary, tremulous work, this waiting for a stealthy enemy, with the knowledge that the first indication of his approach might well be the red tongues of the Mausers, a sheet of bullets—and after that, oblivion.



F. J. Waugh]

THE ATTACK ON GUN HILL, HELVETIA: THE GUNNERS OF THE NAVAL 4.7 SURPRISED.

The moon set and the darkness came down once more, more impenetrable than ever. An hour passed, when out of the blackness, away towards Gun Hill, where was the 4.7, rang the sharp crack of two shots, fired in quick succession. But a moment after came the flash of countless rifles and the rattle of a heavy musketry fire. Something very serious was happening. The Boers had actually crept up to the very base of Gun Hill, picketing their horses there. Gliding silently through the Stygian darkness, they had eluded the vigilance of the sentinels. They were in force round every one of the three British camps at Helvetia, and the two shots were merely the signal to begin the assault. The luckless sentries were shot down or overpowered before they could give the alarm. When the British troops in the main camp awoke from their slumber and dashed out towards the entrenchments, it was already too late. The Boers were there before them. A furious fight, hand to hand, raged in the darkness, but the numbers of the

The Boers attack the post on Gun Hill.

enemy were overwhelming. If in one quarter the British held their own, the Boers burst in upon them from another. Sometimes, in that desperate struggle it seemed to the British that they were fighting with their own men, and that one section was firing into another section. Cries to cease fire sounded amidst the groans and shouts of the combat. But when voices were heard calling in Dutch and broken English to the British troops that they were surrounded and must at once surrender, there was no more room for doubt. Outnumbered, confused, half-asleep, stunned by the suddenness and vehemence of the attack, the men in the main camp submitted to the inevitable. Major Cotton—a veteran of the siege of Ladysmith—was terribly wounded. The soldiers were without leader and did not know what to do. They were collected and led to the point where the Boer horses had been stationed in the charge of boys.


On Gun Hill the infantry were overwhelmed in precisely the same manner. The 47 was at some distance from them, and round it slept the gunners, all ready for the fray. They had named the gun "Lady Roberts." At the breach of the gun were two large carts full of ammunition. Almost before the gunners had time to spring to their feet, the Boers were upon them and among them, covering every man with a levelled Mauser. Under such circumstances there could be no resistance. To refuse surrender at the enemy's summons meant death, and useless death.

The artillery laid down their arms, and the 47 passed into the hands of the Boers. The gunners were disarmed and sent down the hill; at the same moment the infantry post was overwhelmed.



HEROES UNSUNG.

Bearer company in camp after a march. These men, though non-combatants, have repeatedly distinguished themselves by their devotion to duty under fire.



THE END OF AN OLD FRIEND.

Dawn was breaking, and the whole situation was now clear; two of the three posts had been rushed, but the third to the west, held by the half-company of Liverpools under Wilkinson, still maintained a heavy fire on the Boers, showing that its gallant defenders were unsubdued. Nor, despite the desperate efforts of the enemy, were they able to rush the schanzes. The bravery and coolness of this handful of British soldiers repulsed every attack, so that presently the Boers retired in some confusion.

Fortunately this post was within rifle range of Gun Hill, where the 47 had been stationed. The gun

The ammunition waggons saved.

had been already removed from the summit of the hill and was proceeding in the direction of Zwartkopjes, when day broke. But the ammunition waggons, without which the gun was useless, were still in the open, and upon them Wilkinson directed a tremendous fire. So efficacious was the hail of bullets which his marksmen poured in that the Boers were unable to

approach the waggons, much less to remove them. And thus their prize lost all its value. Presently, as the daylight grew, the garrison at Zwartkopjes was able to see what had happened, and when they observed the Boers dragging the 47 towards them, opened a terrific shrapnel fire with their two 15-pounder field guns. These weapons were worked at their fastest, and no one who has followed the doings of the Royal Artillery in this war needs to be told that they were worked with exquisite

precision. A hail of shrapnel bullets tore up the ground round the gun and laid low several of the enemy. Had the Boers fought like men and respected the laws of war, by no possibility could they have removed the weapon.

But now an incident of the most disgraceful nature followed—an incident, however, which will not surprise those who have closely studied the conduct of the enemy in this struggle. A galloper was sent back to bring up the British prisoners from the rear, and they were forced forward with threats of death, into a position where they were interposed as a screen between the British artillery at Zwartkopjes and the 47. The gunners at Zwartkopjes watched through their glasses this dastardly proceeding, contrary to all the ordinances of civilised war and of the Geneva Convention. They were compelled to hold their fire through fear of killing their comrades. Thus by a deed of infamy the enemy got their prize away. It does not appear that any stern remonstrance or threat of reprisals was addressed to the Boer leaders to prevent the repetition of such conduct. Our headquarters, probably in obedience to orders from home, seemed

Prisoners placed so
as to intercept fire.



VIEW OF STANDERTON.

ready to allow the Boers to act towards our men as they liked, while behaving with extreme lenity towards the enemy. And, as we shall see, the conduct of the Boers in the field steadily deteriorated, till deeds were perpetrated which filled all but our British pro-Boers with stupefaction and horror.

The prisoners witnessed the Boer methods of removing their own dead and wounded. All were carried off, according to their almost invariable custom, the injured being held upon ponies until an ambulance could be reached. Those of the British who were slightly wounded were marched away, but the bad cases and all with shot-wounds in the legs and feet were left at Helvetia. Seeing the name "Lady Roberts" painted on the gun, the Boers chalked out the "Roberts" and substituted "Viljoen," the name of their commandant. It was noted that their doctor carried a rifle and bandolier, notwithstanding the Red Cross on his arm, another infraction—and a serious infraction—of the laws of war. But other incidents of the same kind were to follow. The prisoners were badly treated, and—though the Boer captives in British hands were living on the fat of the land in St. Helena and Ceylon—were given an ox at Dullstroom for their only food, and were told that they would get nothing else, because the Boers had nothing else to give them—a statement which appears to have been quite

untrue. Next day the enemy are said to have picked out the gunners and to have informed them that they would be kept to work the 4'7 gun with ammunition from a 4'7 Boer howitzer. When the British prisoners indignantly refused thus to aid the Boer cause, they were threatened with death, a fact which is of no little importance in view of what afterwards occurred, or is said to have occurred, at Vlakkfontein. Finally, finding that threats were useless, the enemy did not proceed to extremities, but that they made the threats at all is matter for grave complaint. The men were afterwards released, while the captured officers were detained.

In this affair the British loss was 13 men killed and 4 officers and 28 men wounded; a total of 231 officers and men, in which probably were included many wounded, were taken prisoners. The Boers were pursued, as soon as a force could be collected, by General Walter Kitchener, but caution had to be used, as Viljoen had no less than 2,000 men in the neighbourhood, and it was

not safe to deplete the garrisons in presence of so formidable a commando. Helvetia was immediately re-occupied.

On his march to Helvetia, Viljoen, on the 25th, had detached two parties of Boers towards the west. Their orders were to break the railway to the west of Belfast, and then to make a feint upon that place. These orders were duly carried out.

Train wrecking. On the 26th, four miles west of Pan, an eastward bound train was blown up and derailed. There were 16 of the Warwickshire



A. C. Ball.]

BRITISH PRISONERS INTERPOSED AS A SCREEN WHILST THE BOERS REMOVED A NAVAL GUN.

Regiment upon it, who opened fire on the enemy, and reinforcements coming up rapidly, they were driven off with a loss of 1 killed and 7 wounded. The British loss was only 5 wounded. The enemy's strength was placed by the British at about 200. The feint upon Belfast had no other result than the turning out of the garrison. Another attack upon the line near Pan was made, probably by the same Boer force, on the 28th, when the rails were broken, but whether or not any trains were derailed we are not informed. The official despatches sometimes passed over such incidents as too insignificant for notice.

Among the incidents which occurred in this quarter towards the end of 1900 was an attack on Utrecht on December 25. The Boer commandant, who had been for some days hovering round the place, sent in a cool message demanding whisky, cigars, and other Christmas luxuries, with the threat that if they were refused, he would feel compelled to come and take them. No reply was returned, and at 2 a.m. of Christmas morning he attacked, but was ignominiously repulsed, losing two killed and several wounded. The British loss was only one man slightly wounded. This was the second unsuccessful assault which the enemy had delivered upon Utrecht. The garrison at Vryheid to the east of Utrecht was attacked in a more determined manner on December 11. The British force was composed mainly of the Lancaster Regiment, under Colonel Gawne, and with a strength of 700 men had to hold a line of 20 miles in length. So admirable, however, were Colonel Gawne's dispositions, so untiring was his vigilance, that the sudden onset of 1,400 Boers was repulsed with heavy loss. Both the Colonel himself and Lieutenant

**Utrecht and Vryheid
attacked.**

British Battery of 4 guns.

Scheeper's Nek.

Boer position.



C. E. Fripp, R.W.S.]

THE RELIEF OF VRYHEID.

[After a sketch by A. E. C.]

Woodgate of the same regiment were severely wounded, and Colonel Gawne afterwards died of his wounds. The total British loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded—for the most part dangerously—and 25 prisoners.

On December 13 Colonel Blomfield, while marching from Dundee to the relief of Vryheid, encountered a force of 600 Boers at Scheeper's Nek. He drove them from their position, inflicting upon them 30 casualties, with a loss to the British of only two, and captured a large quantity of stock. On the 16th he advanced from Vryheid to the Kambula hills, and made some more large captures of sheep and horses. Notwithstanding the presence of considerable British forces at Vryheid and Utrecht, and notwithstanding the strong brigade which held the line of the railway from Volksrust down to Ladysmith, the Boers continued to infest this region. Whether they came from the Orange River Colony or from the Transvaal is uncertain, possibly from both quarters. Sight-seers on Umbulwana were held up, and outlying British farms were plundered. Nor was this stopped by General French's sweeping movement, which forms the subject of the next chapter.

Constant fighting, too, went on along the Natal—Johannesburg Railway, from Greylingstad to Volksrust, and on the Natal frontier. It was never of a serious nature, but Colonel Colville, who operated in the Standerton district, always had his hands full. On December 26 there was a sharp



F. J. Waugh.]

GALLANT DEFENCE BY THE ROYAL IRISH AT BELFAST.

skirmish to the east of Greylingstad, when the camp and baggage of Colville's column were attacked, while the column itself was clearing a kopje at some distance. Trichardt with 400 Boers made a determined rush upon the baggage guard, composed of one-and-a-half companies of the Rifle Brigade with a "Pom-Pom." Fortunately the onset was repulsed by the good conduct of the British infantry, and the Boers were sent to the right-about with considerable loss; but the British casualties were distressingly severe—8 men were killed, 29 wounded, including Captains Harvest and Radcliffe, and 20 captured or missing.

The attacks on the railway in this quarter were incessant and particularly troublesome. On December 29 a train was held up at Vaal Station, its contents plundered, and the rolling stock destroyed.

Early in January, 1901, Steinecker's Horse, who held Komati Poort and the country immediately to the north of Swaziland, made one or two important captures, among them an Erasmus, brother of the well-known Boer general, Abel Erasmus, a person whose sinister treatment of natives had stamped him, even among the Boers, with the reputation of atrocious cruelty. They also raided Bremersdorp, the only Boer settlement of any importance

**Skirmish at Grey-
lingstad.**

**Captures by
Steinecker's Horse.**



CHURCH AT MIDDELBURG.



SCENE ON THE DELAGOA BAY RAILWAY.

in Swaziland, and captured eight Boers, some waggons, and a quantity of supplies. Perhaps as the result of this, and to compel the British to draw in their troops, but also with the thoroughly sound idea of cutting Lord Kitchener's line of communications with Delagoa Bay, a series of determined attacks was delivered upon the line of posts protecting the railway. On the night of January 7 a dense

fog covered the mountain region from Middelburg to the Crocodile River. Along this stretch of upland the most important British garrisons, going from east to west, were those of Nooitgedacht, some miles east of the steep decline which runs down from Watervalboven to Watervalonder, Belfast, Wonderfontein, Wildfontein, and Pan. Under cover of the fog the Boers stole in as close as possible to the British outposts, and just before dawn made their assault. The fighting was of a determined nature, but in all quarters the enemy were repulsed, though not without heavy losses

**Brave stand of the
Royal Irish at Belfast.**

to our troops. At Belfast they actually rushed one of the outlying positions, held by 60 of the Royal Irish, and engaged them in a desperate struggle hand to hand. The Irishmen used their knives and bayonets, absolutely refusing to surrender. When the gallant band had been reduced to only 20 unwounded men, reinforcements arrived, and the enemy retired. Captain Fosbery was killed, with 13 men, while 3 officers and 40 men were wounded and 80 captured. The Boers, however, suffered even more severely. Twenty-four of their dead were

counted, and it is probable that there were others who were removed. Undismayed by this complete and disastrous failure, they attacked Machadodorp on the night of the 9th, but were once more beaten off without serious loss. They were, however, in such strength on the railway and in its neighbourhood—for at this date the Boer forces between Carolina and Middelburg were estimated at from 5,000 to 7,000 men under Botha and Viljoen—that the position of the British garrisons along the line was a critical one. They were liable at every moment to attack by greatly superior forces, and the perpetual vigilance necessary to prevent the success of such attacks imposed a severe strain upon officers and men, the more so as the rations for the men were by no means adequate, owing, it may be supposed, to the difficulty of maintaining communications. It would appear from telegrams which reached England from Delagoa Bay that for some time previous to this series of attacks upon the posts along the railway, the line at some point between the Portuguese frontier and Belfast



GENERAL TOBIAS SMUTS.

had passed completely into the possession of the enemy, since a message reports that "from January 7 the British have been holding the line," and adds that military supplies were being forwarded in great quantities, though there was a want of engines, and though traffic was much interrupted by the frequent derailments.

On January 20 Helvetia was attacked a second time, but on this occasion

Conference of Boer commanders.

fortunately without success. A little before this date an important conference between the Boer military authorities took place at Ermelo. Botha was present, as also a De Wet—not the famous guerilla, though he was so described in telegrams of this date—and the matters debated were the questions of accepting terms or of continuing the war. Our information as to what took place is necessarily neither clear nor precise, but it is certain that the decision of the meeting was for the continuance of the war. The determination finally reached seems to have been to concentrate the great bulk of the Transvaal commandos in the south-east of the Transvaal, and then to invade and devastate Natal. The

Boer generals who were to take part in these operations were Louis Botha, Christian Botha, Lukas Meyer, Smuts, and Spruyt, with 5,000 picked horsemen, and a number of mobile guns—field pieces and "Pom-Poms." The invasion of Natal had been previously discussed, and thus the Boer intentions had come to Lord Kitchener's ears. At this period of the war the British Intelligence Department had made vast strides, and was generally able to procure fairly accurate information of the enemy's plans. The British Commander-in-Chief lost no time in making his dispositions to prevent the accomplishment of the Boer purpose; and this though he was not as yet ready to begin his campaign, since his reorganisation of the army had not been quite completed.

Meantime the derailment of trains along the Delagoa Bay line continued. On the morning of January 17, the Boers threw off the line the westward-bound train in the neighbourhood of Brugspruit, a village to the west of Middelburg. They did this by one of the contrivances of which we have already spoken in the earlier part of the chapter, blowing

More train-wrecking.

up the engine and inflicting terrible injuries upon the driver and stoker. And here it may be remarked that no finer, no more heroic service was rendered by any body of Englishmen during the war than by the drivers and stokers on the railways. Incessantly they had to face death in its most horrible form, with no chance of hitting back at the enemy. Yet they never flinched, and were always to be trusted.

On this occasion no resistance could be offered to the enemy by the passengers in the train, who were mostly civilians. The Boers removed all the stores and provisions on a mule waggon. They then, with the greed of the common brigand, demanded of the passengers their money and valuables. Dissatisfied with the results they actually searched the passengers. One of these, a German, taunted them with stooping to such practices when they pretended to be contending for the cause of God and the honour of their country. The taunt, though fully justified, was inopportune. The Boers searched him most rigorously, and discovered and

appropriated £270 in gold. From the guard they stole his gold watch and all his cash. Such were the proceedings of these noble patriots. The Boers round Middelburg, however, were for the most part of Viljoen's commando, and were particularly savage and violent. Another of their knavish tricks was to creep up to British sentries in the dark, and, when there challenged, to reply "Friend," and shoot the unfortunate men.



GENERAL AND MRS. LOUIS BOTHA WITH THEIR FAMILY, AND COMMANDANT CHRISTIAN BOTHA.

On January 23, Lord Kitchener was proceeding from Pretoria to Middelburg, with the object of settling with General Smith-Dorrien the details of a movement against the Boers, when his train was attacked near Balmoral. On approaching the place, signs of the proximity of Boers were perceived, and this naturally caused suspicion. A


pilot engine in advance of the train, however, ran over the suspected part of the line, and, returning, reported that nothing was amiss. But Lord Kitchener was not a man to be easily taken in, and he

gave orders that two heavily-laden trucks were to be prefixed to the pilot, and that then the engine was to precede his train. His order was obeyed, and his own train slowly followed. The combined weight of the trucks and engine was sufficient to release the trigger of a Boer mine which had not been affected by the weight of the engine alone, and the trucks were blown into the air, the pilot engine at the same time being derailed. The Boers dashed to the spot, but were enraged to see Lord Kitchener's train quietly backing down the line. Troops were rapidly



BOER REFUGEES AT WAKKERSTROOM COOKING BREAKFAST.

brought up and the enemy were driven off, but in the skirmishing which ensued a detachment of the 18th Hussars was roughly handled, and a number of its men taken prisoners.



Geo. Soper.]

[After a photo by A. R. Smith.

WITH FRENCH IN THE TRANSVAAL: THE GENERAL REVIEWING THE
1ST SUFFOLK REGIMENT AT MIDDELBURG.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FRENCH'S EASTERN MOVEMENT.

Projected advance under General French—Smith-Dorrien operates between Wonderfontein and Middelburg—Capture of Ermelo—Boers attack Smith-Dorrien at Bothwell Farm—Dartnell destroys Amersfoort—Boer refugees at Standerton—French occupies Pietretief—Discovery of treasure—Boer treachery at Intombi Drift—The borders of Zululand cleared—Returning columns harassed by guerillas—Results of the campaign—Train-wrecking on the Natal frontier—Erection of blockhouses.



LORD KITCHENER'S visit to Middelburg, of which mention was made in the closing paragraph of Chapter XVII., was connected with the intended advance upon the south-eastern Transvaal. Eastwards of a line drawn from Middelburg to Standerton, and between that line and the Swazi and Zululand frontier, lies a tract of 20,000 or more square miles, three times as large as Wales, and generally mountainous and bush-covered. Within this area are the Boer villages of Carolina, Bethel, Ermelo, Amsterdam, and Pietretief, where the enemy's concentration for the invasion of Natal was now in active progress. To the east this country is extremely wild, destitute of roads, and difficult to traverse. The western half had from time to time been visited by the British troops; both Generals Buller and French had marched through it, but hurriedly, without clearing it and without attempting to strike any serious blow at the enemy who infested it. They had merely pushed the Boer commandos aside and left them to gather again in their rear when they had passed. This country had become one of the chief Boer strongholds. Here the enemy had depôts and flour mills and hither a large number of the women and children had retired from the districts occupied by the British troops. It was this difficult and unpromising region that Lord Kitchener had determined to sweep. To the south of it flows the Pongola, a large stream, in the valley of which is a dense and almost impenetrable jungle of thorn bush.

In charge of the operations Lord Kitchener placed that able and experienced officer General French, and gave him a large force of troops which had, during the middle weeks of January, been steadily moving east through Johannesburg and Pretoria. Numerous columns were to advance from various points on a curving line, which began at Wonderfontein, and ran in a semi-circle to Greylingstad,

on the Natal-Johannesburg Railway. On the extreme left was General Smith-Dorrien, starting from Wonderfontein and marching by way of Carolina towards Lake Chrissie. As the most formidable body of the enemy was in his immediate neighbourhood, his force was the strongest. From Middelburg moved a smaller column under Colonel Campbell of the 1st King's Royal Rifles; from Mooi Plaats General Alderson, a noted leader of mounted infantry, advanced with a third; to the east of Kaalfontein was stationed Colonel E. Knox of the 18th Hussars with a fourth; to the east of Zuurfontein Colonel Allenby with a fifth; General Dartnell, the distinguished Natal officer who had first won his spurs in the famous retreat from Dundee and who combined dash and caution, was to start with a strong column from Springs; the seventh and last column was that under Colonel Colville at Greylingstad. In all about 15,000 men were engaged, all seasoned veterans, expert in South African warfare. Only one fault was to be found



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL FRENCH'S SWEEPING MOVEMENT.

with the force employed. A considerable proportion of it was infantry, who could not be expected to overtake mounted Boers. Thus the mistake of pursuing a highly mobile enemy with slow moving columns was again repeated, probably because Lord Kitchener could not dispose of sufficient mounted men for the work in hand. Again, in the dispositions made adequate precautions were not taken—perhaps could not be taken—to prevent the Boers breaking through between the columns or slipping round them to the north. The line from Barberton to Wonderfontein, barring their retreat in that direction, was not held in strength, and thus a line of retreat was open to Botha and his Boers, of which, as we shall see, they did not fail to make use. The greatest possible secrecy, however, had been observed in the preparations. No one except the generals knew what was intended, and it was no doubt hoped that the enemy would be more or less completely taken by surprise. Up to Lord Kitchener's advent to command, the burghers had generally managed to obtain information of the British plans from the all-too-numerous traitors in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Many of the officials

in the Government offices were Boers who had served under the Kruger *régime*, and who, so long as they thought that there was the least doubt as to the issue, were only too likely to attempt to curry favour with their countrymen still in arms, by giving them news of our intentions. But the number of these gentry had under the new Commander-in-Chief been somewhat diminished.

Hard fighting was anticipated, as the districts to be traversed had produced the commandos which had shown in the course of the war the greatest readiness to attack. This was ascribed by some to the British leaven in the population. The fact is undeniable that numbers of British soldiers, either

deserters or time-expired men, had settled down in the region and married, during or just after the first British occupation of the Transvaal. Their children were fighting in the Boer ranks against the country of their ancestors, lamentable as it may seem. General Smith-Dorrien, whose column was typical in composition, though, as we have said, it was stronger than those of the other generals taking part in the concerted movement, commanded four excellent battalions of infantry, of the Essex, Suffolk, West Yorkshire, and Cameron Highlander regiments, with, as its mounted force, the 5th Lancers, 2nd Imperial Light Horse, and 4th Regular Mounted Infantry. For artillery he had eight 15-pounders of the 66th, 83rd, and 85th batteries, three 5-inch guns,



SWAZI SCOUTS.

and four "Pom-Poms." General French stationed himself with the centre columns, whence he could most conveniently direct the movements of his two wings, by means of signals. As the advance progressed his front would narrow to a distance of some 70 miles—from Carolina to Amersfoort—but even then the control of so many columns operating at intervals of roughly ten miles would be no simple or easy matter. The advance in many columns and on a wide front was, however, necessary from the military standpoint, as the Boers would have had not the slightest difficulty in eluding one great column, while the handling of the transport required for 15,000 men on one or two roads would have been a serious matter.



WITH SMITH-DORRIEN ON THE BORDERS OF SWAZILAND: INTERROGATING NATIVES.

The opening moves were made by General Smith-Dorrien. Unfortunately for the historian, the official telegrams were most reticent as to his actions, and very properly so, as any information which reached England might have been sent back to the Boers in South Africa. Indeed they scarcely tell us anything of his proceedings, nor does the official despatch of March 8, after the movement had been completed, carry us much further. No

**Smith-Dorrien operates
between Wonderfontein
and Middelburg.**



WITH SMITH-DORRIEN ON THE BORDERS OF SWAZILAND: VISITING A NATIVE KRAAL.

press correspondent was present with his column, or indeed with any of the columns under General French, and thus our information is of the scantiest nature.

Smith-Dorrien seems to have left Wonderfontein on January 23 or 24. On the 25th, at Twyfelaar, between that place and Carolina, he fought a five hours' skirmish with the enemy, who held the village. They were about a thousand strong and brought a "Pom-Pom" into the field. But on the usual enveloping movement being carried out by the British mounted troops, they hurriedly retired. One officer was killed and 14 men were wounded on the British side in this action. Just after it, one of the terrible thunderstorms, so common on the high veldt, was the cause of the death of a soldier, who fell a victim to lightning. On the day after this fight Smith-Dorrien entered Carolina, the Boers falling back before him. He now turned westwards, to sweep the country as far as Middelburg and join hands with Colonel Campbell, who was to start from that point. The enemy watched his movements with the utmost vigilance, showing in considerable numbers but keeping well out of range. He did not attack them, and presently they brought up a Krupp and opened fire. There was, however, nothing more than a brisk, uneventful skirmish, and with a loss of 4 killed and 18 wounded, in addition to those already mentioned, he returned to Wonderfontein and filled up his waggons with supplies sufficient to take him to the Swazi border. The precise results of this military promenade do not appear at first sight to have been very satisfactory. It was the fact that the enemy were not attacked and crushed once for all which rendered such frequent clearances of the same region necessary.

The Essex Regiment was left at Wonderfontein to hold that place, and on January 28 the combined movement began. On the 29th General French was engaged with a large force of Boers,

[Photo by the Rev. C. Standish Ensell, the British Chaplain.]
DISTRIBUTION OF FIREWOOD AND COAL: BOER REFUGEE CAMP AT VOLKSRUST.



[Enlarged from a photograph taken on the battlefield.

THE FIGHT AT TWYFELAAR: GUNS OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

The photograph was taken at the moment of firing: a gunner stands at the breech with the lanyard still in his hand. Several men are covering their ears. The vapour from the gun is visible in front of its muzzle.

supposed to be under Beyers' command, though this must be a little doubtful, in the Wilge valley. They numbered about 2,000 men. In this affair the enemy had 13 casualties and the British eight, a figure which points rather to a skirmish of the usual desultory type than to a serious engagement. The British columns engaged were those under Knox and Allenby. A day or two later Campbell, south of Middelburg, was in action with 500 Boers, who were forced back with a loss to the British of twenty. On February 3 General French with the centre was near Bethel, the enemy steadily retiring before him and fighting rearguard actions, in which slight losses were from day to day inflicted upon the British troops. On his progress he captured an abandoned 15-pounder gun, and recovered parts of another which had evidently been disabled by the British fire. Beyers, if the commando engaged upon the Wilge on January 29 was really his, had already succeeded in slipping back between the various British columns, and had returned to

Capture of Ermelo.

his old hunting ground to the north-west of Pretoria. On February 6 General French entered Ermelo, and there captured a number of prisoners and waggons. He destroyed the Boer flour mills and removed all the non-combatants, sending them back to the line of communications, whence they were transferred to the concentration camps.

On February 5, General Smith-Dorrien, on the British left, reached Bothwell Farm, in the neighbourhood of Lake Chrissie, which is famous as being one of the very few sheets of fresh water in South Africa. Here he halted for the night and, with the studious attention to all reasonable precautions, which has won for him so good a reputation in this protracted war, entrenched his



BOERS CUTTING UP WOOD FOR FUEL: BOER REFUGEE CAMP AT VOLKSRUST.

[Photo by the Rev. C. Standish Ensell.

camp strongly. The night was intensely dark, and the obscurity was increased by a heavy mist which hung over these uplands, rendering it impossible for the sentries and outposts to see anyone at a few yards' distance. It was fortunate that so much care was shown on the British side, as Louis Botha during the day had reinforced Lukas Meyer, who was conducting the Boer retreat in this quarter, and had determined upon a night attack with 2,000 men, to cover the withdrawal northwards of the great bulk of his force, now menaced with the danger of being driven into Natal or penned in upon the Swazi frontier. At 3 a.m. of the 6th the assault was delivered. The Boers were able to crawl close

Boers attack Smith-Dorrien at Bothwell Farm.



Ernest Prater.

(From materials supplied.)

THE 2ND GRENADIER GUARDS CROSSING THE WILGE RIVER (p. 369).

in to the British outposts before they were seen and challenged. Their forlorn hope then rushed between two trenches held by the West Yorkshires, driving in front of them a troop of loose horses, so as to confuse the British troops and lead them to think that they were being charged by mounted men. They did cause momentary confusion, but the men of G and H companies of the West Yorkshires were good soldiers, tried by months of war, and they held fast, while the supports coming up caught the Boer stormers and fought them hand to hand, speedily hurling them back in wild disorder. The enemy left on the ground Commandant Spruyt and some twenty burghers dead, close to or inside the British lines. Spruyt was a man of exceptional bravery. He had

previously been taken prisoner, and had escaped, without any taint of treachery or unfairness, by leaping from a train in motion.

While the main attack was going forward, the Boers had opened a heavy rifle fire upon the camp and had also feinted against its eastern corner. The crackle of the fusillade, the hail of bullets, and the stampeding of the horses caused great confusion. Many men were killed or wounded as they lay asleep. But order was speedily restored; the tired troops as they awoke collected their wits, snatched up their rifles, and dashed forth to repel their assailants. They had no mark at which to fire except the fitful flashes of the Martinis and Mausers, yet there is evidence that many of the British bullets found billets in the enemy's ranks. Long before day broke, seeing that their onset had failed, the Boers withdrew, well knowing that the British were too ignorant of the ground to attempt pursuit

until day came. They seem to have made off to the north, sending a detachment eastwards to make the British think that they were retiring in that direction. At daybreak Smith-Dorrien despatched his mounted infantry to follow them up, but they had already got so far that touch could not be recovered.

The British casualties in this affair were heavy, and the large proportion of killed in the figures points to desperate hand-to-hand fighting. Twenty-four officers and men were killed and fifty-three wounded. The West Yorkshires were the hardest hit. Their conduct in face of a surprise attack, with the odds heavily against them, was admirable. Among the Boer killed, besides Commandant Spruyt, were two field cornets, and Commandant Raademeyer was severely wounded; it is probable that the total Boer loss was equal to or slightly in excess of the British figures. The action only lasted half-an-hour.



A. J. Gough.]

HORSES STAMPEDED IN PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK ON THE TRENCHES AT BOTHWELL FARM.

About the same time, on the right, General Dartnell was engaged with a body of Boers, 400 strong, having two guns and a "Pom-Pom." On his advance he destroyed Amersfoort, which had been spared on previous British expeditions through the country. The Boers, in a state of utter panic and alarm, were now retiring upon Amsterdam and Pietretief; 800 waggons, laden with women and children and the impedimenta of the enemy's commandos, were reported to have passed eastward through Ermelo alone. Day by day, as the British advanced, immense hauls were made of waggons and stock, and had not the Boers been favoured by the inclement weather and the almost total absence of practicable roads, large captures of combatants might have been effected. But the rain sadly interfered with the British supply-convoys and reduced General French's progress to the pace of a snail. He was now in touch with General Hildyard's troops, who were pushed forward from Utrecht and Wakkerstroom,

**Dartnell destroys
Amersfoort.**

so prolonging his cordon to the frontier of Natal. From Natal he began to draw his supplies, as his front ran from Amsterdam to Wakkerstroom.



MAKING SURE OF SOME OF THE CAPTURED STOCK.

Several thousand of the sheep captured from Botha, February 9, 1901, near Pietretief, were slaughtered at once, the sword-bayonet being utilised for the purpose.

emigrants from homes which, unhappily, have been harbours of refuge to the Boers." The deported inhabitants suffered cruelly, not from ill usage by the British troops, but from the terrible rains and the scantiness of supplies. All that could be done was done for them. It was manifestly impossible to leave them in an area where all trace of cultivation had been as far as possible destroyed, and where they would have been absolutely at the mercy of roving Kaffirs, whose outrages upon women at the lonely farms were becoming increasingly prevalent, though sternly punished by the British authorities whenever the criminals were detected.

On February 16 General French reached Pietretief. He

**French occupies
Pietretief.**

experienced
extreme diffi-
culty in com-

municating with headquarters and in maintaining touch between his various columns, owing to the incessant rains and want of sun, and this hampered him greatly in his operations. A halt of more than a month followed, as the rains continued and supplies could not be brought up. But this long period of delay was turned to some account, since his troops were now

On or about the 12th General French captured a Boer convoy of 50 waggons,

**Boer refugees at
Standerton.** 15 carts, and 45 prisoners. Since it was difficult to remove

the waggons, most of them were burnt, and only sufficient retained for the conveyance of the Boer women and children to the line of communications. At Standerton the scene is described as unique. Immense convoys of non-combatants from the denuded area daily arrived. "As far as the eye could reach—and it reaches far in South Africa," says a correspondent, "is seen a never-ending line of ox-waggons. Women and children are arriving in hundreds. Their immediate resting place is on the high ground above the Vaal towards the south-east. Opposite them, at a distance, is a laager containing earlier arrivals, with horses, cows, sheep, goats, and pigs innumerable, the stock of these unwilling



HOWITZER AND TWO CREUSOT 15-POUNDERS CAPTURED FROM THE BOERS AT PIETRETIEF.

able to search the country round thoroughly, disintomb buried guns and ammunition, hunt down Boer fugitives, and clear the farms. At the same time General Smith-Dorrien was halted at Amsterdam, blocking the Boer line of escape north. The total number of Boers in front of the British columns was estimated officially at 5,000, but that figure probably included some women and children. Up to the occupation of Pietretief the enemy's loss had been 282 men killed or

wounded in these eastern operations, 56 prisoners, and 183 surrendered, while one 15-pounder, 462 rifles, 160,000 rounds of ammunition, 7,000 horses or trek oxen, 18,700 cattle, 155,400 sheep, and 1,070 waggons had been captured. There is, however, reason to fear that a good many of the cattle and sheep were recaptured by the enemy at various times, though a special corps, known as "Loxton's Horse," had been raised in Natal to carry off and secure the Boer stock. The British casualties up to Pietretief were 46 killed and 112 wounded. Among the killed was Major Howard of the Ca-



DISCOVERY OF GUNS AT PIETRETIEF: DRAGGING UP THE HOWITZER CARRIAGE.

nadian Scouts, a particularly gallant officer, who was murdered by the Boers on the Swazi frontier. He was riding with his orderly a couple of miles ahead of his Scouts, when he was seen to fall into a Boer ambush. He surrendered, and with his orderly was deprived of his arms and equipment. Then the horrified spectators saw the enemy shoot the two in cold blood and make off in hasty flight.

The enemy, in a state of consternation, retired under cover of the rains to the Pongola bush, while General French continued his hunt for guns. On February 25 he was able to report that he had unearthed a 19-pounder long-range Krupp, a howitzer, and a Maxim, with 20,000 rounds of ammunition. These

weapons were found by the British scouts near Pietretief while a convoy was crossing a swollen stream. Further surrenders continued on a large scale, increasing the uneasiness felt by the Boer leaders. No less than 300 men came in during the week following the occupation of Pietretief, and though not all were necessarily combatants, the greater proportion were. Two hundred and eighty-seven waggons and carts, 1,260 horses, mules, and oxen, and 15,000 cattle and



PUTTING THE GUNS TOGETHER.

sheep were among the other prizes. On March 6 further acquisitions were reported. The Hotchkiss gun taken from the Natal Volunteers many weeks before was secured, as also a Creusot high-velocity 14-pounder, while 979 more Boers were accounted for, with 100 waggons and a number of cattle and sheep. But as on this occasion only 179 rifles were brought in, it would seem that 800 of the 979 Boer surrenders either were not combatants or had buried their rifles. In the latter case their good faith may well be questioned. Steinecker's Horse were busy during these weeks, preventing the enemy from retiring into Swaziland and examining the Dutch settlements in that region. They suc-

ceeded in discovering two caches of treasure, evidently belonging to the Boer headquarters—one of £6,000 at Bremersdorp, the other of £3,500 across the Transvaal frontier.

While French with the centre and Smith-Dorrien with the left were stationary, General Dartnell with the right made some progress. On March 9 he was at

Intombi Drift, the scene of a fight in the far-off days of the Zulu War, and here occurred one of those



ON THE NATAL BORDER: A PATROL STARTING.



THE PATROL'S RETURN, WITH PRISONERS.

lamentable incidents of Boer treachery of which we have had so many to chronicle in the course of this campaign. Dartnell had stationed outposts of the Commander-in-Chief's Bodyguard, and presently these outposts saw Boers approaching. The British troopers concealed themselves and allowed the Boers to draw close in, when they covered the enemy with their rifles and called upon them to surrender. The Boers put up their hands, whereupon the British troopers went forward to secure their rifles. At this point one or more Boers, who were seemingly concealed, opened fire and killed three of the British. Reinforcements, however, were rapidly upon the scene and the miscreants were captured. One of them on examination was thought to be a man who had taken the oath of neutrality and who had been seen in the British camp. It would be interesting to know what was his fate: presumably he was shot. On March 14 French was able to report that 192 more Boers were *hors de combat*, on this occasion, it would seem, all combatants, and that 400 more waggons and a good number of horses and cattle had been captured. The enemy's losses in waggons were now verging upon 2,000.

On March 16 the sweeping movement was resumed. Smith-Dorrien marched south from Amsterdam to Pietretief, skirting the Swazi border, while Dartnell and Colonel Rimington headed east from Intombi Drift and Paulpietersdorp, having obtained supplies from Utrecht. Knox and Allenby with their columns were to the rear of the British centre, bringing up supplies from Volksrust. At the same time a column of mounted men was detached from General Burn-Murdoch's command, which had hitherto been utilized in guarding the line of communications from Luneburg to Utrecht, and was sent down the valley of the Blood River as far as Vryheid, to clear it thoroughly of small



G. Soper]

THE MURDER OF MAJOR HOWARD AND HIS ORDERLY (p. 373).

parties of the enemy. At Vryheid were stationed troops of General Hildyard's command, and there great quantities of supplies had been accumulated by that officer. As General French's columns drew closer and closer to the Natal frontier the part which the troops garrisoning Natal played grew more and more important. They were charged with the task of preventing at all costs stray bands of Boers from breaking away to the south and so eluding the sweep of General French's columns just at the moment when the drag-net promised to bring up its most magnificent haul. Paulpietersdorp was entered by Dartnell on March 18, and on the same day Rimington seized the



VRYHEID.

Photo by Caney.

Vryheid was formerly part of Zululand, but was ceded to the Boers in 1884 by Dinizulu in return for their assistance in the war with Usibepu. Vryheid was recognized as an independent Boer State in 1886, and hence was known as "The New Republic," but in 1888 it was incorporated with the Transvaal. The remaining portions of Zululand were added to the British dominions in 1887. The white population of the town numbers about 2,400. The country around is rich in minerals and pasture.

stone bridge over the Bevaan river on the Pietretief and Vryheid road, a point of great importance owing to the swollen state of the rivers. Alderson at the same time marched to Jagt Drift on the Pongola and bridged that stream with the pontoons which had just arrived from Pretoria. French now marched to Bevaan bridge, leaving Smith-Dorrien to search and clear the northern bank of the Pongola, and detached Knox, who had rejoined his force, with orders to clear the strip of bush-covered, mountainous country between the Bevaan and Pongola. On the 25th French was at Vryheid, where he established his headquarters, while his troops went to work upon the triangle of territory enclosed on the north by the Bevaan and on the two other sides by the frontier of Zululand. On the 27th Dartnell pushed into this area with Colonel Pulteney on his right and General Alderson on his left. Pulteney speedily came into contact with a considerable Boer force under Grobler and drove it into the arms of Dartnell, who defeated the enemy, but failed to capture the whole Boer commando. Leaving Pulteney at Vryheid to deal with any Boers who attempted to break back, he marched to the neighbourhood of the Zulu frontier with Alderson on his left, 30 miles to the east-south-east of Vryheid. Alderson and Dartnell were compelled by the nature of the country to leave all their wheeled transport behind in charge of the infantry, and to push on with only the mounted troops and a few of the most mobile of the guns. They traversed the whole area which borders upon Zululand, hunting down the enemy's bands. On March 31 Dartnell engaged a small commando under Grobler and Emmett, took from it 10 prisoners and 30 wag-gons, and recovered a "Pom-Pom" which had been thrown over a cliff by the Boers and damaged. On April 4 he returned to his base with a number of prisoners, women, and children. He had, in addition, forced about 200 combatant burghers over the frontier into Zululand, where they were at once compelled to surrender. Pulteney's column at the end of March proceeded to Glencoe, and entrained for Pretoria. Knox followed a few days later to Springs, and Dartnell, his work accomplished, moved by Vryheid to Volksrust.

The borders of Zululand cleared.



GENERAL DARTNELL AT VOLKSRUST.

The General is seen on the right of the photograph. In the front of the picture is Major Kerrich, supply officer.

Alderson, operating further to the north, after clearing as far as he could the very difficult bush-covered country, returned to Vryheid on April 6, and thence marched to Berthasdorp and down the valley of the Umvolosi. His work was over on the 13th, when his column also was withdrawn. Meantime Smith-Dorrien had been holding a line to the north of the Pongola, to prevent the Boers from breaking back, and columns under Allenby and Campbell had scoured the Pongola valley and hunted down the scattered Boer detachments which were making for Swazi territory. Repeated attempts were made by the enemy to force a passage through the British cordon, but all were unsuccessful. On March 31 Allenby inflicted a sharp check upon a Boer commando, which was trying thus to get away, and took from it a 15-pounder and two "Pom-Poms." In early April Smith-Dorrien concentrated his troops at Pietretief and prepared for his return march to the Delagoa Bay Railway. He moved out on the 14th with Campbell and Allenby on his left, in the direction of Wonderfontein. Though the country was supposed to have been cleared on the advance,

Returning columns
harassed by guerillas.

it soon became evident that
it still harboured a considerable
number of the enemy.

Both British columns were continually harassed



WITH SMITH-DORRIEN'S COLUMN: AN AMBULANCE WAGGON CONVERTED INTO A HOSPITAL TENT.



WITH SMITH-DORRIEN'S COLUMN: IN CHARGE OF THE FODDER.

by small parties of Boers, who hung upon the rear, refusing to be brought to battle, but inflicting all the damage possible upon our men. On April 22 Smith-Dorrien was within heliographic touch of Wonderfontein, which place he reached on the 27th. The same day Allenby and Campbell marched into Middelburg, and the eastern campaign was over.

The results of the campaign, as summarised by General French, were as follows: 369 Boers killed or wounded; 243 taken prisoners; 730 surrendered;

two 15-pounders, two 14-pounders, and one 9-pounder gun captured, with one 4.7 howitzer, two Hotchkiss guns, three "Pom-Poms," 1,280 rifles, 210,000 rounds of ammunition, 7,300 horses,

Results of the
campaign.

370 mules, 6,000 trek-oxen, 27,000 cattle, 175,000 sheep, and 2,281 waggons and carts. Supposing most of those who surrendered to have been combatants, which is doubtful, the enemy's strength was diminished by about 1,200 men. Besides

inflicting this extremely severe loss upon the Boers—and in the figures given the surrenders in Natal and Zululand are not counted, though they were fairly numerous, General French had completely broken up the enemy's plan for a great concentration in the east, followed by a raid into Natal. At

the outset it was hoped that he might succeed in making a bag of from 7,000 to 8,000 Boers, who were in arms in this quarter of the field, but he failed to do this because the inadequacy of his force would not allow him from the outset to close the line of escape to the north. He did, however, traverse an immense area of country which up to that date had been visited by no British columns, and by systematically denuding the area rendered it far harder for the Boers to subsist within its borders. Had he been permitted to devastate it thoroughly, after Sheridan's fashion in the Shenandoah valley, the service rendered might have been still greater, but at this date, in obedience to the clamour raised by the friends of the enemy at home, our generals appear to have been ordered not to destroy farms and towns. Ermelo, in consequence, was left standing, and it speedily became once more the headquarters of Louis Botha. A large number of Boers who were scattered over the region traversed and re-traversed by our troops, hiding in caves and dongas, must have rejoined the



DESTRUCTION OF A TRAIN OF SUPPLIES NEAR GREYLINGSTAD, February 13, 1901.

commandos when General French's columns retired. In an area of 20,000 square miles it was impossible for the British to track down every fugitive. But the enemy lost all, or nearly all, their wheeled transport and a large number of guns, which no amount of ingenuity would enable them to replace. The sheep and cattle were no great loss, as they could always be raided and carried off from the British when wanted.

Some further train-wrecking exploits which were performed during this period may be mentioned here. On February 6 the up-mail from Durban was held up at Vlakklaagte. Seven armed soldiers in the train defended it bravely, but eventually hoisted the white flag, and the train was captured and burnt. A British detachment with a 15-pounder arrived too late, just as the Boers had retired. A day later a second train was captured near the same place, and about the same time a construction train and a supply train fell into Boer hands. On the 13th, midway between Vaal Station and Greylingstad, a pilot engine with three trucks was

**Train-wrecking on
the Natal frontier.**

blown up while crossing a culvert. An armoured train behind the pilot engine brought a "Pom-Pom" into action, and speedily drove the enemy off. On the 20th the up-mail was attacked near Heidelberg. An armoured train came up before the Boers could complete their work of plunder and destruction, and drove them off. The Boers, however, were never cleared away, and their depredations were continual. On January 7 they carried off 150 head

or so of cattle, but the loot was retaken some weeks later. In fact these unlucky animals were perpetually changing hands. On March 7 a pilot engine with seven men

SOME OF LORD KITCHENER'S BLOCKHOUSES.



BLOCKHOUSE OR FORT NEAR KROKODIL POORT, AND A TORTOISE CAUGHT BY THE R.A.M.C.

on it, preceding a Natal train to Pretoria, was blown up, to the west of Heidelberg, and three men killed, while four were injured. On the 18th a party of 150 burghers with a galloping Maxim attacked two trains near Vlaklaagte. They fired on the first without result, and loosened the rails as the second was coming along. The railway staff, however, by this time had become more of a match for the Boers, and the driver saw what had happened in time to avoid a catastrophe. On the 22nd 400 Boers wrecked a supply train at Vlaklaagte, overpowered the escort, and removed most of the supplies before reinforcements could come up.

SANGAR GUARDING A BRIDGE WEST OF NELSPRUIT.



FORT IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL.



BUILDING A FORT.

At the close of March the insecurity of the lines of communication led Lord Kitchener to try a new method of protecting them. Small

Erection of Blockhouses.

blockhouses were built at intervals of about 3,000 yards along the line, each with a garrison of from half-a-dozen to fifty men—bullet-proof and capable of withstanding an assault by a force without artillery. They were surrounded by wire entanglements, rendering approach at night very difficult. Their construction was a work of time, but as it progressed the lines became safer to traverse, and derailments and captures of trains diminished in frequency.



Photo by Hoskins, Capetown.

THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH'S OWN VOLUNTEER RIFLES PARADING AT CAPETOWN.

CHAPTER XIX.

EVENTS IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL.

Methuen's operations in British Bechuanaland—The country denuded—Available British forces insufficient—Treachery of Frank Pearson—Skirmishing with Celliers' commando—De la Rey repulsed near Hartebeestefontein—Methuen marches to Warrenton—Murder of neutrals at Wolmaranstad—Crime unpunished—De la Rey's attack on Lichtenburg—Pickets of the "Fighting Fifth" defend the trenches—Violation of the usages of war—The Boers attempt to rush the defences—The enemy repulsed—Babington's columns concentrate at Rietfontein—Gordon's and Babington's troops exchange shots in error—De la Rey attacks the British convoy—Boers win the ridge—The Imperial Light Horse in difficulties—The convoy saved.



Methuen's operations in British Bechuanaland. DURING the early weeks of the new year Lord Methuen was occupied in dealing with the parties of Boers who had passed into British Bechuanaland in December, and who were working south through that arid and difficult country to the Cape border. From the Lichtenburg district, where he had been operating in December, 1900, he moved west to Vryburg and organised his force for the task before it. Meanwhile in his rear at Rustenburg Captain Umphelby, of the Victorians, was busy denuding the country and despatching the cattle, women, and children to Pretoria. The operations in Bechuanaland were of an uneventful nature. The Boers nowhere offered any serious resistance, though they did their best to annoy the British troops by sniping tactics. One of Methuen's columns marched from Taungs to Kuruman, which had been undergoing a languid siege, and threw an ample store of provisions into the place. It then moved to Daniels Kuil, which was held by a detachment of the Duke of Edinburgh's Volunteer Rifles, one of the Cape regiments. The garrison had been surrounded by the Boers on January 5, when a demand for the immediate surrender of the post was sent in by the enemy's commandant. No attention was paid to the demand, whereupon the Boers delivered a very half-hearted attack. They fired upon the place all day, but without doing much damage. On the 6th they sent in a fresh demand, threatening that if it was



KURUMAN: SHOWING A PORTION OF THE CAMP.

not at once complied with they would destroy all the houses, including those flying the white flag and those in which the women and children had taken shelter. The threat was treated with the contempt which it deserved. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th a long-range fire upon the village was maintained; on the 10th the enemy drew off to some little distance, no doubt because they had heard of the approach of the relief force. The British casualties were three wounded. The enemy had no artillery, and so were powerless against the entrenchments which the British had constructed.

On January 13 Lord Methuen fought a skirmish to the west of Taungs with a Boer force of about a thousand men, said to be under De la Rey's command, but more probably under Liebenberg. With a loss of seven men to the British, the Boers were brushed aside and driven to the south. The country bordering the railway from Taungs to Vryburg was then scoured in all directions and the farms cleared. Nevertheless the enemy still continued to interfere with the line and to snap up weak detachments. On January 20 they captured a body of special police, 20 strong, at Devondale, to the north of Vryburg. All the morning the Boers followed this detachment unnoticed, and when



BEFORE THEIR CAPTURE BY THE BOERS.

the police off-saddled at midday they crept up, surrounded them, and demanded their surrender. This was tamely granted without a single shot being fired on either side. The Boers carried off the saddles, rifles, ammunition, and horses, and retired, releasing the men, for whose behaviour not much can be said. On the 21st the enemy raided a farm close to Vryburg, removing a number of horses and donkeys; they also broke the railway at Dryharts, between Mafeking and Taungs, destroying a culvert and attacking the Kimberley train. To the north of Vryburg a train from Mafeking was fired upon, probably by the same party which had captured the police at Devondale.

About the same time a large commando, several hundred strong, was seen crossing the line and moving west. It was probably the commando with which Lord Methuen's men came into contact on February 2 at Uitval's Kop. The Boers, under Liebenberg, Du Toit, and De Beers, were found to be holding a strong position commanding the watering-places, so that it was essential to dislodge them. The position was shelled and then stormed by the Australian Bushmen, with a loss of six. Eight Boers, among them De Beers' step-son, are reported to have been killed; the enemy's main



AFTER THEIR RELEASE,

Showing how the Boers come to be dressed in khaki, and why many of the British troops are in rags.

force got away, leaving, however, 25 waggons, with women and children, behind them. After this fight Lord Methuen completed, as far as he could, the denudation of the country, though the

The country denuded. women made a great outcry when they were removed from the farms. They invariably pretended to be on the verge of starvation when the British arrived, to avoid having to give up their supplies of foodstuffs. Accordingly, they were taken at their word, somewhat to their surprise, and sent into Pretoria, where, at least, they would never die of hunger. A search in the farms generally revealed great accumulations of provisions, which, of course, were drawn upon by the men on commando as well as by the women and children. From Taungs Methuen proceeded to Schweizer Reneke, the much-besieged garrison of which place had been finally withdrawn some weeks before, and then started on a march back to the Krugersdorp district.

The results of this expedition to the west were not of any very serious value, since no blow was inflicted upon the enemy and no large captures of combatants were made. The same mistake was made in the west as in the east, of brushing the enemy aside instead of beating them. Probably the explanation was that in either case the British forces available were insufficient, but the consequence was that these marches had to be repeated again and again, with incessant small losses, whereas one smashing blow at the enemy would have

**Available British
forces insufficient.**



[Photo by Gregory.]

REMOUNTS FOR THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY IN THE DEPÔT AT SOUTHAMPTON


pacified a wide area permanently, even if it had involved a heavy casualty list. But our troops were still, not merely inadequate in numbers, but also inferior in mobility to the Boers. Horse-sickness caused serious losses among the remounts about this time, while the quality of the animals left much to be desired. They were hurried up to the front, fresh from the troopships, and put to work at once. This was necessary because of the incompetence and neglect at home which had not foreseen in the autumn of 1900 the necessity of maintaining the supply of remounts. Enormous expense to the nation—unnecessary expense, because two, three, or four horses had to be bought where one in perfect condition would have sufficed—and great delay, waste of life, and unsuccess in the military operations were the fruits of this indifference. Thousands of lives and millions of money are a high price to pay in order that estimable but inexpert politicians may mismanage military preparations.

Leaving Schweizer Reneke Methuen had a sharp skirmish with the enemy, but on bringing up his "Pom-Poms" speedily compelled them to retire. He then marched with all possible rapidity to Wolmaranstad, hoping to rescue a number of loyalists who, he learnt, were prisoners there in the hands of the Boers. Their jailer and captor was one Frank Pearson, a young English renegade, son of a Manchester minister, and a person who had distinguished himself for his frantic hatred of England and all things English. A great

**Treachery of Frank
Pearson.**

quantity of correspondence between him and the Boer leaders, amply sufficient to hang him, had fallen into the hands of the British authorities at Christiana. It was thus eminently desirable to lay hands upon him. Unfortunately Lord Methuen came too late to save the prisoners, who had been removed by the enemy. The last of the Boer rearguard were vanishing over the hills to the east, and all that the British could do was to shell them. A number of women and children were removed from the place. The notorious Pearson did not get away for good. He was captured a day or two afterwards on the march to Klerksdorp. At Wolmaranstad the troops halted for a day, requiring rest after their exertions. The Bushmen were sent out foraging, and, as far as they could, cleared the country round.

Next day there was a good deal of skirmishing with a strong



FOUR INTERESTING AUTOGRAPHS OF LEADING TRANSVAALERS.

Boer commando under Celliers, who attacked the British outposts early in the morning. The 10th Yeomanry had to ride hard to the rescue of the threatened detachments, but they arrived in time, and, with the aid of a Maxim, drove back the enemy. In the afternoon 800 Boers renewed the attack, this time bringing up two guns. Paget's Horse, the 38th squadron of Yeomanry, and the British artillery, however, were quickly upon the scene. An artillery fight began, and continued till nightfall, when the enemy made off. Next day Methuen, who had turned off the regular Wolmaranstad and Klerksdorp road, taking

**Skirmishing with
Celliers' commando.**



(Photo by G. Gardner.)

WELCOME-HOME OF THE OXFORDSHIRE YEOMANRY WHO DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES AT HARTEBEESTEFONTEIN (p. 384).

instead a more devious route through the mountainous country to the north, was continually in touch with the Boers. They made no attempt to stand, and steadily retired before him. The same kind of desultory skirmishing with the Boer rearguard marked February 13. Two hundred of the enemy in single file kept on the British right flank, but eluded every attempt to close, and remained just out of rifle-range. Lord Methuen determined to teach them a lesson. Late that evening he mustered his whole force, and after detaching enough men to guard the camp, marched out under cover of darkness, doubling back on his tracks. In this way he was able to get close to a considerable laager at Brakpan, and at daylight he attacked it. The main

Boer force was waiting for the British at another point, further to the west, so that no serious resistance could be offered. He took 40 prisoners, 50 carts and waggons, some thousands of cattle, and a large quantity of ammunition for rifles and "Pom-Poms." After inflicting this decidedly unpleasant

surprise upon the Boers, he advanced on the 15th along the Klerksdorp road, and near Hartebeestefontein found 1,500 of the enemy, under De la Rey, in a strong position, occupying a long line of kopjes, with a front of nearly ten miles. No sign of the Boers was to be seen until the 10th Yeomanry advanced. "Then," as a Yeomanry trooper writes, "suddenly, without a word of warning, a hundred Mauser rifles cracked, and a shower of bullets whistled past us. We were subjected to a hot cross-fire. Without a moment's hesitation I turned round to the left and galloped as fast as I could to the nearest place of shelter, which was a Kaffir kraal to my left front, about 100 yards distant. Here I was joined by the rest of the troop, all of whom had had marvellous escapes, and dismounting and lying flat behind what cover we could get, we blazed back at the Boers." The artillery came into action and shelled the Boer kopjes, while the pressure was taken off the 10th by the advance of the Loyal North Lancashires and more Yeomanry upon the left, and by the 5th Yeomanry with a "Pom-Pom" extending on the right. Still the rifle-fire of the enemy continued to be severe—so severe that the ammunition carts of the 10th Yeomanry could not reach the fighting-line, and had to

De la Rey repulsed
near
Hartebeestefontein.



LIEUT. W. H. CREAK,
Loyal North Lancashires.

[Photo by Plätz, Colombo.
LIEUT. A. W. HEWETT,
Loyal North Lancashires.

[Photo by West, Southsea.
LIEUT. W. WILSON,
5th Imperial Yeomanry.

THE OFFICERS KILLED AT HARTEBEESEFONTEIN.

beat a hasty retreat. On this, Major Lawson, of the 10th Yeomanry, ordered the 40th, 39th, and 38th companies to advance, covered by the fire of the 37th and the artillery. The men went forward in superb style, the 40th or Oxfordshire Company especially distinguishing itself. They carried the kopjes, aided by a few well-timed shrapnel from the field-guns, and the fight was won. The Boers bolted in great confusion to the north-east, leaving 18 dead upon the ground, according to the official telegram, though other British accounts only speak of 6. The British casualties were 16 killed, including three officers, and 34 wounded. From a despatch written by De la Rey, which was captured some weeks later, it was ascertained that the enemy supposed the British to have lost between 300 and 400 men. After the action Lord Methuen's column marched into Klerksdorp to fill its supply waggons, and to leave there the prisoners and waggons taken from the enemy. On February 22 it again moved westwards towards Potchefstroom, and drove Smuts' commando, which had been annoying the district, in a north-westerly direction. Returning to Klerksdorp, it marched down the south-western Transvaal by Wolmaranstad, Bloemhof, and Christiana to Warrenton, a station on the railway north of Kimberley, where it arrived in mid-March, after covering in a few weeks an enormous area of country.

Methuen marches to
Warrenton.

During Lord Methuen's return march to Warrenton the Boers re-occupied Wolmaranstad, and executed three burghers and one British subject who had fallen into their hands. The burghers put to death had all surrendered on the first British occupation of Klerksdorp, and had taken the oath



E. J. Waugh.]

"FIX BAYONETS, JACK!" DEFENCE OF A TRENCH BY TWO SURVIVORS OF THE "FIGHTING FIFTH" (p. 388).

of neutrality. Their names were Theunissen, father and son, and M'Lachlan, who had married a daughter of the elder Theunissen. M'Lachlan was of British birth, and had refused to serve against his country, though, in what he believed to be a just cause, he had fought against Jameson's raiders at Doornkop. In the earlier stages of the war he had left the Transvaal, and only returned in June, when he thought the war over. Boyd, the fourth man put to death, was a British subject, had taken the oath of neutrality to the Transvaal, and had remained in the country during the war. He had made his submission to the British when they arrived, but he had not borne arms for them. He had thus committed no offence, civil or military, deserving a violent and cruel death. As for the elder Theunissen, he was a farmer of wealth and integrity, one of the best types of Boers, and had himself interceded with the British to save Commandant Liebenberg's house and property. But he had the misfortune to possess property, which certain of the Boers in arms coveted.

**Murder of neutrals
at Wolmaranstad.**

The four men while in prison attempted to communicate their plight to the British commanders and for that purpose Theunissen gave a letter to a Boer jailer, who professed to be friendly and who promised to despatch it for £10. Instead of despatching it to Lord Methuen he took it to

Pearson. Pearson at once had the four brought before a special court composed of three members, a Boer named Neethling, a British renegade named Doulthwaite, and another Boer, Boshof. The offence was not one which under the laws of the Transvaal could be punished with death, but notwithstanding this the four prisoners were condemned to suffer the capital penalty. The sentence was confirmed by De la Rey and Smuts, and on March 9 the men were shot under circumstances of peculiar brutality. They were led forth from the gaol to their fresh dug graves, holding each other's hands and bidding one another die bravely, as England would avenge their deaths. Then they



FIND OF BURIED RIFLES AT WARRENTON BY THE 5TH ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS.

were placed in a row and shot down one by one. Boyd received three bullets and was pitched into his grave still breathing, when the Boers fired into his body again.

Several other prisoners—in all the enemy had about forty in their hands—were condemned to death, but do not appear to have been executed. We should have expected the strongest possible remonstrance to have been forwarded to the Boer generals after this cruel and unnecessary crime; but as a matter of fact nothing appears to have been said.

**Crime not promptly
punished.**

Even Pearson was not promptly shot or strung up, and he seems to be comfortably in prison at this moment, notwithstanding the damning evidence against him seized at Christiana, and though he was notoriously a traitor, even apart from his share in these executions. Such acts of severity on the part of the Boers towards civilian prisoners, one at least of whom owed no allegiance to the Transvaal, would have justified the sternest measures towards the Cape rebels had justification been required. But months passed before the Cape rebels were punished as they deserved, and meantime, the Boers, by wholesale executions and by the murder of peace-envoys, endeavoured to strike terror into the hearts of all the inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.

Another incident of importance which occurred in this quarter of the field was the repulse of a determined Boer attack on Lichtenburg, on March 3. Lichtenburg, like Rustenburg, had been besieged

in a languid manner during the early weeks of the year. It was garrisoned by four companies of that fine regiment, the Northumberland Fusiliers, two companies of Paget's Horse, and a section of the 4th New Zealand Battery with two old-fashioned 15-pounders. De la Rey in person collected a force of 1,500 Boers under Smuts, Celliers, and Vermaas, and, from correspondence since captured, felt certain of rushing the place. It need scarcely be said that he had the aid of traitors within the town—Boer residents who had taken the

**De la Rey's attack on
Lichtenburg.**



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

"HALT! IN THE KING'S NAME!"

oath of neutrality and who feigned to be the best friends of the British. With these worthies he had arranged that during the night of the 2nd-3rd two parties of Boers should enter the town from the north-west and south-west. They were to pass in between the outer line of British pickets, and then, at a given signal, when the main body of the enemy attacked these pickets, to rush the inner entrenchments within which were the British stores and guns. The plan was well devised, and but for accident on the one hand, and cowardice on the part of one of the two Boer forlorn hopes on the other, would probably have succeeded.

The party from the south-east did actually enter the town and had worked perilously near to the inner line of defences, when they were seen—before they were quite ready—by a vigilant soldier, who instantly gave the alarm and fired. The sound of shots put every one on the alert, though at first it was supposed that what was going on was only the usual night sniping. As for the party of Boers from the north-west, discretion with them got the better of courage, and they never put in an appearance. As the shot rang out in the darkness the enemy without the town made a most determined rush at the

British trenches. The infantry and the Yeomen of Paget's Horse sprang to arms in the terrible pandemonium, bullets coming from all quarters and the enemy seeming to be everywhere. The pickets, too, offered a most splendid resistance and lived up to the old name of the Northumberland Fusiliers, "the Fighting Fifth." "How those pickets did fight!" writes one of the Yeomanry. "The picket trenches never contained more than seven men, and these were charged by some 100 or 200 Boers at a time, but the enemy could not get through. In one trench only two were left, the others being all killed or wounded, but when a

**Pickets of the
Fighting Fifth defend
the trenches.**

relief arrived the sergeant was just saying to his one comrade, 'Fix bayonets, Jack, we'll keep the—— back.' Time after time the Boers called on these pickets to surrender, but the reply was always the same 'Surrender be——. Fire a volley into them, lads.' When day dawned, dead Boers in numbers were seen to be lying on the very edge of the trenches, showing with what determination the attack had been pressed. Slowly those who were assailing the trenches from outside the town were driven back; the Boers, however, who had penetrated the British defences from the south-east were not so easily disposed of. They had made their way into the houses, from the windows of which they fired upon our men's backs, while the mealie fields, gardens, hedges, and ditches which surrounded the houses of the straggling village afforded them admirable cover. To dislodge them was a matter of extreme difficulty, since it took a long time to locate them, and, when located, they could not be shelled without a good deal of risk to the troops on the outer line of defences. But they made themselves so unpleasant that artillery had to be used upon them. They retaliated after the usual



F. Dadd, R.I.]

A SURGEON AT WORK IN THE FIRING LINE.

savage Boer fashion, by firing upon the ambulances and the hospital. The latter was the special target of their rifles. This sort of conduct had long ceased to provoke surprise or arouse indignation.

**Violation of the
usages of war.**

It was now taken as a matter of course by the British that the enemy would violate the conventions of civilised war. Soft-nosed bullets, bullets with the tops filed off, bullets with narrow slits cut down them, so that they would open out and "mushroom" upon the living body, were found galore upon the Boer dead after the fight; such murderous projectiles rained about the British wounded. One ill-starred man, Colour-Sergeant Scott, was killed while on his way to the hospital to fetch the ambulance for a terribly wounded New Zealander. He was unarmed and his errand was obvious, but he was not spared.

With daylight the Boer guns had got to work, banging shells among the British trenches, where the Northumberlands and the Yeomanry still defied the enemy. But the shells did no one any harm. The blood of the British troops had warmed to the fray; already they felt themselves victors; they could see the Boer dead before the works, in number exceeding their own, and they were not going to be dislodged by any display of fireworks, however terrible. They took the shelling with stolid

contempt, and the Boers, finding that it did not cow, and, moreover, being somewhat short of ammunition, speedily discontinued their fire.

Meantime the Boers within the town were in desperate plight. Their horses had all been killed, they were isolated from their supports, and every now and then the British guns gave them the disagreeable attention of a shrapnel when they became more than usually troublesome. A hail of unaimed bullets was also poured upon their hiding places, and they could see that menacing preparations were going forward to carry at the point of the bayonet the houses in which they lurked. Knowing their hopeless condition, the Boers outside the town made the most determined efforts to give them help and cover their retreat. In the afternoon a large party of them charged on horseback from Burghersdorp, a suburb of Lichtenburg, two miles to the south-east of the town, and attempted to penetrate into the town itself. This they succeeded in doing, though they had to cross a space totally devoid of cover under a very heavy

**The Boers attempt to
rush the defences.**



George Soper.]

[After a sketch by a trooper of Paget's Horse.

PAGET'S HORSE CHASING THE BOERS OUTSIDE LICHTENBURG.

fire. They cut off an outlying picket, which was in extreme danger, attacked both from front and rear. A second party repeated the dash, and matters began to look very serious. The Boers within the town, if strongly reinforced, would render the position of the garrison quite untenable. Twenty of Paget's Horse were sent forward to extricate the regulars and to hold off the enemy, who were clearly preparing to throw fresh parties into the place. The Yeomanry dashed across the open to the threatened point, and found themselves in a trench under a heavy fire from front, flank, and rear. "We had not been there long, however," writes one of them, "before a mounted party appeared on the Burghersdorp ridge, and started to gallop across the open. This was the third party to try the game, and must have numbered about twenty-five. They hadn't got very far before we started on them, and it proved the greatest sport and the most useful bit of shooting we had ever yet tumbled across. Our experience up to that date had been the usual one of firing at a hidden enemy who could see us plainly enough. You can't imagine how vastly we appreciated the turning of the tables. We didn't lose any time either, but fired as quickly as ever we could re-load. At about 1,200 yards'

range one of them came out of the saddle, to be quickly followed by another, and yet a third. Still they came on, and finally gained their point, although by that time one-fourth of them were down. I only saw one man turn back, and he was shot before he had gone twenty yards. Just as they were reaching cover, however, we were provided with a new diversion. There was a report from the ridge, and something that sounded like a Catherine-wheel off the pin came hurtling over the redoubt. They had turned a 7-pounder on us to cover the advance of their men. By this time most of the men from the position in front of us had retired and gained the shelter of the redoubt. Then we got the order to retire—I don't know why—and as we nipped across the open another shell came whizzing just over us—a very decent shot. A third followed, but did no damage." The severe punishment inflicted upon this party of Boers had the desired result.

The enemy repulsed.

They did not repeat their rushes, and as the long day declined their fire slackened. The weary troops still displayed the utmost vigilance, apprehending a night attack or some further effort to strengthen the force within the town. But the Boers had had enough. Their commandos were cowed by the heavy losses which had been sustained with little to show in exchange. In the course of the night there was some sharp firing, but this was only due to a British outpost, on its way back into the town under cover of darkness, encountering a number of Boers who were stealing out of the place. Next day the enemy had gone.

The British loss in this hard-fought affair was Major Edward Fletcher, an officer of distinguished service, one lieutenant, and 14 men killed, while 20 were wounded. Whether any British prisoners were taken by the enemy we are not told; but it is possible that some were, as certain of the outposts seem to have been rushed. According to a report made by General De la Rey, which was captured some weeks later, the enemy lost 14 killed and 38 wounded. But as, even in official



[Photo by Laurie, Lucknow.]

MAJOR FLETCHER,
1st Northumberland Fusiliers. Killed at
Lichtenburg.



ARMY MEDICAL CORPS MEN SCRUBBING THE CLOTHES OF PATIENTS
ON A "COMMANDEERED" TABLE.

and secret reports, they grossly understated their losses, it is probable that the real total of killed and wounded was not far below the 101 at which the British estimated it. Fifteen Boer prisoners were taken. De la Rey's report places the British losses at a figure "far heavier" than his own, and adds the significant statement that "we took several forts where all were shot dead, and other places where but one man was taken prisoner," from which it appears that in dealing with some of the outposts no quarter was given. Over 100 dead Boer horses were counted in front of the defences; such a loss the enemy could ill afford, as at this date De la Rey was in great straits for remounts, and a considerable number of his burghers had to act as infantry in consequence. Altogether the action at Lichtenburg proved a severe blow to him. Whereas

he had expected easily to take the town and get possession of the guns and stores, he was beaten off with heavy punishment. Lord Kitchener, the moment the news of the action reached him, telegraphed his warm congratulations to Colonel Money, the commandant of the

garrison, and to the troops. Lord Methuen, in whose district Lichtenburg was, also sent his congratulations.

Nearer to Pretoria and Johannesburg there was incessant fighting and skirmishing through the early months of 1901. During January fresh attempts were made to clear the Magaliesberg country of the enemy, though, as on former occasions, with but indifferent success. Since the Nooitgedacht affair the region had been traversed again and again by British mounted columns, yet the Boers still clung to the kloofs and kopjes in which the range abounds. On January 5, General Babington concentrated three columns at Rietfontein—the point to which Clements had retired after Nooitgedacht. These columns were

**Babington's columns
concentrate at
Rietfontein.**

Lieut. P. N. Normand, wounded	Captain R. W. R. Barnes, wounded	Captain J. Orr, wounded	Captain C. H. Mullins, wounded	Lieut. W. Curry, wounded	Lieut. Douglas Campbell, wounded	Lieut. Brabant, killed
Captain Clem Webb.	Elandslaagte and Ladysmith.	Elandslaagte.	Elandslaagte and Mafeking.	Elandslaagte, killed	Elandslaagte and Ladysmith.	Ladysmith.



Dr. W. T. F. Davies, Medical Officer. Major Wools Sampson, wounded Elandslaagte. Col. Scott Chisholm, killed Elandslaagte. Major Karri Davis, wounded Elandslaagte. Capt. J. C. Knapp, killed Ladysmith. Capt. and Qr.-Master Donaldson. Captain Lachlan Forbes, wounded Elandslaagte. Lieut. Huntley. Captain T. Fowler. Lieut. Cresswell. Lieut. A. N. Shore, wounded Elandslaagte and Ladysmith.
[Photo by H. W. Nicholls, Johannesburg]

OFFICERS OF THE IMPERIAL LIGHT HORSE AS AT FIRST CONSTITUTED.

This Volunteer regiment, consisting largely of Johannesburgers, has throughout the war shown conspicuous courage. As will be seen above, it lost very heavily in the early days of the Boer invasion of Natal. Major Wools Sampson, who was himself wounded at Elandslaagte, still commanded when the regiment fought at Zandfontein. Major Karri Davis was with the column which relieved Mafeking.

under the orders of Gordon, Kekewich (the defender of Kimberley), and Colleton. The object of the concentration was to attack and, if possible, crush a large Boer force under De la Rey, which had assembled to the north between Naauwpoort and Zandfontein. On the 6th the British marched out, Babington, with Kekewich and Colleton, forming the British left and Gordon the right. Though the

**Gordon's and Babington's troops exchange
shots in error.**

morning was not foggy, a white mist hung on the hills, obscuring, but not totally concealing, the view. The mist was responsible for a mistake which might have proved disastrous. Gordon's and Babington's troops mistook each other for Boers and opened a hot fire upon one another. The cover was good, and the mist

prevented good shooting, so that the error was discovered before anyone had been killed or wounded.

De la Rey, however, had heard the firing. To the north of and parallel to the road, along which the main body of Babington's column and all its transport were moving, rose a long and high ridge.

To the north of this ridge again ran a second, where De la Rey's main force was in position. The Boer general was fully under the impression that the British were engaged with Beyers' men, as Beyers was known to be in the neighbourhood. De la Rey saw the British convoy moving along the road, seemingly unprotected, and determined to bag it. It would give him supplies, clothing, ammunition, comforts—everything that he needed. And so, while our men were shooting at each other, some 500 or 600 Boers made a bold dash from the further to the nearer ridge, and at the same time one of their guns began to shell the rear of the convoy. The British commanders saw that the possession of the ridge was vital, and to seize it squadrons B and C of that famous irregular regiment, the Imperial Light Horse, from Babington's command, were sent forward at a furious gallop, while a troop of the 14th Hussars was pushed ahead on the right. And now on both sides of the ridge the two combatants were racing desperately towards the same goal. The

**De la Rey attacks
the British convoy.**

**Boers win
the ridge.**

Boers were the first to reach the summit. As the Light Horse came up, veterans of so many fights—for though the regiment had been filled up anew with recruits in October, 1900, its renown was such that it attracted the best material discharged from other regiments, such as the Protectorate Force, Brabant's Horse, Rimington's "Tigers," and Montmorency's Scouts—the men mechanically and instinctively extended. It was fortunate they did so,



I. Sheldon-Williams.

THE LIGHT HORSE CHECKED AT ZANDFONTEIN.

since this alone saved them from appalling loss. Suddenly, at a range of only 90 yards, the Boers ambushed in the long grass opened a terrific fire. The squadrons were thrown into momentary confusion and lost heavily. Colonel Sampson, who rode gallantly at the head of his men, gave the order to dismount and return the fire; but in a minute or two it was seen that no effective reply could be made to the enemy, as the Boers were above and could see perfectly, while the long grass only got in the way of our men when they were aiming. In B squadron two officers were speedily hit, and the command passed to Sergeant Green, who himself fell an instant later with his leg smashed by a Martini bullet.

**The Imperial Light
Horse in difficulties.**

The Light Horse, heavily outnumbered and surprised, stood no chance, and the order was given to them to retire. The moment the retreat began, the Boers dashed forward, firing as they advanced.

The convoy saved.

They carried off all the rifles, bandoliers, and saddles on which they could lay their hands, and then they, too, alarmed at the approach of British reinforcements, and at the movements of Babington's force, which threatened to turn their flank, rode back at a gallop. The Light Horse rallied and again advanced, and the convoy was saved; but the British loss was extremely serious. Out of 180 men in the two squadrons of the Imperial Light Horse, 18 were killed, 38 wounded, and almost as many more disarmed. The Boer loss in this affair is placed at 33—probably a mere guess. A court of inquiry upon the mishap was held some days later, but its report has not been made public.



F. J. Waugh.]

THE FAITHFUL PICKET AT ZUURFONTEIN.

CHAPTER XX.

KAALFONTEIN AND MODDERFONTEIN.

Beyers projected attack on Zuurfontein—Garrison repel the assault—Kaalfontein cut off—Preparing defences—Private Park's dash for reinforcements—Enemy driven back—Boer raid on Rand mines—Smuts attacks Modderfontein Nek in the Gatsrand—Brave but ineffectual defence of the garrison—General Cunningham marches to the Gatsrand—Ambushed Boers repulse his column—Unwonted humanity to British wounded—Smuts withdraws, jubilant—More raiding near Johannesburg—Horse sickness—Skirmishing at Bank and Krugersdorp—Death of Queen Victoria.



Beyers' projected attack on Zuurfontein. FEW days after the affair at Zandfontein there was further fighting in the neighbourhood of Pretoria. On the railway between Johannesburg and Pretoria are the two small wayside stations of Kaalfontein and Zuurfontein. Both were garrisoned by detachments of British troops, well entrenched. At Kaalfontein were 115 men, mainly of the 2nd Cheshire Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Williams-Freeman. At Zuurfontein there were 200 men of the Norfolks. At neither place were there any guns or Maxims. On the night of January 11-12 a strong force of Boers, under Commandant Beyers, crossed the railway south of Zuurfontein, on its way from the Magaliesberg to concentrate in the Eastern Transvaal for the invasion of Natal. Beyers seems to have thought that an attack on Zuurfontein would bring him plenty of glory with little risk. He sent a detachment to cut the telegraph wire to the north of the post, thus severing communication with Kaalfontein and Pretoria; another party cut the wire to the south. An attempt was then made in the grey light of dawn to rush the nearest outpost. The enemy, guided by a Kaffir through the wire entanglements, stealthily crept up to a tin hut, which was used by the picket as a shelter, and shouted, "Hands up!" covering the sentry on guard with their rifles. But the soldier was faithful to his trust. With calm courage he fired on his assailants and the seven men with him opened fire thus alarming the garrison and completely

foiling the enemy's skilfully planned surprise. Their conduct, however, cost the men of the picket dear. Of the eight two were killed and two wounded; the other four surrendered, having nobly done their duty and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.

The garrison of Zuurfontein, meanwhile, lined the trenches and opened fire upon the party of Boers which had assailed the picket. The enemy, under shelter of a ridge, which could not be occupied by the British for want of men, were able to creep in to within a hundred yards of the station, and then to fire volley after volley at it. Under cover of a heavy fusillade a determined attempt was made by a strong party of Boers to rush the British lines, but it was met in fine style and repulsed without difficulty. The enemy brought up no guns, and there were no hissing shells or whistling "Pom-Pom" projectiles to disturb our soldiers' aim. After two hours' heavy firing the Boers withdrew to the north, taking their killed and wounded with them. The total British loss was only two killed and two wounded.

At Kaalfontein the Boer attack was vigorously pressed, though, fortunately, with not more successful results than at Zuurfontein. It was reported that the enemy had buried guns and ammunition within the area held by the British detachment, and this may be the explanation of their anxiety to capture the place. As they appeared in sight of the garrison, a little before 7 a.m., a telegram was sent to Pretoria and the northward stations, warning the British commandants that Kaalfontein was being attacked. The wire had not yet been cut, and the message came just in time to save the Cape train, with the military mail for London, which was standing at

Olifantsfontein, the station next to the north of Kaalfontein, and which was upon the very point of leaving for the south. As Olifantsfontein was none too safe, in view of the proximity of so large a Boer force, the train retired to Irene, and ultimately to Pretoria. Meantime the Boers cut the wire and railway to the north of Kaalfontein and blew up a culvert to the south, thus isolating the post.

Within Kaalfontein all was bustle and excitement. The mules and horses were placed in a cutting parallel to the railway; an empty goods train arrived from Pretoria just about one minute before the Boers, and a lady who was on board it was placed in a bomb-proof. Silently the garrison lined the trenches, which were cut deep, after the Boer fashion, well loop-holed, with excellent head-cover, commanding the surrounding veldt. There

the men stood with their rifles ready and their officers fearlessly exposing themselves, waiting for the ball to open. On the brown surface of the sun-baked plain little dots showed and larger objects. The dots were men; the larger objects were two 12-pounders, one of them a gun captured from the British, and a



A. C. Ball.]

PROTECTED TRENCHES.



[Photo by Mitchell, Dublin.

PRIVATE PARK.

Maxim. At 3,000 yards the guns opened a rapid shell-fire; an instant later the Maxim joined in with its steady monotonous rattle. The brown dots spread and enveloped the post, and the faint double-pop, which is the sound of the Mauser, crackled over the face of the plain.

Seeing that he was being enveloped and that the attack was a serious one, delivered by a large force, Lieutenant Freeman determined to appeal for reinforcements. The wires were down; a human messenger must be employed. Accordingly he despatched Private Park, of the Cheshires, on this dangerous errand. Park had to run the gauntlet, and no sooner had he mounted and dashed forth to the north of Kaalfontein than he became the target of every Boer rifle in that quarter. A large party of the enemy, too, rode after him to cut him off, firing as they rode. There have been few more gallant or adventurous incidents in the war than this wild dash of a single brave private. Through the hail of bullets he tore unscathed; his pursuers pressed him for some moments of burning anxiety to all who watched; then to the indescribable relief of the beleaguered garrison he drew away and vanished to the north. To Olifantsfontein he rode without drawing bridle, and there placed a message on the wires for Lord Kitchener. The



J. H. Thornely.]

PRIVATE PARK'S RIDE.

moment it came in, reinforcements were ordered off. First went an armoured train with a 15-pounder and a company of infantry; then, behind this and supporting it, another train with more infantry, under Captain Geddes.

At Kaalfontein the Boers were pressing their attack, but under circumstances of difficulty. There was little or no cover, and they were thus unable to work in to close quarters without facing heavy loss. On the north, however, taking advantage of a hollow in the ground, they closed to some 700 yards; on the south a mealie patch enabled them to do the same. All the while their shrapnel were exploding over the station. Fortunately their artillerists fired too high, else matters might have gone very hardly with the handful of British troops in the trenches. As it was two shells passed through the station buildings, and one burst in the orderly's office. About 11 a.m. the shell fire slackened; a minute or two later came a desperate rush by a party of twenty Boers, who attempted to reach the station from the south. They were warmly received, and,


after a spell of magazine-fire, were driven back in disorder, leaving one man dead with a bullet through his head, close to the British works. Others were seen to fall, but their comrades got them away. About noon the attack was virtually over, with not so much as one scratch upon a single member of the British garrison, thus practically illustrating the almost complete security which good entrenchments bestow upon a defending force. A little later the armoured train from the north came snorting over the veldt, and to the south, far off on the sky-line, General W. G. Knox showed, coming up from Elandsfontein with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and a battery. The Boers saw that it was high time for them to be off. They had a huge transport train half-a-mile long, which they at once put in motion for the east, while they threw out a rear-guard and skirmished to delay Knox's advance. Knox fired a few shells, but he attempted no vigorous pursuit—probably because his force was inadequate to deal with 1,500 or more Boers. Eight wounded and unwounded prisoners were taken, all of them dressed in khaki and wearing British regimental badges, a breach of the customs of war which had now become too frequent to demand the slightest notice. Among the prisoners was Beyers' adjutant. Four dead Boers were found on the ground, and other bodies are believed to have been carried off.

Altogether this defence was creditable in the highest degree both to Freeman and his men. They behaved admirably, and were rewarded by the infliction of a severe check upon the Boers. It is,



HEAD-GEAR OF THE VAN RYN GOLD MINE.

Destroyed by the Boers, January 29, 1901.



CRUSHING BATTERY OF THE VAN RYN GOLD MINE.

Destroyed by the Boers, January 29, 1901.

however, to be regretted that Beyers was allowed to get away, though for this the garrison of course could not be blamed. The real cause was that the British Army was still insufficiently supplied with mounted men, and that, owing to the re-organisation which was then in progress, Lord Kitchener could not as yet undertake offensive operations on a large scale. This, at least, seems to be the only obvious explanation.

A week before these attacks

the enemy showed some activity to the south of Johannesburg, where they raided Klipriversberg and carried off a large number of cattle. Other of their raiding exploits in the neighbourhood of the "golden city" have already been detailed in a previous chapter. A few days after the fights at Kaalfontein and Zuurfontein, there was a sharp skirmish near Springs, without any other result than the killing of four Boers and one British trooper of the Johannesburg Rifles. On January 20 serious damage was done by a small party of


Boer raid on Rand mines.

the enemy, who raided the works at Brakpan, which supply the Rand with electric light and power.




TANK AND HEAD-GEAR, MODDERFONTEIN MINE.
Destroyed by the Boers, January 29, 1901.

with dynamite, the damage done amounting to £50,000. At the same time the Modderfontein Mine was attacked and yet more seriously injured. Sixty stamps were destroyed. No military purpose was served by these futile and stupid acts, which were instances of malicious and wanton destruction of property. They stand on quite a different footing from the burning by the British of farms which had harboured the enemy's forces or served as bases of supply. In all, the pecuniary loss caused by these attacks on the two mines and the electric-light works reached a figure not far short of £300,000. Precautions were taken after these incidents to guard the Rand more securely. The Rand Rifles, raised to protect the immense capital sunk in the



MODDERFONTEIN MINE: THE DYNAMOS AND SWITCHBOARD.



MODDERFONTEIN MINE: THE ENGINE-ROOM.

The photographs on these two pages fairly represent the average plant of a Rand mine. It is obvious that a large amount of mischief can be wrought in a few minutes.

The Boers injured the machinery and then retired. On the 29th a Boer commando again visited the Rand, and this time raided the Van Rhyn Mine. The head-gear of the shaft, the engine-house, one dwelling-house, the workshops, crushing plant with 160 stamps, and compressor-house were burnt, and one engine and the condensing plant ruined

goldfields, were hurriedly recruited to full strength and equipped, and the reef divided into eleven sections, of which the two extremes were most strongly garrisoned. But that the enemy should venture upon such acts in close proximity to one of the chief military centres in the Transvaal shows their enterprise and daring.

A few days after the injury to the mines a sanguinary and disastrous fight

took place at another
Smuts attacks Modderfontein Nek in the Gatsrand. Modderfontein, on the Gatsrand, to the south-west of

Krugersdorp. Of this affair only the most meagre details have been published hitherto, though the loss of a post

garrisoned by some 200 men is not a matter that can be lightly passed over. Modderfontein itself lies to the south of a long and continuous ridge of high kopjes which runs generally parallel to the Krugersdorp and Potchefstroom Railway. According to a soldier correspondent of the *Daily News* at the front, to whom we are indebted for many of our facts, column after column had scoured this



GENERAL HART WITH BOER REFUGEE CHILDREN AT KRUGERSDORP.

ridge of kopjes without effect. A dozen times the hills had been reported clear, but the enemy only retired from in front of the British—after a certain modicum of skirmishing—to reassemble in their rear. The railway, however, was kept open without much difficulty, as a considerable stretch of flat country intervened between it and the hills. At the end of 1900 it was decided to occupy with a chain of posts the passes across this line of kopjes, so as

to prevent the Boers crossing and re-crossing, and unearthing the guns and ammunition which they were supposed to have concealed in the mountains. At Buffelsdoorn, opposite Welverdiend, a pass which earlier in the war had been used by De Wet, General Hart stationed a small detachment in November; in December he sent two companies of South Wales Borderers and 30 mounted men with a Maxim to hold Modderfontein Nek, which lies some miles to the east of Buffelsdoorn. Presently one company of the Borderers was withdrawn, and then the 30 mounted men were wanted elsewhere. Thus it came to pass that a single company of infantry remained in a detached post, far from help, in country which was known to be the haunt of strong bodies of the enemy. If ever the Boers were invited to score an easy triumph it was here.

The company was too weak to hold the position effectively. To quote the *Daily News* correspondent: "The kopjes are of such extent that even from the highest point it is absolutely impossible to command any stretch of them, consisting, as they do, of an endless series of dips and flat ridges and spurs. Five times the number of men could scarcely keep them under thorough observation. Anyhow, there the 100 men were left; to the front a nek leading out on to the open, which we may call Modderfontein Pass; some distance away to their left another nek, and all round ridge upon ridge of these rocky kopjes. Behind them was some level country around Modderfontein itself; not far in the rear a large plantation of trees, and here and there farmhouses, with orchards, affording ample concealment for an enemy. Altogether, a spot where a small force stood not the slightest chance in case of attack, unless provided with guns and a properly-built fort; even then they could do little more than hold out pending the arrival of relief." No fort appears to have been constructed, because the materials and tools to construct it were wanting. There were, however, entrenchments. But with so diminutive a detachment it was practically impossible to provide adequate outposts and pickets.

Once a fortnight convoys with supplies left Krugersdorp and provisioned the post. Such a convoy left Krugersdorp on January 29, under the escort of 70 mounted men of the Yeomanry and



[Photo by Downer, Walford.]

LIEUTENANT GREEN.

Promoted from the ranks for distinguished conduct. Killed at Modderfontein (p. 400).

Marshall's Horse and 40 of the South Wales Borderers. Time after time the convoys had come and gone without incident, until the escorts had grown a little careless. But as the day wore on the heliograph at Modderfontein flashed the news to Krugersdorp that the Boers had appeared and had attacked the convoy. Five hundred of the enemy could be seen. They had laid an ambush at the point whence the garrison drew its water supply, had killed the warrant-officer in charge of the water-party, with three natives, wounded another man, and captured 15 privates and the water-cart. Thus at a blow the garrison had lost its means of obtaining water. The enemy then proceeded to attack the convoy, but, aided by the garrison, it was brought in safely, though not without some casualties. A message to this effect was heliographed to Krugersdorp, and an urgent appeal made for reinforcements. The Boers, it was reported, were hourly increasing in strength, and mustered at least 1,500 men. Further messages were flashed, each reporting some increase in the enemy's force or the arrival of more and more guns or "Pom-Poms," till it was known that the Boers had about 2,500 men on the ground, with four field-guns and a "Pom-Pom." Nothing, however, was done at Krugersdorp to afford relief before the evening of the 30th, though for weeks it had been a saying in every one's mouth that "as sure as fate those chaps at Modderfontein will all be cut up one of these fine days."

All the afternoon and evening of the 29th, and during the whole

of the 30th,
Brave but ineffectual the Boers
defence of the garrison.

poured in a heavy rifle and shell fire upon Modderfontein, sweeping the slopes of the kopje which was held by the British force, now—with the escort of the convoy—about 200 strong, under Captain



(Photo by Werner & Sons, Dublin.)

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. G. KNOX, K.C.B.

Born 1847. Joined the Royal Artillery, 1867; Captain, 1879; Major, 1880; Lieut.-Colonel, 1891; Colonel 1898; K.C.B., 1901. Served in the Abyssinian Campaign, 1867-8; in the Ashanti War, 1873; with the Red Cross Society in the Balkan Campaign, Russo-Turkish War, 1877; in the Afghan War, 1878-9; in the operations against Sekukuni, 1879. Colonel on the Staff, Natal, 1899-1900. Colonel Knox commanded the Artillery with much distinction during the successful defence of Ladysmith, notably in the sortie at Pepworth's Hill, and in April, 1900, took command of the 23rd Brigade, with local rank of Major-General, at Kroonstad, Orange River Colony.

Gray. The British Maxim could make no adequate reply to the projectiles of the Boer guns. Covered by a hail of explosive bullets, and under the personal direction of General Smuts, who had earned a high reputation as one of the most determined of the Boer commanders, the enemy made repeated and desperate attempts to rush the roughly-constructed British schanzes and trenches. Each time they were beaten back. A commandant and 50 Boers charged a schanze held by Captain Magniac of the Yeomanry and three men. The enemy brandished bayonets which they had taken from British



F. J. Waugh.]

"NO SURRENDER FOR US!"

Captain Magniac's reception of the Boer commandant at Modderfontein.


prisoners. Magniac coolly awaited them, and, as they closed, stood up and deliberately levelled his revolver at the Boer commandant. The commandant shouted "Hands up! Surrender!" to which Magniac replied defiantly, "No surrender for us!" and fired, killing his enemy. There was a sharp hand-to-hand fight and the Boers recoiled, but Magniac was left upon the ground.

All the evening the fighting continued, close and desperate. Several men were killed, among them Lieutenant Green, a young and promising soldier, who had just won his promotion from the

ranks of the Yeomanry. The Boers lurked in the rocks, not 50 yards away, and shot incessantly at all who showed themselves. What added to the sufferings of the little garrison was the want of water—a horrible torment in such a climate, even without the fierce thirst which comes upon those who are facing the dangers of battle. When darkness fell there was no rest, no intermission in the combat, for the exhausted troops. The enemy maintained a desultory fire. Rain, however, fell in sheets and somewhat allayed the sufferings of our men. Late in the night an outlying picket was rushed and overwhelmed; just as day was dawning the enemy assaulted the main position, swarming up in hundreds. Though the kopje was now lost beyond a peradventure, the British fought to the last. Not till two or three rifles were levelled over the schanze-tops at each man did the garrison surrender. Then followed a horrible scene. The Boers collected the Kaffir mule-drivers and shot them down in cold blood. The strongest remonstrances were addressed to them by some of the soldiers who watched with horror this cruel deed; but the reply of the Boers was that they meant in future to kill all the blacks found with the British. Otherwise they behaved well to the white prisoners and the wounded, and General Smuts expressed his personal sorrow at the fact that Surgeon Walker, who had displayed the most intrepid gallantry, had been killed.

The British losses in this lamentable affair were Lieutenant Green and Surgeon Walker killed;

Captain Magniac and Lieutenant Crawley wounded. Of the rank and file about 30 were killed or wounded, and about 190 taken prisoners and disarmed. In this case no blame whatever can be said to attach to the defeated force. It displayed exceptional endurance and courage. Nothing more could be expected under the circumstances than what it actually achieved. But the general criticism of the *Daily News* correspondent is not without value as the opinion of an able man upon the spot, though coloured, it may be, with Pro-Boer sympathies. "It is not easy," he says, "to use temperate language in speaking of the causes which brought about this lamentable affair. The main responsibility



S. H. Vedder.]

MASSACRE OF THE UNARMED KAFFIR MULE-DRIVERS AT MODDERFONTEIN.

rests upon the officer—probably a general officer—who established this post. Upon whose advice the post was established it is difficult to know, but probably, if there were any such scheme as I have suggested in view at headquarters, the selection of the positions and the strength of the garrisons would have been determined upon the advice of the general officer who had most recently been traversing that part of the country. No exception could be taken to the choice of the position, as I have already explained; to garrison it with 100 men was a piece of criminal incapacity of which one would have supposed (had not previous experience in this campaign taught one differently) no general could possibly be capable." Among the prizes which fell to the enemy were the waggons and stores in the convoy, and many thousand rounds of ammunition. What the Boer loss was is unknown, but it is thought to have been heavier than that of the British.

Meanwhile, on the evening of the 30th—the surrender took place early on the 31st—Colonel Roche, of the South Wales Borderers, had hurried off from Krugersdorp with some hundreds of mounted men, the remnant of the Borderers, four 12-pounders of P Battery, and a "Pom-Pom," to make a night march, and, if possible, relieve the beleaguered detachment. Unfortunately his force was altogether too weak, and actually it ran the gravest of risks. To venture up against 2,500 enemies with less than a thousand men was a proceeding which might well have resulted in a



THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTABULARY AT LANCASTER MINE, KRUGERSDORP.
In the foreground is Captain McDonell, S.A.C.

second disaster. Colonel Roche, however, very wisely did not commit his little force to a serious trial of strength with the Boers. Just after sunrise of January 31 he attacked the Boer position, and during the whole of the morning skirmished with the enemy. Finding they were too strong to be dislodged by his command, he drew off about 2 p.m., having effected little. The beleaguered post had already surrendered, and there was nothing to be gained by prolonging the combat when any success was, from the want of numbers on our side, quite out of the question. On February 1 General

**General Cunningham
marches to the
Gatsrand.**

Cunningham arrived at Krugersdorp and took charge. He made a night march to Modderfontein, reaching the Boer position at 6 a.m. of the 2nd. There was no sign whatever of the enemy. The hills rose, silent and bare, in front; not a Boer could be detected with field-glasses. Yet from Roodepoort, which lies eight miles to the east of Modderfontein, and which at this date was garrisoned by six hundred of the new South African Constabulary, the news was heliographed that the enemy were in great force, from two to three thousand strong, directly in Cunningham's front, and holding a line ten miles long. That appearances were deceptive, where the Boers were concerned, had been proved again and again in this war. Cunningham, however, seems scarcely to have believed that the enemy could be there without giving any sign of their presence. He sent forward a squadron of Kitchener's Horse to scout and draw the Boer fire.

The troopers rode towards the heights of the Gatsrand. Not a shot was fired at them. The stony slopes were still silent and inanimate. Now the horsemen neared a group of kopjes, which lie

some little distance to the north of the main Gatsrand ridge, completely detached from it. They were barely 200 yards away from these kopjes when from the stony slopes burst the continuous crackle of magazine fire, and a "Pom-Pom" was turned upon them. Some galloped back through the hail of bullets, others dismounted and flung themselves flat on the ground, knowing from long experience in Boer warfare that this was

**Ambushed Boers repulse
his column.**

the safest course, when attack on their part was impossible, and intending to retire under cover of darkness. Seeing that the information he had received was true, Cunningham made an unsuccessful attempt to turn the Boer left. This failed, as the left seemed to run interminably to the west. At nightfall the British for the second time fell back, with 9 killed and 31 wounded. On February 3, reinforcements reached Cunningham, including the Border Regiment, another squadron of Kitchener's Horse, and a battery of artillery. On the 4th he renewed the attack. The infantry demonstrated against the enemy's front, while the mounted men worked round the left flank. The outlying kopjes were carried by the infantry after desultory fighting, but one unfortunate company of the Border Regiment which went too far was virtually annihilated. The enemy waited in ambush, after their usual fashion, till the British were within 150 yards, and then let fly with dreadful effect. Of 82 men, some 40 were killed or wounded. The others threw themselves down. The Boers



Major Wilberforce,
Commandant of the depot of S.A. Constabulary.

Major-General Baden-Powell.

GENERAL BADEN-POWELL REVIEWING HIS SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTABULARY AT MODDERFONTEIN.

On October 9, 1900, exactly one year after the commencement of hostilities in South Africa, the Colonial Office notified that recruiting for General Baden-Powell's Transvaal Constabulary would take place in South Africa only. From Pretoria it was reported that the force was very popular. For 300 vacancies for officers, 900 applications were received. Numbers of New Zealanders, Australians, Yeomanry, and Colonial Volunteers joined the force. On November 14th, 1900, one thousand recruits were asked for in London. The pay offered was, for warrant officers, 15s. per day; staff-sergeants, 10s. per day; corporals, 7s. 6d. per day; first class troopers, 7s. per day; second-class troopers, 6s. per day; third-class troopers, 5s. per day. Commissions were promised through the ranks; the engagement was for three years. The Constabulary, once drilled and organised, soon found work to do, and the Transvaal having been divided up into wards, they distributed themselves over a large area, and have done excellent service.

behaved with great, indeed, almost unmilitary, humanity on this occasion, and as we have had so often to blame them for their conduct it is pleasant here to be able to give them praise. They carefully abstained from firing at or shelling the prostrate men, so long as they lay quiet, no doubt out of regard for the wounded; and this though the unwounded soldiers still fired from time to time and showed no intention of surrendering. Eventually Cunningham found it impossible to extricate these men and had to abandon them. They were captured and added to the melancholy tale of British soldiers disarmed by the enemy, though, as the Boers could not guard, keep, or feed their prisoners, they had to be speedily released.

If Cunningham was unsuccessful, he was at any rate persistent, and that is much in war. On the 5th, he again attacked, but this time he moved to Roodepoort and assailed the enemy's right with the aid of the South African Constabulary. The Boers on this occasion did not wait for him, but precipitately retired to the west. They were seen riding away and they were not followed. Thus no punishment of any kind was inflicted upon them, though from first to last they had inflicted upon the British Army a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners of about 350 men. Little was said

**Unwonted humanity to
British wounded.**

of this affair in the official dispatches, but the general result was extremely humiliating. To drive Smuts' large force away to the west, columns under Colonels Shekleton and Benson were instructed to co-operate with Cunningham, while Lord Methuen, towards the end of February, was brought up to Potchefstroom. Yet Smuts remained unbeaten, and the clearance of the Gatsrand was a clearance only in name.

Smuts, who had received an English University education, is honourably distinguished among the Boer leaders for the extreme consideration which he showed to the wounded. The British surgeons went to his camp after the fighting to attend both to his prisoners and to his own men. They reported that the Boer women drove from the farms round—a statement which, by the way, shows that in February these farms had not been cleared—bringing delicacies of all kind for those in hospital and showing the wounded extreme kindness. The enemy were jubilant over their series of successes, as well they might be. Indeed, when the true, or approximately true, story of these events is told, it is seen that the Boers had much of which to boast. In close proximity to Johannesburg and Krugersdorp, they had stealthily assembled a large force, captured a British post, and thrice repulsed a column which sought to avenge the mishap.

**Smuts withdraws,
jubilant.**



POTCHEFSTROOM.

Potchefstroom is a pretty, willow-shaded, well-watered town on the banks of the Mooi, or "beautiful" river. It is in the centre of a considerable agricultural district, and has, normally, a population of about 5,000. Its main interest lies in the fact that it is the oldest town in the Transvaal, of which country it was long the capital. It was founded by the old Voortrekker, Potgieter, in 1839, so that, compared with it, Johannesburg and Pretoria are mere mushroom towns. In the Boer War of 1881 there was a siege of the town, when Colonel Winsloe, after losing a large number of men, was starved out and compelled to surrender in spite of the fact that an armistice between the British and Boer armies had been in existence for a fortnight, knowledge of the fact having been carefully kept by the Boers from the beleaguered garrison. (See the note below Cronje's portrait, "With the Flag to Pretoria," Vol. I, p. 157.)

Early in February the enemy appeared on the show ground, which was actually in Johannesburg, and thence carried off 1,700 head of cattle. A day or two later they raided the stores of the Crown Deep Mine, and helped themselves liberally to the provisions which they found there. They then descended upon Bezuidenhout's Farm, where were a large number of remounts, and took all the serviceable horses. At the close of February the condition of Johannesburg is described by an inhabitant "as practically a state of siege. The Boers are only an hour or two from here and take all they want in the way of horses, oxen, and mules."

**More raiding near
Johannesburg.**

Round Johannesburg and Pretoria at this date the horse-sickness had become most troublesome, and was seriously hampering the British authorities. "About 60 a day are dying in Pretoria alone,"

Horse sickness.

writes a correspondent on January 25. "New orders have been issued, instructing officers in the preventive measures that may be taken, but these are not of much use where the animals are necessarily left out of shelter at night. The disease, when once it gets hold of the horse, is seldom curable. . . . One morning he appears dull and watery about the eyes. He



THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY HOSPITAL, DEELFONTEIN.

When it was decided at the end of 1899 to send to South Africa a force of Imperial Yeomanry, several ladies formed a committee with the (then) Princess of Wales as president, and Lady Georgiana Curzon as chairman, to collect funds for an Imperial Yeomanry Hospital. A base hospital was formed to contain 625 beds, at an estimated cost of £50,000 for six months, among them named and equipped beds presented by the late Queen, the Princess of Wales (Queen Alexandra), the Princess Louise (Duchess of Argyll), and the Duchess of York. Deelfontein, 29 miles south of De Aar, 4,460 feet above sea level, on the veldt, was chosen as a site for the hospital, where the first batch of patients arrived on March 18, 1900. The wards varied in size, containing from 10 to 20 beds each. After the establishment of the base hospital, a field hospital and a bearer corps were instituted in connection with it. Later on a large building in Pretoria was obtained, and here it was that Prince Christian Victor of Teck died (p. 406).



No. 270.

Special Army Order.**SOUTH AFRICAN FIELD FORCE.**ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
PRETORIA.

24th January, 1901.

DEATH OF HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA—

The following telegram has been received from the Adjutant-General, War Office, dated London, 23rd January, 1901:—

"Commander-in-Chief deeply regrets to inform you of the death of Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof, Empress of India, who departed this life at 6-30 p.m., 22nd January, at Osborne House, Isle of Wight."

The following from Lord Kitchener has been sent in reply:—

"The news of the Queen's death has been received with the greatest grief by the Army in South Africa. In their name I beg to express our sincere condolences with the Royal Family on the great loss sustained by them and the Nation."

By Order.

W. F. KELLY, Major-General,
Adjutant-General

4

looks sleepy. During the day he develops a cough and begins to have difficulty in breathing . . . A few hours later he is in a state of collapse and the same night he dies." The only consolation was that the enemy suffered in much the same degree. But they seem to have had an abundant supply of remounts; moreover, the Boer was a born horsemaster and did not use up remounts at anything like the pace of the British trooper, whether of the cavalry, mounted infantry, or Colonial irregulars.

On February 14, 700 Boers, probably detached from Smuts' command, attacked Bank station on

Skirmishing at Bank and Krugersdorp.

the Potchefstroom Railway, and were able to damage one span of the bridge, which at that point crosses the Wonderfontein river, before they were repulsed. On the 15th the place was again attacked, without success. Three days previously a patrol from General Babington's force of cavalry, which was operating in the Krugersdorp district, captured a small Boer post. About this same time a number of foreign desperadoes, who had been causing trouble on the Krugersdorp line, perpetually destroying or attempting to destroy culverts and bridges, were

captured. They were taken to Krugersdorp and confined there, when they made a desperate attempt to break out of prison. They fell upon the guard, and in the *mêlée* that ensued two of them were shot dead. The others were secured before they could escape.

We have left to this point mention of the death of Queen Victoria, the news of which reached South Africa on the night of January 22, adding to the general gloom. She was

**Death of Queen
Victoria.**

lamented by all; by the British, who felt

that with her one of the most splendid eras of their history had ended, that her loss had deprived them of a ruler of supreme wisdom, vast influence, and extraordinary experience; by the Boers, who had always looked up to her, even in the hours of war, as a model of probity and moderation. That she had felt most bitterly in her own home and person the inevitable sorrows of war, added to the Army's veneration and regard for her. Her grandson, Prince




THE MOURNING FOR
QUEEN VICTORIA.

Wreaths at the foot of the statue opposite the Parliament House, Capetown.

Christian Victor, had been among those who laid down their lives for the cause, dying of enteric fever at Pretoria. Those who knew her best, and saw her during her last days, tell how her eyes were red with tears for the sad sacrifice of noble blood. -So, when she passed away,

the Army lost a beloved friend. One of her last questions, as her feet went down to the river of death, was concerning Lord Kitchener and the gallant Army under his command.

On January 24 Lord Kitchener issued a special order, placing on record the Army's sorrow; of this order a facsimile is given on page 405. On the 25th a special salute of 81 guns was fired. From Capetown, from Pietermaritzburg, from Bloemfontein, came the same tidings of sorrow, the same messages of sympathy and eternal regret. The flags were half-masted; the troops paraded with arms reversed; the symbols of grief were imposing, but more moving was the universal sorrow.



THE MOURNING IN CAPE COLONY.

Memorial service at Cradock. Similar services were held all over the Colony.



GOD SAVE THE KING!

Photo by "The Cape Times."

The Town Clerk of Capetown reading the proclamation of King Edward VII. from the temporary stand in front of the Town House.

CHAPTER XXI.

STATE OF THE BOER ARMY. THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Proclamation of King Edward VII.—Lord Kitchener returns to Pretoria—The moment not propitious for negotiations—Boers maintain their demand for independence—They rely on fickleness of party politics—Distribution of Boer forces—Mrs. Botha as intermediary—Boer council of war—Murder of the peace envoy, De Kock—Meeting at Middelburg—Botha's account of the interview—His statements not to be accepted—Lord Kitchener's version—Representative government—Arming of natives—Language question—Franchise, church property, public trusts, and debts—Pecuniary aid—Conclusion of the conference—Criticism of Kitchener's terms—Revision by the Home Government—Curt rejection by the Boers.



SCARCELY had the guns at Pretoria ceased firing their last salute to the departed Queen when at Johannesburg they roared in honour of the new King, Edward VII.,

Proclamation of King Edward VII.

who was proclaimed "Supreme Lord of and over the Transvaal." The Queen's death was not without considerable political effect upon the course of events in South Africa. It is said by

those who should know—though precise information on this subject is not likely to be available till ten or twenty years have passed—that the German Emperor,

on his filial visit to his august ancestress's dying bed, urged the King most strongly to make proposals of peace to the enemy—proposals which would not humiliate the Boers and which could have been accepted by them without ignominy—on the ground that such action would conciliate public opinion throughout the world. That the story has some foundation would appear from the negotiations which followed in February and March, and which will be detailed in another chapter. If it be true, it undoubtedly explains much that would otherwise be almost inexplicable.

Presumably in obedience to instructions from London, directing him to open negotiations and ascertain the intentions of the Boers, Lord Kitchener returned by railway from De Aar, where he had been superintending the operations against De Wet, to Pretoria. So unsafe was the line at this date that even his train could not be secured from molestation. On February 18, to the south of Johannesburg,



THE WRECKED PILOT-ENGINE TO LORD KITCHENER'S TRAIN.

between Klip River and Elandsfontein, a pilot engine with four trucks, preceding his train, was blown up and derailed. The luckless engine-driver was scalded to death. An armoured truck, with a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment, was then sent forward, and under Lord Kitchener's eyes they drove off the Boers with a loss to our troops of two killed. Lord Kitchener reached Pretoria without further incident that evening.

Lord Kitchener returns to Pretoria.

It must be confessed that the omens were not by any means favourable to negotiations. From the British standpoint the independence so obstinately demanded by the Boers could not for one moment be granted. To have conceded it would have meant an acknowledgment that the enemy had been victorious in the war, since before the struggle, whatever view be taken as to the disputed question of "suzerainty," Britain had the right to reject foreign treaties concluded by the Transvaal, and the existence of such a right is incompatible with independence. We should then, after a war in which we claimed to have been successful, have given the Transvaal something which it did not originally possess. Alone of the two Boer republics the Free State had been independent from the first. There was, too, this further consideration, which had immense weight with the nation and its statesmen. Any peace that left the Boers independence would

The moment not propitious for negotiations.

leave them the power to renew the conflict at some future date, and possibly under better conditions, when England was embroiled with some European power. In that case, if the struggle had to be fought out once more, to what purpose would England have expended a hundred millions of money and many thousands of lives?

The Boers, on their part, stubbornly demanded independence, and would rest content with nothing short of independence. Little had happened since the capture of Cronje in



LORD KITCHENER SURVEYING THE WRECKAGE AT KLIP'S DRIFT, CAUSED BY AN EXPLOSION INTENDED TO DESTROY HIMSELF.

[After a photo by Dr. Stanley.]

February, 1900, and of Prinsloo in August of that year, to break down their will. No serious blows had been inflicted upon them; their losses had not been heavy, while they had inflicted numerous small defeats upon the British. They had captured post after post, cut off detachment after detachment, and laid sacrilegious hands upon no few of the British guns. During the South African summer of 1900-1901 the tide of British

Boers maintain their demand for independence.

conquest had not advanced. General French's sweeping movement in the Eastern Transvaal was only just beginning at the date of which we write. On the other hand, while the British had gained no ground, the Boer invasion of Cape Colony had vastly extended the area of operations and the responsibilities of the British commanders. It was a fair offset to the work of our mobile columns, which had to march again and again over the self-same ground, and which had not by February, 1901, succeeded in effectively conquering a thousand square miles of Transvaal territory. Each month, each march cannot but have strengthened the Boer conviction that, whatever the English might do or attempt, they could never catch the fast-moving commandos. So long as ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand fleet horsemen remained in the field, waging guerilla war, descending suddenly on weak posts, concentrating against and overwhelming small detachments, and doing all this, too, with complete impunity, the struggle was far from hopeless. The longer it was protracted the greater the chance of foreign intervention.

Thus it would be absurd to represent the enemy's plight as hopeless. What,

They rely on fickleness of party politics. perhaps, inspired most hope in the Boer's

heart was the firm belief that England had only to be withstood, when, sooner or later, her patience would be exhausted or the party in power replaced. The Boers, from imperfect knowledge of England, imagined that one party could always be trusted to undo what the other had done. They were unquestionably encouraged by the great clatter which the insignificant peace faction was making in England about this time. Moreover, one and all could look back to Majuba and recall that instance of abject



SCHALK BURGER,
"Acting President of the Transvaal Republic."

[Photo by L. Weinthal.]

surrender after a British Government had protested that it never would give up the Transvaal. In view of the teaching of history, a second surrender was by no means out of the question, if only the Boers made themselves troublesome enough in the field.

Printed orders and dispositions which were captured by the British at the end of 1900, show that the enemy still had over 20,000 men under arms. In the Transvaal Smuts had 1,500 men

Distribution of Boer forces.

in the Ermelo district; Erasmus 1,500 near Middelburg; Beyers 2,000 in the Waterberg; De la Rey 1,800 at Rustenburg, while near Lydenburg there were 1,000 in the field; in the Zeerust district 1,500; in the Wolmaranstad region 600; in the Klerksdorp district 400, under Liebenberg; near Potchefstroom 400, under the renegade Doulthwaite;



SUMMIT OF MAJUBA.

Reference has frequently been made in these pages to the British defeat at Majuba. The details of the disaster may be related here. In the Transvaal War of 1881, Sir George Colley, having met with severe reverses at Laing's Nek on January 28, and on the Ingogo Heights on February 8, determined to seize Majuba Hill, which commanded the right of the Boer position on Laing's Nek. The hill was daily occupied and nightly evacuated by the Boer pickets; therefore, on Saturday evening, February 26, led by Major Fraser, with two Kaffir guides, a column consisting of two companies of the 58th Regiment, two companies of the 60th Rifles, three companies of the 92nd Highlanders, and part of the Naval Brigade with a Gatling gun—in all 554 men—silently left the camp at Mount Prospect, and climbed one of the two ridges terminating in the summit of Majuba. Two entrenched outposts were stationed *en route*, and the climb up the steep ascent to the bowl-shaped ridge and defensive preparations were accomplished by sunrise. The Boers in their camp below soon discovered that no counter attack was in preparation, and having ascertained that no reinforcements were on the way from Newcastle, gradually encircled the hill, skirmishing up among the boulders under cover of their own curtain of smoke. So secure did Sir George Colley deem his position that proper entrenchments were neglected; hence the terrible disaster. The Boers broke through the line of defence, the British reserves, when called up, failed in adequate response, and the second rush of the enemy, who, though picked shots, actually numbered less than 200, caused an immediate stampede of the British away from the summit, only partially checked by the outpost of Highlanders on the ridge. In vain Sir George Colley, with his subordinate officers, tried to arrest the panic. He was shot through the forehead, facing the enemy. The British lost 92 killed, 134 wounded, besides prisoners; the Boers under the leadership of Nikolaas Smits lost only one killed and five wounded. Steps were at once taken by Sir Evelyn Wood to repair the disaster, but Mr. Gladstone instructed him to make terms with the enemy, and the British agreed, on March 21, 1881, to evacuate the Transvaal.



MAJUBA, FROM MOUNT PROSPECT CEMETERY.



WHERE COLLEY FELL.

near Heidelberg 800; and about Vryheid 1,000. In the Orange River Colony 3,000 men under De Wet were in arms, and another 2,000 in scattered bands over the face of the country. In Cape Colony the raiding commandos and rebels numbered in February over 3,000 men.

In January Mrs. Botha, the wife of the Transvaal Commandant-General, Louis Botha, applied to Lord Kitchener for leave to visit her husband. This leave was readily granted, as it had often been granted before. It was an extraordinary

situation that the wife of the Boer Commander-in-Chief should be permitted, not merely to reside in

Pretoria after the British occupation of that town, but to go backwards and forwards between the British and Boer headquarters. Living at Pretoria she must have been able to obtain valuable information, which she would naturally impart to her husband. She was on terms of friendship with many officers of the British Staff, and it is difficult to suppose that secrets did not occasionally leak out in her presence. As all this time a most rigid censorship was being enforced to prevent military news from being written or telegraphed home, the anomaly is more striking. Mrs. Botha might reasonably have been requested at the outset either to leave South Africa under a British safe-conduct, or to join her husband. But she seems to have produced on the minds of our military authorities the erroneous impression that she burned for peace.



MR. AND MRS. LOUIS BOTHA.

[Photo by S. L. Rossini, Johannesburg.]

On this occasion Lord Kitchener personally asked Mrs. Botha to point out to her husband the uselessness of further fighting, and suggested that a peace might be arranged. This, at least, is the story as told by Botha, and given to the world by Dr. Bierens de Haan, of the Dutch ambulance. According to

Mrs. Botha as intermediary.

Botha, his wife, who, no doubt, had reasons for not accepting Lord Kitchener's view of the situation, declined to dissuade her husband from continuing the war. However, she promised to take a message suggesting a meeting of the two generals, with the express proviso, according to Lord Kitchener, but not according to Botha, that the independence of the Boer republics was not to be discussed in any way. She left, then, with this mission, and met Botha at

Boer council of war.

Klipstapel. As soon as he learned Lord Kitchener's proposals he moved to Tantesberg, and there consulted his Executive Council, including, we suppose, the Acting-President of the Transvaal Government, Schalk Burger. Botha had nothing to lose, if he had also nothing to

gain, by discussing peace possibilities with the British Commander-in-Chief. If the terms offered were generous, the burghers on commando could be encouraged by the story that the British Government, despairing of victory, was striving to coax them into surrender. If the terms were such as a conqueror would naturally impose, the commandos could be urged to stiffen their backs, and hold out for something more favourable.



MEYER DE KOCK, THE PEACE ENVOY SHOT BY THE BOERS.

Mr. De Kock was instrumental in forming the Burgher Peace Commission at Pretoria, and was allowed by the military authorities to return to Belfast to work in the interests of peace. On January 21, 1901, he undertook to deliver a despatch from General Smith-Dorrien to General Botha, and left Belfast under the white flag. De Kock was taken prisoner by the Boers, and tried for high treason at Roosenekal, the charge being based on papers relating to the meetings of the Peace Commission. He was sentenced to death, and a despatch from General Viljoen to the officer commanding at Belfast notified him that De Kock was shot on February 12. He left a wife and five children.

While this Boer Council of War was in progress, it would seem that one more unlucky peace-envoy was put to death—no doubt by way of defiance to the British, who had quietly acquiesced in so many atrocities. On January 18 the Peace Committee at Belfast applied to the Boer Field-Cornet Tante, of Steenkampsberg, for a safe-conduct, that they might meet him near Belfast and discuss peace with him. Doubtless the safe-conduct was accorded. The next item of news is the death-certificate of one of the unhappy envoys, showing how the Boers kept their faith. It is culled from a collection of Boer documents, published in a parliamentary paper. "CERTIFICATE.—On the 12th February, in my presence, the executed Meyer de Kock was shot; three bullets entered the chest, one of which entered the heart. Death was instantaneous; thus the burial could take place immediately. De Jeugd, February 19, 1901. Dr. Menning, Johannesburg Police Ambulance."

This cold-blooded record of a terrible crime will cause a shudder. But, if the British authorities allowed this man to go forth to his doom, was it not their duty to avenge him, if, as was the case, he was treacherously murdered? Was not the honour of an army and a nation involved? Or was it taken as a matter of course that peace-envoys, like Kaffir mule-drivers, were proper billets for Boer bullets?

Whatever the answer to these questions, no notice of the murder seems to have been taken by the British authorities. The nation at home knew nothing. For fear of irritating it against the generous and noble Boer, such facts were suppressed by the censorship. On February 22, Mrs. Botha returned to Pretoria with a letter from Botha to the effect that he had consulted his generals on the express understanding that the question of the independence of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony was not to be raised, and was ready to meet the British Commander-in-Chief. The time was, after some further correspondence, fixed as February 28, and the place Middelburg.

Meeting at Middelburg.



MIDDELBURG, WHERE LORD KITCHENER MET GENERAL BOTHA.

"I was accompanied," says Botha in his account of the interview, "by Mr. Van Velden, Mr. Schalk Burger's secretary [who, we may note, was probably sent by the Acting-President to keep a sharp eye on his Commandant-General's words and acts, as even Botha was not altogether above suspicion], and my own military secretary, Mr. De Wet. We selected the best horses in our camp and applied a piece of soap to my own white stallion—a wasteful, profligate sort of thing to do, as soap is a rare luxury with us. But we wanted to look our best. Three miles outside the village we were met by a large British escort, and greeted with military honours by the staff officer in command. We rode along at first, but presently we broke into a gallop, leaving the escort some distance behind us. Arrived at the British headquarters,

Botha's account of the interview.

Lord Kitchener came out to meet us, and offering me his arm, led me into a room. The British General rapidly opened the conversation, but I insisted upon the presence of my secretaries, in which Kitchener acquiesced. His Lordship was the only one present as representing the British."

The "slimness" of the Boer leader in taking care himself to have witnesses, while his enemy had none, is to be remarked. It enabled him, at least, to colour



GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA AND HIS STAFF RIDING INTO MIDDELBURG TO MEET LORD KITCHENER.

his report of the interview. It is, then, scarcely surprising to find that, accord-

His statements not to be accepted.

ing to his record, no notice was taken by Lord Kitchener of the murder of the various peace-envoys, or that he forthwith proceeded to repudiate the understanding under which the conference had been arranged, by bringing up the subject of independence. "I intimated at once," he says, "that the independence

of the Republics would be the primary and essential condition of any compromise we might arrive at.. Lord Kitchener replied that His Majesty's Government never could or would assent to a restoration of Boer independence, but added that he was prepared to make a number of proposals. He told me that Sir Alfred Milner had been appointed Governor of our territory, a fact I had already gleaned from newspapers we captured. 'It would be as well for you,' he said, 'to meet the High Commissioner.' I replied that I had no wish to see Sir Alfred Milner. 'Why not?' inquired Lord Kitchener, 'he is such a nice man.' 'That may be,' I retorted, 'but I decline, all the same, to have anything to do with him.' 'Surely, General Botha, you are strangely prejudiced against Sir Alfred—probably because you don't know him. If you once get to know him you will certainly alter



HOUSE IN MIDDELBURG IN WHICH LORD KITCHENER AND GENERAL BOTHA MET.
The house was the headquarters of General Lyttelton, who was away in Cape Colony at the time.


your opinion,' said Kitchener. I replied 'No, sir; I am too familiar with recent South African history, and probably know considerably more than even your Excellency of Sir Alfred's acts and opinions. The fact is, that I and every other of my Afrikaner compatriots have lost faith in this man, whom we regard as the man of all men who has done most to bring about this present trouble.'

"The conversation then developed. I expressed my astonishment that the British Government should be so singularly tactless as to instal at the head of affairs this man, who had done nothing but sow hatred and create race rancour among the two white peoples of South Africa, when it was obviously the interest and aim of British policy in South Africa to conciliate the two races. The conversation travelled to other matters. Lord Kitchener inquired if, his proposals being acceptable to my government, but not agreeable to Steyn's and De Wet's Boers, the Transvaalers would stop fighting, to which I replied, 'No; we commenced this war together, and we will continue and end it together.'"

The enemy unquestionably feared Sir Alfred Milner because he knew too much, because he was firm as a rock, and because he had that sympathy with the Uitlanders which the military authorities, almost without exception, lacked. No doubt the Boers thought that, with this inconveniently well-informed and determined statesman out of the way, they would be able to trick or cajole the military authorities into conceding terms such as



MR. SMUTS,
Late State Attorney of the Transvaal.



MR. F. R. REITZ,
State Secretary during the late Boer Administration of the Transvaal.

Mr. Reitz, State Secretary of the Transvaal, succeeded Dr. Leyds in that responsible position. Formerly he was President of the Orange Free State, and during his tenure of that office he did good work, although he more than once showed himself to be a weak man in great crises. He is undoubtedly honest in comparison with the average official in former government circles in Pretoria, and he never abused his position. Although ardently attached to Mr. Kruger and his régime, he is hardly a Boer at all, and by ties of marriage and consanguinity he is related to many perfectly loyal Colonial families. Since the war began he has thrown in his lot with Mr. Steyn.

would give them all that they wanted. Before going to work upon the terms, however, Botha by his own account, which, as we have said, must be received with no little suspicion, lodged a series of complaints against the British for their inhumanity. The effrontery of his action, in view of the quite recent murders of the peace envoys, as also the tone of the answers which he puts into Lord Kitchener's mouth, would be not a little surprising did we not bear in mind that the Boer leaders have all along "played to the gallery;" that their concern has been, not to tell the truth, but to influence their own partisans against the British. But the passage must be reproduced in his own words:

"I protested against the maltreatment of the women and children of burghers still fighting, and the burning of farms and the thousand and one other useless acts of vandalism and cruelty. Lord Kitchener promised to institute inquiries into some of the more flagrant incidents I cited, stating that such acts were outside of and in antagonism with his orders.

"'But,' Lord Kitchener contended, 'every Boer farmhouse appears to be a Boer commissariat, and, under the circumstances, I had no choice but to deport these families, who I believe are very fairly treated.'

"I again protested against the forcible deportation of the old and weak, of the non-combatant population, of the ill-treatment of our women by Kaffirs, who accompany the British troops. Lord Kitchener promised to investigate these matters; but in the past he has made similar promises, and failed to carry them out. 'Many farms,' the British general added, 'have been burned by irresponsible officers; I will punish the guilty parties.'

"I also complained of the treatment of our women in the Boer refugee camps, and of the awful mortality among the children, of the interdicts placed on banking accounts, and of the defenceless women being treated as prisoners of war.

“Lord Kitchener listened attentively, offering to afford all the relief circumstances and the exigencies of war would permit. He also offered to send me any medicinal assistance or ambulance aid my burghers might require.



[Copyright by H. Walter Barnett.]

LORD MILNER OF ST. JAMES'S AND OF CAPETOWN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

This is the latest portrait of Lord Milner, and was taken during his short stay in England in the summer of 1901. Lord Milner arrived in London May 24, and was met at Waterloo by Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Lord Roberts. He was driven to Marlborough House, where he was received by King Edward, who bestowed a peerage on him. He took his seat in the House of Lords on June 13, received the freedom of the City of London July 23, and left for South Africa August 10 to resume his onerous duties as Governor and High Commissioner.

“‘But why,’ said Lord Kitchener, ‘are you so hard on the peace emissaries and conciliation committees? Why did you treat Janse van Rensburg (of Heidelberg) so cavalierly?’

" 'Because,' I replied, 'this man shirked commando duty, sheltering himself behind a lucrative war billet in his town, afterwards seizing the first opportunity to lay down his arms. Possibly you, my lord, respect such a man. I cannot. Janse van Rensburg, the traitor, was one of the most active advocates of the war, while I opposed it tooth and nail, and now you send such a man to me and my burghers to seduce them from their duty. The man is a traitor, and you, Lord Kitchener, will never compel me to discuss terms of peace with traitors.'

"Kitchener appeared to agree with this view."

Such statements are not to be for one moment accepted. They represent what Botha wished the Boers to believe that Lord Kitchener had said and done. There is not one word



A BOER REFUGEE CAMP SCHOOL AT VEREENIGING.

of gratitude for the extraordinary, almost insane, generosity which England had displayed to the Boer refugees, maintaining the wives and children of the burghers still in the field at the British taxpayers' expense. The mortality, as Botha knew perfectly well, was far less when these people were collected in camps and given skilled medical attendance, than it would have been if they had been left to



AT PLAY IN A BOER REFUGEE CAMP.

These photographs show something of the light side of life in the refugee camp at Standerton. The British officers are here seen starting races for boys and girls. The photographs on this and the opposite page go to show that, if it is a hardship to take the women and children from their homes, at least their custodians do what they can to lighten the tedium of life under surveillance.

starve upon the veldt. The audacity of the Boer general in complaining of the burning of farms is simply astonishing, in view of an order of his, dated October 6, 1900, which was afterwards found at Roosenekal. "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers laying down their arms. I shall be compelled, if they do not listen to this, to confiscate everything, moveable or immovable, and also to burn their houses." Thus in his complaints Botha had not a leg to stand upon. He was himself threatening the very acts "of vandalism and cruelty," of which he accused the British. Such evidence of his trickiness shows how



little he was to be trusted, and yet he was unquestionably the most honourable, upright, and humane of the Boer generals.

Even this list of charges did not exhaust Botha's ammunition. In his account of the interview he proceeds: "We next discussed the matter of the Kaffir belligerents employed on the British side. I protested strongly against armed natives being used as scouts, and pointed out how very necessary, how vitally necessary, it was to keep the Kaffirs outside the white man's war. 'We Boers,' I said, 'have faithfully adhered to the principle, and when in August last a powerful Kaffir chieftain offered

us assistance, Mr. Kruger declined the offer.' Lord Kitchener confessed that deficient knowledge of the country's topography compelled him to employ Kaffirs as guides and scouts. 'But surely,' I remarked, 'your troops have been here quite long enough to have acquired sufficient knowledge of the country. And then you inflame the Swazis against us, which leads to the murder of a number of male refugees and women. It is shameful; it is scandalous.'" Here, again, we should like to know the name of that Kaffir chief. But Botha's statements on this head are one



A "TURTLE RACE."

SPORTS IN THE BOER REFUGEE CAMP AT VEREENIGING.

long string of falsehoods. Almost at this very moment a number of armed natives were being captured by the Australians with one of De Wet's parties on the Seacow River. Kaffir scouts were persistently employed by the Boers, and in the earlier period of the war, during General Buller's advance to Ladysmith, were found armed in the trenches stormed by the British infantry. Moreover, the Boers exhausted every artifice to induce the Basutos to attack the British, just as some years before the war there is good reason to think they had incited the Matabele to revolt and supplied them with arms. Still, nothing is lost in this world by impudence, and, if Botha can be believed, his accusations imposed upon even Lord Kitchener. "Lord Kitchener," the Boer leader went on to remark, "is no politician. This he betrayed very quickly by his astonishing ignorance of native conditions and questions in Cape Colony and the Republics."



A NEEDLE-THREADING RACE.

The competitors run a specified distance, thread a needle, and return.

After thus, to the best of his power, putting Lord Kitchener upon the defensive, Botha proceeded to ascertain how much he could obtain from the British Commander-in-Chief. Here, fortunately, we have the surer ground of Lord Kitchener's own report, in which, be it noted, there is no mention

whatever of all these complaints and charges. Lord Kitchener states that he had a long interview with Botha, "who showed very good feeling and seemed anxious to bring about peace." Botha "asked for information on a number of subjects which he said he should submit to his Government and people, and, if they agreed, he should visit the Orange River Colony and get them to agree. They should all then hand in their arms and finish the war. He told me that they could go on for some time and that he was not sure of being able to bring about peace without independence. He tried very hard for some kind of independence, but I [Lord Kitchener] declined to discuss such a point, and said that a modified form of independence would be most dangerous and likely to lead to war in the future."

**Lord Kitchener's
version.**

Major Stockenström,
Border Horse.

Major Warren,
D.M. Rifles

Lieut.-Colonel D. Harris,
Diamond Fields Horse.



Lieut.-Colonel C. P. Crewe,
Commanding a Brigade.

Brigadier-General Brabant,
Commanding Colonial Division.

Major H. T. Tamplin,
A.D.C.

CAPE PARLIAMENTARIANS ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

The six officers whose portraits are here given are members of the Cape Legislative Assembly, and of the South African League. Major Stockenström and Major Warren took a prominent part in the formation of the Border Horse, a regiment of farmers from the eastern province. General Brabant organized "Brabant's Horse" (see pp. 348-9 of "With the Flag to Pretoria"), and was placed by Lord Roberts in command of the Colonials, by whom he was known and trusted.

Botha now went on to ask certain questions, the importance of which, bearing as they do on the intentions of the Government when a final settlement is arrived at, cannot be exaggerated.

**Representative
government.**

The replies given to these questions need, therefore, to be very carefully examined by the British people. The first was as to the nature of the future government of the conquered territories. Botha wanted representative government at once. Now the ruin and disorganisation caused by the war to the industries of the two ex-Republics has been so great that it will be quite impossible for them to recover immediately peace is proclaimed. That is to say, many of the Uitlanders cannot return for some months or years, for the simple reason that there will be no work for them. The Boers would thus be in a majority in the Transvaal, and would have matters all their own way. In the Orange River Colony they must, in

any event, except for a large immigration of British settlers, be in the majority. So that, had Botha's demand been conceded, they would have been put back after the war in much the same position of power which they had held in October, 1899. Even in Canada, which we conquered from France, and in the Confederate states, which the North subdued in 1865, there was an interval of military rule before representative institutions were established or restored. In the case of Canada there was a period of four years of martial law after the conquest, though the law was administered with tact

and discretion by the English governors, retaining and as far as possible respecting the French customs and ordinances. In Canada, however, the complications caused by an Uitlander population were wanting. In the Confederate states there was a long term of military rule before the rights which they had enjoyed under the constitution of the United States were restored. Lord Kitchener told Botha that, when the war ended, military rule would be replaced by Crown Colony administration. That is to say the governing authorities would be nominated by England, though they would be advised by an elected assembly. In the course of time, when the country settled down, full representative government, as in all the great British Colonies, would be conceded. Botha, Lord Kitchener states, seemed satisfied with this.

The next question was, if anything, more important. Would the Boer, Botha ingenuously asked, be allowed a rifle



R. Caton Woodville.]

HIS ONLY GUN (?).

"Surrendered arms" are only too often *not* the kind of weapons with which the Boers shoot British soldiers.

"to protect himself from the natives?" That is to say, would the Boers be allowed to remain armed, in which case they would be certain, as soon as it suited them, to renew the war? The danger of


Retention of arms.

such a state of things in so vast a country is evident. Moreover, a revolver or a good shot-gun would have been quite sufficient protection against the Kaffirs, especially in view of the facts that England was prepared to police the conquered territory and maintain order, and that the Kaffirs were not armed with good rifles. Revolvers and shot-guns would have been useless for military purposes. Much, no doubt, to Botha's joy, Lord Kitchener

replied that he thought the burghers would be allowed to retain their rifles if they took out licences and registered the weapons.

The third question concerned the use of the Dutch language. Lord Kitchener said he thought that both English and Dutch

Language question. would be allowed equal rights, and thereupon Botha expressed a hope that the authorities who came in contact with the farmers would know Dutch. Again much is involved in this question of language. The Dutch have always been most intolerant of foreign languages. In the early days of Cape Colony they mercilessly suppressed the French spoken by the Huguenot settlers. In the Transvaal they proscribed English and refused to allow it to be taught, except under impossible conditions, in the State schools, for which the Uitlanders paid, and this though in Cape Colony both languages were upon a footing of equality. They were "thorough" in their policy, which had as its aim the creation of a great Dutch state in South Africa. But though their policy has failed, after causing a bloody and disastrous war, that is no reason why England should adopt half-measures. Language is incomparably the most powerful agent in forming a nationality, a fact which is recognised in the United States, where, notwithstanding the traditional attitude of hospitality and liberality to strangers, one language, and one language only, is officially recognised. In Cape Colony the mischief caused by the revival of



REDUCED FACSIMILE OF A BOER £1 NOTE.

This is one of the Transvaal notes issued against the security (*inter alia*) of treasure which Mr. Kruger afterwards transported to Europe.



[Photo by Bassano.]

MR. H. F. WILSON,

First Colonial Secretary of the Orange River Colony.

Henry Francis Wilson is a late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. He was called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1888, fulfilled special missions to Trinidad and Malta, and between 1895 and 1897 acted as principal private secretary to Mr. Chamberlain. In the latter year he was appointed legal assistant at the Colonial Office. In February, 1900, he went to South Africa as legal adviser to the High Commissioner, and in February, 1901, was appointed first Colonial Secretary of the Orange River Administration.

the "Taal" has been incalculable. For the Dutch dialect of South Africa, the "Taal," has no literature and no associations. It has a mean and miserable vocabulary and can scarcely be understood by the educated Hollander. But for political animosities, artfully fanned by Mr. Kruger and the group of Boer intriguers about him, it would ere now have given way to English, which is the tongue of a world-wide race and which has an imperishable literature and the most magnificent traditions. It would seem, then, that in the future English alone should be recognised as the official vehicle for thought and speech, though there is no reason why Dutch should not be taught in the schools, where practicable, and it would, of course, be desirable to appoint in the country districts British officials who understand the "Taal." Something has been done in this direction by requiring recruits for Baden-Powell's South African Constabulary, who are enlisted for three years, to undergo an examination in the "Taal." This is a reasonable requirement from men whose duties must necessarily bring them into constant contact with ill-educated persons, Dutch and Kaffir, who know little or no English. But on the ground of general convenience, as well as that of Imperial policy, the use of English should be encouraged.

On the Kaffir question, Botha asked whether the natives would be given the franchise, and was told that they would not until representative government had been conceded to the Boer states.

This was reasonable and judicious. A preponderating Kaffir vote might easily become a menace to the white population. Another point, on which assurance was required, was whether Dutch church property would remain untouched. This again was answered in the affirmative, as was also **Franchise, church property, public trusts, and debts.** a question as to public trusts and funds for orphans. But now came a demand of the coolest nature. Would the British Government, Botha asked, take over the legal debts of the ex-Republics? And these debts, it turned out, were to include the paper-money issued since the beginning of the war, the requisition notes and so forth. In other words, England was to pay the Boers the expenses they had incurred in waging war upon her. Manifestly there could be no real security against fraud, if this demand were conceded. It had been a practice, which we have noted from time to time in the course of this history, for the Boer leaders to take, say, £50 worth of goods from a burgher, and to give him a requisition note for £100 worth, or even more. Botha referred explicitly to certain notes issued during the war, "amounting to less than



F. Dadd, R.I.]

[After a sketch by Lionel James, special correspondent of "The Times,"

"SURRENDER!" BURGHER POLICE CAPTURING A BOER SNIPER.

At Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, and elsewhere, surrendered burghers have been employed as police, and have done good service. The sketch represents an incident which happened near Kroonstad, when a couple of members of the Burgher Police captured a sniper, red-handed.

a million," though what was the exact nature of these notes we are not told. Lord Kitchener seems to have suggested that a total sum of one million should be allocated by England to defray the Boer debts, but he added that the creditors must be able to show that they had received value for the money. If the *bonâ fide* debts exceeded a million, all were to be reduced proportionately.

The next question was whether any war-tax would be imposed upon the Boer farmers. The answer was that it would not. So that the Uitlanders would have to "foot the bill" though they

Pecuniary aid.

had fought for England. Further, Botha wanted to know whether pecuniary assistance would be granted the Boer farmers, to rebuild farms and replace stock. Such assistance was promised—again, it would seem, from the unhappy Uitlander's pocket. When was there a war after which the victor paid the vanquished's expenses and set him up again in business? If this were the custom, then indeed the old saying *Vae Victis!* "Woe to the vanquished!" would have to run *Vae Victoribus!* "Woe to the conquerors!" Botha concluded by asking when the

prisoners would return, and whether an amnesty would be granted to the Colonial rebels at the end of the war. Such an amnesty was promised, subject to the possible disfranchisement of rebels.

All Lord Kitchener's promises and assurances were given subject to approval by the Government at home and thus were not final and binding. The conference ended, and now it remained for

Conclusion of the conference.

Lord Kitchener to telegraph to England the Boer wishes and obtain the required approval. "Lord Kitchener," says Botha, "after the conference gave me an excellent lunch, which was a pleasant change from our own stereotyped menu of mealie-pap and meat and meat and mealie-pap." The two generals were photographed, and the photograph was afterwards used by certain of the "slim" Boer officers to convince the burghers that the magnanimous Botha had taken Lord Kitchener prisoner and released him on parole—an absurd story which was also told about General French. Then Botha rode back to the open country, saluted by the British escort as he galloped away.

That the terms outlined by Lord Kitchener were extraordinarily magnanimous no one can deny. Even the bitterest foreign critics had to admit their generosity, when they were published. But



CAPTURED BOER RIFLES AT CAPETOWN.



BOER GUNS IN THE ARTILLERY BARRACKS AT PRETORIA,
Including the dynamite gun captured from De Wet.

perhaps the best evidence of their extreme kindness to the enemy is the dismay which was felt by the Uitlanders, when the details were known.

Criticism of Kitchener's terms.

"When the text of the despatches on the subject was published here a day or two ago," says a Johannesburg correspondent, "a feeling little short of consternation prevailed. . . . Any peace concluded upon the conditions offered would have been but the signal for a period of trouble and unrest, which would probably have made this country a safe thing for the Boer at no distant date. . . .

In order to bring home to the Boer the fact that he is conquered it is necessary to compel him to confess it. In other words he must not be asked politely to surrender; he must be made to beg for peace on bended knees." There is a good deal of common-sense in this criticism. The unfortunate Uitlander, however, had only too many reasons to know that the military authorities disliked him, and vastly preferred the Boer to him. Indeed, opinion in Uitlander circles grew steadily in bitterness all through early 1901, and this bitterness was all the greater because the Uitlanders felt that they knew the Boers, and so knowing had tendered advice, which had not been taken, but which, if taken, would certainly have helped to shorten the struggle. The thought that they were to be the "milch-cow," even after the conflict in which they had suffered so cruelly, and that their taxes were to provide the funds for setting brother Boer upon his legs again, added to their rage and indignation.

Mr. A. de Jager.

Captain Maxwell.

Mr. H. Fraser.

Major Watson.

Mr. Van Velden.

Colonel Henderson.



Colonel Hamilton.

Lord Kitchener.

General Louis Botha.

Mr. De Wet.

THE MEETING BETWEEN LORD KITCHENER AND GENERAL BOTHA AT MIDDELBURG, February 28, 1901.

This reproduction has been made, by special and exclusive arrangement with Mr. Barrard, the owner of the copyright, from the very fine guinea carbon-print (size 15 in. x 12 in.) published by Messrs. Mayall, of 126, Piccadilly. The original negative was taken by permission of Lord Kitchener by Messrs. Barrard and Pavay, of Middelburg; it forms a unique record of a very interesting event. With their usual cunning some of the Boer leaders promulgated the report among their more ignorant followers that Lord Kitchener and his Staff had been made prisoners by Botha and released only on parole, and they produced this photograph to prove their assertion.

What will be the ultimate consequence of being unjust to friends in the desire to be just to the enemy, history alone can show. But it is likely to be disastrous.

Lord Kitchener's terms were carefully revised by Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, who made great changes in them. Sir Alfred Milner objected, very justly, that a complete amnesty to rebels would have a deplorable effect in Cape Colony and Natal, and this clause was modified. Mr. Chamberlain further required a complete cessation of hostilities by all the Boer forces, before



UITLANDERS EJECTED FROM THE TRANSVAAL BY THE BOERS.

This photograph represents some of the refugees banished from Pretoria and Johannesburg at the commencement of the war (October, 1899), waiting on the pier at Lourenço Marquez for the ship which should convey them to Durban.

the promises made by England should be fulfilled; he pointed out that the prisoners would have to be brought back gradually and could not all be embarked at once, while he declined altogether

Revision by the Home Government.

to allow the foreigners who had fought with the Boers to be returned to South Africa. He defined with greater fulness and clearness the constitution which would be granted to the Boers, so as to prevent misunderstandings, and, in the matter of the public debts of the conquered states and the requisition notes, stipulated that goods commandeered from the Uitlanders by the Boers should be paid for out of the million which Lord Kitchener had suggested as an indemnity from England. Moreover, he insisted that all claims should be examined by a special tribunal appointed by the British Government, so as to prevent fraud. The assistance proposed to be rendered to Boer farmers would, he thought, seem to offer greater advantages to the enemy than to those who had remained loyal, and he required that any aid should be rendered by way of loan, and then only to those who took the oath of allegiance. Further stipulations with regard to the retention of rifles by burghers and the status of the Kaffirs were included in his despatch.

Finally the following proposals were made, embodying all these alterations, in a letter addressed by Lord Kitchener to General Botha: "In the event of a general and complete cessation of hostilities and the surrender of all rifles, ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the burghers or in Government depôts or elsewhere, His Majesty's Government is prepared to adopt the following measures:

"His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies for all *bonâ fide* acts of war committed during the recent hostilities. British subjects belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to those Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the law of those Colonies specially passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penalties for high treason in the present cases.

"All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere will, on the completion of the surrender, be brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements can be made for their transport.

"At the earliest practicable date military administration will cease and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of Crown Colony Government. There will therefore be, in the first

instance, in each of the new Colonies a Governor and an Executive Council, consisting of a certain number of official members, to whom a nominated unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a representative element and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities a High Court will be established in each of the new Colonies to administer the law of the land, and this Court will be independent of the Executive.

"Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be respected.

"Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught in public schools where parents of the children desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law.

"As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His Majesty's Government cannot undertake any liability. It

is however prepared, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not exceeding £1,000,000 to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies for goods requisitioned from them by the late

Republican Governments or, subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in the field being in a position to enforce such requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission appointed by the Government to investigate and assess them, and if exceeding in the aggregate £1,000,000, they will be liable to reduction *pro rata*.


"I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will take into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting



[Photo by André, Colombo.]

ARRIVAL OF A FRESH BATCH OF PRISONERS AT BANDARAWELA (THE NEAREST STATION TO DIYATALAWA CAMP), CEYLON.

In the corner is a specimen of the paper money current in the Diyatalawa camp, not more than 25 cents (fourpence) in copper being allowed in the possession of each prisoner.



BOER PRISONERS AT DIYATALAWA, CEYLON, EMPLOYED AS BRICKLAYERS.
(See the note on p. 148.)

by loan the occupants of farms who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair any injury sustained by destruction of buildings or loss of stock during the war, and that no special war tax will be imposed on farmers to defray the expense of the war.

"When burghers require the protection of fire-arms such will be allowed to them by licence and on due registration, provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences also will be issued for sporting rifles, guns, etc., but military fire-arms will only be allowed for means of protection.

"As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to give such franchise before representative government is granted to these Colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white races. The legal position of coloured persons will however be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony.

"In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that if the terms now offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration they must be regarded as cancelled."

In essentials they were the same as the terms proposed originally by Lord Kitchener. They showed, at least, that England was ready to make many and serious sacrifices to end the war, and, had they been accepted, innumerable embarrassments to the British and to the Uitlanders must have been the result.

Curt rejection by the Boers.

The Boers would certainly have believed that they themselves had been generally victorious, and would have revised the history of the struggle to suit their own fancies and prejudices. But, perhaps fortunately for us, the enemy were not in a yielding mood. On March 16 a curt note from Botha reached Pretoria, stating that he himself and the Boer Government, to which he had communicated the terms, did not feel disposed to accept the proposals. In a proclamation which he issued to the burghers he told his people that "the letter contains nothing more, but rather less, than what the British Government will be obliged to do, should our cause go wrong. . . . The voice of the people is totally unrecognised. It is also proposed, and this as a favour, to place only one million pounds disposable for covering our State debts, whereas, according to general legal advice, should the cause unexpectedly go wrong with us, the British Government must bear the responsibility of all State debts and not simply walk away with the assets."

It would be interesting to know whence Botha obtained his "general legal advice." But in their heart of hearts he and the Boers believed that England was a weak, shifty, vacillating Power, which by a little obstinacy on their part could be induced to make much larger concessions.



DR. LEYDS AND HIS SECRETARY AT WORK.

Dr. Leyds, the clever and unscrupulous representative in Europe of the late Kruger Government, is still actively engaged in endeavours to stir up anti-British feeling on the Continent. His influence with the ex-President has perhaps been somewhat modified by the presence of Messrs. Fischer, Wessels, and Wolmarans.



CLEARING THE COUNTRY: BOER WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT PIETERSBURG ABOUT TO ENTRAIN FOR PRETORIA.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTHERN TRANSVAAL.

Results of the failure to negotiate—The Uitlanders alienated—Boer strongholds in northern Transvaal—District to be cleared—Plumer and his force undertake the work—Capture of Warmbaths—Construction trains clear the Pietersburg line—Advance to Nylstroom and Piet Potgieter's Rust—Entry into Pietersburg—Capture of war material—Plumer's force weakened—Lack of good horses—Sir Bindon Blood to co-operate from the east—Disposition of his six columns—Plumer moves through the bush-veldt—Seizure of Chunies Poort Pass—Jeffreys advances towards the Olifant—The fords guarded—Schroeder's position reconnoitred by Australians—Skilful capture of the camp by Lieut. Reid—Twenty-one Australians take forty-two prisoners—Captures by outlying British detachments—Grenfell rushes Beyers' laager—End of the last Boer Creusot—Grenfell operates north of Pietersburg—Plumer's column returns south—Results achieved.



O the war was to continue and to become what in the interests of the future of South Africa it should have been from the first—a fight to a finish, in which it should be finally and inevitably decided which of the two opposing forces was the stronger. British opinion was strengthened by the negotiations in the resolve to continue the war to the bitter end. Among the Boers, however, the impression produced was that England was anxious for peace, almost at any price, while among the

Results of the failure to negotiate.

Uitlanders the terms offered fostered a dangerous sense of injustice—a tendency to ask “whether, after all, it was worth their while to sacrifice their properties and their futures and to jeopardise their lives in a cause which is so utterly unmindful of services rendered, so oblivious of ordinary considerations of gratitude.” With uncontrollable bitterness the thousands of South African Britishers fighting in our ranks, after they had sacrificed everything for the British cause, saw that their advice had been neglected, that their sufferings had been overlooked, and that they were to be made in the future to



AN AMBULANCE WAGGON.

compensate the Boer for the ruin which the aimless, exasperating, protracted guerilla war was bringing upon his people. "Your Government at home," said a loyal Uitlander to a British correspondent, "is trying to do the impossible. It is trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It is contemptuously ignoring the trials and sufferings of the loyalists in the vain attempt to gain the goodwill of an irreconcilable people who don't know what magnanimity means, and who will before long bite the hand that feeds them back to comfort and prosperity."

"The guerilla burgher—the 'brother' who is but a little removed from a savage, who has spent the last six months in wrecking bridges and culverts, and with his low cunning hoodwinking the confiding British officer—he, the enemy, is to be gently put back on his homestead his farm restocked, while a grateful British Government will supply him with coffee and tobacco money until he can grow these things for himself. It is quite

**The Uitlanders
alienated.**

safe to say that burghers and foreigners with forged receipts for 'commandeered' goods will get the lion's share of what is going. The Uitlander householder and shop-keeper will, at the most, receive perhaps a tenth of all he has lost. He will pick up the broken threads of his business with rancour in his heart, a wiser but sadder man—not



THE ENGINEER'S LITTLE
JOKE.

Armoured train No. 17, better known
as "Sweet Seventeen."



FIELD-GUN MOUNTED IN ARMoured TRUCK.

This photograph represents the gun of armoured train No. 17 at Pietersburg.

the best type of Transvaal Colonist who is to be the British bulwark against the insidious advance of Dutch influence!"

Thus we had alienated our friends without conciliating our foes. It now remained to apply more vigorous pressure

to the Boers, to sweep the country more thoroughly, and to wrest from the enemy's grasp their last arsenals and the last towns remaining to them. In the northern Transvaal a vast tract of

**Boer strongholds in
Northern Transvaal.**

territory round Pietersburg had never been visited by the British troops. In August, 1900, the tide of invasion had surged as far as Nylstroom, which had been occupied by General Baden-Powell, but owing to Lord Roberts' want of men for the movement against Botha, after a brief occupation, Nylstroom had been abandoned, and subsequently Pienaar's River had been made the advanced British station upon the Pietersburg Railway. Pietersburg itself had never seen the Union Jack hoisted. Far to the north of it, in the tropical region of the Transvaal, lay the Zoutpansberg, a region inhabited mainly by Kaffirs and remote from civilisation, though it had been the scene of constant wars with the natives in the past history of the South African Republic. Here the enemy had, or were supposed to have, great depôts of ammunition and foodstuffs. At Pietersburg, too, the Boers had installed an arsenal, where shells were in process



Allan Stewart.]

AUSTRALIAN BUSHMEN ON THE MARCH.

of manufacture for the 4·7 gun captured at Helvetia from the British, and where repairs of all kinds were executed. This arsenal was in charge of two foreigners. They had also a printing press and large depôts, which were kept supplied from the fertile country round Pietersburg. The place itself was of no great size or importance; in England it would have been accounted only a small village. But it was the terminus of the railway which ran northward from Pretoria, and the headquarters of one of the boldest and most aggressive of Boer generals, Beyers. South-eastwards of it stretched a tract of mountainous country, succeeded again by the vast plains of the bush-veldt, drained by the head waters of the Olifant, and as yet unconquered by the British. In the heart of this country lay the little hamlet of Roossenekal, a collection of miserable tin shanties, but now the seat of government of the South African Republic, or what yet remained of it. Here President Schalk Burger had his printing press, which was constantly at work producing fictitious bulletins. In the neighbourhood had assembled the relics of the two divisions of the Boer army commanded by Botha and Viljoen. Botha had retired hither after eluding the wide-spread meshes of General French's drag-net; Viljoen had his headquarters at all seasons in this region, and from its mountain fastnesses descended from time to time to harass the British garrisons on the Delagoa Bay line and to break the railway.

Lord Kitchener determined to repeat over this area the sweeping movement which General French had carried out in the south-eastern Transvaal, with not wholly satisfactory results. He was anxious to clear the Boer government out of Roossenekal, and, if possible, to lay by the heels the 4,000 or 5,000 Transvaalers who had gathered in this region. For movements against Roossenekal, Middelburg and Lydenburg, both of which points were held by the British, were the obvious starting points. But before columns advanced from these points, it was desirable to close the enemy's line of escape northwards and westwards, and to occupy the railway from Pienaar's River to Pietersburg. Consequently an advance northwards was the first measure ordered by the British headquarters.

To command this advance, General Plumer was selected. From the very beginning of the war he had rendered the most admirable service, and he was one of the few British officers whose reputation had steadily grown. Known in the army as a "thruster," which is, being interpreted,



ARRIVAL OF THE 2ND GORDONS AT PIETERSBURG: SERVING OUT RATIONS.

a general who is not afraid to attack, he had repeatedly displayed that spirit of initiative which should characterise the subordinate leader. His lieutenants, Jeffreys and Colvin, were likewise good soldiers and fine leaders of Colonial troops. In the chase of De Wet, Jeffreys had done sterling service under Plumer, and the scouts of his command had all through the most critical days kept close touch of the slippery guerilla. Fresh from this chase, Plumer entrained in the Orange River Colony for Pretoria, and arriving at the capital refitted his force. It was composed of the 4th Imperial Bushmen's Corps, comprising squadrons from Queensland, South Australia, West Australia, and Tasmania, the sixth contingent of New Zealanders, the Bushveld Carabiniers—a newly organised unit, raised in the Transvaal—four guns of the 18th Field Battery, three mobile "Pom-Poms," and a fourth, mounted in an armoured train for the protection of the three railway repair trains that were to accompany his march. He had also a section of Mounted Engineers. In all, the strength of his command amounted to 1,500 rifles and seven guns, but he was promised the assistance of other troops as he pushed forward, so that his whole force would remain available for active operations, while we may suppose—though it was not the habit of Headquarters to be excessively communicative—that he was informed of the other movements which were in due time to be carried out from Lydenburg and elsewhere, and which would support him by diverting the attention of the enemy.

It was hoped to surprise the enemy, but it is practically certain that by hook or by crook they obtained information of the British intentions. They could scarcely have overlooked the assemblage of transport at Pienaar's River, the collection of stores, the building of special platforms, and the constant movements of the trains bringing up all the requisites for the advance from Pretoria. On March 26 General

AN OUTPOST OF THE 2ND GORDONS AT WARMBATHS.
The men are dicing off biscuits and "bully beef."

Plumer was ready. On that day he left Pretoria for Pienaar's River, where he was reinforced by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, who were to garrison and guard the railway as he advanced. A day or two passed in repairing the line immediately to the north of the railhead, but on the afternoon of the 29th the column began its march upon Warmbaths—the next station to the north. The country was low and bush-covered, with but little water. At Warmbaths sharp fighting was expected. Beyers was reported to be there in some force, with Creusot guns mounted on a range of bushy hills which at this point intersects the railway. But, as it turned out, Beyers had no great desire for a fight. Many of his men were unmounted, and the others were dispirited. The guns had been quietly removed some days before General Plumer moved out of Pienaar's

River. Early on the 30th the British troops rode into Warmbaths. The village, which had been a health resort in the days of Mr. Kruger's government, boasted a hotel and baths, from which it took its name, built over the source of its famous hot springs. No resistance was offered in the place itself. A Dutch doctor and a dozen or so of prisoners were captured there; most of them were awaiting the arrival of a Boer train to take them north. They revealed the fact that the stories as to the Boers in the northern Transvaal being in the last extremity of hunger were absurd. Meat, corn, coffee, salt, and brandy were all produced in the country, while, despite the British jests as to Boer antipathy for soap, the burghers had managed to prepare that indispensable article for themselves.

To the north of the village rose hills commanding it and the railway. It was necessary to occupy these heights at once for the security of the British column. Accordingly the advance guard rode rapidly through the village, when the first shots were fired since the northward movement began. From the hills came a sputtering of Mausers, but the enemy were not in force, and were speedily dislodged. Snipers still hung round the outskirts of the place, and fired from time to time from out of the cover afforded by the dense thorn-bush. Plumer's Colonials, however, paid no attention to them. The British construction trains, which moved at a walking pace, so as thoroughly to overhaul the permanent way, were speedily in the station. The line had scarcely been damaged;



PARTRIDGE SHOOTING EXTRAORDINARY.

Partridges abound on the Pietersburg line, and the armoured trains not infrequently afforded excellent opportunities for replenishing the larder. Shooting from a moving train at birds on the wing is exciting sport.

Construction trains
clear the Pietersburg
line.

a broken culvert or two was the limit of the destruction accomplished by the enemy, though a foreigner



OFFICERS' BAND OF THE 2ND GORDONS AT PIETERSBURG.

village on the Nyl, which has its name from the fact that the early Boer settlers believed this stream to be

**Advance to Nylstroom
and Piet Potgieter's
Rust.**

the headwater of the Nile. Again the resistance was insignificant. A few shots were fired by snipers, without harming anyone. The

country was cleared of Boers, and among those who surrendered were Grobler and Potgieter, with a considerable number of burghers. Others escaped the British by retiring with their cattle into the Watersberg. Long experience of British strategy had taught the

enemy that they had only to move out of the beaten track to elude our columns, and this because the subordinate generals were tied down to certain definite movements by orders from headquarters, and were not permitted to act according to the demand of circumstances. Beyond Nylstroom and between that place and Piet Potgieter's Rust, the railway runs for many miles under the Watersberg, and here the snipers were in waiting for our troops, while a locomotive was derailed and disabled by a mine on the railway. The measure of resistance offered, however, still continued insignificant; the

column and convoy passed almost unmolested, and the lurking guerillas in the bush were driven off by the 2nd Gordons, with the loss of only one man wounded. At the Iron Pass, a difficult defile not far from Piet Potgieter's Rust, a stubborn stand had been anticipated. It was a position which might have



"JOCK," THE PET MONKEY OF THE 2ND GORDONS.

The officer is 2nd Lieutenant Cameron. Nearly every regiment has adopted a pet or pets—lambs, goats, dogs, cats, and zebras are among the number, and not a few monkeys, which at least have the merit of being amusing.



AN OUTPOST OF THE 2ND GORDONS FORTIFYING A KOPJE AT PIET POTGIETER'S RUST.
Kaffir labourers are, when possible, employed for work of this description.

column and convoy passed almost unmolested, and the lurking guerillas in the bush were driven off by the 2nd Gordons, with the loss of only one man wounded. At the Iron Pass, a difficult defile not far from Piet Potgieter's Rust, a stubborn stand had been anticipated. It was a position which might have

been held with success by a handful of determined men. But the Boers there mustered only fifty men, and were dislodged by the Australian Bushmen. Two of the enemy were killed; one man in the British ranks was wounded. The Bushmen showed that they were fully a match for the burghers at the Boer game, with the result that the Boers were very careful to keep away from them. Piet



BRIGADIER-GENERAL PLUMER, C.B., A.D.C.

[Photo by Bassano.]

Potgieter's Rust was entered on April 4, and on the way several prisoners were captured. "They were towsy, unkempt fellows," says Mr. Bennet Burleigh, "and three of them well-nigh barefoot."

Entry into Pietersburg. The enemy continued to retire and decline battle. On April 8, General Plumer's advance guard entered Pietersburg. They found that the enemy had retired the night before, blowing up two train-loads of ammunition. To the north of this place snipers

still lurked, and the Tasmanians, riding boldly out in that direction, were fired upon. Two officers and a trooper fell wounded, but the Colonials made short work of the man who fired the deadly shots. With the casualties previously suffered on the march, this made a total of seven men killed or wounded in the advance from Pienaar's River to Pietersburg.

The town was found to be full of women and children whom the Boers, after their invariable fashion, had left behind to be fed and supported by the British. Sixty burghers either surrendered or were made prisoners. In the gaol were discovered General Schoeman, who had been condemned to death for acting as a peace envoy, and another burgher, under the same sentence for a similar crime. Confined with a number of Kaffirs in a miserable, damp cell, were three of the Yeomanry, who had been captured six months before and had been treated in this manner because of an attempt to escape,

though by the laws of war a prisoner cannot be punished for attempting to escape otherwise than by stricter confinement. Among the Boers taken was Mr. Rissils, the Surveyor-General of the Transvaal, while Tjart Kruger, son of the ex-President, was only prevented from coming in by physical force. The enemy in their retreat moved in the direction of Roossenekal, which lay south-east, and Haenertsburg, which lay due east. Beyers headed for the latter place with several hundred men, two field guns, and a heavy gun. This



MAP OF THE DISTRICT BETWEEN PRETORIA AND PIETERSBURG.

last was not removed without infinite trouble, as, owing to its weight, it repeatedly stuck in the drifts. The Boer officials and archives were sent to Roossenekal.

At Pietersburg General Plumer made large captures of war material, besides two engines and 36 trucks. One Krupp 7-pounder, two limbers for the 4.7 gun, a large number of shells, 210,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition, and a great quantity of powder and dynamite were among the prizes that fell into his hands. The Boer arsenal, which included a shell foundry, waggon factory, dynamite manufactory, and small-arms repair shop, was destroyed, as the British had no use for it. The whole railway system of the Transvaal was now in our hands, and the Boers had lost the last of their arsenals. In all, up to and including April 8, the Boers who were captured or who surrendered during these operations numbered 94.

Capture of war material.

A period of inactivity followed, while reinforcements, and, it is to be presumed, remounts, were

despatched to the front from the base of operations. As the line of communications had now been greatly lengthened, the Wiltshires were sent forward along the railway to join the Northampton

and aid them in holding the line, while the Gordons garrisoned the town of Pietersburg itself. At the same time a hundred Queenslanders, whose time of service had expired, were sent down from the



PIETERSBURG GAOL.

Portraits of the prisoners found in, and released from, this prison are given on p. 353.

front. They were a serious loss, as they had become seasoned, experienced troops. The grave

Plumer's force weakened.

error of enlisting men for the term of a year only had been pointed out by experts when

the Colonial forces were raised, but the British War Office declined to listen to reason or history.

And thus it came about that Plumer's force was weakened at a time when it had hard work

before it. Its efficiency had already, thus early in this new campaign, been much reduced by the loss of horses. Colonel Jeffreys' Colonials, for example, a few days later, had only 350 mounts left out

Lack of good horses.

of 500. The New Zealanders, though they were full of spirit and among the best of our troops, had been placed upon raw, unacclimatised mounts, which,

fresh from a long sea voyage, succumbed rapidly to horse-sickness and exhaustion. Moreover, the men were not good horse-masters, and so the sickly beasts they bestrode had small chance of

recovering condition.

Throughout the war the great trouble of the British had been the provision of good horses for the cavalry and mounted infantry. Only by a considerable period of rest after landing could the horses, bought for the Army in all quarters of the world and shipped hurriedly to South Africa, be expected to recover condition. But unfortunately the supply of remounts was never equal to the demand. No sooner had the animals been landed than they were hurried up to the front and distributed. At the very moment when



PRISON AT PIETERSBURG IN WHICH BOER PRISONERS OF WAR ARE CONFINED BY THE BRITISH.



KAFFIR KRAAL AT MARABASTAD, NEAR PIETERSBURG.

there seemed some possibility of the demand being overtaken, the home Government cut short the supply—an economy which cost the nation some tens of millions of money and some thousands of lives. Yet the War Minister guilty of this colossal blunder was, as we have seen, promoted in Cabinet rank!

During this pause in the operations, the arrangements for a general movement from the east, to be carried out by a number of columns, were completed. The plan of the operations now about to begin was this: General Plumer's men were to move down into the valley of the Olifants and hold the drifts over that river, thus preventing escape to the west. They would also secure the defiles in the mountainous country to the east of Pietersburg, and close the tracks which ran northwards to the Zoutpansberg. Then six columns starting from points between Lydenburg and Middelburg would beat up the vast triangle of country which lies between lines drawn connecting Lydenburg, Middelburg, and Pietersburg—an area rather smaller than Yorkshire, or about the same size as Inverness



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

ANY MOUNT BETTER THAN NONE.

The Yeoman in this picture (which was sketched from an actual incident), having lost his horse, is fain to content himself with a donkey. One of his "chums" has rigged up a harness for a Cape-cart out of his saddle-horse trappings, using stirrup-straps for traces, &c. A ride in a Cape-cart, even with this improvised harness, is a blessed relief to a man who, perhaps for days together, has hardly been out of the saddle.

—and, as was hoped and expected, would drive the skulking bands of the enemy into General Plumer's arms. Thus General Plumer's men were to be the anvil upon which the eastern columns were to crush the Boers. In command of the eastern force was Lieutenant-General Sir Bindon Blood to co-operate from the east. Sir Bindon Blood to co-operate from the east. Blood, an officer who had won great distinction in Indian frontier warfare, and who, at Lord Kitchener's request, had been sent from India to take a command in South Africa. With him came two other Indian officers, Major-General Beatson, who was placed under Sir Bindon Blood's orders, and Major-General Elliot, who was assigned to the northern Orange River Colony.

The total strength of General Blood's six columns was nearly 10,000 combatants with 28 field or mountain guns, howitzers and "Pom-Poms." About half the force was mounted, so that there were 5,000 horsemen to sweep this great area—not by any means a large number, remembering the

work that was to be done. The first column, under Colonel Park, mustered 800 men and three guns; it was to march from Lydenburg into the Steelpoort valley, and there prevent the Boers in the neighbourhood of Roossenekal from escaping north. The second column, under Major-General W. Kitchenier, the brother of the Commander-in-Chief, was 1,400 men strong with five guns; it was to start from Lydenburg, cross the Steelpoort, and march to Fort Weber, in the country between the Steelpoort and the Olifants. The third column, under Colonel Douglas, mustered 1,100 men with five guns, and was to move from the Delagoa Bay line to Dullstroom. The fourth column, under Colonel Pulteney, numbered 1,700 men with three guns, and starting from Belfast was to occupy Roossenekal — the seat of Boer government. This and the next column were under the orders of Major-General Fetherstonhaugh. The fifth column, commanded by Colonel Benson, was the strongest of all, mustering 2,200 men and eight guns, and was to move from Middelburg into the Upper Steelpoort valley, aiding Pulteney's column in the occupation of Roossenekal. The last column, under General Beatson, 1,400 strong with four



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD, K.C.B.

[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

Born in 1842. Joined the Royal Engineers, 1860; Captain, 1873; Major, 1879; Lieut-Colonel, 1882; Colonel, 1886; Major-General, 1898. Served in the Jowaki Expedition, 1877-8; in the Zulu War, 1879; in the Afghan War, 1878-80; in the Egyptian War, 1882, and was present at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir; with the Chitral Relief Force, under Sir R. Low, 1895, as Chief Staff Officer; commanded the Malakand Field Force during the campaign on the north-west frontier of India, 1897-8, and the Buner Field Force, K.C.B., 1896. Left India for South Africa, February 20, 1901, and took command of a Division in April of the same year.

guns, was to make connection with Plumer's men and hold the upper drifts of the Olifants. It was to start from Middelburg. Each column was given a strictly defined route and time-table, so as to ensure combination; but these very precautions, by limiting the independence of the subordinate commanders, militated in some degree against the success of the operations. As a matter of fact, Botha, with the bulk of the fighting Boers, had already noted the signs of trouble brewing, and speedily betook himself from the threatened area by the simple process of slipping between the British columns. Viljoen's commando, however, and numerous small parties of Boers still remained, and if these could be laid by the heels the exertions of the British troops would not be without reward. These parties ranged in numbers from a handful of men to one or two hundred.

On the morning of April 14, General Plumer led his Colonials out of Pietersburg

**Plumer moves through
the bush-veldt.**

into the dense bush. The country was covered with thorny scrub and dwarf mimosa, the thorn bushes inflicting painful wounds on man or beast who strayed from the rough tracks. This bush-veldt had an evil name for insalubrity; men sickened in it; horses died of the mysterious horse-sickness. In its tangled thickets wandered many wild animals, whose cries broke the stillness of night. Everywhere, too, were lizards and snakes and strange insects, the fauna of the sub-tropics. The landscape wore a sad, forbidding look, says Mr. Bennet Burleigh, "though the beaming sunshine of morn and afternoon spreads broadcast rich colouring upon the kopjes and veldt . . . We kept to the high road, wending along by swelling uplands, and at length down into a wide valley of soft sand and clayey ground, beyond which the track ascended towards the hill-



SUPPER FOR THE INVALIDS.

Poultry "commandeered" by the R.A.M.C. for a field hospital.

range and the pass of Chunies Poort." No large trees broke the monotony of that wilderness; melancholy and abandoned by man, it stretched for mile after mile, always the same, with eternal repetitions of the same uplands, the same river bottoms, the same drifts, and the same kopjes in the far-off distance.

Nearing Chunies Poort, Colonel Jeffreys was ordered to advance and seize the pass with his

**Seizure of Chunies
Poort Pass.**

Australians. This he effected without even firing a shot, though the tracks of Boers were evident and recent. Three miles behind him General Plumer's main body halted and passed the night. On the 15th the advance was resumed, though not until a desultory Boer attack upon the Australians guarding the Poort had been delivered and repulsed. The road now ran for many miles through a narrow defile, bordered on either hand by forbidding



ZEBRA.

One of several captured by Colonel Grenfell's column and brought into Pietersburg.

precipices. Here and there patches of bush and reed grass offered just the very cover, of which the Boers knew so well how to avail themselves. But the snipers had gone, and presently the troops debouched into a kindlier country, where native kraals with their concomitant patches of Kaffir corn and mealie were seen in all directions, and where hundreds of Kaffir men and women came out to gaze upon these strange visitors. Now and again a Boer farm was seen and examined; the men upon these farms either surrendered or were made prisoners, and the women and children were removed, to be sent down to the refugee camps. In the course of the 15th Jeffreys' men captured two snipers and about a dozen other Boers, who were well armed, as they had thirty rifles between them. The column bivouacked for the night some twenty miles from the Olifants.



A KAFFIR VILLAGE.

The photograph represents a typical kraal in the Northern Transvaal, which is thickly populated with Blacks. It is estimated that there are not less than 600,000 within the confines of the Transvaal, while there are about 60,000 in the Orange River Colony.

On the 16th the column divided. One section under Colonel Jeffreys marched directly to the east, to Olifants Drift, which it was to hold; the other, under Colonel Colvin, accompanied by General Plumer himself, headed southwards towards Fort Driehoek, a long-abandoned earthwork raised in the interminable Sekukuni wars. During the day two Boer scouts were captured by the Colonials. At the close of the day Plumer's men stood upon the far-off Olifants, which ran through thick bush, a stream sixty or seventy yards wide and six feet deep. Plumer himself camped just above a drift, where a space was cleared in the dense growth of prickly aloe and cactus. Jeffreys camped at Olifants Drift, and on the 17th Major



A NACHTMAAL AT PIETERSBURG.

Vialls, with a section of Bushmen, was detached thirty miles to the south to hold Commissie Drift.

The fords guarded. In these positions the troops remained some days, as their allotted stations had now been reached. Communication between these small isolated parties was maintained by strong patrols, while scouts kept a careful watch upon the country on the further bank of the Olifants, and strove to get into touch with Sir Bindon Blood's column.

On April 22 it was decided to extend the British front still further to the south, as it appeared that there were fords in the stretch of river between Major Vialls at Commissie Drift and the extreme outposts of General Beatson's force, which held the southern crossing places. By these fords indeed Viljoen's men had already, on the previous day, escaped to the west, so that the British were locking

the stable door after the horse had gone. Major Vialls moved yet higher up the stream, and was replaced at Commissie Drift by Captain Markham with a company of New Zealanders. On his march to Commissie Drift, Markham came across the trail of a small Boer commando, and at once pursued. All day he pushed after the enemy, and when they crossed the river at the drift, he followed them, only halting because the utter exhaustion of his horses and the density of the thorn bush rendered further progress impossible. Wishing to catch them, he sent back to General Plumer's camp for a reinforcement of thirty men with fresh horses, reporting what had happened; the men arrived on the 25th. On the previous day Major Vialls had detached a young Australian officer, Lieutenant Reid, with twenty Bushmen to cross the Olifants, scout northwards, and capture a number of cattle reported to be close at hand. Reid rode east sixteen miles, and then by mere chance came upon traces of the very party of Boers that Captain Markham had been following. From



F. J. Waugh.]

REID'S PARTY SURPRISING SCHROEDER'S COMMANDO (p. 442).

natives he learnt that they were under Schroeder, a well-known Boer desperado, whose following might be trusted to make a good fight, since among them were many members of the South African Republic's Police—a force which had always distinguished itself in action. Reid at once hurried after them along their track, and late in the afternoon reached a deep-cut watercourse. Here he halted his men in the thick bush, and pushed forward stealthily upon hands and knees. The two had not gone far, when they perceived signs that they were close upon the enemy. Out of the stillness of the night behind them came the loud noise of a jolting waggon, while, above a long ridge just to the south of them, showed the bright glow of a fire. Reid, returning, took with him three or four Colonials, and with them and Brink proceeded to investigate the ridge. To the south of it were two small kopjes, and between the kopjes and the ridge lay the Boer encampment. Cautious scouting showed that the Boers had outspanned carelessly, but that they

Schroeder's position
reconnoitred by
Australians.



THE CAPTURE OF SCHROEDER'S COMMANDO BY LIEUTENANT REID WITH TWENTY BUSHMEN.

F. J. W. Angell

had placed a picket upon the westernmost of the two small kopjes. No doubt they had trusted to the screen which the long ridge interposed between them and the British, and to the care with which they had doubled back upon their tracks, to hide their whereabouts. With extraordinary daring Brink worked his way right into the Boer camp, and listened to the burghers' talk. From what was said he learnt that another party of Boers, a hundred strong, was only a few miles away.



[Photo by N. P. Edwards.]

JOHANNESBURG MOUNTED POLICE WITH THEIR BAND.

The photograph, taken just before the war, represents the force which afterwards fought so stubbornly at Bergendal, and to which some of Lieut. Reid's prisoners belonged.

He then retired, relieving the enemy of two horses and a donkey, and rejoined Reid.

Reid now made his dispositions, collecting his little band of 21 men, all told, including Brink, upon the easternmost of the two small kopjes. Four Bushmen

Skilful capture of the camp by Lieut. Reid.

were stationed to the north of the ridge, while two parties, of four and five respectively, guarded the neks which ran eastwards and westwards between it and the two kopjes. On the eastern kopje he waited with Brink and seven men, till daylight should appear, when, on a signal given by firing a carbine, all the parties were to pour in a rapid fusillade upon the unsuspecting enemy a hundred yards or so away. As the hour for action drew near, three or four of the British force crawled towards

the western kopje, with the object of rushing the Boer sentry upon it. They got within five yards of the man, when he quietly walked off to the camp, without discovering them. But the Kaffirs



JOHANNESBURG POLICEMAN OF THE PRESENT DAY.

The Johannesburg Police Force, under the Kruger régime, was recruited entirely from Transvaal and Orange Free State Boers, no foreigners being eligible. The pay was poor, and the men did not earn the respect of the Uitlanders. They were known as "Zarps," from the initial letters on their coat-collars, "Z.A.R.P." (Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Politie). The photograph shows one of the British successors to this force.

with the enemy must have scented danger, as they began to slink out of the camp. Day was now breaking, and the Boers were just beginning to stir and make ready for the day's trek, when the signal was given. A shot rang out, the various parties opened fire, and with amazing daring Reid and Brink, followed by four Tasmanians, dashed impetuously at the camp, uttering a British cheer. A loaded Maxim, trained on the eastern kopje, was captured in an instant; the Boers knew that considerable British forces were in the vicinity, and supposed themselves surrounded by overwhelming numbers. In three minutes from the first shot Commandant Schroeder raised the white flag. The enemy had not lost a single man: Reid had directed his troopers to fire the first volley over the heads of the Boers.

In the camp were found, besides Schroeder, 41 Boers, nearly all of them "Zarps," as the Transvaal police were called, with several women and children, 12 waggons or carts, 100 mules and oxen, a limber for the 4.7 gun laden with detonators and fuses, 15,000 rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of blasting powder. The difficulty, however, was how with 21 men to secure 42 prisoners. Fortunately the



OLIFANTS RIVER BETWEEN COMMISSIE AND KROKODIL DRIFTS.



UNWILLING CAPTIVES.

The Boer women in this photograph are objecting to go to the refugee camp.

Boers imagined that Reid's party numbered at least 200, and the quick-witted Australian officer had recourse to a simple stratagem which took full advantage of this belief. He called to his two sergeants, and ordered them to guard the right and left, each taking 20 men. They were further instructed to direct two other, wholly mythical, sergeants to guard the flank and rear with even stronger detachments. All this was said in the plain hearing of Schroeder, who understood English. The Boers were disarmed, formed in column of route, and hurriedly marched off towards Commissie Drift, while all the way the farce of shouting orders to imaginary bodies of British troops was well kept up by Reid. Not till a drift was reached, at which it was necessary for the British to close in, did the Boers discover the truth.

Meantime small British detachments to the rear of General Plumer's line of posts on the Olifants were also making captures. Major Colenbrander of Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, who was on his way

**Twenty-one Australians
take forty-two
prisoners.**

to General Plumer with a convoy of provisions, captured a dozen of the enemy and a good number of cattle to the south of Pietersburg; while, on April 24, Major Kirkwood, at Chunies Poort, laid hands upon a small party of Boers who were on their way to join Beyers. Among them were some burghers of political importance—G. Munnik, the ex-landdrost of Pietersburg; H. Munnik, his son, the state mining engineer, and credited with designs of destroying the Rand mines in May 1900; and W. de Villiers, his secretary. Further to the south-east Major Davis, detached from General Beatson's column, had the good luck to come upon another portion of Schroeder's commando, and made prisoners of the Boer native commissioner, Christian Fourie, with 33 burghers, several waggons, and a quantity of cattle.

The prisoners told extraordinary tales. They believed, or pretended to believe, that De Wet had raised 30,000 rebels in Cape Colony, and was sweeping what had been the Free State clear of the British, while General French—who already, according to veracious Boer reports, had been captured and released on parole—had been compelled to swim out to sea, to avoid re-capture and the penalties that attend breach of parole. They knew about our peace proposals, which, naturally enough, they ascribed to weakness, and openly said that, if the worst came to the worst and they were utterly defeated, they could yet get what they wanted from the British. Why, then, they asked, should they yield?

Other prisoners were brought in by Colonel Jeffreys' patrols. Unfortunately time could not be spared thoroughly to examine the large tract of rough country which he had to sweep, nor were troops available in sufficient numbers to draw an effective cordon round the small parties of Boers known to be lurking in the kloofs and spruits.

On April 27 he made a bold attempt to capture a small force of Boers who were lurking in Malip's Valley. Three columns were employed, and the valley swept, but through the mistake of a subordinate officer he failed to lay the enemy by the heels. None the less, he took eleven Boers and a quantity of cattle and waggons. He and his men were indefatigable, examining the remote hiding places of the enemy; marching all the day and much of the night, and from time to time making captures of burghers and waggons. They were in a position of some insecurity, as Beyers with 160 men was hovering round Pietersburg, and there were other commandos of less size near at hand. These, however, steadily refused to fight, and kept out of the way of the stronger British columns, though they were ready enough to attack weak parties or isolated patrols. Thus Beyers himself drove back a patrol of 50 Mounted Infantry, which moved out from Pietersburg towards Klipdam, capturing a man and wounding four others, two of whom fell into his hands. They were treated with exceptional consideration, the Boer commandant himself assisting to bandage their wounds.

As it was highly desirable to dislodge Beyers, Lord Kitchener, on receiving intelligence of the skirmish at Klipdam, directed Lieutenant-Colonel Grenfell to take Kitchener's Fighting Scouts and attack the enemy. Grenfell moved out on the night of April 26, and succeeded in getting to the



REMAINS OF THE BOER CREUSOT DESTROYED AT BERGPLAATS.

From a photograph taken at Piet Potgieter's Rust.

laager unperceived before dawn of the 27th broke. He then assaulted the laager and rushed it with the loss of only one wounded. It was found that Beyers had gone, and that Van Rensburg was in command. Seven Boers were killed in the assault and 41 captured.

Grenfell rushes Beyers' laager.

Among the prizes which fell to the British troops were 76,000 rounds of ammunition and many waggons and carts. As the prisoners asserted that Beyers had mounted a Creusot gun—the last remaining to the Boers—at Bergplaats, on the road from Pietersburg to Haenertsburg, and as this agreed with information received from other sources, Grenfell determined to secure the weapon. He obtained Lord Kitchener's sanction, and on April 30 was close to Bergplaats. The enemy saw him, and opened fire at the enormous range of 10,000 yards with their "Long Tom." The fire was ridiculously ineffective, and did not prevent the troopers of Kitchener's Fighting Scouts from pushing rapidly in to 3,000 yards. At this range the enemy ceased firing and burst the gun, finding that they could not possibly remove it. They then fled in a north-easterly direction, but ten of their number were made prisoners. The Creusot had been badly damaged,


End of the last Boer Creusot.

but it was carried off

as a trophy, and 35 rounds of ammunition for it were captured. The only British casualties were two men wounded. Grenfell remained for some days in the locality, hunting for buried ammunition and concealed burghers, and succeeded in discovering a huge deposit of Martini-Henry cartridges on a farm known as Bergvlei.

As they were of no use to the Army they were destroyed. The existence of this *cache* of ammunition showed that there was good foundation for the vague reports which had reached the British Intelligence Department—that the Boers had huge stores of food and ammunition concealed in the Zoutpansberg region.

In the opening days of May, another success was scored by the troops under Colonel Grenfell's command. Major Thomson with the 12th Regular Mounted Infantry, under cover of a thick fog, surrounded and captured Commandant Marais and 40 burghers, while Colonels Colenbrander and



W. B. Wollen, R.I.]

[After a sketch by a Yeoman.

LORD KITCHENER INSPECTING THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY AT ELANDSFONTEIN
(April 22, 1901), PRIOR TO THEIR RETURN HOME.

Wilson made other hauls, and swept the country. Louistrichart, an insignificant village in the Zoutpansberg, was also occupied. This place lay nearly 70 miles to the north of Pietersburg, and only 50 miles south of the Limpopo, the frontier between the Transvaal and Rhodesia, in a region which was unmapped and almost unexplored. Here 40 Boers surrendered, while 50 more were taken prisoners. On May 6 Grenfell returned to Pietersburg, and was able to report that he had lessened the enemy's forces by 7 burghers killed, 129 captured, and 50 surrendered, besides which 240,000 rounds of ammunition had been destroyed. Beyers, however, was still at large, and was said to have collected some 400 burghers, and with them to have moved south towards Nylstroom, where he was threatening the railway. On May 8 two of the enemy, among whom was a man named Nicholson, recently acting as adjutant to Beyers, came into Pietersburg under a flag of truce, to ask what terms the British would grant to them and to a number of other burghers. The terms were stated and regarded as satisfactory, whereupon about 40 Boers made their submission. Among them was a well-known Boer official, Mr. Barend Vorster. The country seemed to be rapidly settling down, and, no doubt, if Lord Kitchener had been able to prolong the operations in this quarter, Beyers might have been forced into surrender. Unfortunately the



[Photo by D. Barnett, Pietermaritzburg.]

HOW THE BOERS TREAT THEIR OWN WOMEN.

The women depicted in this photo had to drag the heavily laden waggon thirteen miles over rough country and across several drifts. Their husbands, having taken the oath of neutrality, were in Heidelberg for protection from the Boers. David o. d. Westhuizen, the Field-Cornet of the Zinkerbosch Rand, sent the wives in, and would not allow them oxen or mules to draw the waggon. One of the women, in consequence of the hardships of this journey, was ill in bed for some weeks afterwards.

troops, being wanted elsewhere, could not be spared, and, when the columns withdrew, the waverers thought better of submission.

At the end of April General Plumer's outlying posts were drawn in, and a southward movement on his part began. Jeffreys marched to Bathfontein, where the General's headquarters had been established, and then with him joined Major Vials at Commissie Drift. Here they learnt that Lieutenant Hercombe of the Bushmen, striving with a small party of men to emulate Lieutenant Reid's exploit, had met with a mishap.

**Plumer's column
returns south.**

Accompanied by the guide Brink, he surprised and captured a party of nine Boers with several waggons and 500 cattle. The cattle he sent by a round-about track to the British camp, knowing that a good many of the enemy were in the vicinity. With the prisoners he followed the main road, but was so unlucky as to fall into an ambush in a mealie patch. He was knocked down and captured with three of his men, while the Boer prisoners all made their escape. The rest of the Bushmen and Brink got away by bolting into the dense thorn-bush, where the Boers did not care to follow them, or face the risk of having clothing and flesh torn by the cruel mimosa. Hercombe and the three men were released after being stripped of their glasses, weapons, and accoutrements. The cattle they had captured were safely driven into the British camp along the other road.

Major Vialls' men fell into General Plumer's column, and the southward march towards Pretoria was resumed. They were, however, again detached on May 3 in pursuit of two of the Pretorius family with a party of 300 Boers and a great number of cattle. Major Vialls struck the Pietersburg Railway at Waterval, and from this point headed for Hamanskraal, hearing that the armoured train had been in action in that direction with small parties attempting to cross the line. Still in pursuit he rode far to the west of the railway, till he was close to the outposts of De la Rey, but without effecting any important captures, and, returning, he entrained at Pienaar's River on May 6.

Plumer, meanwhile, marched by Wagon Drift to Eerste Fabrieken on the Delagoa Bay line, clearing all farms that he passed. For all the falsehoods invented by the Boers as to the atrocious conduct of the British soldiery, it was found that they had left their wives and children behind, often without a particle of food, so that the soldiers' rations had to be cut down to give these



A. C. Ball.]

CAPTURE OF BOERS BY CYCLISTS NEAR EERSTE FABRIEKEN.

thankless, bitterly hostile people bread and meat. Women and children were in a disgusting state of filth and squalor; the ramshackle sheds in which they lived exhaled a sour odour which sickened even the hardy Australian troopers; the dress of the women was sacking, and the children had for weeks had nothing to eat but mealie-pap. Yet these were the people against whose lot in the concentration camps, where at least cleanliness was enforced, and where wholesome food and good clothing were issued free of cost, the British pro-Boers declaimed!

On the way to Eerste Fabrieken, a daring New Zealand cyclist, Lieutenant Joss, was sent in advance to carry despatches, and was given an escort of 10 wheelmen. They fell in with 10 Boers on the way, chased them on cycles over the veldt and captured nine of them, this being the only feat of the kind achieved by cyclists in the war.

On May 4 General Plumer's northern movement came to an end, and the column began its refit at Eerste Fabrieken. It had captured 143 Boers and received the surrender of over 400, and this without any mishap of the slightest importance, indeed with scarcely a casualty, and in country particularly favourable to the enemy's tactics.

Results achieved.



MOUNTED INFANTRY WITH LOOTED FORAGE.

CHAPTER XXIII.

FURTHER OPERATIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Boer commandos, forewarned, disappear—General Kitchener marches to Fort Weber—Movements of Douglas, Pulteney, Benson, and Beatson—Surrender of part of the Boksburg commando—Viljoen destroys his guns and escapes—Remnant of his force surrenders—Pulteney enters Roossenekal—Seizure of Boer documents and correspondence—British columns withdraw—Results of the campaign—Lord Erroll temporarily replaces Lord Methuen—British evacuate Hoopstad—Babington moves on Lichtenburg—Pursuit of De la Rey and Smuts—Narrow escape of the Imperial Light Horse—Casualties—Boer spy hoodwinked—Boers attack Babington's convoy—Grand charge of the Bushmen and New Zealanders—De la Rey's account of the action—The spoils counted—Babington pursues De la Rey—Methuen, Dixon, and Williams join in the chase—Sweeping movement in the South-West Transvaal—Depredations on Delagoa Bay and Natal Railways—Treason at Heidelberg—Murder of Kaffirs—Boers active in Zululand—General situation in the Transvaal—Return of Boer prisoners—Mrs. Botha visits Europe.



WHILE General Plumer was holding the drifts of the middle Olifants, General Sir Bindon Blood and the force under his command had not been inactive. On April 13 the six columns, which were to drive the Boers into General Plumer's arms, were disposed in a semi-circle—Colonel Park and General W. Kitchener at Lydenburg, Colonel Douglas midway between Lydenburg and Belfast, Colonel Pulteney at Belfast, and Colonel Benson and General Beatson at Middelburg.

General Kitchener directed the columns on the right or Lydenburg flank, General Fetherstonhaugh those on the left or Middelburg flank, while Sir Bindon Blood in the centre had supreme control. Just before the

start of the columns the Boers were reported in all directions to be crossing the Delagoa Bay Railway—a piece of news which indicated that they were perfectly well aware of what was intended, and which was explained when later in the operations a fairly complete set of British military telegrams was discovered in their archives at Roossenekal. It was tolerably obvious that they were kept supplied with this valuable information by traitors near head-quarters, and the probable sources of this "leakage" were discovered some months afterwards among the paroled and ostentatiously loyal Boers at Pretoria. Thus it came about that only one



BRIDGE OVER A RIVER, CONSTRUCTED BY THE DEVONS WITH GENERAL WALTER KITCHENER.

commando of any strength was left in the threatened area. This was Viljoen's, numbering about

1,600 men according to trustworthy reports.

On April 13 General Kitchener and Colonel Park started from Lydenburg. Just a month before, Colonel Park with the Devonshire Mounted

SNAP-SHOTS IN THE LYDENBURG DISTRICT.



BUILDING A FORT.

Infantry had scoured the country to the north of Lydenburg, capturing on March 14 a Boer laager at Kruger's Poort and inflicting upon the Boers a loss of six killed or wounded and 32 prisoners. On this occasion the notorious Abel Erasmus, a burgher famous for his cruelty to the natives and a man of great wealth, had been made prisoner. Colonel Park now again marched northwards, while General Kitchener took a more westerly road. The two columns met at Rietfontein in the valley of the Waterval, which is one of the many tributaries of the Steelpoort. There they separated, Park and his men remaining to beat up the mountains and kloofs of the Waterval and Dewars River valleys and to prevent any attempt of the Boers to break out to the north. General



WATERFALL IN THE SABI VALLEY.

A column of mounted men can be seen crossing in the distance.



DIGGING ENTRENCHMENTS NEAR LYDENBURG.

Kitchener marched rapidly, without meeting any opposition, to the

General Kitchener marches to Fort Weber. Steelpoort, forded that

river, and pressed on to Fort Weber, an old earthwork situated midway between the Steelpoort and Olifants. So anxious were the Boers to avoid him that they did not even trouble to snipe his column on the march. Without firing a shot many positions were passed in which a small party of the enemy would have caused an

infinite amount of trouble; but the Boers were not in a fighting mood. It looked as though there was some truth in the various reports which had reached the British Intelligence Department, to the effect that they were short of re-mounts, and that what horses they possessed were in bad condition.

At Fort Weber General Kitchener was in touch with

Movements of Douglas, Plumer's column and was thus able to bar the Boer

line of retreat north. Meantime, Colonel Douglas from Witklip marched to the village of Dullstroom, burnt by General Smith-Dorrien's troops some time before for various acts of treachery committed by the inhabitants.

The Boers always hung round the place and were particularly

troublesome; on this occasion they fell back to the east, out of the British drive, and taking post in the hills assumed an aggressive attitude. Colonel Douglas was met at Dullstroom on April 17 by the fourth column, under Colonel Pulteney, which had left Belfast on the 15th and which had had to traverse difficult country. Colonel Pulteney, however, could not stop to assist Colonel Douglas; his orders were to continue his advance by Witpoort to Roosenekal, and without further assistance Colonel Douglas was too weak to deal with the enemy. The last of the columns, those commanded by Colonel Benson and General Beatson, left Middelburg on April 15, General Beatson marching to close the drifts of the Upper Olifants, and Colonel Benson directing his men upon Roosenekal and the range of mountains known as the Tantesberg or Tantesberg—for both spellings are used, though one is obviously the result of a misprint.

It had been hoped that the enemy would make a great stand in the Tantesberg. In that case they would have been attacked by columns coming from all sides, General Kitchener from the north, Colonels Park and Douglas from the east, Colonel Pulteney from the south-east, Colonel Benson from the south-west, and General Beatson from the west. They must infallibly have been captured or killed. But, as so often happens in war, the Boers did not do what their adversaries hoped and expected. They



WRECK OF A CREUSOT GUN, BLOWN UP BY THE BOERS AT RIETFONTEIN, IN THE WATerval VALLEY, April 15, 1901.



UNTEAMING A WAGGON: A LITTLE HEALTHY EXERCISE FOR THE KAFFIR "BOYS."



W. T. Maud.]

PAYING OFF OLD SCORES: SEKUKUNI'S NATIVES DRIVING THE BOERS OF VILJOEN'S COMMANDO OUT OF THEIR TERRITORY.

When the Boers of Louis Botha's command broke back in front of Sir Bindon Blood's drive, they split up into three parties. The centre party, under Ben Viljoen, tried to take a short cut to the Zoutpansberg by crossing Sekukuni's country. But Sekukuni's impi had been waiting for this opportunity, and fell upon the advance guard of the Boers in the heavy bush. They claim to have killed thirty, ridden down and "knobkerried" in the narrow paths of the bush-veldt.

[After a sketch by Lionel James,

offered no resistance and made no stand. As the British advanced they either retreated or dispersed, and, when they had dispersed, it was by no means easy within narrow limits of time to lay hold of them. An ample mounted force and unlimited time would probably have resulted in a complete clearance, though then fresh problems, as for instance the difficulty of maintaining supplies, would have arisen.

Colonel Benson marched through Bankfontein and Klipspruit to Blinkwater, a farm and nothing more, for in this part of the Transvaal the only place approaching a village in size is Roosenekal.

**Surrender of part of the
Boksburg commando.**

Beyond Blinkwater and to the south of the Tantesberg, on April 20, he found a considerable Boer laager. This contained the weak-hearted part of the Boksburg commando, and its inmates were waiting to make their surrender. They numbered 102 men—we are not told how many of them were combatants—with 29 waggons and some cattle. They gave the news that when they left Viljoen, he was hurrying hither and thither to effect his



THE EXILED "BOER GOVERNMENT" AT HILVERSUM.

Mr. Kruger left Utrecht for Hilversum March 26, 1901. He is here seen returning from his morning walk escorted by Mr. Bredell, Dr. Heymans, and Mr. F. Eloff. The valet, Happe, is in the background.

escape. At first he had dashed north, but when near Fort Weber had found General Kitchener in his front, and had been compelled to beat a hasty retreat. Doubling south he attempted to pass between the columns of Colonels Benson and Pulteney, but was foiled by an unexpected movement of Colonel Pulteney's, which upset all his calculations. He was now so closely hemmed in that his one chance of safety lay in abandoning his artillery, and then penetrating the gap which still existed to

**Viljoen destroys his
guns and escapes.**

the west, on the course of the Olifants, between General Plumer's and General Beatson's outposts. If this was to be effected rapid movement was essential. Accordingly he burst his last remaining "Pom-Pom," blew up the 4.7 gun captured at Helvetia, and disabled his last Krupp. This done he fled to the west, and passed through the gap with 600 men, just twelve hours before it was closed. His subsequent movements are uncertain, but he seems to have slipped down south between the Wilge and Olifant, finally reappearing to the south of the Delagoa Bay Railway, where he was soon as active as ever.

Thus once more was demonstrated the extreme difficulty of drawing an effective cordon round the enemy's elusive commandos. Always the Boers discovered some gap or some weak place, and with their mobility and local knowledge, the majority of them were able to get away. Some relics of Viljoen's forces, however, still remained on the Tantesberg, and to secure these was Colonel Benson's aim. A number of them were wavering between flight and surrender. They were seen coming towards the British camp, when they changed their minds and retired to the north. But they were followed up, and now that the gaps were closed, escape was hopeless. A day or so later they made their submission. Colonel Benson now pushed on to join Colonel Pulteney. The latter had entered Roosenekal on April 22, after an awkward march along bad roads through narrow defiles, offering splendid opportunities to the Boers for their peculiar style of warfare. But there was

**Remnant of his force
surrenders.**

**Pulteney enters Roos-
senekal.**

no sign of serious resistance. On entering the village the landdrost and 48 burghers were found waiting to surrender. They stated that the seat of Government had been, a fortnight or more before, transferred to Ermelo. Hovering




WATERFALL AT NELSPRUIT, IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL.

round the village in the mountains were many other Boers, some few of whom came in that day, while others were captured after the usual man-hunt by British detachments.

At Roosenekal or in its neighbourhood, on the various expeditions, a number of interesting papers and the Boer archives were seized. Some

**Seizure of Boer docu-
ments and corre-
spondence.** £50,000 worth of Transvaal notes, which had been printed on common paper at Pietersburg, were among

the captures. The documents included politically important lists of burghers in the field, commandants' despatches, diplomatic correspondence, the outlines of a scheme for despatching ammunition and food from Delagoa Bay to Roosenekal by three different routes, and the collection of British telegrams already mentioned. Some of the despatches were amusing reading. Commandant Badenhorst reported on the strength of information received from Herzog, that Cape Colony had risen "to a man, and taken up arms" and that the leading commandos were "right in the Cape." A victory of De Wet's was detailed, in which that leader had killed General Knox and disarmed 400 men. This would seem to have been an exaggerated account of the Tabaksberg affair. Another despatch from the Commandant-General of Roosenekal threatened to burn the houses of all who surrendered to the British. An



WATERTANK AT PAN STATION, NEAR MIDDELBURG TRANSVAAL, WITH SIGNALLERS AND SAND-BAG FORTIFICATIONS.

entertaining missive from the "Telegraphist, Ermelo," showed with what falsehoods the Boer leaders encouraged their commandos. This stated, under date October, 1900, that a Congress of Powers



A TRAIN-LOAD OF PRISONERS ON THE WAY TO CAPETOWN.

held at Paris had refused to allow England to carry on the war for another six months, that France was going to land troops in England on November 1, and that Australia, India, Canada, and Cape Colony wished to recall their troops owing to the great cost of the war. Other papers and depositions showed to what extent the faith of a Boer could be trusted. A "peace-envoy," named Joubert, arrested by the Boers, asserted that he had acted as envoy only to rejoin his comrades, and offered to take up arms against the English, though obviously he had given his parole to the British authorities. A good deal of correspondence between General Botha and Mr. Schalk Burger completed the seizures.

The occupation of Roossenekal was, unfortunately, not sufficiently prolonged to result in the real subjugation of the country round. On April 29 Colonel Pulteney withdrew his troops and retired to Blinkwater. Colonel Benson had already marched to join Colonel

**British columns
withdraw.**

Douglas at Dullstroom, and deal with the enemy in that neighbourhood. With

Douglas he attacked the Boers on April 30 and dispersed them. Such an issue

was by no means what was to be desired; in these circumstances, for the British to "disperse" their enemy was tantamount to a British check. There was a miserable total of eight Boers killed, wounded or made prisoners, while the British lost as many men—unhappily, four of them officers, who could not easily be replaced.


General Blood had intended to thoroughly clear the district, and it was disappointing in the extreme for him to have to move his troops away before his work was done, especially as the burghers were everywhere surrendering in groups of two and three, and as the crops had not been completely destroyed or the stores of concealed ammunition all brought to



ARRIVAL OF BOER PRISONERS AT AHMEDNUGGUR.

On April 23, 1901, five hundred Boer prisoners from South Africa were landed at Bombay, and proceeded to the old fort at Ahmednuggur, which had been fitted up with electric light and every arrangement for their comfort. It possesses a healthy, fine, dry climate, similar to that of the Transvaal, and is a favourite station in the Deccan, 2,000 feet above sea-level. A man of the native escort can be seen in the background towards the right of the photograph.

light. Before finally withdrawing, Colonel Pulteney was permitted to strike one more blow. The enemy had re-occupied Roossenekal, and this coming to his knowledge he made a night march with a small force of mounted men, and at dawn of May 2 surrounded the village. Unfortunately, the Boers heard the ring of our horses' hoofs a great way off, and for the most part bolted. A few, however, were captured, with some waggons and cattle.



[Photo by W. J. Wright.]

COLONEL PARK.

Of the other columns, Colonel Park's remained near Lydenburg clearing the country. General Kitchener moved southwards from Fort Weber, once more sweeping the Tantesberg, and then struck west to the confluence of the Olifants and Wilge, whence he turned eastwards again to the railway at Middelburg, clearing the Bothasberg range on his march. General Beatson returned up the Wilge to Balmoral, and spent some days in dislodging the enemy from the country to the north of that place.


The campaign resulted in the capture or surrender of 1,081 Boers, with an even greater number of women and children, while two guns, one a "Pom-Pom" and the other a 1-pounder

Results of the campaign.

Krupp, were taken undamaged. A Creusot gun, the 4.7-in. weapon carried off by the enemy at Helvetia, two field guns, two "Pom-Poms," and two Maxims were destroyed by the Boers to avoid capture.

The rifles taken were only 540, so that about half the captured Boers must have buried their weapons; the captured horses numbered 247, which seemed to point to the fact that the Boers were running short of mounts, if all the prisoners or the majority of them were fighting men. As to the general effect of the operations there could be no doubt. The enemy had been attacked where they thought themselves absolutely secure. A large area had been scoured by the British columns; the capital and seat of Government of the South African Republic—or what remained of it—had been seized and occupied for a time, and, as the result of the papers captured, the schemes for smuggling in supplies from Portuguese territory had been checkmated. Yet though all this had been achieved, no serious blow had been struck at the armed force of the enemy. There is every reason to suppose that the voluntary surrenders were those of the less resolute and less robust Boers. The captures in which the fighting burghers figured were few and far between. The boldest and most irreconcilable of the enemy had been taught no lesson, and yet, so long as they remained in the field, the conflict was bound to continue. They could only be removed from the field by capture or death. Generals Botha and Viljoen and Mr. Schalk Burger, whom above all others Lord Kitchener wished to take in this cast of the net, escaped, and the great bulk of their forces eluded capture with them.

This was all the more disappointing, as Head-quarters realised that if the Boers could keep the field through the South African autumn and winter, the struggle would be prolonged for at least another year. That winter roughly coincides with the British summer, as the South African autumn corresponds with our spring. But the autumn was already over in the



THE USEFUL "HOUSEWIFE."

One of the regulations for the Imperial Yeomanry was that every man should be provided with a "housewife" containing needles, thread, buttons, &c. There were occasions when the provision proved exceedingly useful.

Transvaal without any real sign of submission. The winter was at hand; only three months now remained, if any substantial result was to be obtained before September. And with September would come the rains of the South African spring, bringing up the grass upon the dry veldt, simplifying for the enemy the problem of obtaining forage and supplies, and facilitating a fresh outburst of guerilla activity.

We have surveyed the progress of the British arms in the north and east of the Transvaal during this South African autumn; it now remains to trace the campaign in the west and south. In the west, Lord Methuen, after prolonged and arduous marching up and down Bechuanaland and the south-western Transvaal, had returned to Warrenton to refit. Here

his health gave Lord Erroll temporarily replaces Lord Methuen. way as the result of his continued and unwearying exertions; for, to his credit be it said, that while he spared his troops, he never spared himself. Long months of campaigning, in which he had rendered admirable service, had effaced the painful recollections of that earlier period of fruitless battles and defeats. The



PRISONERS TAKEN BY GENERAL BABINGTON AT BUFFELSDOORN, NEAR KLERKSDORP.

general had restored his reputation, and had gained the esteem and regard of his troops. So that his loss, though only for a short period, was in every way unfortunate. He was temporarily replaced in his command by Lord Erroll, who was instructed to enter the Orange River Colony, withdraw the garrison of Hoopstad, which place was to be abandoned in accordance with the decision to evacuate all posts far from the railway, and return to Warrenton. On March 28 he moved out from Warrenton, while

**British evacuate
Hoopstad.**

at the same time a small column from Kimberley made a demonstration in the direction of Boshof and Zwartkopjesfontein, to occupy the attention of the enemy. Lord Erroll was opposed by Commandant Badenhorst with a small force of Free State burghers and rebels, who attacked the column at Steenbokpan, but without achieving any success. On April 2 Hoopstad was reached and the march back commenced, the garrison and most of the inhabitants accompanying Lord Erroll. Warrenton was entered on the 7th, and there the troops remained a fortnight.

On receiving news of the Boer attack upon Lichtenburg, on March 3, an event which has been narrated in a former chapter, Lord Kitchener directed General Babington to move to that place from



GENERAL BABINGTON'S PRISONERS DRAWN UP OUTSIDE THE PRISON AT KLERKSDORP.

Naaupoort, near Krugersdorp, and, if possible, to strike the Boer force. General Babington was informed that he would be joined at Ventersdorp by Colonel Shekleton with a
Babington moves on Lichtenburg. convoy of supplies. The weather, however, was exceedingly unfavourable and retarded the movement of the convoy, so that it was not until March 17 that the British mobile column reached Lichtenburg. By that time the Boers had retired, most of them making for Klerksdorp. General Babington followed close on their tracks, and between Lichtenburg and Hartebeestefontein killed eight of them, and captured 62, with several waggons.

The British force consisted of Shekleton's Regular Mounted

Pursuit of De la Rey and Smuts. Infantry, the 1st Imperial

Light Horse, the 6th contingent of Imperial Bushmen, the 4th contingent of New Zealanders, the 20th Imperial Yeomanry, detachments of the 14th Hussars, Somersetshire Light Infantry, and Welsh Fusiliers, four field guns, and as many "Pom-Poms." The Boers were under the command of Generals De la Rey and Smuts, two of the ablest and most daring of the enemy's officers. Their strength was estimated at about 1,500 men, and thus they were nearly equal in numbers to the British. On March 22 the two forces came into contact. Early that morning

Narrow escape of the Imperial Light Horse. the Imperial Light Horse,

with one "Pom-Pom," under Major Briggs, were ordered to advance from the valley in which the hamlet of Hartebeestefontein lies, through a low pass into the plain beyond, to reconnoitre and ascertain the whereabouts of De la Rey. Information had reached the Intelligence Department that he was near at hand, and he was, in fact, lying with his men behind a kopje, which rose in the centre of the plain. The Light Horse negotiated the pass without misadventure. Not a shot was fired; not a Boer was to be seen. In the



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

COLONEL CHARLES GORE, EARL OF ERROLL, K.T., C.B., LL.D., D.L.,
Hereditary Lord High Constable of Scotland.

Born in 1852, at Kingston, Canada West. Educated at Harrow. Joined the Royal Horse Guards, 1869; Lieutenant, 1871; Captain, 1875; Major, 1881; Lieut-Colonel, 1887; Colonel, 1895; Honorary Colonel 3rd Volunteer Battalion Gordon Highlanders, 1892; A.D.C. to Commander-in-Chief, 1895-8; A.A.G. under Inspector-General of Cavalry, 1898-9; special service, South Africa, 1899-1900; A.A.G., South Africa, January-March, 1900; Temporary Brigadier-General whilst commanding Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa, March, 1900; temporarily replaced Lord Methuen in command of a mobile column, March-April, 1901; A.A.G. to Inspector-General of Cavalry, June, 1901.

stillness of early day the plain lay before them, apparently void of human life. The troopers rode steadily forward and had covered about ten miles from General Babington's camp, when in the farm of Geduld twenty Boers were suddenly observed. The main body of Light Horse were now just abreast of the kopje which veiled the ambush. On sighting this party of Boers—the main Boer force had not yet come into view—the British squadron closed up and gave chase to the enemy, who had already betaken themselves to a precipitate flight. Lieutenant J. Dryden with a troop of twenty men led the pursuit. As he turned the kopje and obtained a first glimpse of what lay behind it, he saw the Boer camp, and realised in an instant the trap which had been laid for the British. Not a moment was to be lost if anyone was to escape. General Babington was too far away to hear the noise of battle, and if he did hear it, or if the heliographs succeeded in calling him up, he could not be upon the scene in time to avert disaster. There was no course but instant, swift retreat,



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

NARROW ESCAPE OF THE LIGHT HORSE: LIEUTENANT DRYDEN DISCOVERS THE BOER CAMP.

and even as he and his men drew rein, a great force of Boers dashed forth from their lair to bar the backward route. From either flank of the kopje they came, thundering over the dry veldt, 600 strong or more, and headed for the pass.

Major Briggs was already in retreat, one squadron with the "Pom-Pom" in the centre of his force, and the two other squadrons extended on either flank. The crackle of musketry ran along his front; the "Pom-Pom" barked furiously; but the enemy came on with spirit and determination. More and more Boers were swarming out of the laager, and the Light Horse were in dangerous plight. By a great effort they succeeded in holding off the enemy, who were attempting to block their retreat. Now only two miles intervened before the pass—and comparative safety—was reached. The Boers seeing their foe on the verge of effecting escape, redoubled their efforts. They worked boldly in to within 500 yards of the "Pom-Pom." It looked as though with the aid of a little luck they might

yet capture the weapon. Now the gun had to cease fire and retired, while A squadron remained behind to cover its retreat. A party of twelve officers and men who acted as rearguard were, all but two, shot down. The enemy made rush after rush: again and again their uneven, waving line of skirmishers broke forward, gained a little ground, and then receded as the burghers felt the force of the Lee-Metford fire. Lieutenant Dryden was severely wounded; Lieutenant Holling mortally; Lieutenant Ralston was shot dead. Each British trooper in the firing line had used his 150 rounds, and the rifle barrels burnt the hand. But the determined stand of the famous corps had saved the day. The "Pom-Pom" at last was clear and rattling through the pass; the order came for the rearguard to go, and it went. The Boers did not pursue, realising that their prey had now finally escaped them.

In this skirmish of 90 minutes' duration the

Casualties. British lost eight killed,

twenty wounded, and one missing, and claimed to have killed or wounded over forty of the Boers, though the official report only puts the Boer loss at eleven killed and thirteen wounded. Among the latter was Field-Cornet Wolmarans, who a day later was captured by the British. De la Rey's despatch, describing the action, was afterwards taken, and from that it appears that he placed the Boer loss at four killed, including an assistant-field-cornet, and five slightly wounded, while asserting that forty British, killed or wounded, were left on the field, besides a number taken prisoners.

Too much importance, however, need not be

attached to his figures. It was the invariable Boer habit to minimise their own losses and exaggerate those of the British.

General Babington was in no mood to leave De la Rey to claim victories and compose mendacious despatches. Now that the enemy had been located, he determined to strike them, and to strike hard. Early on the 23rd he put his column in motion, and he himself attacked the Boer left, while Colonel Shekleton operated against their right. The Boers were forced back to Taaibosch Spruit, when heavy rain came down and closed the pursuit for that day. The British encamped, and presently into their camp strolled the inevitable amiable burgher of outwardly British sympathies, presuming on the ineffable stupidity of the "Khakis." The worthy burgher set to work to learn what was to be learnt,



I. Sheldon-Williams.]

GALLANT REAR-GUARD ACTION OF TWELVE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE LIGHT HORSE.

previously to slinking away under cover of darkness and telling the Boer generals what he had heard. But for once the stupid "Khakis" were too sharp for Boer slimness. The spy learnt on every hand

Boer spy hoodwinked.

that the column would start at 3.30 the next morning, on its return to Hartebeestefontein, and would go no further. With this intelligence he betook himself to the Boer laager. De la Rey on hearing the intelligence smelt a rat. The British after all might not be quite such fools as they looked. Generals Smuts and Kemp, however, entertained no doubts or misgivings, and when De la Rey urged an immediate retreat, refused to acquiesce, and proposed instead to follow the British and cut up their rearguard. That meant plunder, and plunder

was an attractive object to the ragged desperadoes of these Western commandos. The dispute waxed fierce, but Smuts and Kemp carried the day.

The British, as a matter of fact, were meditating neither retreat nor moving at 3.30 a.m. Late in the night orders were given for the column to be under arms at 5 a.m., an hour and a half later than the spy had gathered. At 3.30 a.m., Smuts and Kemp moved out, gleefully anticipating a good day with the British rearguard. Their belief that the foe intended to retreat was strengthened, when they marched some distance and some time elapsed without any trace of the "Khakis." Yet if, as De la Rey had maintained, the British meant continuing the pursuit, and if they had started at 3.30, the two forces must have come into collision. It does not seem to have occurred to the Boers that the hour of moving might have been changed. A thousand or more of them were scattered in a rough



F. J. Waugh.]

A "FRIENDLY" BURGER SEEKING INFORMATION IN THE BRITISH CAMP.

column of route along the road, and with them were the guns. Five hundred more were directed to make a wide detour, so as to avoid the supposed British rearguard and come in upon the convoy.

General Babington's column drew out of camp at 5 a.m. on March 24. Colonel Shekleton, with the Regular Mounted Infantry, held the flanks; the Imperial Light Horse were acting as rearguard; the Bushmen and New Zealanders, under Colonel Grey, formed the advance. The formation adopted was a very open one. The first sign of the enemy was the sound of Mausers at work on the British convoy. But the Boers speedily found that they had made a most grievous miscalculation. Just as the rifles began to crack, the New Zealanders and Bushmen poured through a nek, and saw before them the Boer columns

Boers attack Babington's column.



THE CHARGE OF THE BUSHMEN AND NEW ZEALANDERS, March 24, 1901.

R. Caton Woodville.]

with all their guns driving towards them. "The sight," says the *Standard* correspondent, to whom we are indebted for most of our facts, "was too much for the dashing Bushmen and New Zealanders, who set up a shout, and made at full gallop for the Boers. The latter, taken off their guard, and for the most part panic-stricken at the sight, made no attempt at a stand. One of the Boer guns,



A BATTERY OF THE STAATS ARTILLERIE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

As already stated, the Staats Artillerie was the only body of regular soldiers possessed by the South African Republic. It gave a good account of itself on many a battlefield.

in charge of an officer of the Staats Artillerie, was run out into the veldt and served with remarkable coolness, but the teams of the others were turned round and whipped up with the one mad idea of getting away. The transport, which was horsed entirely with mules, sought to follow suit. The opportunity of the campaign had arrived, however, for the Bushmen and New Zealanders, who, riding with loose rein, and firing off the backs of their horses, went headlong at the enemy, turning the waggons nearest them, and making prisoners of the Boers in charge. The others ahead saw what was going on, and, abandoning their charges they scattered and made off into the veldt. The fighting men, imbued with the one desire to get away, made little or no attempt to return the Colonials' fire, and many were shot down or surrendered. The veldt was covered with fleeing Boers. Here a gun was stopped in its career by a single Bushman, who, yelling to the drivers to pull up, would, with a brace of flying shots, tumble a couple of artillerymen off the limbers before he got his prize. There a pursuing New Zealander, wild with the exhilaration of victory, charged a whole clump of Boers, and got home too, without a scratch. The immunity of the Colonials, indeed, was one of the most remarkable

**Grand charge of the
Bushman and New
Zealanders.**

features of that half mad but wholly purposeful charge. Out-numbered as they were by the Boers, who, if they had not been panic-stricken, might have prevented some of the guns from being captured, they took the affair so masterfully into their hands that the enemy never had a moment to think. It was one yelling relentless rush, with the Boers never drawing rein, but engrossed with the idea of getting away from these avenging horsemen."



HUGE STACK OF FODDER AT ELANDSFONTEIN, NEAR JOHANNESBURG.

ment of the enemy are well illustrated in De la Rey's despatch. "The enemy attacked us," he writes, "and as far as we could see there was nothing but mounted men in full gallop. The enemy charged us so actively and in such wide formation that we all ran the danger of being surrounded

The consternation and amaze-

or captured. We were thus compelled to retire again, with the loss of nearly the whole of our laager . . . As heavy rain had fallen the previous evening, the draught animals were soon exhausted and were not able to draw the carts and waggons." The pursuit of this demoralised and dishearted enemy was continued by the Colonial troops till their horses could no longer stand, and till a strong ridge, six miles from the point where the chase had begun, had been reached by the Boers. Then the spoil could be reckoned up.

**De la Rey's account
of the action.**

One hundred and forty prisoners, all fighting men, 160 rifles, two 15-pounders — one captured at Colenso from General Buller and the other at Stormberg—one "Pom-Pom," six Maxims, 320 rounds of 15-pounder ammunition, 15,000 of rifle ammunition, and 77 waggons and carts were taken. The Boer loss was 22 killed and 32 wounded left on the field, besides, in all probability, a few men carried off. In face of this it required some effrontery on De la Rey's part to put it at "three killed and seven slightly wounded," besides 100 prisoners.

The Boer attack on the convoy was repulsed with great ease. The enemy got to within 200 yards, but were so warmly received by the troops with the waggons, and by two sections of the 78th Battery under Major D. C. Carter, that they speedily made off, especially as they saw that Colonel Shekleton's Mounted Infantry were moving to threaten their retreat.

Thus the net result of this affair was a complete defeat inflicted upon De la Rey, and the loss of most of his guns and his train of waggons. According to his own despatch his whole force must have been captured had the pursuit been further pressed, since his horses were completely exhausted. To such a pitch was he reduced that he was compelled to remain some days at Tafel Kop



MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES MELVILLE BABINGTON.

[Photo by C. Knight.]

Born 1854. Joined 16th Lancers, 1873; Captain, 1880; Major, 1890; Lieut.-Colonel, 1892; Colonel, 1896. Served with the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir C. Warren, 1884-5. A.D.C. to Sir E. Wood, Aldershot, 1889-1890; A.A.G., India, 1896-9; Colonel on Staff commanding Cavalry Brigade, E. District, 1899; Major-General, 1st Cavalry Brigade, with French, South Africa, October, 1899-February, 1900; A.A.G. of Imperial Yeomanry at the inception of the force, February-March, 1900; Major-General, South Africa, in command of a mobile column, December, 1900. He has done useful work on the lines of communication, was present at the battle of Magersfontein, and in January, 1900, carried out a reconnaissance from Belmont into the Orange Free State, which state he was one of the first to enter. The following month he advanced to Kimberley with the relieving force. In the early months of 1901 he carried out a sweeping movement against De la Rey in the Western Transvaal, as related in this chapter. In October, 1901, he accepted the office of Commander-in-Chief of the forces in New Zealand.

to train the remounts which he had bought—one wonders whence. It appears also that he had been intending to move south into Cape Colony—a proceeding now out of the question. He speaks of 800 burghers in arms under Kemp, and of 300 under his personal orders. Smuts he does not mention. The British lost two killed and seven wounded, of whom only one was wounded during the pursuit.



THE GUNS CAPTURED BY BABINGTON FROM DE LA REY in March, 1901.

The group of guns includes two field-guns captured by the Boers at Colenso and Stormberg, and a machine-gun used by Dr. Jameson in the famous "raid"

De la Rey was not permitted long to remain unmolested at Tafel Kop. On April 2 General Babington advanced in that direction, and a day or two later had a brush with Smuts' force near Rietpan. He returned to Ventersdorp for supplies, and learnt that Smuts' main laager lay in the hills at Goedvoornitzicht, to the south-west. On the night of April 13 Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson left Ventersdorp with Roberts' and Kitchener's Horse, to attack the camp. The hills south of Kaffir Kraal were crossed, and at dawn of the 14th the attack was delivered. Unfortunately, most of the enemy succeeded in getting away, but only by abandoning their guns and waggons. One 12-pounder, one "Pom-Pom," fourteen waggons, and a moderate quantity of small-arms ammunition were captured, while six of the enemy were killed, ten wounded, and twenty-three taken prisoners, at a cost to the British of only three men wounded.

**Babington pursues
De la Rey.**



DISTRIBUTION OF CLOTHING TO MEN AT THE FRONT, FROM FUNDS COLLECTED BY MRS. EDMUNDS AND THE COUNTESS OF BRADFORD.

The guns were almost the last remaining to the Boer commandos in the west. The enemy, however, still showed extraordinary recuperative powers. Only a few days later De la Rey was reported near his old haunt at Hartebeestfontein, with no less than 2,000 men. How he horsed them is something of a mystery, but the disagreeable fact remains that there he was, nearly as strong as ever. To watch him more closely, General Babington moved to Syferkuil, but found himself too weak to attack alone. While he was waiting for the co-operation of other columns, a convoy on its way between the British camp and Klerksdorp was attacked by De la Rey with 700 men. The Boers were beaten off with a loss of twelve killed and six wounded.

Three other commanders were now instructed to march against De la Rey.

The first of these was Lord Methuen, who had resumed his command on April 23 and who at once moved to Mafeking. From Mafeking he marched with 1,000 Yeomanry, 150 mounted infantry, regular and irregular, 600 infantry, ten guns, and four "Pom-Poms" to Lichtenburg, and, after reprovisioning that garrison, turned south-east, so as to prevent De la Rey from breaking out to the west. At the same time General Dixon, who in mid-April had been sweeping the country north of Welverdiend with 1,200 men, was directed by way of Tafel Kop to Leeuwfontein, where he would be in a position to bar De la Rey's retreat to the north-east, and was reinforced by the whole of Colonel Benson's column, which had been operating round Potchefstroom, Benson himself being transferred to the north-east, where he was employed under Sir Bindon Blood. Finally, a strong column of Australian Mounted Infantry under Colonel E. C. Williams reinforced General Babington.

All preparations having been thus completed, it remained to "bag" the Boer force. But, as usual, the enemy were perfectly informed of our intentions, and on the alert; moreover the old



REFUGEES, ESCORTED BY COLONEL WILLIAMS' COLUMN, ARRIVING AT HEILBRON.

difficulty of drawing a really effective cordon round their mobile commandos in rough, broken country remained. On April 26 their positions, which, if report can be believed, were strongly entrenched, were shelled at long range. On the 27th the Boers began to abandon these positions, scattering in small parties and slipping between the various columns, which, burdened with heavy transport and guns, had small chance of running them down. General Babington pursued them and destroyed Hartebeestefontein, where it was found that De la Rey had for weeks established his headquarters in pleasant security, with telegraphs running to the vicinity of Lichtenburg, Schweizerreneke, and Wolmaranstad, by which means he was able to arrange rapid concentrations and to ascertain all that the British were doing. So safe did he feel from molestation that he had actually given a ball a day or two before the British appeared on the scene. De la Rey fell back towards the north, but on May 5 he was once more attacked by General Babington near Kaffir Kraal. Lord Methuen's troops co-operated and succeeded in capturing a 12-pounder—one of the Horse Artillery guns taken ten months before at Nital's Nek—in addition to seven prisoners and five waggons. Four Boers were killed. About the same time General Babington unearthed one of the buried guns which abounded in the soil of the Transvaal. The weapon was a Krupp, and with it were found nine rounds of ammunition. On May 8 the

**Sweeping movement
in the South-West
Transvaal.**

British were again in action with the Boers at Leeuwfontein and Putfontein, but with no very decisive result. The great bulk of De la Rey's men escaped, and De la Rey himself is believed to have gone to Wolmaranstad. Mr. Steyn and De Wet are said to have been with him, and to have broken away to the east, whence they returned to their old hunting ground in the Orange River Colony. The sweeping movement in this quarter closed with a sharp fight at Korannafontein, where on May 10 Colonel Williams was attacked by the Boers, whom he easily repulsed. Then the columns returned to their various bases to refit, taking with them 70 prisoners, 26 surrendered burghers, and

102 waggons.

Through April and early May sporadic fighting occurred in the central and south-eastern Transvaal.

**Depredations on
Delagoa Bay and
Natal Railways.**

Train-wrecking continued, though the extension of the block-house system was rendering it a matter of greater difficulty for the enemy than in the past. On March 29 a body of 200 Boers exploded a mine under a locomotive at Pan, on the Delagoa Bay Railway, and threw it off the line, but, upon advancing to help themselves to the contents of the trucks behind it, they met with a stout resistance and finally were driven off by one of the armoured trains, leaving six dead and wounded on the field. The same day an empty train was wrecked at Olifantsfontein, south of Pretoria. Early

A FORT NEAR MAJUBA.



CAMP OF THE GRENADIER GUARDS AT HARRISMITH.

on April 2 they attacked the railway near Mount Prospect, on the Natal line. They numbered 500 men under Commandant Mears, and had made their base at O'Neill's Farm, just under the ill-omened mountain of Majuba. Two empty trains were allowed to pass over the line; their mines were then placed to derail the up train, which passed every morning, laden with supplies. The enemy's proceedings show them to have been admirably posted with information—probably by traitors in the railway service. When the train came along, the engine and leading truck were derailed by the explosion, but the bulk of the train and the guard's van at the end of it were not thrown off the line. The Boers uncoupled this van and started it down the steep gradient to Prospect Station, hoping that it would do serious damage. As a matter of fact it did all but cause a bad accident. A train with 160 of the Grenadier Guards was standing in the station; into this the van crashed, after tearing at an ever-increasing speed down the long incline. The van was splintered and shattered, but, fortunately, little damage was done to the train, and no one was hurt. The troops at once detrained, and, as soon as daylight permitted, moved up the line. Most of the supplies had been

carried off by the enemy before their appearance on the scene; as they came up, the Boers set on fire what remained in the train, and bolted in great surprise to the hills. The enemy, it afterwards appeared, were firmly persuaded that there were no British troops nearer than Laing's Nek, and Laing's Nek they were closely watching. A skirmish followed, which ended with the appearance of a force of mounted men from Volksrust, who threatened the Boer retreat. Then the burghers galloped off, taking a gun and the captured supplies with them, and leaving on the field three dead and three severely wounded. The Natal farmer O'Neill was suspected of complicity in this affair, and was immediately arrested. Several trains with troops arrived on the spot when the fighting was over; but, as mist covered the high ground, it was impossible to pursue the enemy. Mears' usual theatre



GENERAL FRENCH AND SOME OF HIS STAFF.

From a photograph taken at the Victoria Hotel, Durban (Natal), April 15, 1901.

of operations was the country round Standerton. He had moved from Standerton into the Orange River Colony, and thence through Alleman's Nek into Natal. On April 7 men of this same commando suddenly appeared at Ingogo, the next station to the south of Prospect, looted and set the hotel on fire, raided a house, and shot a resident through the shoulder.



MUHURRAM FESTIVAL AT VOLKSRUST

The King's Mohammedan subjects—of whom there are a large number, mostly from India, serving as bearers, etc., with the army in Africa—celebrate the commencement of the Mohammedan year (April 20), with the rejoicings usual among men of their faith.

The activity of the Boers on the Natal Railway was in some degree diminished when, in early April, the

Treason at Heidelberg.

British authorities in Heidelberg discovered a conspiracy to supply them with information. A Kaffir runner, who had been entrusted by the conspirators with a message to the nearest Boer commandant, took it instead to the British police. Further investigations showed that five residents, among them the station-master, had been in the habit of assembling, comparing notes, and forwarding their observations to the enemy. In the possession of these men were found papers giving full details of the earthworks which defended Heidelberg, of the garrison,

and of the disposition of the outposts. The five were arrested, but it was suspected that other accomplices remained undiscovered. From the very first the Uitlanders, who knew the Boers, had warned the military against the danger of employing burghers in any position of trust, but their warnings had been disregarded. About the same date a disabled 4.7 gun was abandoned by the Boers in the vicinity of Heidelberg, the enemy, it appeared, having run out of ammunition for it. Where this gun came from we do not know, as the only British 4.7 gun ever in the possession of the Boers was the weapon which they captured at Helvetia, and this had been already accounted for. The gun may, however, have been a howitzer of 4.7 calibre, of which the Boers had two or three.

In the Standerton district Colonel Colville's column was kept busy, continually skirmishing

Murder of Kaffirs.

ing with small detachments of Boers, without any particular result other than the capture of cattle and horses, which were not always safely removed. On April 24 the enemy were guilty of an atrocious outrage in this quarter. Two Kaffirs, who were scouting for the British near Platkop, were wounded by a party of burghers, and while lying on the ground were cruelly killed. This was only part and parcel of the systematic plan by which the enemy attempted to terrify the natives and to prevent them from obtaining any information which would be of service to the British. Yet the burghers themselves never scrupled to employ natives when it suited their purpose.

In Zululand small parties of the enemy continued to give trouble. Driven south by General French's sweeping movement, they wandered up and down that wide expanse of broken country, harassing the natives and attacking any British post which seemed to be weakly held. On April 27 a commando 500 strong, under Scholtz, made a determined attempt to storm the magistracy of Mahlabatini. They surrounded the place, which was held by only 26 Europeans and 20 of the Natal Police, at daybreak, and poured in a heavy fire from all sides. But they met with an unexpectedly obstinate resistance. The magistrate and his court officials happened to be crack shots, and, turning out, joined the police in the defence,

Boers active in Zululand.



CHRISTIAN BOTHA'S CHILDREN.

Photographed in their own garden near Standerton. A few seconds after the group was photographed Christian Botha's commando attacked, and the whole family, including Mrs. Botha and the English governess, were under fire.



ALLEMAN'S NEK: BRITISH FORCES CROSSING BETWEEN NATAL AND THE TRANSVAAL.

actually advancing to attack the enemy. After six hours' steady fighting, in which the little garrison lost no less than five killed and two wounded, the enemy retired, taking with them several killed and wounded, and leaving in the hands of the British two severely wounded. The British loss was incurred when the tiny force gallantly ventured to take the offensive. Lord Kitchener thought so highly of the bravery and energy displayed, that he telegraphed congratulating the garrison upon its conduct.

The general situation in the Transvaal at the end of April showed some improvement. The British advance had been pushed north and north-east, and a large area had been swept in a more or less satisfactory manner. A considerable number of burghers had been captured or had made their surrender. But the more prominent Boer generals still remained in the field, and in no single case, except that of De la Rey, had severe punishment been inflicted upon them. Botha and Viljoen and Beyers, whom for every reason it was desirable to lay

**General situation in
the Transvaal.**



[F. J. Waugh.]

THE GALLANT DEFENCE OF MAHLABATINI.

by the heels, had escaped every combination directed against them. Nor had the country settled down, as it had been hoped that it would. It was still unsafe for small British forces to move about at any distance from the railway. The western posts, Zeerust, Rustenburg, and Lichtenburg, were still in a condition of virtual siege. Even the immediate environs of Johannesburg and Pretoria were insecure. The Modderfontein Mine, which seemed to be a special target for Boer animosity, was again attacked in April. Fortunately the local forces were quickly upon the spot, and little damage was done.

The Uitlanders in the "Golden City" were given a fresh grievance by the authorities at the end of April, when, to the surprise of all, a large number of Boer prisoners of war were allowed to return from the coast after taking an oath of neutrality, which experience in the past had shown that they never kept. This permission was felt to be a great injustice, as the wives and families of the few British

civilians in Johannesburg and many thousands of loyal British refugees on the coast were not permitted to come back, because the military authorities professed themselves unable to feed them. Yet, it was

**Return of Boer
prisoners.**

asked, if they were
unable to feed the
loyalists, how was it

that they were able to sustain the enemy? This measure, taken in connection with much that had gone before, seemed to point to a deliberate purpose on the part of the British army to prefer the enemy to those who were heart and soul in the British cause. And the resentment thus engendered became all the greater when it was seen how these returned Boers abused the trust which had been reposed in them. Many of them at once proceeded to violate their oath and rejoin the commandos in the field. Others, without going as far as this, supplied the enemy's commanders with information, and plotted against the lives of the loyal in the city. Nor was proper severity shown to the traitors when detected. In

March a German officer who had served with the Boers, had surrendered, and had taken the oath of neutrality, was captured, armed and uniformed in khaki, near the town. He had committed a double offence, since he had not only again taken up arms, but had also assumed the British uniform. It appeared that he had at once, after taking the oath, gone off and joined Commandant Beyers, near Springs. He was put upon his trial before a British court-martial, when he pleaded the time-honoured excuse that he had acted under compulsion. The sentence of death was passed on him, but, to the general surprise, Lord Kitchener remitted all punishment and decided that he should be treated as any other prisoner of war. There may, of course, have been political reasons for this extraordinary leniency, as for example the fear of arousing German opinion, but the general effect was to encourage treason in the disaffected, and to spread the belief that the English were either afraid or else too stupid to punish acts of perfidy.



THE JOHANNESBURG HOSPITAL.

The Johannesburg Hospital, the finest and best equipped in South Africa, stands on the hill to the north of the town. It was built in 1893-5, and has accommodation for several hundred patients. The architect was Mr. Arthur H. Reid, F.R.I.B.A. It cost £37,000 to build, without the furnishing. At first the nursing was done entirely by Roman Catholic sisters, but subsequently this was altered, and properly qualified nurses were engaged from England.



FLOWERS FOR THE STRANGER'S GRAVE.

Children of loyalists placing flowers on the grave of a private of the Northampton's accidentally drowned at Zeerust.

So wide-spread was the indignation caused by the return of the Boer prisoners that the military authorities thought it well to explain their action. The returned burghers, it seemed, were to act as peace-envoys, to go out to the various commandos, and persuade the enemy to submit. This scheme was somewhat extraordinary, as the reason was not obvious why the British army should be always attempting to coax the Boers into submission. Moreover there was something humiliating in our endeavouring to induce the burghers to desert their cause, instead of convincing them of its hopelessness by victories in the field. These new peace-envoys were no whit more successful than their predecessors had been.

An incident which showed how untrustworthy were these surrendered Boers was the trial of a Hollander named Spoelstra, who had taken the oath of neutrality, but who instead of keeping



R. Caton Woodville.]

THE DESPATCH RIDER.

it had occupied his time in circulating in the Pro-Boer press of Europe malicious libels as to the conduct of the British troops. He was given every opportunity of justifying his statements by

the court which tried him; but, though he called a number of Boer women to testify to the truth of his charges, their evidence all told in precisely the opposite direction. One and all they acknow-



BOUND FOR A REFUGEE CAMP.

ledged that the conduct of the troops had been uniformly good, and that where there had been any cause for complaint the offenders had met with immediate punishment from the military authorities. The prisoner was found guilty of evading the censorship regulations, breaking the oath of neutrality, and publishing false and defamatory statements concerning the army, and for these offences was punished with a short term of imprisonment.



SOUTH AFRICAN REGULATION HELMET, WITH KHAKI COVER.

departure of Mrs. Botha for Europe in May. She went with the consent of the military authorities, and at the time it was supposed that she was the bearer of some new proposals to Mr. Kruger, with the view of ending the war, though this does

not actually appear to have been the case. For some unexplained reason, after her journey, Mr. Kruger was permitted to communicate by telegraph with the Boer leaders. Mrs. Botha maintained a great deal of mystery as to her mission, which was probably to inform Mr. Kruger as to the real state of the war and to concert with him measures for introducing recruits and ammunition into the Boer territories, in conjunction with the as-yet-undiscovered knot of conspirators in Pretoria. No doubt the military authorities were not sorry to be rid of her, since she had means of obtaining and transmitting to her husband a great deal of valuable information.

Another incident of this period was the




I. Sheldon-Williams.]

A BREAK FOR FREEDOM.

[From a sketch on the spot.

While the 28th Company of Imperial Yeomanry were acting as Military Police on the Rand, it was part of their duty to bring in Kaffirs detained for some offence, such as being abroad without a pass, lifting cattle, or looting empty houses. The Yeomanry became expert in the art of "rounding-up" these Kaffirs; so much so that two or three men would prove a sufficient escort for quite a number of native prisoners.



[Photo by McKenzie, Cradock.]

PREPARING TO RESIST THE INVADERS: THE CRADOCK TOWN GUARD AND THEIR CAMP.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY *(continued from page 300).*

Difficulties of the campaign in Cape Colony—Tactics of the invaders—Movements of Kritzinger and Scheepers—Lieutenant Hunt defends Fish River against Kritzinger—Opportune arrival of an armoured train—Kritzinger's force scatters—Malan's commando enters Richmond—Capture of patrol of Kitchener's Fighting Scouts—A farmer's description of Kritzinger—Scheepers driven from Willowmore district—Raids in Namaqualand—Lack of remounts—"Gorrings Light Oxen"—Garrison of Pearston surrenders to Kritzinger—Brutal treatment of Kaffir defenders—Kritzinger retreats towards Tarkastad—Attempt to surround him at Tarkastad—Boers driven into the Bamboesberg—Predatory bands threaten Cradock—Failure to capture Kritzinger—Scheepers attacks Aberdeen—Boers retire to the Koudeveld—Malan, Fouché, and Scheepers unite—Boers chased from Jansenville and Blaauwkrantz—Wounded Boers tended by the British—Capture of Boer camp at Roodepoort—The enemy captures three British patrols—Guerilla bands in the Midlands—Plague in Capetown—Efficient commissariat—Boer commandos in the Midlands—Railway traffic dislocated—Kritzinger on the Orange River—Farm-burning and looting—Desultory fighting—Discontent of the loyalists—Sir Alfred Milner visits England—Honours conferred upon him.



W E left the Boer invaders of Cape Colony, in mid-February, moving north to effect a junction with De Wet. Herzog and Brand alone, however, succeeded in getting into touch with the Free State general, and with him re-crossed the Orange River in early March. The

other Boer leaders, Kritzinger and Scheepers, remained behind

to the south of the river, and there renewed their desultory and harassing operations. In the

Difficulties of the campaign in Cape Colony.

period which elapsed between the coming and going of De Wet, there was fighting in the Colony, which will best be treated in this place, because it stands apart from the operations against De Wet, and because it is less confusing to take the story of the guerilla war in the Colony in continuous sequence, when the puzzling movements of Boers and British may be better followed, and the progress, or want of progress, of our operations



BETHULIE BRIDGE RESTORED.

The photograph shows the railway bridge at Bethulie after its restoration by the British, and the means taken to defend it against the enemy. Several spans of the original bridge had been completely destroyed by the Boers early in the war, and traffic had to be carried on by a "deviation" (as illustrated in "With the Flag to Pretoria," p. 552) until new sections, to replace the broken ones, could be put in position.

more clearly appreciated. It is a tale of perpetual, small, and indecisive skirmishes that we have to tell, of interminable "hot pursuits," which never resulted in any serious captures, of "combined movements," which invariably issued in the escape of the enemy, with a growing sense of insecurity in the Colony, and an ever-widening spread of the rebellion of the Dutch. Yet in common fairness to the British, the difficulties with which they had to contend should be taken into consideration—the vastness of the area within which they were operating, the profound disloyalty of the sparse population, the utter impossibility of distinguishing the combatant burgher from the (supposed) peaceful farmer, the difficult and mountainous nature of the terrain—in a word, all the troubles which had confronted our troops in the Transvaal and Free State, but in an exaggerated form.

The tactics of the invaders were never to fight if they could possibly avoid it. They ran away when the British appeared in anything like equal force, and only when they caught their enemy in weak and isolated detachments did they venture to attack. Their object, as expressed by Kritzing



MAP OF THE MIDLAND DISTRICT OF CAPE COLONY.

Tactics of himself, was not the invaders. to attempt pitched battles, for which without artillery they felt themselves utterly unequal, but to harass the British, and to keep the country in a perpetual state of "nerves." For the most part the invaders were rebels, and knew thoroughly the terrain in which they were operating. They had no train of carts and waggons; for ammunition they depended on what they took from the

bandoliers of the British; and thus they were able to move with the most marvellous rapidity.

In the Midland region of Cape Colony, the chief Boer commandos present were those of Kritzing and Scheepers, which had been among the first to enter the Colony. Kritzing, in early February, had feinted in the direction of Cradock and then turned off sharply to the west, towards Graaff Reinet, round which place he moved in the direction of Murraysburg. Scheepers, from the mountains to the south of Graaff Reinet, had turned off as though he intended to cross the Kimberley Railway at Beaufort West, but, apparently thinking better of this enterprise, turned eastwards again, and seems to have scattered his force over the Aberdeen, Willowmore, and Uniondale districts. In pursuit of Scheepers were British forces under Colonels Scobell, Parsons, and Grenfell, while Colonel Haig was given control of a number of small mobile columns operating against Kritzing. In the Zuurburg was another force of Boers, charged, apparently, with the task of maintaining communications with the main Boer commandos in the Orange River Colony.

From Murraysburg, which he found strongly held by Colonel Haig, Kritzing doubled back yet again towards Cradock, and attacked a small British post on the railway to the north of that place,

Movements of Kritzing and Scheepers.

at Fish River, on February 23. The story of this affair well illustrates the peculiar advantages which the rebels possessed, operating amidst a friendly population, which gave them every assistance possible.

**Lieutenant Hunt
defends Fish River
against Kritzingers.**

They were guided by a man named Olivier, an inhabitant of Fish River, who had invariably posed as a loyalist, and who had actually amassed no small competence by supplying the troops with dairy produce.

At Fish River an iron bridge spans the stream, and to break this was no doubt the object of the Boer attack. The bridge was guarded by a detachment of the 4th Lancaster (Militia) Regiment, under Lieutenant Hunt, numbering 35 men. On the night of the 22nd the telegraph both to the north and south ceased to work, which gave the British an indication that an attack was impending. They were therefore on the alert, and manned the two small forts which had been previously constructed, one at either end of the bridge. A few Boers were seen hovering near as night came down, but owing to the severance of the wires it was impossible to call up assistance. Still, the mere fact that communications had been interrupted would, it was hoped, warn the neighbouring posts that Fish River was in danger. At daylight the first shots were fired. The assailants, who numbered from 400 to 500, worked their way in towards the bridge and station. They left their horses some little distance away, and crawling up to a store near the station, poured in from it upon the defenders a most galling fire. Thrice they sent in emissaries under the white flag




LIEUTENANT HUNT
Received the D.S.O. for
his gallantry in defend-
ing Fish River Bridge.



VIEW OF THE FISH
RIVER, SHOWING
THE BRIDGE.

to call upon the garrison to surrender, but these demands were received with derision.

On the third occasion the Boer envoy was turned back by a soldier, when, notwithstanding their own white flag, the enemy fired a volley at our man, grazing his neck, but, fortunately, inflicting no other injury. This treacherous act was highly characteristic of the methods of these guerillas, who rendered not the slightest obedience to the laws and customs of war. Lieutenant Hunt displayed great gallantry, directing his



A. Barraud.]

[After a photograph.]

THE FISH RIVER AT GRAAFF REINET.

men with admirable coolness, though early in the fight he was painfully wounded in the neck by a splinter. At last, when matters were beginning to look somewhat critical, and when the fight had gone on for more than four hours, a welcome sound of firing was heard from the north, and an armoured train from Rosinead Junction steamed into the station, plying Maxims and a "Pom-Pom" upon the

Boers. The enemy, without more ado, took to precipitate flight, leaving one dead man upon the ground—the traitor Olivier. No pursuit was possible, as there was no British mounted force at hand. A detachment of Dragoons was, however, sent out from Cradock some hours later to attempt to cut off the enemy, but in this it was unsuccessful.

The appearance of the armoured train upon the scene, in time to save the post, was due to the courage and presence of mind of a young ganger, named Wilson, who not only preserved the garrison

from capture, but also prevented the carefully-planned derailment of the down mail from Rosmead. It had proceeded on its way, notwithstanding the severance of telegraphic communication, which does not appear to have caused disquietude—presumably because it was an everyday occurrence. As the train neared Fish River, Wilson, who had seen the Boers approaching and had hidden in a culvert, rushed out



TRACTION ENGINES ON THE VELDT.

waving a red flag, and warned the driver under no circumstance to proceed further. He had a narrow escape of being shot while giving this warning, as the Boers were in close proximity to him. When the engine-driver learnt what was happening, he took the ganger on board, and ran back at his fastest towards Rosmead. At Conway station the armoured train was found waiting, and at once sent on to the rescue. Behind the train again followed with all possible speed a strong detachment of troops from Cradock.

The Boer force engaged in this affair was probably that commanded by Kritzinger, though Kritzinger himself is believed not to have been present. Its loss was certainly greater than the one man found dead, but how much greater it is impossible to say. Traces of blood were found near, and local reports asserted that the enemy had carried off several wounded. The British loss was only three wounded. Other

**Kritzinger's force
scatters.**

sections of
Kritzinger's
force, which

seems to have been very much broken up about this date, were engaged by Colonel Gorringe on February 23 and 24. The enemy were further scattered as the result of the fighting, but this was hardly satisfactory. What was required was to capture the enemy, not to disperse them. when, as experience showed, they invariably reunited, so soon as it suited their purposes.

One section of Kritzinger's force does not appear to have doubled back from Murraysburg

**Malan's commando
enters Richmond.**

with the main body. This was a small commando under Malan. Lingering in the neighbourhood of Murraysburg and Richmond, it entered the latter village on the 25th and got as far as the market-place before the defence force could muster to meet it. But it was then greeted with a heavy fire, under which it recoiled. It did not



TYPE OF SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAY ENGINES.

depart without the usual wanton atrocities. A coloured boy who was standing in a doorway was shot dead, though unarmed, and a coloured scout was killed in cold blood outside the town. On the 26th this commando scored a petty success, capturing a patrol of Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, near Klipkraal. The patrol numbered 74 men, and, with a loss of only three wounded, surrendered to the Boers, who were said to have a strength of 200 men. From Klipkraal this Boer force moved to Biesjespoort, and near there fired on a train on the Kimberley Railway, but was driven off by men of one of the Australian contingents, proceeding to the front. Kitchener's Fighting Scouts were ordered to follow the enemy up, but, needless to say, did not succeed in overtaking them.

**Capture of patrol of
Kitchener's Fighting
Scouts.**

Another detachment of Kritzinger's command, on the day after the attack on Fish River, appeared at Roodehoogte station and burned it, at the same time breaking the line. Some interesting details of the ubiquitous Boer leader, who, in his own way, was now becoming almost as troublesome



A. C. Ball]

BOER TREACHERY AT FISH RIVER BRIDGE.

as De Wet, are given by a farmer who was at a farm which Kritzinger visited about this date. Kritzinger is, he states, a short, thick-set man, speaking in a very loud voice. His age seems to be

**A farmer's description
of Kritzinger.**

about 35 or 40. He speaks English well and gives every sign of being well-educated. His habit is to go unarmed, carrying nothing more than a pair of field-glasses. When he was seen he had only 200 men with him. These men were of the better class of Boers, with horses in excellent condition, and they were well-clad. Many of them were of well-known Transvaal families. They professed themselves desperate, and said they were only anxious to do as much damage as possible. The tinge of savagery which marks the true Boer betrayed itself, when it was noted that their bandoliers contained soft-nosed bullets. They defended the use of these cruel missiles by alleging that the British troops were employing Dum-Dum bullets, and Kritzinger himself went so far as to pretend that he had a quantity of this very



MURRAYSBURG.

ammunition in his laager, which he had taken from a British force, though this falsehood had been contradicted and disproved times without number. This account of Kritzinger's force differs in some respects from other descriptions, which speak of many "bywoners" as being among his men; but that, perhaps, is to be explained by the fact that this detachment was a picked one.

As for Scheepers, he was beginning to prove just as troublesome as Kritzinger. He had now returned to the Willowmore district, whence he had been driven in January, and his scouts were even seen outside Uniondale, which he had momentarily occupied in the same month.

Scheepers driven from Willowmore district.

He was, however, compelled to move away from this locality by the approach of Colonel Parsons with a small column. He evacuated a strong position at Toverwaters Poort on the 24th and headed north. On the 27th, he and his fellow-commandant, Fouché, were attacked by Parsons, but with no greater results than the capture of ten horses. The enemy, as usual, dispersed, to concentrate later, when the British pursuit had worn itself out.

Besides the detachments under Kritzinger, Scheepers, and Malan, yet another distinct force of Boers was present in the Colony. This was a diminutive commando in the remote deserts of Namaqualand.

Raids in Namaqualand.

It was powerless for serious mischief, but it had to be watched, as it threatened the Ookiep copper mines. From time to time it would descend upon one of the out-of-the-way hamlets in this region. Thus on March 3 Pella was raided by 47 Boers from this commando, several Kaffirs were cruelly treated, and a few prisoners carried off. The enemy in this quarter were recruited from the mean white class who had been the backbone of the numerous risings in the Prieska district. It was thought, perhaps wrongly, that they hovered on the northern confines of the Colony partly with the object of introducing arms and recruits from German territory. Their headquarters were at Kakamas.

It will naturally be asked how it was that these diminutive forces were able invariably to evade the



FIELD FARRIERY.

pursuit of the British columns. One answer undoubtedly was that the British were badly supplied with remounts. Thus an officer with Colonel Gorrings's column, which all through February, March,


and April was ceaselessly trekking after the Boers, reports that the operations necessarily involved a severe strain upon the horses. In the course of the three months each man used up on an average

Lack of remounts. ten horses. The difficulty was to replace those "expended." "Lord Kitchener," says this witness, "had to refuse to send more remounts, according to report, for the simple reason that he had none to send. Most men had their turn at footing it. One officer walked for four days before he could get a horse." At a later stage in the operations, however, dismounted men were carried along in ox-waggons commandeered from the farmers on the way. Many jokes were made at the expense of these men, who were known by the nickname of

"Gorrings Light Oxen." Obviously, a column encumbered with dismounted men and clumsy ox-waggons could have little chance of capturing troops who were always admirably mounted, and who moved without any carts or waggons. How the Boers got their mounts is still a puzzle, but it is certain that the greater number of them had two and even three horses apiece. Perhaps the Dutch farmers could have explained the enigma.

On March 3 Kritzinger appeared at the little village of Pearston, midway between Graaff Reinet and Somerset East. The place was garrisoned by the usual town guard, aided by a handful of Nesbitt's Horse. Before it was light the enemy penetrated into the village, and, the moment day broke, opened a heavy fire upon the defenders, who held a number of small redoubts and schanzes which had been previously constructed. They then

sent in a summons to surrender to the commandant of the town. Under cover of the white flag the enemy sneaked in to close quarters. The British loss up to that point had been three killed and as many wounded. The garrison included no regulars, and, as the casualties had been relatively heavy, it had lost heart. It was seen that the enemy were in enormously superior force. They had about 600 men, and, what was more,



VISITORS TO THE CAMP AT GRAAFF REINET.



RIDERLESS.

Wandering horses which have lost their riders show much pleasure on finding themselves "back to the army again."

they threatened to give no quarter if the resistance was protracted. This was a common trick of Kritzinger's, but he was quite capable of acting up to his threat. After some parleying the white flag was hoisted, and the garrison, numbering only 18 men, surrendered. Of these 18 but 12 understood how to use their rifles. There were also 30 coloured men, who gave some assistance in the defence.

**Brutal treatment of
Kaffir defenders.**

To them the Boers behaved with the utmost brutality. They held a court-martial upon them a day or two after the capture of the place, and then debated whether they should shoot these natives *en masse* for defending themselves. They finally decided to compel them to run on foot in front of their horses for nine days—a punishment which was rigidly enforced with the sjambok. Again we have to add that the British authorities, who had employed these poor creatures' services, made not the slightest effort to remonstrate or retaliate when they were thus cruelly treated. Moreover, it is painful to have to relate that the English Pro-Boers, who were always ready enough to raise an outcry over the supposed outrages



T. Sheldon-Williams.]

BOERS DRIVING KAFFIRS ON FOOT AS A PUNISHMENT FOR SERVING THE BRITISH.

perpetrated by the British troops, never uttered one word in condemnation of these and yet worse atrocities perpetrated by the enemy upon the Kaffirs.

Two days later Kritzinger evacuated Pearston, on the approach of Colonel Gorringer's column, first taking the thoughtful precaution to plunder all but the Dutch stores. His loss is believed to have reached 8 killed and 11 wounded. He had with him residents in the place who were able to give him all the information he required about the disposition and strength of the garrison and the defences. He was not pursued, having obtained much too good a start. Preparations were, however, made to direct a stronger force against him, and Colonel De Lisle, with a mobile column, was ordered to co-operate with Colonel Gorringer. On March 9, Kritzinger crossed the Port Alfred Railway at Sheldon, which station he sacked. An attempt was now made by the British columns to surround him, and De Lisle, who controlled the operations, endeavoured to force him into the tongue of land between the Koonap River and the Great Fish River. The drifts were to be well held, and then his own column,

with two others under Colonels Gorringe and Herbert, was to sweep down this tongue and make an end of his plundering. Unfortunately, the plan, though excellently conceived, broke down, because,



R. Caton Woodville.]

THE LIONS HIDE.

A captured Boer in a British khaki uniform. The offence of wearing British uniforms became so common that in November, 1901, Lord Kitchener issued orders that it should be summarily punished with death.

at the critical point, Louws Drift, whither Kritzinger was speedily forced back, the British were not in sufficient strength to prevent his passage. The ford was held by only 40 men of the Colonial

Defence Force, and they had to fall back at the critical moment. There were several small skirmishes with portions of this commando, but no result of any importance was obtained. Kritzinger retired into the Adelaide district, and seemed to be making for Tarkastad. In this quarter the Boers are



COLONEL DE LISLE AND HIS CHIEF STAFF OFFICER.

said to have burnt two or three farms belonging to well-known loyalists, while they were undoubtedly guilty of further atrocities upon the natives. Two examples of their proceedings deserve mention. In the first instance they captured and shot in cold blood four native scouts. The second instance occurred on the 15th, when they took 26 men of the Colonial Defence Force prisoners. The British mistook the enemy for a portion of one of their own columns, since the Boers were dressed in khaki. As a further offence, the enemy came on treacherously waving white flags, and then, having closed with the patrol, opened fire before

Kritzinger retreats towards Tarkastad.

their perfidy had been detected. They were much superior in numbers, and under the circumstances there was nothing for the British but surrender. The Boers behaved very badly to one man, who was badly wounded, leaving him lying out in the mountains alone, and refusing to permit his comrades to take him water. Three other British scouts whom they caught alone upon the hills they are said to have murdered. And such was their general conduct that the story is in no way improbable. At this date, for some reason or other, Kritzinger openly threatened to kill the British officers who fell into his hands. He seems not to have acted upon this precious menace, probably reflecting that such conduct would be certain at last to stir the British authorities to make reprisals.

The Boers were, however, being pushed slowly north, in spite of the fact that they could not be brought to battle or overtaken.

Attempt to surround him at Tarkastad.

Near Tarkastad another attempt was made to surround them, but with no greater success than on previous occasions. On March 17 Captain Lund marched out from Cradock, with two squadrons of Lancers and a "Pom-Pom," to bar their northward road. Colonel De Lisle, by a forced march, performed in a torrential downpour during the previous night, had seized a strong position further to the east, so as to interdict flight in that quarter. As the result of the downpour, the rivers rose in flood. When towards dawn the British



TARKASTAD.

looked down from their airy perch in the mountains, it seemed as if nothing could save Kritzinger, if only the other columns were in their appointed positions. De Lisle extended his men, and held the line of heights from where the Eland swept down in foaming torrent, to its sister stream, the

Vlekpoort. The length of the line to be guarded was no less than eight miles, while the force available to guard it was only 400 rifles, two 12-pounders, and two "Pom-Poms." Presently the Boers, 600 strong, appeared upon the scene, and fighting began. Behind them should have been Colonel Gorrings's column, but of it there was as yet no sign. The Boers realised their danger, and at once set to work to find the weakest point in the British line. That point was on the extreme left, where 100 men of the Colonial Defence Force had been ordered to take post and prevent the enemy's passage. Unluckily this detachment mistook its orders and wandered off in a wrong direction, leaving a gap which the Boers speedily discovered, and through which they began to make their way. To crown the run of bad luck, the Eland fell as rapidly as it had risen, and about four in the afternoon became fordable. Across it the Boers streamed away in precipitate flight, and it was impossible for De Lisle with his small force, strung out along so wide a front, to interfere seriously with them in their retreat. His guns shelled them, but probably without much effect. One hour after the enemy had got away, Colonel Gorrings came up, too late to do more than fire a few shots after them. The only possible course was for De Lisle to march back to Tarkastad, the mountainous nature of the country into which the enemy had retired precluding pursuit without special means of transport, with which De Lisle does not appear to have been provided. Kritzinger, too, had made up his mind to get out of this wild and difficult region, and he also doubled back and marched in much the same direction. And thus it came to pass that on the 18th the two hostile forces collided on the route. Unfortunately, Kritzinger's main body, by a bold dash, succeeded in getting past the head of the British column, and only the Boer rearguard was brought to action. A desultory encounter



R. Caton Woodville.]

JACKALS OF THE ARMY.

The Boers are in the habit of replenishing their own bandoliers with cartridges dropped from those of the British soldiers. That this should be possible is sufficient proof that the British equipment is faulty. Unfortunately, so many fully armed prisoners have fallen into the enemy's hands that they are well supplied with British rifles, and have no difficulty in using our ammunition.

of transport, with which De Lisle does not appear to have been provided. Kritzinger, too, had made up his mind to get out of this wild and difficult region, and he also doubled back and marched in much the same direction. And thus it came to pass that on the 18th the two hostile forces collided on the route. Unfortunately, Kritzinger's main body, by a bold dash, succeeded in getting past the head of the British column, and only the Boer rearguard was brought to action. A desultory encounter

followed, in which again no severe punishment could be inflicted upon the Boers. The British guns shelled them, and the mounted infantry followed them from ridge to ridge, but they finally escaped into the Bamboesberg, where De Lisle left them and proceeded on his way.



MAJOR (AFTERWARDS COLONEL) THE
HON. ANDREW DAVID MURRAY.

In command of Lovat's Scouts, 1900-1. Killed in an action with Kritzinger. He was a brother of the Earl of Mansfield.

**Boers driven into the
Bamboesberg.**

Before making their escape they captured two carts of the Colonial Defence Force transport, and shot a native driver. On the previous day they had added to their long list of unavenged crimes the murder of a Kaffir, whom they alleged to be carrying despatches for the British.

After these skirmishes Kritzinger's main force seems to have crossed the Stormberg-Rosmead Railway at Henning Siding. It was supposed that he was heading for the Orange River, which was now in heavy flood; but, if he really had contemplated retreat into the Orange River Colony, he must have changed his mind after ascertaining the state of the river. He hurried to within a short distance of its banks and then, with the British columns always in close pursuit, turned sharply back, and succeeded in passing between them into the Zuurberg. In this range of mountains there is reason to believe that the Boers had hidden depôts of food and ammunition, and a supply of remounts. His force, to effect its escape, split up into several bodies, one of which made for Arundel and another

for Naauwpoort. Others again must have worked rapidly south, back to the neighbourhood of Tarkastad and Cradock, for there once more small detachments of the enemy were reported towards the end of March, and the Cradock Railway was cut again at Fish

River on the 28th. These small parties may, however, have been Cape rebels from various localities, acting independently, as there was some evidence to show that Kritzinger's men had really left the Tarkastad region; and it was notorious that, in country pronounced clear of the enemy by the most careful scouting, bands of armed Boers or Boer sympathisers would appear as if by magic. Such bands could only have been composed of the "peaceful" Dutch agriculturists, who could not resist the temptation of a little looting and shooting when they thought the coast clear of British troops. This conduct of the Dutch was a grave embarrassment to the British generals, who had a vast area to patrol and protect against a phantom foe.

**Predatory bands
threaten Cradock.**

LORD LOVAT.

[Photo by White, Inverness.]



LOVAT'S SCOUTS PARADING AT BEAUFORT CASTLE.

This photograph of the corps of Scotch ghillies organized by Lord Lovat was taken at Beaufort Castle shortly before their departure for Africa on March 10, 1900.

On March 25 a skirmish between one of these small parties of Boers and the local defence forces took place at Vogelstruis Nek near Tarkastad. The British, about 100 strong, attempted to storm a position held by the enemy, but were compelled to retire by the failure of the Queenstown Defence Force to advance at the critical moment—a failure for which undisciplined troops cannot be severely blamed. The British loss on this occasion was seven wounded, besides a few prisoners taken by the enemy. Eight Boers were afterwards found on the field, so that the enemy suffered more severely. Meantime Kritzinger was being followed by no less than seven columns, directed by General Jones. These columns were com-


manded by Colonels Herbert, Gorringer, De Lisle, Crewe, Crabbe, Codrington, and Henniker, while Major Murray with Lovat's Scouts was to the east

ready to

join in.

On the 29th, Colonel Henniker's men had a brush with the slippery Boer; but, as usual, he managed to escape without any serious loss. He now drew near to Scheepers, whose movements will shortly be narrated, and crossing the Naauwpoort - Rosmead Railway, laagered close to his fellow commandant and rebel near Middelburg.

Elaborate preparations to surround Scheepers had not proved much more successful than those, the failure of which we have just narrated, against Kritzinger. At the opening of March he was close to Aberdeen, a small village to the south-west of Graaff Reinet. The place was held by a detachment of Derbyshire Militia, the same battalion which had suffered so severely at Roodeval in the previous



E. Prater.]

THE ATTEMPT TO STORM THE KOPJE AT ABERDEEN.

**Scheepers attacks
Aberdeen.**

year, with twenty of the 6th Dragoons—another regiment with a splendid record in the war; there was also a small Town Guard. The whole force was under the command of Colonel Priestley and numbered about 100 men. At 4 a.m. of March 5 the Boers, 300 strong, began their attack with an attempt to rush the village from the south. Foiled in that by the vigorous resistance which the Town Guard offered, they then made a bold effort to storm a kopje held by the Dragoons and Militia, but again

they were repulsed. Yet in spite of these checks they were able to enter the village, which, like most South African townships, was a very scattered one, covering a wide extent of ground. They were attempting to loot the shops when they got something which they had not anticipated—a shower of bullets from the men of the Town Guard, who had taken up a new position whence they swept the stores menaced by the would-be plunderers. The prisoners in the gaol were released by the enemy and the telegraph office was entered, but the Boers could never dislodge the defenders from their positions. Towards evening, after the fight had continued for more than twelve hours without any result being reached, reinforcements began to arrive. First came Colonel Parsons with a column of regulars and Colonials, and then followed Colonel Scobell from Beaufort West. This latter officer had to cover a distance of no less than fifty miles—a long march in that difficult country, even for mounted troops. Yet the goal was reached in twenty hours from the start. On the 6th the Boers were attacked by Colonel Parsons outside Aberdeen, where they had taken up a strong position. A series of kopjes, which they had entrenched, were taken by the Imperial Yeomanry, who, well led by Major Warden of the 18th Battalion, cleared the enemy away in fine style. At last the Boers fell back across the Camdeboo Spruit in some confusion, but without any heavy loss. They had learnt to calculate to a nicety the art of delaying the British by rearguard actions, and always so timed their movements as to get away the moment they were in any danger. The country into which they now retreated was difficult

**Boers retire to the
Koudeveld.**

and bush-covered. The British commanders did not care to follow them into it, but halted near Aberdeen, while fresh arrangements were being made to deal with the enemy. The Boers hurried to a hiding place in the rugged and desolate Koudeveld Range, which rises to the north of Aberdeen, and which offers a fine strategical position for guerilla warfare, lying as it does midway between the two great trunk railways to Capetown and



[Photo by Bassano.]

MAJOR C. H. MULLINS, V.C.

Major Mullins belongs to the Imperial Light Horse, and with that regiment was engaged at the battle of Elandslaagte, October 21, 1899, when he won the Victoria Cross. He and Captain R. Johnstone under a heavy fire rallied the men, and enabled the flanking movement which decided the day to be carried out. Major (then Captain) Mullins was wounded, but recovered, and afterwards served with his regiment.

Port Elizabeth. In this same range Commandant Malan had his rendezvous, but further to the west near Murraysburg.

The troops operating against Scheepers comprised small columns under Colonels Scobell, Grenfell, and Parsons, and Major Mullins, composed mainly of irregulars. Their efforts to head the guerilla back to the north were not very successful. Scheepers swiftly turned towards the south-east, but not without a brush with Major Mullins' column to the west of Graaff Reinet on the 15th, in which the enemy admitted a loss of nine killed and



"POM-POM" CAPTURED FROM DE WET AT BOTHAVILLE IN NOVEMBER, 1900, AND USED AGAINST THE BOERS AT JANSENVILLE BY SCOBELL.

seven wounded. The Boers after this action crossed the Rosmead-Port Elizabeth railway at Marais Siding, and seemed to be moving towards Jansenville. Meantime Scobell's attention had been diverted to Malan, and to force back that commandant he had marched to Murraysburg, leaving the other columns to deal with Scheepers. But Malan, instead of waiting for the British, promptly hurried south into the stretch of country known as the Sunday River Basin, where he got into touch with Scheepers. The Boer forces now collected in this quarter were the commandos of Fouché, Scheepers, and Malan, numbering in all perhaps a thousand men. There seemed to be more than a possibility of a big capture, and the British dispositions were speedily made with a view to that desirable result. Grenfell was instructed to get to the south of the Boers, Mullins to meet them if they attempted to retire north, and Scobell and Herbert—

**Malan, Fouché, and
Scheepers unite.**

the last named had been diverted from the chase of Krit-zinger — were to come in upon them from the west and east respectively. The plan was a good one, and it only miscarried through the inevitable difficulty of ensuring perfect combination between a large number of separate forces operating over a wide extent of country. On the night of the 18th Scobell made a forced march to occupy Jansenville and prevent the enemy seizing it and obtaining fresh supplies. He was just in time, and



THE ERASMUS FAMILY, ARRESTED AT JANSENVILLE.

The group consists of the father and eight sons, all of whom were arrested on charges of assisting the Boers.

the Boers, discomfited, fell back from the neighbourhood of the place to Blaauwkrantz, where they laagered. On the night of the 19th the columns simultaneously moved against them. Early in the morning of the 20th the laager was reached and fighting began. Nothing could have saved the Boers had all the British columns been in their appointed positions, but unluckily a message to Major Mullins miscarried, and the consequence was that a gap was left in the surrounding cordon, through which the Boers managed to make their way. Thus, when the Boer positions were carried by Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, nothing but a rearguard was found to be before the British, and our men were baulked of their prey. Yet the action caused some loss to the enemy. Fourteen Boers were found dead on the field and four prisoners were taken, and in addition 101 horses in good condition and half as many wounded or lame mounts were captured. Local report increased the tale of Boer killed to 45, but there seems to have been no ground for this figure beyond the splendid imagination of Kaffirs. The British loss was only three killed and four wounded.

**Boers chased from
Jansenville and
Blaauwkrantz.**

On the day before this action the enemy had burnt the farm of a British sympathiser. Yet, notwithstanding this wanton outrage, which could be justified by no military necessity, and notwithstanding the numerous atrocities of which they had been guilty, they presumed so much on our inexhaustible good nature as to send in a flag of truce and request Major Mullins to see that medical attention was given to two of their wounded upon a distant farm. To increase their own mobility they had no ambulances or medical stores with them; but they never had to suffer for want of them, as our columns carried ambulances and medical stores for both sides. This was hardly fair to our troops. What Scheepers' and Kritzinger's treatment of the British wounded was upon occasions we have already seen.

From Blaauwkrantz the enemy retired north-eastward through the cactus thorn, where pursuit was impossible without great sacrifices of horseflesh, towards the mountains, and as usual divided into a number of small parties. The largest section was seen near Jakhalsfontein, on March 26, moving upon Stockdale. Another section, said to be that commanded by Fouché, moved to Bethesda, crossing and breaking the railway *en route*. All the sections must have received a common rendezvous, for one by one they all headed to the Camdeboo mountains—an offshoot of the Koudeveld. There they encamped in three places—at Roodepoort, Komplaats, and Zuurpoort.

From their lurking-places in these mountain fastnesses they threatened Richmond, and picked up contact with Kritzinger. But here also, after necessary delay to arrange for operations against them, the British followed them, and, after a most arduous march through cactus-covered stretches of veldt and rugged mountains, Major Mullins captured their camp at Roodepoort, and took from them a quantity of plunder which they had carried off from the loyal. In spite of this they were soon once more upon their old hunting ground. On April 6 they appeared on the Zeekoe River to the north of Aberdeen, and captured a large patrol, 100 strong, composed of men from the 5th

**Wounded Boers tended
by the British.**



H. M. Paget.

[After a sketch by H. Egersdorfer.]

THE PLAGUE AT CAPETOWN: REMOVING NATIVES FROM AN INSANITARY QUARTER.

The threatened epidemic rendered it necessary to clear certain parts of the town; between 800 and 1,000 native men, women, and children were removed from the Horsley Street district to more open ground, a proceeding which they naturally viewed with very great disfavour (p. 490).

**Capture of Boer camp
at Roodepoort.**



THE PLAGUE AT CAPE-TOWN: INTERIOR OF A WARD OF THE UITVLUGT PLAGUE HOSPITAL.

How the dreaded Asiatic plague first came to Capetown is not known, but it is believed that it was brought thither by rats in ships from infected Eastern ports. Sporadic cases occurred early in 1901, and gradually increased in number, but, thanks to energetic sanitary measures, never assumed the proportions of an epidemic. The cases reported in the Capetown district, 801, were divided as follows: Europeans—males, 156, deaths, 51; females, 47, deaths, 17; Coloured—males, 277, deaths, 150; females, 151, deaths, 83; Natives—males, 155, deaths, 66; females, 15, deaths, 8 = 801 cases, 384 deaths. The average rate of mortality was 47·9 per cent., viz., Europeans, 33·5; Coloured, 56·5; Natives, 43·5 per cent.

Lancers, Imperial Yeomanry, and Brabant's Horse, under circumstances which have never been fully explained. The enemy were said to be in much superior force. The British troops lost two killed and 14 wounded. Another patrol of Brabant's Horse is also said to have been captured about the same time in the same region. A few days previously, in the neighbouring range of the Zuurberg, yet a third patrol, this time composed of Marshall's Horse, had been snapped up, probably by Kritzinger's men. The patrol was surrounded in the mountains, and though it fought bravely, losing six men out of a total of 26, it was compelled to surrender.

At the end of March and beginning of April there is reason to think that a number of the enemy crossed the Orange River, as was assumed at the time, because they had had enough fighting; but it seems on the whole likely that this interpretation of their movements was not the correct one, and that these parties may have been charged with the task of passing remounts, collected in Cape Colony, to the Boer commandos still in arms in the Orange River Colony. At this date the situation in Cape Colony is thus summed up: Besides the detached commando in the north-west, there were numerous

Guerilla bands in the Midlands.

detachments in the Midlands, numbering about 200 men each. These still evaded battle with success, and always fell back on the mountains when pressed by the British troops. Elsewhere in the Colony



[Photo by T. W. Ravenscroft.]

THE PLAGUE DOCTORS AND NURSES.

Dr. Mitchell, the Medical Superintendent, sits in the front row with his hand upon a book.



ORIENTALS AT THE PLAGUE HOSPITAL.

The Hadji and Staff who attended to the spiritual needs of the Malay patients.

were a number of small predatory parties, recruited in all probability from the local farmers, and only waging war intermittently. No system of scouting or patrolling could get rid of these men, and they could only be driven from the field by showing them that treason was a game in which the treasonable staked his neck. It is because this fact is slowly driven home to the British Government that we find a steady advance in the direction of severity to rebels. The warfare was of an illegitimate kind, inasmuch as it was spasmodic, the guerillas returning to their homes after obtaining loot or cutting up some British patrol which they happened to have surprised. They were, too, controlled by no



[Photo by Window & Grove.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. W. E. FORESTIER-WALKER, K.C.B., G.C.M.G.

Born 1844; elder son of Sir E. W. Forestier-Walker, K.C.B.; educated at Sandhurst. Joined the Scots Guards, 1862; Captain, 1865; Regimental Major, 1881; Lieut.-Colonel, 1873; Colonel, 1878; Major-General, 1887; Lieut.-General, 1895. Served in the expedition to Griqualand West, 1875; in the Kaffir War, 1878; in the Zulu War, 1879; in Bechuanaland, 1884. Acted as A.D.C. to Major-General, Mauritius, 1866-7; Assistant Military Secretary to G.O.C., Cape of Good Hope, 1873-8; Military Secretary to Governor, Cape of Good Hope, 1878; on Special Service, Cape of Good Hope, 1878-9; A.A. and Q.M.G., Home District, 1882; A.A. and Q.M.G., South Africa, 1884-5; Brigadier-General, Aldershot, 1889-90; Major-General in Egypt, 1890-5; Lieut.-General, Western District, 1895-9. In August, 1899, he went again to the Cape to take up the general command and direction of the lines of communication.

coloured population away from Capetown. Much of the army traffic was diverted to Port Elizabeth, but there also this pestilence made its appearance before long. In the army it caused but few

Efficient commissariat.

deaths, no doubt because of the healthy life which the soldier lived in the open air. It says much for the admirable manner in which the commissariat was now managed, that, despite all these embarrassments, the army was kept properly victualled and supplied. The railways were constantly interrupted both in Cape Colony and in the Boer territories, and yet all the difficulties had been triumphantly overcome.

In April there were further cases of derailments of trains on the Cape Colony lines, the enemy

responsible officers who could prevent them from violating the laws of war. At the outset our policy had been to punish rebellion with nothing more than fines and a short term of imprisonment, or in some cases with disfranchisement alone. Such penalties had made rebellion seem a trivial crime in the eyes of the Dutch. But now sentences of penal servitude for long terms of years, and even death, were passed upon the more flagrant traitors.

The total number of Boers in arms in the Colony was very variously reported at the opening of April. Official statistics placed it at under 2,000; on the other hand, the Boer authorities in Europe alleged that they had from 7,000 to 8,000 men south of the Orange River. The latter estimate is certainly a gross exaggeration; no doubt the truth lay between the two extremes.

The British authorities were unquestionably hampered at this stage by the

Plague in Capetown.

appearance of the dreaded plague in the Colony. It first showed itself at Capetown early in February. It did not attack many whites, though at the outset its coming excited great fear for the army; but it was a serious scourge to the large coloured population, which was so extensively employed in the work of unloading stores for the army in the harbour. It thus caused delay at a time when delay was dangerous, and it reduced the labour available by frightening the

being especially troublesome in the neighbourhood of Graaff Reinet and Cradock. The night service of trains had to be suspended on account of the guerillas' activity, and thus further embarrassments to the

**Boer commandos in
the Midlands.**

British commissariat followed. At this date Scheepers was in the Koudeveld, Fouché near him in the vicinity of Murraysburg, and Kritzinger close to Middelburg.

On April 1 yet another small party occupied Philipstown, an insignificant village, which in the operations against De Wet had repeatedly changed hands. The main body of Kritzinger's men, on the 6th, passed close to Middelburg. It numbered about 200 men, but though the Town Guard turned out there was no fighting, neither side being strong enough to attack. From the

**Railway traffic
dislocated.**

neighbourhood of the town the enemy retired into the mountains, and thence directed a series of annoying attempts upon the railway. On the 8th they derailed a train on the Cradock line. On the 9th the approach of a column

under Colonel Grenfell drove them away for the moment, but they none the less managed to loot the



G. Soper.]

[After a sketch by Lionel James.

COLONEL HAIG RECONNOITRING IN THE STORMBERG MOUNTAINS IN A BLIZZARD. (See p. 492.)

The operations described in this chapter took place when winter, which in South Africa may be said to begin in April, was rapidly approaching.

town of Conway, and on the 12th they fired on a train near Fish River. Their attack brought up one of the armoured trains from Rosmead, before which they, of course, decamped. Scheepers, while Kritzinger was thus busied, had been located near Aberdeen, and an attempt was made to surprise his camp. The elements, however, fought in his favour, and, as a thick mist settled down on the hills just as the British were drawing into their positions round his laager, he managed to steal away without any loss other than a few rifles and saddles captured. Malan, another of the Boer guerilla leaders, who was gaining some notoriety, about the same time descended upon the station of Kendrew, south of Graaff Reinet, fired on a passing train, burned a goods-shed, and fell back into the hills. "The commandos now in the Colony," telegraphed a correspondent about this date, "generally break up into small parties, avoid all risks, and, concealing their spare horses among the hills to the north of Graaff Reinet, march in a circle, returning to pick up fresh mounts and to leave their tired animals to recuperate." Nor was it only in the Midlands that the enemy dislocated railway traffic. In the

east they were nearly as troublesome, derailing on the 18th a train on the East London line between Molteno and Stormberg. The Boers managed to remove the cattle with which the train was laden; they wounded the driver and stoker of the leading engine, both of whom displayed signal courage, uncoupling under heavy fire the engine, which had kept the rails without sustaining any damage, and steaming off to Stormberg, whence they brought up troops. The Boers killed a native whom they found on the train, and wounded another. A British force pursued, and on April 24 a sharp skirmish took place near Dordrecht, in which the enemy did not get off scot free. They lost one man killed and four wounded, included among whom were one of their officers and a local rebel named Sauer. They also had 30 of their horses taken by the British.

On April 12 Colonel Haig took command at Rosmead, with orders to clear the enemy out of the midland districts. Fresh columns were brought into the field, but unhappily no great measure of success could be attained, as the Boers always managed to show a clean pair of heels when pursued, and invariably doubled back the minute the pursuit relaxed. As one of the results of Colonel Haig's operations, Kritzinger, at the end of April, fell back from the Zuurberg, in the direction of Venterstad, where his movements caused well-founded suspicion that he was forwarding supplies to the burghers in the Orange River Colony, as his men were continually crossing and recrossing the Orange River, with little let or hindrance from the British troops. Colonel Crewe, who was in pursuit of him, attacked him near Gelegfontein, but with no more result than the usual desultory

**Kritzinger on the
Orange River.**



[Photo by T. C. Turner & Co.]

LIEUT.-COLONEL THE HON. ARTHUR H. HENNIKER, C.B.

Born in London, 1855. Joined the Coldstream Guards (from Militia), 1875; Captain, 1885; Major, 1891; Lieut.-Colonel, 1899. Commandant, School of Musketry for Auxiliary Forces, Wellington Barracks, 1886; Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of State for War, 1888-91; D.A.A.G., Southern District, 1891-4; D.A.A.G., Home District, 1896-8; D.A.A.G., Headquarters of Army, 1898. Served in the Egyptian Expedition, 1882, and in the South African War, 1899-1901, being present at the battle of Belmont.



MARTIAL LAW IN CAPE COLONY: COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF HORSES OF COLONISTS AT JAMESTOWN, March 14, 1901.

skirmish. He succeeded in causing a great deal of uneasiness in the Aliwal and Albert districts, and then doubled back towards Steynsburg, which place he, or a part of his command, attacked on April 28. He was beaten off, and retired into the Zuurberg.

Meantime Scheepers, Malan, and Fouché were, in the official phrase, "hustled" in the

Pearston district, to which they had returned, by Colonels Scobell and Henniker, but they none the less continued their depredations, visiting farms and looting, or in some instances burning, them.

Farm burning and looting.

Thus Scheepers destroyed a large farm belonging to a Dutch loyalist named Dr. Moolman, whose neighbour he had been before he threw in his lot with the enemy. He had previously sent a letter threatening that the farm would be burnt

unless Dr. Moolman would take an oath of neutrality. No attention was paid to this impudent message. At the end of April it was reported that Scheepers, with only about 180 men, was in the Sneeuwberg Range, Malan, with a yet smaller force further to the north, Swanepoel, a leader of whom we have previously heard little, with 60 men, near New Bethesda, under the Sneeuwberg, and Fouché in the Zuurberg with some hundreds of men. These



MARTIAL LAW IN CAPE COLONY: HANDING IN BICYCLES TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AT GRAAFF REINET.

estimates of the enemy's forces appear, however, to have been considerably below the actual mark. There were reports that Kritzinger had crossed into the Orange River Colony, but owing to the Boer practice of spreading misleading rumours, it is doubtful whether much credence can be attached to them. Early in May however, reinforcements joined the enemy in Cape Colony from across the Orange River, and it is possible that Kritzinger had received orders to go north, and did leave the Colony to conduct the new-comers to the south of the river. That, at least, was the British official information.

On May 2, a patrol of Diamond Fields Horse was attacked by Malan near Cradock, and eight men were captured, while a day or two later the enemy blew up the line at Mortimer, near Cradock, and plundered a goods train. The



MARTIAL LAW IN CAPE COLONY: FIVE HUNDRED BICYCLES HANDLED IN UNDER MILITARY ORDERS AT GRAAFF REINET.

line was easily cleared on the arrival of one of the armoured trains. About the same time some of Kritzinger's men broke the Naauwpoort-De Aar Railway at Taaiboschfontein, and, in quite another quarter, a section, probably of Fouché's commando, burnt a supply train at Rayner, near Stormberg. Other bodies of Boers descended on the De Aar and Kimberley Railway, breaking it at Graspan. On April 30, they held up the station of Paauwpan, where they destroyed the telegraph instruments and plundered the safe. They were speedily dislodged by the armoured trains.

In the east of the Colony there was some desultory fighting in April near Dordrecht, while in Namaqualand, Agenhuis, which had been seized by the enemy, was reoccupied. The Boers, though

they had been driven back, clung to the hills to the north-east of Pella and showed no disposition to fight. Their only motive appeared to be plunder, and their number was so small, and the country so difficult and arid, that there was no particular reason for undertaking vigorous operations against them.

Desultory fighting.

In mid-May it could scarcely be said that there had been any improvement in the state of the Colony. Indeed, it was thought by many on the spot that the situation had changed, if at all, for the worse. None of the Boer bands had been hunted down, and not a single real defeat had been inflicted upon the guerillas. They had completely fulfilled their threat of harassing the Colony and causing infinite annoyance to the British, and they had fulfilled it with surprising impunity. Because of the impotence of the British mobile columns, in face of this evasive enemy, discontent was spreading in the Colony. The Colonials

Discontent of the loyalists.



S. Spurrier.]

THE FIRST COURT-MARTIAL AT CRADOCK.

[After a photograph.]

After the trial the prisoners were brought into the market-square and their sentences read out in public. The Commandant is here represented in the act of reading the sentence on one of the rebels, Abel Jourdaan, who was condemned to pay £100 and to be imprisoned for five years.

alleged that the British took the war as a kind of glorified picnic, and asserted that they themselves could speedily finish the invaders off if given a free hand. Moreover, martial law in many of the districts was administered with a want of tact which added fuel to the secret fire of indignation. Business was impossible; chaos ruled in place of order; and the freaks of some of the petty military despots were such as to irritate almost beyond endurance those who were devoutly loyal to the flag.

On April 22, an important proclamation was issued by Lord Kitchener. It stated that, on and after that date, all British subjects who, while residing in districts to which martial law had been applied, should take up arms against the British, or incite others to do so, or commit any overt or covert act endangering the safety of the British troops or subjects, should be immediately arrested, tried by Court-Martial, and if convicted be liable to the severest penalties. Nor was it long before action was taken on this proclamation. On May 2, two young Dutch farmers of the Aberdeen district were tried by Court-Martial for the crime of joining Scheepers and looting British property, and were

sentenced to death. The sentence was, however, commuted to one of five years' imprisonment, as it appeared that they had voluntarily surrendered. Other farmers, of the Colesberg district, were tried about the same date for the common offence of misleading the British troops and withholding from them information of the enemy's movements, and were sentenced to terms of from six to twelve months' hard labour. Thus now at last the severity was being displayed which, if it had only been shown at the outset, would probably have prevented the conflict in Cape Colony from attaining such dangerous proportions.

On May 8, Sir Alfred Milner left South Africa for a term of rest in

England. It was pretended by the Pro-Boers that he had been virtually recalled, and this rumour caused the utmost disquietude among the loyal. By way of reassuring public opinion, he delivered an important speech on the eve of sailing, in which he told Cape Colony that the British people were determined not to turn back. England's purpose, he said, remained unshaken, and the clearest proof of this was to be found in the manner in which the peace proposals had been received in the British

Honours conferred upon him.

and of Cape Town.



F. Dadd, R.I.]

SIR ALFRED MILNER'S HOME-COMING.

Sir Alfred Milner was met at Waterloo Station by the Marquis of Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury), Lord Roberts, and other distinguished men. With Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain he drove by a route densely crowded with cheering spectators to Marlborough House, to be received by the King, by whom he was afterwards entertained at Windsor Castle. (See the note beneath the portrait on p. 415.)

press. On his arrival in England it was soon seen that there had been no ground for the suspicions entertained. Sir Alfred, to the great chagrin of the Pro-Boers, was received by the King, presented by the Common Council with the freedom of the City of London, and raised to the peerage, with the title of Lord Milner of St. James's and of Cape Town. He returned to South Africa in August to complete his work.



W. B. Wollen, R.I.]

[Sketched on the spot.

THE BURNING OF COMMANDANT TUBBIT'S FORTIFIED FARM AT MODDER RIVER BY BABINGTON'S CAVALRY IN January, 1900.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND THE LOYAL REFUGEES.

Severe measures forced upon the British—German and American precedents—Lord Roberts' proclamations concerning farm-burning—His mistaken clemency—Flagrant treachery of the Boer women—Establishment of concentration camps—Miss Hobhouse's visit—Her one-sided report and impracticable suggestions—Overcrowding—Rations—Death-rate—Government appoints a Ladies' Committee—Reasons against removal of camps—Dr. Jane Waterston's report—Dr. Hougen's refutation of the charge of cruelty—American methods of dealing with the disaffected—German treatment of non-combatants—Neglect of loyal refugees—Instances of hardship and privation—Loyalists exasperated—Tender treatment of Boer prisoners—Places of confinement over sea—Misinterpretation of British leniency—Persistent enmity of the Boers—Prisoners' attempts to escape.



THE determination of the Boers to wage a guerilla war had compelled the British Generals, notwithstanding their reluctance to employ severe measures, to take steps to deal with the outwardly non-combatant Boer population.

Severe measures forced upon the British. The enemy's custom of wearing no uniform, except that of the British troops—in itself a grave infraction of the laws of war—

and their habit of resuming their peaceful avocations and returning to their farms when they required rest from their labour of derailing trains and sniping British sentries, coupled with their invariable practice of using the farms as arsenals and bases of operations, and with their proved determination to respect no oaths of neutrality, no solemn promises to refrain from hostile action, had driven our Generals, in spite of themselves, to this course. It was not entered upon until the provocation given had been almost past endurance, and such as would have been tolerated by no other army in the world. The course adopted was to destroy farms where acts of hostility were committed, where ammunition and arms were found concealed, in certain instances where trains were derailed in the neighbourhood, and where the owner was on commando.

It is laid down by the British manual of military law, on the authority of eminent juriconsults, and with the support of innumerable precedents, that, as far as possible, the property of an enemy

should be spared. But it is added that this property can be taken or destroyed in punishment for injuries inflicted on the invading troops by its owners, or by the community to which they belong. In such cases the innocent must sometimes suffer with the guilty. Again, property can be destroyed where its destruction will contribute to accelerate the end of the war. The damage to property must not be wanton; but with this qualification the laws of war, and indeed of common sense, recognise that it is legitimate to strike a foe by menacing not only his life and limbs, but also his temporality. In the past such action has been taken by almost all generals, especially where the resistance offered has been of a guerilla nature. The Germans, in the conflict of 1870-71, never showed any extravagant respect for property. They burned farms and villages as punitive acts, over and over again. The United States generals, again, in the American



BURNING OF A FARMHOUSE NEAR DEWETSDORP IN May, 1900.

This was one of the houses burnt under Lord Roberts' proclamation; the offence in this case was the treacherous firing on British troops from the building while a white flag flew from its gable.

German and American precedents.

Civil War, never shrank from systematic devastation, when any military purpose was served thereby. General Sheridan destroyed barns without number and all the crops in the Shenandoah Valley, in 1864. General Sherman was even more ruthless in his famous march through Georgia. The slightest resistance called down upon any locality the sternest measures. Both generals openly avowed their determination to make the non-combatant population suffer the miseries of war, declining to recognise the theory that a conflict can be fought out to a finish without subjecting the non-combatants to its hardships. In both

of these cases, too, the enemy had a uniformed army in the field, and in neither was treachery carried to the lengths to which the Boers habitually carried it.

Quite early in the war, in May, 1900, Lord

Lord Roberts' proclamations concerning farm-burning.

Roberts had issued a proclamation warning the Boers that the residents of any locality would be held responsible in person and property for any damage done to the railways in that locality. In June, as has been noted in an earlier part of this



MARTIAL LAW IN JOHANNESBURG: THE COURT CONSTITUTED TO TRY OFFENCES UNDER MARTIAL LAW.

The President of the Court is on the bench with Captain Da Costa and Lieut. Hughes. The photograph was taken immediately after the conclusion of a trial in August, 1900.

work, he had specifically directed the burning of farms near any point where the line was broken, and the conveyance of burgher hostages on the trains. In thus acting he was only following German precedent. Even so, his proclamation was not unflinchingly carried out, and the number of farms destroyed for this reason is shown by an official return to have been comparatively small. A later proclamation, issued on August 14, had warned the Boers that farms on which the enemy's scouts were harboured would be liable to be razed to the ground. It had further ordained that as there was no means of distinguishing the combatant from the non-combatant, all burghers in occupied

districts should henceforth be regarded as prisoners of war. On September 22 yet another proclamation was issued in which we have the first clear suggestion of the concentration camps. It stated that burghers who voluntarily surrendered would not be sent out of South Africa, but that camps for them would be formed at Pretoria and Bloemfontein.

In November, further directions were issued by Lord Roberts, then on the eve of leaving for home, in which he forbade **His mistaken clemency.** the burning of farms merely because the owner was absent on commando, and limited such punishment to cases where treachery had occurred, or where the farm had been used as a base, or where the railway had been interfered with in the vicinity. Throughout Lord Roberts' régime, however, much was threatened, but the threats were rarely fulfilled,



SURRENDERED BOER FAMILIES ON THEIR WAY TO THE REFUGEE CAMP AT STANDERTON.

and the natural consequence was that the Boers came to regard the British as a people who talked very big, but who did very little—a state of mind which rendered further severities necessary to prove that British generals could not be played with. Towards the end of 1900, the policy of stripping the country was put into force by the British army, as the only sure means of ending the war. This brought into fresh prominence the question of how to treat the Boer women and children. They could scarcely be left on the farms, after the foodstuffs had been carried off or destroyed, so instead of giving the enemy notice to remove them, it was finally decided to take them away with the British columns and collect and maintain them in camps under the eyes of the British authorities. Even before this measure was definitely adopted, a considerable number of women and children must have been in the British camps, since in most cases where farms had been destroyed, their non-combatant inhabitants had been permitted to accompany the troops to the nearest town, and had there been presumably fed by the army.

As to the position of these non-combatants, they had no right to expect exceptional treatment at our hands. Many of the women had been guilty of acts of treachery; they constantly shot at



isolated patrols, trusting to the immunity which their sex gave them in the eyes of even the worst of our men, and at all times they assisted the Boer forces with food and information. The old men

**Flagrant treachery
of the Boer women.**

and the children were no better than the women. A generous enemy will never harshly criticise—rather, indeed, he will praise—wives and daughters for doing their utmost in the cause for which their husbands and fathers are fighting.

But he will always draw the line at flagrant treachery, and declare that if women take up arms they can no longer expect their sex to shield them. The British manual of military law states clearly that such conduct exposes them to the sternest treatment. "Old men," it says, "women, and children, wherever found, will be carefully guarded from outrage, unless they take up arms, in which case they subject themselves to the rigid rules of war applicable to combatants, and some times to still harsher treatment."

From November 1900, onwards,

**Establish-
ment of
concentra-
tion camps.**

then, begins the system of collecting these dubious non-combatants into camps and feeding them at the expense of the British taxpayer. It was, in the light of subsequent events, a great mistake, as



W. T. Maud.]

[After a sketch by Lionel James.

A WOMAN WARRIOR: AN INCIDENT IN A SEARCH FOR ARMS.

During General French's advance through the south-east of the Transvaal an officer was told off to search a particular farm for arms and foodstuffs. He was half-way up a ladder to the loft when he was suddenly confronted by a woman with an ancient blunderbuss. Shutting her eyes she fired in his direction, fortunately without doing him any damage, though the recoil flung her against the wall.

it removed from the enemy a source of embarrassment and outlay and transferred this embarrassment and outlay to the account of the British army. Moreover, it gave a handle to the Pro-Boer agitators at home and to the enemy in the field, of which both were quick to avail themselves. A carefully engineered campaign against the concentration camps began in Europe, while the Boers in the field were cynically confessing that, now they were freed from all anxiety for their wives and families,

they could fight on with a light heart. The organiser of the campaign in Europe was an English lady named Miss Hobhouse, who early in 1901 was permitted by the British authorities to visit the camps,

Miss Hobhouse's visit. on the promise that she should not make any use of her visit for political purposes.

The manner in which she kept her promise showed that she hardly understood the gravity of her undertaking.

No sooner had she returned to England than she produced a report in which she drew what Pro-Boers called

Her one-sided report and impracticable suggestions. a "terrible picture" of the camps. She made no allowance whatever for the special difficulties of war, and forgot

the fact that to keep a large population of hostile non-combatants supplied, while their husbands and brothers and sons were daily cutting the railways, was a stupendous task. She knew nothing of the normal conditions of Boer life, or of the state of dirt and squalor in which a large proportion of the camp inmates usually lived. She did not test or analyse what these people told her, but, so long as they were to the discredit of her country, eagerly accepted their stories, though men who had lived for years in the Transvaal could have shown her how little Boer assertions, when uncorroborated, were to be trusted. She complained of such things as the want of cows to give fresh milk to the children, when, had she inquired, she might have discovered that British soldiers were dying of enteric in hospital because there were no cows and no fresh milk to be obtained. It was not that the British were deliberately cruel, or even careless,


but that war brings inevitable sufferings and privations, and that the Boer women had necessarily to experience these. Where possible, milk and every available luxury were given them, even to an extent of which the tax-payer had ample right to complain. Where the Boer "refugees" suffered, they suffered in company with the British troops, and they might have had the grace to recognise the fact. The infant mortality, of which she especially complained, was due to the special conditions

of war, and, as even she was compelled to admit, not to any inhumanity on the part of the British authorities. And she had to allow that several of the camps, especially those in Cape Colony, were satisfactory. The system of giving half-rations to the people whose relatives were still on commando was another matter which excited her indignation. But it was quite legitimate in view of the fact that the half-ration allowed was adequate, if not excessive. There was nothing wrong in drawing distinctions, in a matter of charity, between those who were our enemies and our friends, except to a certain type of mind which seems to imagine that to have been an enemy of Britain *ipso facto* confers the right to preferential treatment. For the rest, this report contained not one word of praise for the kindness and self-abnegation displayed by the soldiers to these hostile women and children, nor did it hint that Thomas Atkins had again and again had to fare upon short commons that they might not be stinted. Nor did it recall the manner in which the Boers, in the day of



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MISS HOBHOUSE.



[Photo by Rev. W. H. Weekes, Rector of Mafeking.]

RELICS OF BOER CHIVALRY: FRAGMENTS OF SHELLS FIRED INTO THE WOMEN'S LAAGER AT MAFEEKING.

their power, had treated the wives and children of loyal Britishers. Miss Hobhouse's indignation had slumbered while the army of Joubert was denying the women and children, in that terrible camp at Intombi, the barest necessities, and when babes were dying day by day for want of milk. It had slumbered while the Boers poisoned the water supply of Ladysmith, entailing the certainty of disease upon delicately-bred Englishwomen. It had slumbered while they shelled the women's quarter at Mafeking. Yet her humanitarian sympathies, had she been the un-biassed observer she represented herself to be, would have been aroused by such acts; she might, too, have reflected that for these things the slow working mills of God were grinding out recompense, none the less just because long delayed. The Boer women, who had gone to the summit of Bulwana as to a picnic, to witness the shelling of that fever-devastated town of Ladysmith, now found that the war had come home to them, yet were they not done by as they themselves had done.

A report may be judged by its recommendations, and Miss Hobhouse, with the elegant impracticability of the sentimentalist, could only suggest that the Boer women should be turned loose once more. What would have happened to them she does not seem to have considered. When the country was being systematically devastated, they could not have found subsistence on the farms; in the towns there was nothing for them to do, and, what was more, no

food was to be had. Presumably, even she did not think that convoys ought to be sent out to them in the remote hamlets of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal by the British administration. She overlooked, too, the very real danger to these white women from the natives on lonely and distant farms—a real and terrible danger, as is proved by the fact that the British provost-marshals had continually to punish Kaffirs for attacks on them. Thus on the



R. W. Macbeth, A.R.A.]

[After a sketch by H. McCormick.

THE BULWANA PICNIC.

On Christmas Day, 1899, quite a number of Boer women, some of them fashionably dressed, were seen holiday-making through the naval telescopes in Ladysmith; the naval 4.7 gun had not fired for several days, and the Boers concluded that Ladysmith was out of ammunition. They easily persuaded some of the women to ascend Bulwana Hill and witness the bombardment of the town, till the howitzer on Middle Hill gave them a gentle reminder that Boer gun-pits were dangerous. One wonders if they ever gave a thought to the anxious women and children biding in terror from their big shells.

facts Miss Hobhouse failed to take an impartial view, and in her recommendations she quite lost sight of what was practicable.

Not content with her report, however, she delivered a series of partisan addresses throughout England, and permitted herself to be made the unconscious instrument of the Boer plotters in Europe, who caught up her words, reprinted them, translated them, heightening the colour at times, and scattered them broadcast through the world, the result being to increase the animosity felt abroad against Britain, which was already only too bitter. It must be confessed that this well-meaning but meddlesome lady cut a sorry figure in the eyes of loyal Englishmen. Not that her statements were allowed to pass unchallenged. A vast amount of evidence speedily poured in from the front, exposing her inaccuracies and mistakes. It was pointed out by those conversant with Dutch life in South Africa that in many of the farms during winter it was impossible, even in time of peace, to get fresh milk; so that there was no real cause for complaint if it was not issued in the

Overcrowding.

Bloemfontein camp. Miss Hobhouse had found fault with the overcrowding in hot tents. *The Times* correspondent at Capetown wrote, "I have seen all the members of a family huddled together in damp



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

THE HON. ELLA CAMPBELL SCARLETT,
M.D. (BRUSSELS), L.S.A. (LONDON).

Miss Scarlett is the eldest daughter of the late Lieut.-General Lord Abinger, C.B. After a brilliant career as a medical student, she was appointed medical adviser to the Court of Corea; but, pending the erection of a hospital in that country, was selected by the Colonial Office as one of the medical officers to the refugee camps in Orange River Colony.

rooms with closed windows, affording no fresh air and no comfort. In one farm I have seen a common bed-room in which the father, mother, and four children slept. These experiences are common out here, and it would not be necessary to touch on them were it not for the fact that Miss Hobhouse dilates upon the misery of overcrowding as though it were something unknown before in the lives of the inmates of the camps."

Again, with regard to the question of supplying reduced rations to the women

Rations.

whose men-folk were upon commando, it was pointed out that cases had actually occurred in which women supported in the camps had abused the generosity of the British people by smuggling part of their allowance out to the fighting burghers. Thus Weillbach's commando on the Gatsrand was enabled to maintain itself on food sent from the Johannesburg camp, a fact which proved that the allowance could not be increased without some military risk. It was really almost too much to call upon the British Government to supply with food not only the enemy's women and children but also his men. However, this grievance of Miss Hobhouse's was removed at the instance of



THE GENTLE AMAZON.

A Boer and his wife, brought into Pretoria as prisoners in the autumn of 1900, both of whom had been on commando for three months.

the Home Government, always nervously susceptible to the criticism of Pro-Boers, and the system of reduced rations was abandoned.

A great amount of evidence from all manner of sources showed that, generally speaking, the food issued was abundant and of good quality, especially in Cape Colony and Natal, where the supply-trains were not constantly being derailed. Thus Major Sykes testifies that in a camp of 6,000 women and children which he had under his charge the food supplied was ample, and the best of its kind. "The rations supplied weekly consisted of 7 lb. meal or flour, 3 lb. meat, 6 oz. sugar, 6 oz. coffee, and 2 oz. or 3 oz. salt, per adult. Water was plenti-



SCHOOL FOR DUTCH CHILDREN IN THE REFUGEE CAMP AT STANDERTON.

ful, but with regard to the supply of milk for such a camp there were difficulties. A number of cows were kept, and milked regularly for the sick, the weakly, and the children, and when this was not sufficient they had a good supply of tinned milk. For the use of the sick and those in hospital, the Medical Officer had *carte blanche* for anything that he might deem necessary, however luxurious or

Death-rate.

costly. There was no stint in such cases. The death-rate might appear high, but when it was taken into consideration that the whole of the district under his administration was as large as Ireland, and that people were gathered together from all quarters,



BOER BOYS OUT OF SCHOOL.

it was not very striking that the mortality should appear high. The medical men told him that there was no very great increase over the normal death-rate under their old conditions. There were shops in the camp at which people might purchase at any time such little luxuries as they fancied. The able-bodied, both of women and boys, were made to work at something, and they were paid for what they did. The pay was not great, three-

pence, sixpence, or one shilling a day, but it nevertheless allowed them to buy little delicacies over and above their rations." And so a score of others whom it would be wearisome to quote. There is this also to be remembered. Many of the inmates of the camps had considerable sums of money

in their possession, and, if they wanted anything over and above the supplies issued, could very well buy it for themselves. Thus in the Kimberley camp, according to Mr. V. Sampson, who visited it, one woman begged of the superintendent extra supplies on the score of poverty, while her husband had £3,000 in his actual possession in the camp. In the Howick camp in Natal, an old lady, who had been in receipt of the British Government's charity, died, and was found to have £1,500 in her belongings. "The chief complaint that one hears here on all sides," says the witness who records this fact, "is that the Boer refugees are petted and pampered." Toys, it appeared, teachers and temporary schools, were provided for the children, pianos and tennis-courts for the healthy, and



EVICTED BOERS LOADING UP FURNITURE WHICH THEY ARE PERMITTED TO TAKE TO THE REFUGEE CAMP.

medical comforts on the most lavish scale for any who might fall sick. It would seem that organised attempts had been made by Boer emissaries to persuade the refugees to complain. In view of this fact Miss Hobhouse's report is intelligible. The women and children told her what they thought would benefit their cause, with an obvious contempt for the truth.

Another question which might well be asked is, whether, if Miss Hobhouse's contentions were correct, the onus of granting additional relief ought not to have fallen rather upon Mr. Kruger, who had carried off vast sums, stolen from the owners of the South African mines, with him into his comfortable seclusion, than upon the British Government. This idea, however, seems never to have occurred either to the Boers or to their supporters, the Pro-Boers. It is true that Mr. Kruger, even in the days of his power, had never been inclined to part with his money for charitable objects, and that any application to him would certainly have been refused. But it should surely have been

recognised that his was the ultimate responsibility for these sufferings of the Boer non-combatants, real or imaginary.

The following menu of the daily fare in the camp at Simon's Town, in Cape Colony, may serve to clinch the discussion on the food supplied to the Boer refugees. It is dated August 30, 1901, and we may remark, in passing, that thousands of respectable British families do not fare so well as these enemies—these ungrateful enemies:—"Breakfast: Provost oats porridge, liver and bacon, beefsteaks and chops, bread and butter, jams various, and coffee. Dinner: Pea-soup, roast beef, roast mutton, Irish stew, baked potatoes, cabbage, sago pudding, pineapple (tinned). Tea: Herrings (tinned), cold roast beef, bread and butter, jams various, and tea."

Allusion has already been made to Miss Hobhouse's statements regarding the rate of mortality in the camps. This mortality was heaviest among the children, of



LIFE IN A REFUGEE CAMP.



W. T. Maudslayi

THE "BRUTAL" BRITISH SOLDIER FRATERNIZING WITH HIS CAPTIVES.

[After a sketch by a correspondent in the field.]

whom, according to an official return for the month of August, 1901, 1,545 died in the month, out of a total of 52,225 in the various camps. The death-rate was, then, high, but it must be remembered that an epidemic of measles was raging at this period, and for this epidemic the British authorities could not be held in any sense responsible. Many of the Boer children when brought into the camps were already suffering from the contagion. Most of them had experienced extreme privations before reaching the camps, and so had had their vitality lowered. Difficulties, in the way of fuel and water supply, due to the war, may have contributed in some degree to the deadliness of the epidemic, but the only means of ascertaining whether this was the case would have been by comparing the mortality in time of peace among children in the outlying districts of the Transvaal. Miss Hobhouse made no attempt to do this, and there is no doubt that such statistics would have been fatal to her wild accusations.

Such, however, was the eagerness of the British Government to disprove the charges of severity, that a committee of

**Government appoints
a ladies' committee.**

ladies was sent out to South Africa, to report on the camps, in July, 1901, and instructions were issued to Lord Kitchener to relax the strictness of the conditions imposed upon the inmates of the camps, where it was possible to do so without military danger. Not only this, but Boer officers were positively invited to inspect the camps. Thus, in September, 1901, Lieutenant Malan, one of General Viljoen's aide-de-camps, under a flag of truce visited the camp at Middelburg, which contained 7,000 souls, to ascertain what foundation there was for the charges so assiduously circulated by his countrymen. The only complaint made to him was with regard to the meat supplied. The same meat, however, was issued to the British troops, and it was the best that was to be had. There can be no surprise that it was not of the highest quality, as the enemy's presence, in close



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MRS. MILLICENT GARRETT FAWCETT,

One of the members of the Ladies' Committee appointed by the Government to visit the concentration camps and report on the condition of their occupants. Mrs. Fawcett, widow of the late Professor Henry Fawcett, the blind Postmaster-General, was born at Aldeburgh, Suffolk, in 1847, and is a member of the intellectual Garrett family, Dr. Garrett Anderson being her sister. Mrs. Fawcett is a distinguished scholar, orator, politician, authoress, and advocate of women's suffrage; she has long been a student of economical and social problems, and has written a standard book on political economy. The other ladies on the Committee were Dr. Jane Waterston, Miss Scarlett, and Miss Brereton, who were already in South Africa, and Lady Knox and Miss Deane, who joined at Capetown in August.



[Photo by a British officer.]

A BOER AMBULANCE GOING TO THE BRITISH CAMP AT MIDDELBURG (TRANSVAAL) FOR MEDICINES FOR THE BOER SICK AND WOUNDED.

proximity to the British lines, prevented the cattle which had been sent up from obtaining proper grazing. Malan stated that he found the refugees contented, and he expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with all the arrangements. Perhaps he recalled the plight of the British prisoners of war at Pretoria, in the days of Mr. Kruger's régime, and contrasted it with the comfort which pervaded this great assemblage of non-combatants under the fatherly guardianship of the much-reviled British Government.

It was suggested by critics of the Government that the proper course would be the removal of the refugee camps to the coast. But when these camps were organised, no one at Headquarters anticipated that the war would linger on for months and years, and it was, quite naturally, decided to keep the non-combatant population in their own country, so as to facilitate their return to their homes immediately after the pacification. Next the plague appeared on the seaboard of Cape Colony, and rendered it, for a time, impossible to send the people down. What would have been said by the Pro-Boers and our Continental critics if a number of camps had been located on the coast, and then the most dreaded of maladies had scourged the inmates? Would it not have been pretended that this was a fiendish atrocity on the part of the British—an attempt to put out of the way a population which was resolutely hostile, by placing it in the path of contagion? There was, too, this further consideration to be remembered. The Boer women and children were accustomed to the dry climate of the veldt, and the change to the less healthy littoral of Cape Colony would in all probability have re-acted unfavourably on their health. That they would have been sent down, had there not been good reasons against such a course, is obvious from the fact that near the sea it would have been easier to feed them. For this reason the Uitlanders requested, not once, but a dozen times, that the camps should be moved to the seaboard, and that the railways having thus been relieved of a great strain, their additional facilities should be utilised in re-opening the Rand and carrying supplies for the Uitlanders, who, it was pleaded, might be allowed to take the place up-country of the Boers who were deported. It would be interesting to know if the Boer women themselves

Reasons against removal of camps.



BOER REFUGEES AT WINBURG AWAITING INSPECTION BY THE GOVERNMENT LADIES' COMMITTEE.

expressed to the British authorities any wish to be moved. So far as we know they did not, and yet, when they had the slightest subject for complaint, they never hesitated to complain. A further complication arose from the fact that, under certain of our many proclamations, a number of Boers, who had surrendered voluntarily, had received a solemn assurance that they should not be sent out of the country, and had they been sent down, such action would certainly have been represented as a breach of faith on the part of the British Government.

A well-known South African philanthropist, Dr. Jane Waterston, who was appointed by the British Government to serve on their Committee of Inspection, stated that the Boers in the camps had no cause for complaint. She, unlike Miss Hobhouse, was impressed by the immense amount that had been done for the enemy's women and children, and reported to that effect. She was thoroughly conversant with the normal conditions of Boer life, so that she spoke with convincing authority. A Dane, who had served with the enemy, and

**Dr. Jane Waterston's
report.**



EXTERIOR OF HOSPITAL AT KLERKSDORP
FOR BOER REFUGEES.

Another foreign witness, whose evidence is of great importance, is

**Dr. Hougen's refuta-
tion of the charge
of cruelty.**

Dr. Hougen, a Norwegian present in the Pietermaritzburg camp, where there were, when he wrote, 2,300 Boer refugees. "The state of health," he reports, "in the Boer laager is very good; the dry weather has reduced the number of bed-ridden patients to a minimum, and facilitates the carrying out of sanitary works. In

comparison with the conditions under which the English refugees live, the Boer prisoner is in every way better off. Nevertheless one hears perpetual complaints of bad treatment and so forth. In all the cases I have been able to investigate these complaints have been quite unfounded. The fact is the English authorities do all that can possibly be done to satisfy their demands, and much more regard is shown for the comfort of the Boer families living here than is evinced for the English refugees living in Pietermaritzburg or Durban. These must care for themselves as best they can, receiving at the utmost a payment from Government of a shilling a day for adults. Boer prisoners have house-room, food, and clothing—in a word, everything gratis that is not luxury. Here in the camp are two large bath-houses for daily use, and four or five buildings turned into laundries; but the difficulty is to impress the smallest idea of cleanliness into these people, and to make them understand the sanitary value of this virtue. Many of them are slow and without initiative, and

who after his surrender saw no little of the camps, gave his testimony that "if the English make any mistake in their treatment of the Boers, I can only say that, in my opinion, it has been in treating them with a great deal too much forbearance and good nature." The evidence of a foreigner, who had no particular reason to love us, is valuable, because it proves that in unbiassed eyes the British were absolutely innocent of the misdeeds attributed to them by the ill-informed and hysterical in England and abroad.



THE CHILDREN'S WARD IN THE KLERKSDORP REFUGEE HOSPITAL.

unwilling to help the others; a few conspicuous exceptions serve only to establish the rule." With this report were forwarded a number of photographs, which served to prove the ludicrous falsity of the garbled pictures sown broadcast over Europe, representing Boer children with wretched, emaciated frames, who had, Boer sympathisers alleged, been starved to death in the camps by the British authorities. Some of these lying photographs were believed to have come from India, and to have represented originally Hindoo children in the last stage of starvation during the famine; others hailed from Cuba, and had done duty before to portray the sufferings of the "reconcentrados" under Spanish rule; others, again, came from South Africa, but represented children who had been photographed by the British authorities to bring home charges of neglect and cruelty against their Boer mothers!

It was said that this treatment of the non-combatant population was a thing unprecedented in the annals of war. We have already given precedents, which will show that there is little foundation for



Arthur Garvatt.]

[After a sketch by Sydney P. Hall, M.V.O.]

REFUGEES IN THE PIETERMARITZBURG CONCENTRATION CAMP FETCHING THEIR RATIONS.

such a statement, and we may add that in Cuba the Spanish military authorities were driven to much harsher measures by the hostility of the Cuban population in a protracted guerilla war, for they concentrated the non-combatants in the towns of Cuba, but without taking any steps to feed them. In the Philippines, too, notwithstanding the outcry raised by some uninstructed individuals in the United States against the South African camps, the American generals found themselves compelled by events to form concentration camps for the Filipino population, as the only means of bringing an otherwise interminable conflict to a termination. There also, as in South Africa, leniency had been tried, and tried in vain. The Filipino non-combatants in the American lines, so long as they were given liberty, used it to spy upon the Americans and to assassinate American soldiers. Yet no sane person will accuse the United States troops or generals of inhumanity. The truth is that in war there is no means of shielding women and children from suffering, and in a guerilla struggle the conflict is

**American methods of
dealing with the
disaffected.**

prolonged mainly at the expense of the non-combatants. They pay for the facile but petty successes of the guerilla bands, and it is for this reason that the waging of a guerilla conflict is so strongly to be reprobated. The attitude of the true soldier will be that of General Lee, the great Confederate leader, who, when urged after his defeat in the field to adopt such tactics, said that he knew he could prolong the struggle by such means, but that to inflict the suffering on his country which they would involve, would be nothing less than un-Christian and criminal. Nor has posterity refused him its approbation because he thus bravely accepted defeat with the spirit of a man. There comes a point in all wars when further resistance ceases to be justifiable, and only serves to bring additional misery upon the beaten community. But the Boer sympathisers in Europe never looked at matters in this light.



AN INDIAN FAMINE PHOTOGRAPH

Of the class referred to on p. 509 as having been used to represent starved Boer children.

to go. "But when they went, in most cases," says Mrs. Neybergh, the Johannesburg secretary of the Guild of Loyal Women, "they returned to the camps after the lapse of some days or weeks, having failed to pay any rent or bills, for which they were liable, and being unable to obtain any more credit or relief." In fact, they looked upon the camps as very comfortable and useful institutions, and at no time did they display any extravagant eagerness, even when they could easily have obtained work, to support themselves. "Why should we work," they asked, "so long as we get enough to eat?"



[Photo by Elliott & Fry.]

MRS. K. H. R. STUART,
Delegate to England of the Guild of
Loyal Women.



LEISURELY CAPTIVITY.

An old Boer prisoner at Nylstroom, on his way to a concentration camp, drawn by his own team of six donkeys.

The burden transferred from Boer to British shoulders by our maintenance of these Boer refugees may be understood when we state that in August, 1901, the number of whites in the various camps was 105,347, of whom 16,695 were men, 36,427 women, and 52,225 children. All these people, had the war been waged upon German or American methods, must have been fed and sustained by the enemy, and, instead of their remaining unflinching advocates of a prolonged resist-

ance, because they were guaranteed and secured from suffering, they would have brought their influence to bear upon their husbands and sons to induce them to submit. The Germans, in the winter of 1870, took the food from farms and villages, and, without the slightest compunction, left the non-combatants



BLOEMFONTEIN CEMETERY, EASTER, 1901.

[Photo by M. Andrew.]

The Guild of Loyal Women of South Africa, of which Queen Victoria was patron, undertakes as a sacred charge the care of the graves of men who have given their lives for the British cause, and, where practicable, tends also the graves of Boers killed in the war. It has established branches all over South Africa. Members of the branch at Bloemfontein are here shown about to distribute wreaths and crosses over 1,500 graves in Bloemfontein Cemetery, on the conclusion of a short religious service, April 6, 1901. The aim of the Guild is to spread loyalty, enlightenment, and education among the white peoples of South Africa.

to obtain what they could get from the French commissariat. General Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the United States Army, instructed General Sherman, in 1864, in the following terms: "Let the disloyal families of the country thus stripped go to their husbands, fathers, and natural protectors in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerillas in our rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We are certainly not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better than they themselves treat each other. Even here in Virginia, within 50 miles of Washington, they strip their own families of provisions, leaving them to be fed by us or to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people long enough."

**German treatment of
non-combatants.**

The British mistake lay in overlooking the fact that the essence of war is the infliction of suffering. Attempts to mitigate its severities can have only one issue—to prolong its duration, and this is the greatest cruelty of all. It is for that reason that the Germans were stern almost to excess in their invasion of France, and their sternness,



TENDING THE GRAVES OF SOLDIERS IN ZEERUST CEMETERY.

The photograph shows some of the members of the Young Ladies' Grave Protection Committee, who work in connection with the Guild of Loyal Women, and who have undertaken to keep the soldiers' graves in order.

as a German officer wrote, was in the end humanity, because a war, which, if conducted on English lines, might have lingered on for three or four years, was concluded in eight months. But then the Germans thought of their own soldiers first and foremost, and there was no Pro-French party in Germany to espouse at every turn the French cause, and to be humoured by the German Government.

While the hostile refugees were being thus sedulously fed and tended, far otherwise was it with the 53,000 of loyal women and children, who, on the outbreak of war, had been driven from the Boer territories, often with every circumstance of insult and contumely. Many of them were delicately bred and used to comfort. Most had lost everything by the war. The husbands of many had fought in the British ranks and sacrificed life, or health, or limbs for the cause which in their eyes was the cause of justice and of right. They had served their country faithfully, and, as was only meet, they looked for her to acknowledge the fact by granting to them and those nearest and dearest to them the same measure of assistance, when they fell out of the ranks for ever, that had been so readily bestowed upon the bitter enemies of England. But if they looked for this, they looked in vain. There were no Pro-Loyalists at home to sway the measures of an irresolute ministry. No pamphlets, widely distributed, urged their claims; no Miss Hobhouse inquired into their sufferings, or exposed the incredible misery into which so many of them had sunk. It was one more example of that bitterest of South African sayings, founded upon long experience of British Governments, that "loyalty does not pay."

**Neglect of loyal
refugees.**



[From a photograph taken in April, 1900.]

LOYAL REFUGEES AT PORT ELIZABETH LIVING IN THE STALLS OF THE CATTLE MARKET.

At the time when Miss Hobhouse was bewailing the sufferings of the Boer refugees, this scathing parallel appeared in the *East London Times*, from a lady who had visited the Boer and the British camps at East London:—

The Boer camp: "I have visited the Boer exiles' camp, and found 350 women and children in the various buildings, and very healthy. The buildings consist of three erections, containing 50 rooms, besides hospital, dining-room, kitchen, store-room, wash-room, and so on. The exiles state they are well treated and quite satisfied with their lot. The food is given to them as to boarders; rations are not served, and as much food is given as asked for, and no stint whatsoever. The food is of first-class quality; the bread is the finest I have seen in my life. Day school is carried on daily in the dining-room—60 scholars. Mrs. Hertzog was teaching one of the girls music, a number of whom show special aptitude for learning. The Dutch Committee hired a piano specially for the people. The Government inspector has seen the school and approved of the arrangements."

The loyalists' camp: "I have visited the refugee camp on the beach, East London, where there are about 120 men, 100 women, and 200 children living in the shelters provided for them by the relief committee out of the Mansion House Fund. The shelters are constructed of damaged condemned tarpaulins, stretched over frameworks of wood; they average from seven feet to nine feet in height



BOER WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE BRITISH CAMP AT ERMELO.

from floor to ridge-pole, are unfloored, dark, draughty, leaky, and so insecure that in one severe wind-storm over 40 were blown down, and delicate women, children, invalids, and women in childbed exposed to the pitiless, drenching rain—a night of horror never to be forgotten. As one woman remarked, 'We would not shelter cattle in England in the places we are forced to live in.' In many instances the front room is the dining-room, kitchen, bedroom, and store-room. What do refugees want with privacy? No hospital here. No room for chronic sickness in the local hospital. The British refugees are not fed by the Imperial Government, but by the Mansion House Fund. In cases of absolute destitution the relief granted is 1s. a day for adults, and 6d. for each child. Should the husband be in employment or fighting for King and country, part of the relief is cut off. An intimation has been received from the Central Relief Committee that after June 30 all men and women are to be struck off relief altogether, relief being granted only to the sick, aged, infirm, and children (hardly sufficient to feed them on first-class food, 'like boarders with no stint whatsoever'). No school has been provided, nor has any Government school inspector ever been near. After the children had run wild for twelve months, the refugees and their friends started a school on their own account, supported by voluntary contributions from liberal-minded East Londoners and refugees who had been fortunate enough to find employment."

For the loyal there was scant assistance from Imperial funds. They had to rely upon the charity of the British public, which speedily and not unnaturally dried up, after the contribution of a sum of £255,000—no ungenerous figure—when it was seen that the Government was maintaining the hostile



Max Cowper]

[After a photograph by Middlebrook, Durban.]

LORD MILNER VISITING THE REFUGEE CAMPS AT DURBAN, October 29, 1901.

Mrs. Chas.
Hayne. Lady Chas.
Bentinck.Miss
Fairbridge. Mrs. Anderson.Mrs. Mrs.
Hall. Spilhaus.

Mrs. Noble.

Lady Edward
Cecil.Malay child
refugee.

Mrs. Murray.

Coloured
refugee.

Mrs. Pearson.

Mrs. Rawbone.

White
refugee.

Miss Linscote.

THE WOMEN'S RAND RELIEF COMMITTEE IN THE METROPOLITAN HALL, CAPETOWN, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

The Ladies' Rand Relief Fund was founded as far back as September 1, 1899, at Capetown, before the war began, but when the refugees were flocking from Johannesburg to the Cape Colony, and wanted succour and relief. It was aided by the wives of the richer Transvaal merchants and others, and among those who took a prominent part in its organisation were Lady Edward Cecil and Lady Charles Bentinck. The photograph represents the Relief Committee at work on the platform, the applicants for relief being seated in the body of the hall.

refugees in a state approaching luxury, and when it was concluded that they could not do less for the British. Hapless, indeed, had been the lot of these from the first. On their way down to the

Instances of hardship and privation.

coast they met with brutal threats, and sometimes worse, from armed Boers. They were denied food, water, and privacy, under a burning sun, huddled together in open trucks. And when they reached the coast their troubles had only begun. "I hear," says a loyalist, writing in August, "of children with shoeless, bleeding feet—who cares? I hear of delicately-nurtured women living month after month in tents, with barely the means to keep themselves clean. They are not Boer women. And while the utmost private benevolence can compass is the barest pittance and the scantiest accommodation for our own people, the Government is spending millions on those others and supplying them with hot water three times a day, the committee of Englishmen in Pretoria is advertising for more comforts for the burgher camps, and ladies at home are beseeching people to send funds for the same mistaken object. . . . The British Government has got so used to the silent loyalty and self-effacement of its subjects that it seems to feel they need no longer be looked upon as a factor in the settlement. Britishers, home



JOHANNESBURG REFUGEES AT DURBAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

or colonial born, must stand back while Germans, Boers, and Blacks have their claims attended to. The pity lavished on the Boers is hardening other hearts and awakening with intense bitterness the memory of cruel wrongs and injuries that find no tender echo at home. Are the Boer women homeless? So are the Johannesburg Uitlander women. Are there burnt and desecrated homesteads? Ask in Newcastle, in Dundee, in Natal farms of the ruin wrought there by the gentle Boer. What of

our prisoners stripped to the naked skin, kicked, and turned loose on the veldt? What of our prisoners

flogged? What of our sick prisoners at Waterval? What of the thousand desolate English hearths and the good men and true who strew the veldt, sacrificed to fever and fatigue in this lengthened campaign that the Boer may be gently dealt with?"

Other cases, again, were collected by *The Times* correspondent at Capetown, and it must be remembered in weighing his facts that prices at that place were



STORE WRECKED BY THE BOERS IN NEWCASTLE, NATAL.

The photograph shows the condition of Messrs. A. Oldknow & Co.'s store as it was left after the Boer occupation.

from twice to thrice as high as in England. Fifty-three thousand loyalists, he writes, had to be maintained from the small funds raised at the beginning of a war which most men hoped was only going to last for weeks—which no one imagined would last for years. Ladies of culture were serving in shops for £1 a week, the bare equivalent of 7s. in England. Men once wealthy were acting as fifth-rate clerks. Among the pitiable instances, which might be multiplied almost to any extent, a few may be selected to illustrate the hardships and privations so uncomplainingly endured. The first example taken is that of a man who had served at the front and had been discharged as medically unfit, with a wife and three daughters dependent upon him. He was destitute and without any resource. The second case is that of a woman with two sons at the front, one of whom had fallen in his country's service. She, too, was destitute. The third case is of a man who had fought in Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, and had been discharged as medically unfit. It had been better for him to have fallen on the blood-stained summit of Spion Kop than to have been thrown upon the tender mercy



FURNITURE OF LOYALISTS GATHERED BY THE BOERS IN THE TOWN HALL, NEWCASTLE, PREPARATORY TO FIRING THE HALL.

The enemy were driven out in time to prevent the performance of this benevolent act.

of the nation for which he had suffered. Broken down in health and penniless, he begged only the price of a passage home.

A fourth example is that of a man with a wife and invalid daughter and two others dependent on him, the invalid daughter undergoing surgical treatment for the threatened loss of her sight.

Loyalists exasperated. He and his son were in the fighting ranks at the front, while his total income, arising from his pay as a soldier, was 7s. 6d. a day, at first sight not an inadequate sum, but in South Africa one which goes but a short way. And so on through an interminable miserable list. Small wonder, then, that South Africans, as they turned from the comfortable camp of the Boer refugees to the squalid hovels in which the betrayed loyalists eked out a wretched existence, ground their teeth; no wonder that recruiting among the loyal declined; no wonder that there were renegades in hundreds in the Boer ranks; no wonder that Johannesburg surged with rage at the prolongation of the war, due to British clemency, and cried out incessantly against the want of energy displayed in the operations in the field; no wonder that everywhere there was indignation when Boers were allowed to return to the Rand, and even to occupy the very houses of the loyal refugees, from which the loyalists were banished; no wonder that Miss Hobhouse's report, and the jeers deliberately



F. C. Dickinson.]

[After a sketch by Henry Lea.

LOYAL COLONISTS IN NORTHERN NATAL BURYING THEIR WARDROBES TO PROTECT THEM FROM BOER RAIDERS, Autumn, 1901.

directed by the Pro-Boer press at the loyal kindled fury in South Africa. But the time will come when this exasperated population will be the British garrison in the conquered territories. Then it may, to our discomfiture, show that it has fully grasped our great principle of alienating the loyal and faithful, and in time to come join hands with the Boer to have done with a country which neither rewards its friends nor punishes its enemies.

And the pity of it all was that these things were done by the British Government against the will of the British people. Had the nation been polled, it would assuredly have declared itself against leaving its friends to starve while the enemy were banqueting at its cost. The treatment of the loyal refugees was only part and parcel of that want of thought and attention to the realities of war which marked the Government's whole conduct of the campaign. It should be remembered against them when the hour comes to pronounce judgment. It should be remembered that they alienated the loyal, and "coddled" the enemy, thus augmenting the sum of human suffering, prolonging the conflict, and greatly increasing the sacrifice of British blood. Nor could it be said that the sufferers deserved to suffer. Foremost in battle, the loyalists, who gave the army the Imperial Light Horse,

were also foremost in self-abnegation, bearing their miseries at the outset without a murmur, and only lifting up their voices in protest when it seemed that they were forgotten and betrayed. In



ON THE MARCH: SUPPLYING BOER PRISONERS WITH WATER DURING A MID-DAY HALT.

From a photograph taken with General Rundle's division in the Harrismith district.

the eyes of posterity it will appear that these traduced Uitlanders played not the least heroic part in a struggle where there were many heroes.

One other matter may be dealt with in this chapter, as it is connected with the usage accorded to the British and Boer refugees.

Tender treatment of Boer prisoners.

This is the treatment of the Boer prisoners of war. We have read in a previous part of this work how the Boers had behaved to the British prisoners in the day when their star seemed to be in the ascendant. Quite otherwise was the conduct of the British Government, and with reason, for, as Napoleon once said, the soldier who maltreats a prisoner thereby dishonours himself. Indeed, so generous were the conditions of con-

finement for the Boers that here also there was a suspicion of that peculiar tenderness for the enemy which seems at every turn to have infected the British Government. Yet, notwithstanding this, people in England and Europe were found to pretend that the Boer prisoners were ill-used.

From the *Bloemfontein Post* we obtain an account of the manner in which the captured burghers were received by the British military authorities. In the Orange River Colony they were first collected at a base prison at Bloemfontein before being sent out of South Africa. They were supplied with food and all necessaries on a far more liberal scale than they had been used to on commando, better supplied indeed than our own British soldiers, though it would be difficult for even a Pro-Boer to defend a policy which sacrificed the servant of our country for an alien and an enemy. The daily ration consisted of $1\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of bread, 3 oz. of sugar, 1 lb. of meat (always fresh, while poor Thomas Atkins had too often to be content with tinned beef), 1 oz. coffee, condensed milk, jam, vegetables, and potatoes. Wood and coal were regularly issued. All prisoners, immediately on their arrival, received warm suits, flannel underclothing, boots, and slouched hats. And this while incidents of the following nature were occurring almost daily:—“The Boers captured one of our cavalry”—we quote from an officer's letter—“and stripped him, and turned him loose a long way from the column, so that he was two days without clothes or food in the awful cold nights and hot days of the mountains. He was very nearly dead from exposure when he rejoined, and would have died had it not been for some friendly Kaffirs, who tied a sheepskin round him and directed him to us. And yet you often see our men carrying the blankets of our prisoners for them on the march, and these men, who are liable to be shot for not fighting in uniform and for carrying explosive bullets, grumble at having to march



BOER CAVE-DWELLERS.

A primitive dwelling place in the Harrismith district.

with us and not ride with their women." Never had any army in war so followed to the letter the principle of turning the other cheek to the smiter; never had tenderness for the foe been received with blacker ingratitude.

There is some dispute as to the total number of Boer prisoners in our hands at any given moment, as even the official figures vary in a strange manner, possibly because sometimes they include and sometimes omit a



HUTS OF BISCUIT TINS MADE BY BOER PRISONERS AT ST. HELENA.



CRONJE'S HOUSE AT ST. HELENA.

15,182. At the outset the Boer captives had been confined in St. Helena, but, as the number of them increased, the resources of that island were insufficient to provide accommodation for the growing total. Recourse

**Places of confinement
over sea.**

was then had to Ceylon, and a large prison camp was established at the healthy hill station of Diyatalawa, where the conditions were exceptionally favourable to white men. But even Ceylon could not stand, without some strain, unlimited additions to the population of the island, and the British Government had then to apply to the Indian authorities, who selected Ahmednuggur, a pleasant hill station, as the location for a camp. This selection was the subject of bitter but ignorant criticism on the part of the Pro-Boers, on account of its supposed heat and unhealthiness. It is curious, by the way, to note how ready these people, who called themselves Englishmen, were to believe any mean and malignant slander against their own countrymen. It was, we need scarcely add, proved that Ahmednuggur was by no means hot or unhealthy, inasmuch as it was a point at which British troops had been regularly stationed, and even Pro-Boers would scarcely believe that the Indian military authorities

certain number of prisoners who had taken the oath of allegiance, and had consequently been allowed in some cases to return to the annexed territories, or to live in the refugee camps. In his proclamation issued on August 5, 1901, Lord Kitchener puts the total of prisoners, and those who had submitted, at 35,000, of whom probably some 30,000 were prisoners of war.

In January, 1901, the number had been



SURRENDERED BOERS EMPLOYED AND PAID BY THE BRITISH AS QUARRYMEN AT STANDERTON.

could choose an insalubrious cantonment for the English soldiers garrisoning the country. When Ahmednuggur could no longer hold the prisoners who were being captured, camps were established at Umballa, Bellary, Trichinopoly, and other places. Another point selected for the reception of prisoners was the island-group of Bermuda, which was specially suitable, as it lies out of the track of vessels in the central Atlantic.

It will be seen that in selecting the positions of the prison camps the British authorities were careful



CONTINENTAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

The first of these examples is from a sixpenny French publication eagerly bought on the boulevards. The picture is supposed to represent the condition of the Boer women and children in the concentration camps. In the original it is accompanied by a pretended quotation from a despatch by Lord Kitchener to the effect that "some of the tents present a quite homelike appearance," and the sketch given above is a comment on that despatch. It should be said that the publication in question must not be accepted as representing the respectable press of Paris; it is rather a straw which shows which way the wind blows. Another cartoon in the same publication represents Boer women and children bound to stakes at the corners of the trucks of an armoured train, as a security against the fire of the Boers.

to choose such as would permit their prisoners to live under conditions of climate approximating to those they had long been accustomed to. It is strange that this scrupulous regard for their health and welfare, and the care which was taken to provide them with comforts, and even with amusements, should not have created a better impression on the minds of our Continental critics. We might even have reasonably expected that the Boers themselves would have acknowledged with some gratitude the forbearance and generosity with which they were treated; but it would seem that they were ready to attribute their good fortune to any cause rather than magnanimity on the part of their conquerors.



This picture is from an Italian paper of good standing, *L'Illustrazione Italiana*, and goes to show that even our good friends the Italians are ready to believe evil of us. The picture represents a crowd of men, women, and children gathered together under conditions which permit the sick and weak to lie in the fierce glare of the sun without shelter and without privacy.



INTERIOR OF THE BOER PRISONERS' CAMP AT BELLARY, SHOWING THE THATCHED HUTS AND THE FORT ON THE HILL.

The prisoners were on the whole well conducted and gave little trouble. They were granted a daily ration which compared more than favourably with that of the troops guarding them—a circumstance not particularly creditable to British administration, since there is no escape from the dilemma that either the soldier's ration was insufficient or that of the Boers excessive. Thus at Ahmednuggur, the Boer had $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. more of meat, an ounce more potatoes, an ounce more green vegetables, and two ounces more rice per day than were issued to the British private, while he had also a ration of jam, condensed milk, and soap, which the soldier did not receive at all. In a period of five months there were no deaths from disease at this place, which is additional evidence of its healthiness. The association for providing recreation for the prisoners of war was attentive to their comfort, quite overlooking the British troops in its solicitude that the quondam enemy should be amused. Tools, materials for making toys, games, books, and periodicals flowed in upon the prisoners from England, while poor Mr. Atkins, from the other side of the fence which enclosed the prisons, was left to ruminate on the thought that loyalty is its own reward. The Boers interpreted these attentions in a

Misinterpretation of British leniency. political light, and were more than ever convinced that there was a large party in England which sympathised with them. Nor, despite the generous treatment which they received, were they in the least inclined to think the better of the British Government. They still cherished at heart the old rancour, and professed to regard the British as a race of brigands. While totally ignoring the fact that they themselves had begun the war, they ascribed all their sufferings to the machinations of the capitalists and Mr. Rhodes.

Persistent enmity of the Boers. Nor could the great majority of them be convinced that the conflict could have any other ending than a victory for the Boer cause. So strong was the feeling in the prison camps, that those of the prisoners who accepted the new conditions in South Africa had to be separated from their fellows, to secure them from maltreatment. And at the Bermuda camp, when a burgher died, the Boer chaplain requested on behalf of the men



BOER PRISONERS OF WAR AT BELLARY GOING OUT FOR EXERCISE.

that his coffin should not be draped with the Union Jack, and that the three volleys over his grave should not be fired by the British soldiers. Such a request well illustrates the intractability of the Boer, and raises the question whether it will ever be safe to permit such people to return to South Africa. Experience has shown that they regard no oath or promise as binding upon themselves, and those who are in contact with them have little doubt that their first proceeding when they are liberated will be to exhume their buried rifles and take the field once more against the British. Reasons of self-preservation, then, seem to dictate that they shall not be liberated without some guarantee against future trouble. The policy of smothering the enemy with



SPORTS IN THE CAMP FOR BOER PRISONERS
ON DARRELL'S ISLAND, BERMUDA



BOER PRISONERS TAKING POSSESSION OF THEIR TENTS IN THE CAMP AT
DARRELL'S ISLAND, BERMUDA.

kindness has, in fact, proved so far a complete, though not perhaps a dishonourable, failure.

Of attempts to escape there were a few which deserve notice, though the precautions taken

were such as to render it extremely difficult to get clean away. In islands such as Bermuda and St. Helena not merely while the sentries were off their

had the fence which surrounded the prison to be negotiated guard, but there was the far more serious problem to be faced of obtaining undetected a passage from the island by sea. Vessels were not permitted to land or embark passengers at St. Helena, and in the Ceylon harbours their visits



SINGING CLASS OF BOER PRISONERS ON BURT'S ISLAND, BERMUDA.

Over 3,000 Boer prisoners are quartered in the five beautiful coral Bermuda Islands. At Darrell's Island are 851, mostly irreconcilables and strictly guarded; at Morgan's Island are 884, including 27 officers; at Tucker's Island, 809; at Burt's Island, 607; and at Port's (the hospital) Island, 35. The prisoners employ their time in camp work, under the direction of the Industrial Association connected with each camp, in making toys for disposal by the Boer Toy Agency, and in recreative games. Each camp has a singing class, and every night towards dusk the members may be heard singing their evening prayer. On Darrell's Island they have clubbed together to purchase a piano, and those who care to be taught go to Captain Mostert for musical instruction. The prisoners, with few exceptions, appear contented with their treatment and resigned to their lot, which certainly possesses compensating features.

were carefully watched. A few Boers did, however, succeed in making their way on board a Russian



AGED BOER PRISONERS IN TIN TOWN, LADYSMITH.

this, after great patience had been shown, a sentry fired at a Boer who had thrown a stone at him, killing the Boer. The circumstance was regrettable, yet unquestionably it was necessary to put a stop to such conduct. It need scarcely be added that this occurrence was distorted into a British atrocity by our Pro-Boers.

Another incident at St. Helena was the discovery of a quantity of provisions buried near Bank's Battery, one of the best landing

transport at Trincomali, and, with gross disregard for international courtesy, the captain, instead of giving them up to the British authorities, carried them off to Odessa, and set them at liberty. In St. Helena there were several attempts at escape. It was here a practice of the Boers to throw stones at the sentries on duty, presumably to cover digging operations near the wire fence which enclosed the prison. As the result of



TOYS MADE BY BOER PRISONERS IN TIN TOWN, LADYSMITH.



"BRITISH GALLANTRY": A FRENCH LIBEL ON TOMMY ATKINS.

places on the rock-girt island coast. The stores included water in cans, tinned meat, hams, biscuit, and condensed milk, and had evidently been placed there in readiness for an intended escape. A full inquiry was made, but the culprits were never discovered. In May, 1901, two Boers tried to swim off to a Russian vessel at Jamestown, but they were not permitted by the crew to go on board, and had to return disconsolately. On May 13 it became known to the military authorities that a concerted attempt to break out was to be made by the foreign prisoners in the Deadwood Camp, and great precautions were taken in consequence. The troops were on the alert, while the man-of-war, which always lay in Jamestown Roads, landed a party of bluejackets at Rupert's Valley to prevent

any effort to put to sea from that place. Nothing would have been known of this project had not the Boers talked freely of it.

In Bermuda a small number of Boers managed to break loose in Darrell's Island, and for a long time eluded capture. They were aided by the thick bush which covers the island, and in Bermuda there were also a number of Boer sympathisers, who may have rendered help. In India there were several escapes, notably one in which two Boers got away



CARTOON FROM THE "LUSTIGE BLÄTTER," BERLIN.

Two British officers are represented as inspecting Raphael's picture of the "Massacre of the Innocents." One remarks, "He was a bungler at child murder." To this the other replies, "Yes, that sort of thing Mr. Rhodes does much better than Herod." The attribution of the war to Mr. Rhodes is characteristic.

from the Bellary Camp, but the fugitives always attracted attention in a country where the population is not white, and in most cases were hunted down and returned to confinement. The watch maintained over the prisoners was, on the whole, vigilant and satisfactory. A small percentage of escapes by unusually daring or ingenious men was almost inevitable.

A few of the burghers, as time went on, lost hope and accepted service under the British flag, some of them with the burgher police, and others in India. But the vast bulk of the prisoners remained obdurate to all blandishments.



Gordon Browne, R.I.]

[After photographs by C. C. McCoy.]

MRS. ALBERTYN READING TO BOER BOYS ON BOARD THE S.S. "MANILA" ON THE WAY TO BERMUDA.

Mrs. Albertyn is the wife of the chaplain to the Boer prisoners in Bermuda. She held classes for boys on board the transport. The fact is typical of the British treatment of the prisoners of war.



GETTING SUPPLY WAGGONS ACROSS THE VAAL RIVER.

CHAPTER XXVI.

VLAKFONTEIN.

Fresh concentration against De la Rey—Failure to “corner” him—Boers attack a convoy—Action at Koodoos Drift—Boers fire from behind women and children—Capture of waggon by the British—General Dixon’s movements—Enemy concentrating at Vlakfontein—They fire the grass and capture two guns—Splendid stand of the Derbyshires—Scottish Borderers to the rescue—The guns re-taken—The enemy rob and murder our wounded—Ministerial endeavours to suppress the evidence—Heavy losses on both sides—British column withdrawn—Futile chase of Kemp and De la Rey—Necessity of using mounted troops only.



It might have been supposed that the blows inflicted upon De la Rey by General Babington and Lord Methuen would have left him powerless for mischief, but as a matter of fact the western commandos had been scotched, and not destroyed, by the operations in April and early May. In spite of all their defeats they continued to prove themselves not one whit less aggressive than they had been at the beginning of the year. We left De la Rey at Wolmaranstad in mid May, after the loss of most of his guns. Orders were at once issued by the British headquarters for a fresh combined movement against him. Lord Methuen was once more to

Fresh concentration against De la Rey. march from Mafeking with a force composed mainly of Yeomanry, 2,200 strong; Colonel Rawlinson with 700 mounted infantry and seven guns was to attack him from the west; Colonel Williams, with the New South Wales Mounted Infantry, a small number of regulars and seven guns, was to move about 1,400 men from Klerksdorp, accompanied by General Fetherstonhaugh, who had succeeded General Babington in command of the mobile columns in the south-west Transvaal. General Babington’s column no longer formed part of the British force in this locality, but had been transferred to the eastern Transvaal, where we shall meet it anon.

Rawlinson started from Maribogo, a station south of Mafeking, on May 14, and that same day had a brush with the enemy near Brakspruit, which resulted in the capture of a large number of sheep and cattle, to say nothing of 20 Boers. He continued his march on



[Photo by Lafayette.]

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN GRENFELL
MAXWELL, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Military Governor of Pretoria.

Born 1859; educated at Cheltenham. Joined 42nd Foot, 1879; Lieutenant, Royal Highlanders, 1881; Captain, 1887; Major, 1889; Lieut.-Colonel, 1896; Colonel, 1898; Major-General, South Africa, 1900. Served in the Egyptian War, 1882, with 1st Battalion Black Watch; in the Nile Expedition, as Staff Captain, 1884-5; with the Egyptian Frontier Field Force, as A.D.C. to Major-General Grenfell, 1885-6; in the operations near Suakin, 1888; in operations on the Sudan Frontier, 1889; with the Dongola Expeditionary Force, under Sir H. Kitchener, in command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, 1896; in the operations of 1897; in command of the 2nd Sudanese Brigade, 1898; in the South African War, 1899-1901, first on special service, afterwards in command of the 14th Brigade. Appointed Military Governor of Pretoria, with rank of Major-General, April, 1900.

Wolmaranstad with little or no opposition, and on the 22nd entered the place, only to find that the enemy had flown. Here he got into touch with Colonel Williams' column, and with it marched upon

**Failure to "corner"
him.**

a small Boer laager at Syferkuil, but drew blank. The Boers must have gained information of the British intentions, and, after their usual policy, when attacked in force, made themselves scarce. Lord Methuen, who was to have come in upon

the enemy from the north-west, reached Korannafontein on the 23rd, and there came across traces of a commando retiring in the direction of Lichtenburg. He moved after it, but was not able to overtake it. Thus the attempt to "corner" De la Rey, like so many that had gone before, was a failure, only redeemed by some small captures of Boers and cattle. The clearance of the country which the columns were supposed to have effected was speedily shown to have been of a very imperfect character. On the 23rd, in close proximity to the British columns, the

**Boers attack a
convoy.**

Boers turned up in their jack-in-the-box fashion, and delivered a desperate attack upon a convoy which was proceeding from

Potchefstroom to Ventersdorp. The convoy was escorted as far as Witpoortje by the Potchefstroom garrison, and at Witpoortje was met by the troops from Ventersdorp who were in charge of it for the rest of the distance. The exchange had been made, and the Ventersdorp detachment, composed of 100 infantry, 58 of the Dorset Imperial Yeomanry, who had only just joined and who were in consequence strange to the country and to Boer methods of fighting, and one 15-pounder gun, had started on their march, when 300 Boers suddenly swooped down and delivered a determined attack upon them just before day broke. They got to the closest quarters, but the British gun, well-served with case, inflicted severer punishment upon them than they had expected, and, as at the same time the Potchefstroom troops turned back and took them in the rear, they were driven off in great confusion, having lost, if Kaffirs can be trusted, a large number of killed. The Yeomanry, according to letters from the front, "were running about all over the place, having no one to lead them." They lost more than a fourth of their strength—two killed and 16 wounded. Such disorder would be quite excusable in the case of irregular troops for the first time under fire. A second attack was delivered some hours later by the enemy, who seem to have been reinforced, at Rietfontein Drift, but the Boers were once more repulsed, this time with the help of a small detachment from the Ventersdorp garrison. The total loss of the British in these affairs was considerable—four men were killed and 33 wounded.

From Wolmaranstad, Colonel Williams' column marched back towards Klerksdorp, on the south side of the Vaal, clearing the country for about the twentieth time. That there should have been anything to clear is the mystery—a mystery which can only be explained by the supposition that previous clearances had been of the most perfunctory nature. On May 24 the column had a skirmish with a Boer commando under Van Rensburg, who was discovered moving about with a convoy. Thirteen waggons and a quantity of cattle were taken, but all the Boers and many of their waggons got away,



[Photo by Goldmann.]

COLONEL SIR HENRY SEYMOUR RAWLINSON, C.B.

Born 1864. Joined King's Royal Rifles, 1884; Captain, 1891; transferred to Coldstream Guards, 1892; Major, 1899; Lieut.-Colonel, 1899; A.D.C. to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, 1885-90. Served with the Burmese Expedition, 1886-7, as A.D.C. to Sir F. Roberts; Brigade-Major, Aldershot, 1895-8; in the Sudan Campaign, 1898; D.A.A.G., Egypt, 1898; D.A.A.G., Natal, 1899; A.A.G., South Africa, October, 1899; Colonel, commanding a column South Africa, May, 1901.

which shows that the British were still not mobile enough to overtake slow-moving ox-teams. On the 27th, this or another commando was once more encountered, again with a convoy, and another opportunity was afforded the British of showing their mobility. The enemy were sighted on the south side of the Vaal, at Leeuwboord. They made the most desperate efforts to escape, deploying a strong rear-guard to delay to the utmost the British advance, and behind it they urged their waggons to Koodoos Drift, intending to cross the Vaal. The drift, however, like most of those in South Africa, was difficult to negotiate, with only a steep and bad track down to it, and a sandy bottom in which the teams and waggons sank when the water was reached. In such a place the Boers, despite all their marvellous skill in handling waggons, were likely, amidst the confusion and panic of their endeavours to get away, to find their

Action at Koodoos Drift.



FRIENDLY ENEMIES: CAPTIVE YEOMEN ENTERTAINING THEIR CAPTORS.

Two men belonging to the 28th Company of the Imperial Yeomanry, engaged in police duty near Johannesburg, became friendly with the family of a Field-Cornet away on commando. He, however, one day surprised them as they were being regaled with coffee. Shots were exchanged, the Field-Cornet was hit in the arm, and the house becoming quickly surrounded by Boers, escape for the Yeomen seemed impossible. The wife, however, so effectually pleaded for the captives, on the ground of their previous kindness and consideration, that they were released, minus arms and ammunition. Before leaving they entertained their captors with music. The incident quaintly illustrates the anomalies of warfare.

train of cumbrous vehicles jammed. This was exactly what happened. The British speedily drove in the enemy's rear-guard and drew close to the drift. Though the banks of the drift were lined with Boer sharp-shooters, they strove in vain to hold the advancing troops off from the seething mass of waggons in the river-bed below. Knowing that any treacherous trick could be practised with impunity upon the British, and that our forbearance was almost inexhaustible, the enemy poured in a hail of

Boers fire from behind women and children.

bullets from behind waggons which were crowded with Boer women and children, and the British troops were directed to withhold their fire, so that the Boers were able to shoot our men down without themselves running any kind of danger. Certainly no foreign troops would under such circumstances have forborne to reply, and consideration for our own men might have dictated the returning of the enemy's fire. If the Boers had no regard for their own non-combatants, they could not legitimately expect us to show any.



THE BOERS FIRING FROM BEHIND THEIR WOMEN.

A. C. Ball

On the further bank of the drift, however, there were no women, and the British fire was directed with effect upon the Boers who showed themselves in that quarter. A "Pom-pom" was brought into action, and its shells proved more than the enemy could stand. The Boers began to bolt to the north side of the river, leaving their waggons and women to be taken by the British. In all, 30 waggons, 24 prisoners, and 6,200 rounds of ammunition

**Capture of waggons
by the British.**

fell into our hands. There were the usual reports of fabulous Boer losses, to which, however, no importance can be attached. That the enemy did suffer considerably is obvious, yet only two of their wounded were captured. On the way back to Klerksdorp a number of Boers surrendered, among them Commandant Potgieter, a man of some distinction and influence.

During these operations a column under

**General Dixon's
movements.**

General Dixon had been engaged in the country to the west of Krugersdorp, preventing the enemy from retiring to the north, building blockhouses, establishing posts, and removing the forage and supplies from the Boer farms that yet remained tenanted. The district which General Dixon patrolled was, in the words of Mr. Wallace, the *Daily Mail* correspondent, "of that deceptive character which has so often been responsible for

minor disasters, a grassy undulating plain, where waving grasses veil yawning dongas, and the apparently flat plain is scarred and seamed with sluits and waterways, where a whole command might ride parallel to the column which is pursuing it and remain undetected." This country had been for months the especial haunt of the burghers who followed De la Rey and Kemp and Smuts. It had been the scene of perpetual skirmishing, and no British commander could pass through it, when the Boers were in an aggressive mood, without having as much fighting as he desired.



CLEARING THE MAGALIESBERG.

There were considerable "finds" of hidden arms and ammunition in this district (p. 530).

[After a sketch by Sydney P. Hall, M.V.O.]

